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HISTORIC CHRISTIANITY AND THE SOCIAL
QUESTION.

Coincident with the spread and organization of the Christian Church in the Roman Empire there arose in the minds of the more enlightened of its rulers the thought that a new and by no means negligible factor in the social and political affairs of mankind had made its appearance. Since that time the significance to society of a well-organized church has been a subject of thought and concern to reformers of all stripes as well as to rulers. Decius, one of the most statesmanlike of the third century emperors, "would more patiently and tolerantly hear that a rival prince was raised up against himself than that a priest of God was established (bishop) at Rome."¹ A recent author writing of a period sixty years later says: "It is idle to ask whether the Church would have triumphed even apart from Constantine. Some Constantine or other would have had to come upon the scene. Only, as one decade succeeded another it would be all the easier for anyone to be that Constantine."² From the day that Constantine took the momentous step here referred to until the present, no great figure in the political history of Europe has found it possible to ignore Christianity. All the Justinians, Charlemagnes and Napoleons, have sought to find some place for it in their schemes of government where it might strengthen their authority. As

¹Cyprian, Ep. LV, 9.²Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity*, Vol. II, p. 334.

long as the old conceptions regarding society and the state prevailed, and while rulers were considered to hold their powers by divine right or popular suffrage, the question of adjustment was comparatively simple.

Because of the development of the science of Economics in recent times, new ideas have gained currency not only concerning the character and constitution of society and the state, but of the origin of Christianity and its place and influence in history. The Transcendentalists, the Positivists, the Evolutionists all propounded their Philosophies of History and according to their respective principles explained or eliminated Christianity as a factor in progress. The attitude of the scholars who represented these various schools was always more or less academic and they were not compelled to trouble themselves regarding the fate of their theories if they eliminated the Christian religion. To the upholders of the Economic Interpretation of History who are for the most part propagandists as well as philosophers, the problem presents itself in a different light. They cannot fail to be aware that Christianity, though apparently in eclipse in some quarters, is a force that must still be reckoned with and that the socialist Decius of to-day may be succeeded by the socialist Constantine of to-morrow. Hence it is that while there are some who find in economic causes the sufficient key and explanation to early Christian history,³ others less hostile, but perhaps not consistently with a strict interpretation of their own philosophy carry Christianity bodily to the socialistic camp, proclaiming that it was socialistic in its origin and in its early and uncorrupted days, and that the Christian fathers aiming at perfection in life and conduct gave expression to principles which contain the very essence of socialistic doctrine. The position of those who represent this moderate school of opinion is clearly stated by Gustave Le Bon. "During the first two or three centuries of our era the Christian religion was the socialism of the poor, of the *deshérités*, of the malcontents, and like modern socialism, it was in constant conflict with estab-

³ Kautsky, *Der Ursprung des Christentums*, Stuttgart, 1908.

lished institutions. Christian socialism triumphed, and for the first time socialistic ideas obtained a notable victory.”⁴ How the fruits of this victory were lost and how this triumphant socialism abandoned its principles and its conquest, the author explains by saying it went the way of all successful revolutions: the acquisition of power and wealth produced conservatism and Catholic Rome pursued ideals not much different from those of the Rome of the Emperors.

It is useless to multiply citations on this point. The same or similar statements are found in the writings of many authors who have no socialistic leanings, and, except in a few cases, one does not get the impression that the writers are giving the result of their own explorations in the field of patristic literature. For this, however, they are scarcely to be blamed as the field is large and there are not many documents to be found there which deal professedly with things economic.

In discussing the attitude adopted towards society by the Christians, it will not be necessary as a preliminary to say anything regarding the principles of interpretation according to which socialistically-minded investigators find in the facts of Christian history the results of the working of economic causes. The problem can be stated in such a manner as to make a discussion of this sort unnecessary. In order that the point at issue may appear clear it is well to bear in mind that the Christian religion was first practiced in an alien and hostile environment, that after a long period of trial it triumphed and was finally associated with the civil authority in the hegemony of western civilization. During this long period numbers of earnest men strove by word and deed to give Christian standards of conduct the fullest expression. Remembering this the question may be asked: Were the ideals of Christian life advocated and practised by those leaders in the church of such a nature as to deserve being considered revolutionary of the existing social and political order, or would a society founded on such lines possess the characteristics advocated by the upholders of the modern socialistic or communistic idea?

⁴ *Psychologie du Socialisme*, Paris, 1898, p. 12.

In attempting to find an answer to this question it is advisable to follow the lines laid down by all historians who have dealt with the question, and to make a sharp distinction between the attitude taken by the Christians in the Roman world before Constantine's Edict of Toleration, while they were felons before the law, and their attitude towards society and the state after they had ceased to labor under the disabilities removed by that edict.

Without attempting, therefore, either to discuss the Teaching of Our Lord on social questions or entering into any criticism of the principles of Socialism itself and striving solely to bring out with some degree of clearness what the attitude of Christians towards society was prior to the rise of organized socialism, it will be necessary in the first place to define their relation to existing conditions while paganism was still the religion of the state: to discuss their attitude at this time towards property, and wealth, and finally to attempt to ascertain whether the ascetical doctrines of individual perfection so freely advocated in the early church can be said to have had any influence as a social or economic force.

In the period after the Peace of the Church the investigation presents an entirely different aspect. Christianity in a short time superseded paganism as the religion of the State, asceticism found expression in organized monasticism, and the doctrines of faith and rules of conduct were gradually systematized and found expression in the great works of the Scholastics. Hence the most summary discussion of this subject will fall under six heads:—

1. Early Christianity and the then existing political structure.
2. The teaching of the Pre-Constantinian Church on Property and Wealth.
3. Asceticism as a social force.
4. The Economic aspects of organized monasticism.
5. The Church-Fathers on Property and Wealth.
6. Scholastic Theology as represented in St. Thomas and the Social Question.

I.

EARLY CHRISTIANITY AND THE THEN EXISTING POLITICAL
STRUCTURE.

The special difficulties which are met with in attempting to arrive at a just estimate of the attitude taken by the early Christians towards the civilization by which they were surrounded come from two causes. In the first place the words of many Christian writers of the period are to be taken as expressing ideals rather than actual conditions, and in the second place the conditions such as we find them can at best represent only very inadequately the views of the faithful, who, could neither regulate the policy of the government which was striving to annihilate them, nor in despite of the government establish a social system in keeping with their own convictions. Nevertheless the Christians did have definite social ideals which found expression in their lives and which brought them into conflict with their rulers. From the character of this conflict as well as from their words and actions, we shall be enabled to judge whether the Christians under the rule of the pagan Cæsars deserved the epithets of rebel and innovator.

It is well at the outset to avoid a fundamental mistake made by some, who, attempting to gauge the character of Christian moral precepts, insist on their purely individualistic character. It is true that Christ required from all His followers personal perfection, but His prescriptions did not stop there, He required from them also fraternal relations, and it would be closing one's eyes on the plain truths of history to pretend that a great and profound social upheaval was not wrought in the world by the spread of the Gospel. To have stopped short at the individual and to have provided him with a higher form of religion and a more perfect code of individual morality, would have been only a partial reformation, if even that. The ancient world needed a social and economic as well as a reli-

gious and moral transformation and to have succeeded in bringing about a change so desirable is not the least of the achievements of Christianity.

It is one of the commonplaces of history that this transformation was not effected without bloodshed, but it is also one of the paradoxes of history that the Christian martyrs even though they effected a social revolution for which they paid with their lives were not political rebels in the strict sense of the word, nor in the slightest degree disloyal to the government which persecuted them. How this can be true and how the Christians can deserve credit for having elevated the tone of social and economic affairs in the Empire will be clear from an analysis of the causes which led to the struggle between them.

Stated in the briefest possible terms the causes of conflict and the insuperable obstacle to unity of action between the Christians and the pagans arose from their radically different concepts of religion and morality. The Christians believed in One God and looked on Polytheism and idolatry as supreme objects of reprobation, and they placed the goal of all effort in the attainment of moral perfection. Those fundamental differences touched every sphere of activity, and led, inevitably, to friction and violence. Paganism was in possession. It had penetrated every department of effort and colored every phase of life. Not only was public life inextricably bound up with the customs and rites of paganism, but domestic and social affairs were interwoven with constantly recurring acts of idolatry. Its symbols were everywhere, and the omnipresent statues gave constant pretexts for superstitious observances over and above the many formal sacrifices, libations and banquets which formed part of the national cult. Because of this widespread diffusion of paganism not only were many occupations closed to Christians, but it was impossible for them to participate in the social life and recreations of their neighbors. Tertullian though perhaps a rigorist, does not exaggerate in his treatise *De Idololatria* the difficulties and scruples which Christian carpenters, workers in stucco or gold or brass, joiners, slaters,

painters and engravers would frequently experience in the practice of their different trades. So, too, not only was it considered incompatible with the profession of Christianity to be an actor or a gladiator or a lanista, but it was forbidden to attend the theatre, the pantomimes and public spectacles,⁵ because of "the way the whole business of the shows was dependent on idolatry." (*Ex idololatria universam spectaculorum paraturam constare. Tert., De Spec., iv.*) For the same reason because of their connection with idolatry public banquets and frequently private festivals were repugnant to the Christian conscience.⁶

On the other hand the high moral aspirations of the Christians and their adherence to the requirements of their religion raised insuperable barriers between them and their pagan neighbors. It was impossible to condone the private and family life of the heathen, their utter absorption in degrading and vicious amusements, their disregard for the marriage tie, and their practices of infanticide, abortion and other unspeakable vices and crimes.

Thus by the very nature of their beliefs and practices the Christians were cut off from free intercourse with their neighbors in even the most ordinary affairs of daily life. It was impossible that such an attitude of aloofness could pass unnoticed and the resentment which it aroused found expression in frequently repeated accusations and assaults. The mob at all times easily finds reasons for violence, and the shocking tales which gained currency among the common people were repeated even by such men as Fronto of Cirta,⁷ the teacher of Marcus Aurelius. The Christians were denounced as "skulking and shunning the light, silent in public but garrulous in corners."⁸ They were spoken of as outcasts⁹ who led gloomy and joyless lives,¹⁰ whose language was barbarous,¹⁰ who hated

⁵Minucius Felix, Oct., XII. Novatian, *De Spectaculis*, *passim*.

Lactantius, *Instil.*, VI, 20-21. Arnobius, *Adv. Gent.*, IV, 35.

⁷His arguments are very probably to be found in the *Octavius* of Minucius Felix.

⁸Minucius Felix, *Octavius*, 8.

⁹Tertullian, *Ad Nat. cii.* Min. Fel., *Ibid.*

¹⁰Theoph. ad Autoly., I.

science and knowledge,¹¹ who belonged to a secret society into which they were initiated by the slaughter and blood of an infant, and who at their meetings were guilty of the most revolting acts of lewdness and uncleanness.¹²

Though these stories were picked up in the gutter, the fact that the apologists find it necessary constantly to refute them or others like them is clear evidence not only of the frequency with which they were repeated, but of the wide currency which they had obtained. In every case the accusations were met with blank denial and a challenge to prove that they contained a scintilla of truth. "You take no pains," says Tertullian, *Apol.*, chap. VII, "to elicit the truth of what we have been so long accused. Either bring, then, the matter to the light of day if you believe it, or give it no credit as having never inquired into it."

One striking thing in connection with this campaign of ridicule and villification is that the Christians were never called on to answer to a charge of disloyalty on the part of any of their body. Among the charges so industriously circulated against them they were never called rebels. So far, indeed, were the Emperors of the second century from considering that the accusations and attacks made on the Christians had any bearing on their loyalty as Roman citizens that Trajan, who would not for political reasons allow a company of firemen to be organized in Bithynia, ordered the Legate of that province not to go to the trouble of seeking out the Christians. The same course was followed by Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, who while far from wishing to protect the Christians did not think it necessary to take special steps to hunt them down. In fact the regulations they imposed on the governors of the provinces unquestionably tended to suppress mob violence against the Christians.

Superstition and hatred, however, prevailed over law and prudence. The ignorance of the people saw in the inundations of the Tiber, in the failure of the Nile to overflow its banks,

¹¹ Orig., *Contra Celsum*, III, 75.

¹² Min. Felix., *Oct.*, 9. Tertull., *Apol.*, I.

in the famines, wars and pestilence, manifestations of the anger of the gods because the Christians were tolerated, and the prudent reserve of magistrates and emperors was powerless in the face of popular fear and fury. The Christians were thrown to the beasts: but even then they could find safety by abjuring their faith, which is a resource not usually at the disposal of those who are accused of being enemies of the established order, political or social.

Even when brought before the tribunals the Christians were charged not with rebellion or disaffection of any sort, but with Atheism and Hatred of the Human Race. Atheism in the sense in which it was here employed meant, not that the Christians denied God, but that they refused to worship the gods of Rome. This charge unquestionably assumed somewhat of a political character when the test proposed to the Christians was that of doing homage to the Emperor as God. Without going into any discussion of the real motive of this imperial cultus or whether it would have been possible for the Christians to have made some compromise on this point in the interest of Roman imperial unity, they as a matter of fact absolutely repudiated Cæsar worship, being guided not by hostility to the ruler or the state but rather by their hatred of idolatry and state despotism in matters of religion.

The other charge, *Odium generis humani*, though perhaps not so frequently resorted to, was also political in import. It did not mean misanthropy or murderous anarchy but failure to conform fully to Roman standards of civilization. How far this was from constituting a proof of disloyalty was clear to the Christians themselves, who, conscious of their lack of sympathy with the institutional life around them, knew whence this discord arose and found in the cause to which they assigned it only additional evidence of their loyalty and devotion. "What the soul is in the body, that are Christians in the world. The soul is dispersed through all the members of the body, and Christians are scattered through all the cities of the world. The soul dwells in the body, yet is not of the body; and Christians dwell in the world, yet are not of the world.

The invisible soul is guarded by the visible body, and Christians are known indeed to be in the world but their godliness remains invisible. The flesh hates the soul and wars against it, though itself suffering no injury, because it is prevented from enjoying pleasures; the world also hates the Christians though in nowise injured, because they abjure pleasures. The soul loves the flesh and members that hate it, Christians likewise love those that hate them. The soul is imprisoned in the body yet preserves that very body; and Christians are confined in the world as in a prison, and yet they are the preservers of the world." ¹³

That the action of the Roman authorities in persecuting the Christians offers no argument for questioning their absolute fidelity to the prevailing political and economic system is clear in the first place from the fact that all legislation against them found its root in sectarian animosity; that the innovations in matters of religion by many of the emperors themselves showed that even the rulers did not consider that the elimination of the old and the introduction of new deities endangered the Roman constitution: and finally because even at the time when anti-Christian feeling was bitterest, as during the third century, it was possible to abolish all tests and establish a *modus vivendi* which might easily have been made permanent.

Turning then to the other phase of the question we find the most overwhelming evidence that the Christians not only had no feeling of opposition to the Empire but that they prided themselves on their loyalty and their willingness to bear their share of the public burdens. In a passage as eloquent as the famous plea of Shylock, Tertullian says: "We are not Indian Brahmins or Gymnosophists, who dwell in woods and exile themselves from ordinary human life. We do not forget the debt of gratitude we owe to God our Lord and Creator; we reject no creature of His hands, though certainly we exercise restraint upon ourselves. So we sojourn with you in the world, abjuring neither forum, nor shambles, nor bath, nor booth, nor workshop, nor inn, nor weekly market, nor any other places of

¹³ *Epistola ad Diognetum*, Chap. VI.

commerce. We sail with you and fight with you, and till the ground with you; and in like manner we unite with you in your traffickings—even in the various arts we make public property of our works for your benefit But if I do not frequent your religious ceremonies, I am still on the sacred day a man.”¹⁴

Far from regarding the existence of the Empire as being in any way inimical to the interests of Christianity, the feeling among the faithful was that one was the necessary complement and sustaining adjunct of the other. With a political insight almost prophetic Melito of Sardis could say to the Emperor Marcus, while the Church was still feebly struggling for existence, that it was the sole power capable of sustaining the state. “For our philosophy having sprung up among the nations under thy rule during the great reign of thy ancestor Augustus, it became to thine empire especially a blessing of auspicious omen. For from that time the power of the Romans has grown in greatness and splendor. To this power thou hast succeeded, as the desired possessor, and such thou shalt continue with thy son, if thou guardest the philosophy which grew up with the Empire and which came into existence with Augustus. . . . And a most striking proof that our doctrine flourished for the good of an empire happily begun, is this—that there has no evil happened since Augustus’ reign, but that on the contrary, all things have been splendid and glorious in accordance with the prayers of all.”¹⁵ The same thought is more strongly expressed by Tertullian who thinks the great shock impending over the whole earth is only retarded by the continued existence of the Roman Empire.¹⁶

It is not surprising, therefore, seeing that the Christians

¹⁴ *Apology*, Chap. 42.

¹⁵ *Apology*, *apud Eus.*, *His. Eccles.*, iv, 26-7.

¹⁶ *Apol.* Chaps. 32 and 39. See also, Hippolytus in *Dan.*, iv, 9, who does not take such a favorable view of the universal character of this Empire. The most important text on this subject is that of Origen, *Adv. Celsum*, iii, xxix, xxx, which is unfortunately too long to be cited here. The great Alexandrian takes a view of the political importance of the Christian Church which was valid not only for Rome but for all time.

entertained such views not only on government in general but regarding the Roman Empire in particular, that we find them constantly repeating the apostle's injunction "let every soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power but from God: and those that are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God." ¹⁷ No command is more explicitly inculcated in the Christian writings than this. Kings must be obeyed because their power is from above.¹⁸ Civil authority is from God,¹⁹ and civic allegiance knows no exception only when conscience is violated.²⁰

Civic allegiance to those persecuted witnesses of the Christian faith meant something more than lip-service. It was an obligation of conscience imposed on them by their faith. Hence, we find them in all sincerity offering prayers for their rulers and the welfare of the state. That the subject was one which frequently occupied their thoughts is shown by the frequency with which it recurs in the writings of the time. More fully than any other author does Tertullian set forth the attitude taken by the Christians to their rulers. "We offer prayers for the safety of our princes to the eternal, the true, the living God, whose favor beyond all others, they must themselves desire. . . . We offer prayers without ceasing for all our Emperors; we pray for life prolonged; for security to the Empire; for protection to the imperial house; for brave armies, a faithful senate, a virtuous people, the world at rest, whatever, as man or Caesar, an Emperor would wish."²¹ That prayers for the rulers formed part of the regular liturgical service of the Christians is clearly testified further on: "We meet together as an assembly and congregation, that, offering up prayer to God as with united force, we may wrestle with Him in our supplications. We pray, too, for the Emperors, for their ministers and for all in authority, for the welfare of the world, for the prevalence of peace, for the delay of the final consummation."²² Time after time Tertullian returns to the same

¹⁷ Rom., XIII, 12.

¹⁸ Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.*, v, 24.

²¹ *Apol.*, Chap. XXX.

¹⁹ Athenagoras, *Legatio*, XVIII.

²⁰ Theophilus ad Autolycum, XI.

²² *Ibid.*, Chap. XXXIX.

theme. "A Christian is enemy to none, least of all to the Emperor of Rome, whom he knows to be appointed by his God, and so cannot but love and honor, and whose well-being, moreover, he must needs desire, with that of the empire over which he reigns so long as the world shall stand—for so long as that shall Rome continue."²³ He sums up the situation by saying: "On valid grounds I might say Cæsar is more ours than yours, for our God has appointed him. Therefore as having this property in him, I do more than you for his welfare . . . because in keeping the majesty of Cæsar within due limits, and putting it under the Most High, and making it less than divine, I commend him the more to the favor of deity, to whom alone I make him inferior."²⁴ Proscription and persecution did not cause the Christians to waver in those sentiments of loyalty and devotion, and serene in their confidence of carrying out a divine behest, they prayed in times of adversity as well as of peace. "Pray," says Polycarp, "for kings and potentates, and princes."²⁵ "Night and day," says Cyprian to the persecutor Demetrian, "we pour forth our prayers for your peace and salvation."²⁶

Though fully conscious of their ability successfully to defy the government, the Christians never sought to be revenged for the sufferings they were made to undergo, nor revolted against lawful authority. "If we desired," said Tertullian, "to act the part of open enemies, not merely of secret avengers, would there be any lacking in strength, whether of numbers or resources."²⁷ This feeling of loyalty and subjection was so deeply ingrained in the Christian conscience that we find the martyrs at the moment of their condemnation not only not expressing any desire for retaliation or revenge for their sufferings, but praying for the welfare and safety of their rulers.²⁸

²³ *Ad Scapulam*, Chap. 11.

²⁴ *Apol.*, Chap. xxxiii.

²⁵ *Ep. ad Phillippians*, Chap. 12.

²⁶ *Ad Demetrianum*, Chap. xx. See also Clem. Rom., *Ep. ad Cor.*, 60-61. Minucius Felix, *Oet.*, xxix. Tertull. *Scorpiace*, xiv. Origen, *Contra Cel.*, vii, 65.

²⁷ *Apol.*, Chap. 37. *Ad Scapulam*, Chap. 5.

²⁸ See *Passio SS. Scilitanorum*. *Passio Perpetuæ et Felicitatis*, Chap. vii. *Acta Proconsularia S. Cypriani*, Chap. 11.

Finally, there is no test by which loyalty and civic virtue can be judged, that will condemn the Christians of the pre-Constantinian period. They paid their taxes promptly and without complaint. "And everywhere we, more readily than all men, endeavor to pay to those appointed by you the taxes both ordinary and extraordinary, as we have been taught by Him: for at the time some came to Him and asked Him, if one ought to pay tribute to Cæsar, He answered . . . Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and to God the things that are God's." ²⁹ "Does the sovereign order the payment of tribute" says Tatian. "I am ready to render it." ³⁰ Tertullian insists that the Christians had the same scruples against defrauding the government of its revenue that they had against practising dishonesty against their own brethren.³¹

In addition to bearing their due share of the burden of taxation and contributing to the support of the government the Christians gave still further evidence of the sincerity of their professions of loyalty by the large share they took in the administrative affairs of the government. There were many reasons why they should have had no part in public life. Their ranks were recruited largely, but by no means exclusively, from among the poor and lowly, and their faith was a bar to any participation whatsoever in idolatrous rites. Public life in pagan Rome was completely interwoven with polytheistic practices, and because of this officials of all grades were constantly called on in the exercise of their duties to perform acts of idol worship. Senators, Consuls, Praetors, Questors were all bound by the same regulations and could not, except at the risk of denunciation, avoid sharing in pagan worship or providing feasts or games or gladiatorial shows in honor of the gods. In many cases especially as regards provincial governors they were charged with the maintenance of the temples. These and other considerations unquestionably caused many Christians to withdraw from public life. "We are not all from the lowest class if we do refuse your honors and your purple robes," was the answer of

²⁹ Justin, I. *Apol.*, Chap. xvii.

³⁰ Adv. Graecos, v.

³¹ *Apol.*, Chap. 42.

Minucius Felix to those who accused the Christians of being poor and outcasts.³²

Despite the great dangers involved in holding public office some means were devised by which a compromise was adopted or by which Christians were saved from violating their convictions. Even Turtullian declares himself in favor of the practice under certain conditions. "And so let us grant that it is possible for any one to succeed in coming forward with the mere title of the office without either sacrificing or lending the sanction of his presence to a sacrifice, without farming out the supply of sacrificial victims; not assigning to others the care of temples; not looking after their tributes; not giving spectacles at his own or the public charge; or presiding at such spectacles; proclaiming or announcing no ceremony, without taking any oaths; . . . supposing all that to be possible then there is no reason why a Christian should not be an official."³³

Notwithstanding these difficulties and restrictions we find that from the earliest days there was an ever increasing number of the faithful who devoted themselves to the service of the state, to say nothing of the large number of Christians to be found at court, the Cæsarians.³⁴ There were consuls, like Acilius Glabrio and Flavius Clemens, senators like Apollonius, Curiales, Magistrates and people of "every order," as Pliny says, so that Tertullian's boast that the Christians were filling the camp, the town council, the palace, the Senate, the Forum,³⁵ was more than idle rhetoric. If all other evidence should fail we have sufficient proof of the extent to which the Christians had gained admission to the public service from the Edict issued by Valerian in 258. More clearly than a mere enumeration of names or numbers this edict ordering that "Senators and prominent men and Roman knights should be stripped of their property," proves how numerous Christian public officials were in the middle of the third century. Less than half a century later, as we learn from Eusebius,³⁶ "The Em-

³² Octavius, Chap. XXXI.

³⁴ Harnack, *Mission and Expansion*, Vol. II, p. 48.

³⁵ *Apol.*, Chap. XXXVII.

³³ *De Idololatria*, 17.

³⁶ *H. E.*, VIII, I.

perors trusted Christians with provinces to govern and exempted them from the duty of offering sacrifice," and in one town in Phrygia at the same time all the inhabitants and all the magistrates were Christians.

Finally the supreme evidence of good citizenship and fidelity to Roman institutions was that afforded by the manner in which Christianity permeated the army.³⁷ There more than elsewhere in the public service a Christian would be exposed to the danger of apostasy. Because of this and because of the large number of Christians in the army there was proposed for the consideration of Christian moralists the question whether a Christian could consistently be a soldier. Rigorists, like Tertullian and Origen and Lactantius, might find some incompatibility between military service and Christian faith, but their protests were unavailing, and Christians were found in all the legions. In fact so numerous were they that at one time they were exempted from the duty of sacrifice,³⁸ and later made the object of a special edict of persecution. Their fidelity to the Empire was shown by the fact that though frequently tried they never revolted and their faith was attested by the frequency with which they laid down their lives in its defence. No class produced more martyrs than the army.

Thus viewing the early history of the Christians under every relation in which they stood to the state and society, we may conclude that they never dreamt of destroying or even changing the existing social and political structure. No word of protest was raised against the forms of government, except in so far as these favored polytheism and immorality. The constitution of Rome did not of itself impose any burdens on the Christians, they were content with it and never gave any indication of a desire to withdraw and establish a separate state.

If the Christians were innovators it was because they insisted on a more rigid observance of the law, because they taught a higher citizenship, and because they strove to eliminate the very evils which called forth the denunciations of even

³⁷ Harnack, *Militia Christi in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten*, 1906.

³⁸ Eusebius, H. E., VIII, 6-8.

pagan satirists and publicists. By the spread of the Gospel a profound and far-reaching reform was effected, but it was brought about within the old political and economic framework. The office which Constantine filled did not differ from that of his predecessors because he assumed the protectorate of the Church. No constitutional change can be attributed to the triumph of Christianity. Everything went on as before, except that the pure worship of the Church had driven out the disgraceful orgies associated with the pagan Pantheon; that faith had supplanted philosophy as the guide of conduct, and that human life had received a new value. Membership in this new kingdom was not restricted to the poor, nor were the faithful of those days antimilitarists nor committed to the Tolstoyan doctrine of non-resistance. They took up the burdens of citizenship just as they found them, and if they strove to remedy existing ills, these were religious not political, moral not economic. Hence it can be nothing but a perversion of the plainest truths of history to see in the conduct of the early Christians anything that can in the slightest degree be regarded as a socialist movement against the then prevailing economic or political conditions.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

ST. THOMAS AND THE WILL TO BELIEVE.

History has often witnessed the splitting up of a movement of thought into opposing factions. It is almost an established law that any idea, any system, any school, has, from its very inception, the germs of its own dissolution. Division is followed by division till the power of the system is exhausted and it gradually loses its hold upon the present and sinks back into the history of the past. What is true of single systems and schools of thought holds also of eras which last through centuries. Great minds are followed by little minds, till over vast areas and through the little rivulets of a delta, the rushing torrents which came from the high levels of a noble past are lost in the low plains of an effete and stagnant century. So it was with Grecian Philosophy. Such too was the fate of Middle Age Scholasticism. None other need be expected by the glorious era of modern research, although its truths and those with which men built their faulty systems in ages past are eternal.

Already there has appeared a dualism, evident indeed of growth, but the presage of future decay. This dualism has appeared in spite of the bright hope of unity which the modern method of observation seemed to hold out. Observation, the final test of validity, has done much to unify results in science, but it is not a method of universal application. The general introduction of this method distinguishes the modern era from the old. Even the beginnings of the humanistic movement were due to the craving of men to see and observe for themselves the glories of antiquity. The yearning to observe soon extended beyond the domain of letters, and has not ceased to characterize the modern era, since Galileo looked at the satellites of Jupiter with his telescope and Vesalius turned from the text-book of Galen to study the human body. How could it be that such a method would ever lead to divided and contradictory results? Do not all those who see with normal eyes

see alike? To some extent they do, and were it not that it is the man who sees and not his eye, were it not also that there are different classes of men, all would see alike, and our method of observation would lead everywhere to perfect agreement. Unfortunately, however, there is a class of men that claim they see all that can be seen and what remains will never be seen. Another class holds right stoutly that all things visible can be seen. Nothing more is seen because there is nothing more to be seen. Here, then, is the dualism of the modern world, which is at once a witness to its growth and the warning of its future disintegration. Religion fares ill on each side of the divided field. If she turns to the former, she finds her proffered offerings relegated to the dark shadows of the unknowable. And if, leaving that ground, she goes to the latter, her choicest gifts are snatched from her by ruthless and unthinking hands who tear in pieces what they cannot understand. One class of men say certain knowledge about the higher truths is impossible. The other would explain our entire religious life by the same laws of motion whereby they hope to make the whole universe fall under the sway of some all-embracing mathematical equation.

Both these positions are difficulties of reasoning, one in excess, the other in defect. Both are rooted in the fundamental assumptions of the modern era, that every phenomenon must be explained by Galileo's laws of motion. Neither one nor the other can be harmonized with Faith, which is built upon the possibility of a moral obedience and involves the concept of a liberty that transcends the mechanism of the Universe.

Science is constructed out of the sensible, palpable world. Its object has been prosecuted since the formation of the laws of motion with an ever increasing success. Its methods have been applied, not to nature alone, but to every branch of human learning, until now no student can touch a piece of research who does not feel that there is imposed upon him the fundamental assumption of the age. What is that assumption? It is this: Every phenomenon can be explained by mechanical law. If any occurrence seems to escape such an explanation, it is

either falsely recorded or its interpretation is impossible for lack of data.

It is easily seen that our Christian religion cannot stand on the same ground with this assumption. Clip and prune the legends of the Saints as much as you will. Cut away from the deposit of Faith all the accretions of centuries till only that which is certainly *de fide* remains. It will still be evident that Christianity and any universal mechanical theory are incompatible and forever irreconcilable. Granting that such an assumption were true, where then would be the provident care of a loving God for His children who labor on earth? What then would become of the central doctrine of our religion, the Incarnation of God, the Virgin Birth of our Lord, his miracles and his glorious Resurrection? Where would be our moral freedom and that superiority to temptation which endows our character with the transcendent perfection of triumph over sin?

Living as we do in the atmosphere of the age, the weight of this assumption bears heavily upon us. We cannot help feeling its pressure, and all unconsciously it works its way into our opinions—not by strength of reason, but by dint of its constant activity. For who has explained the universe of nature and of morals by any system of mechanism? Or who can hold out any serious hope that all things will be so explained? At the same time where is the religious minded man acquainted with modern research who has never felt the insistence of modern difficulties? Does it not happen at times that the mists of worldly disputes penetrate even into the sanctuary of the soul, enveloping our ideals in shadows, clouding the vision for a moment, obscuring, perhaps even eclipsing the glory that shines from the eternal Truth Who illumines our minds by the rays of Faith? Thus does God prove his servants. We suffer the sting of doubt, that through many tribulations we may enter at last into the Kingdom of Heaven.

It is only natural that we should look for aid and light on the problems that confront us. This we find all unconsciously in those about us who have the same burdens to bear and the same problems to solve. Their life and example work upon

us in proportion to the nobility of their being. In history we find the same source of consolation. All through its pages we meet with men who have been perplexed and puzzled as much and more than we have ever been. Their writings remain. The brilliancy of their genius still shines through the ages. The nobility of their endeavors still spurs their fellow men to higher things. The tide of their thought rolls on and bears us along with it to the happy shores of their haven in eternity.

From out this goodly company, rises preëminent the Angel of the Schools, St. Thomas Aquinas. None more sensitive than he to the insidious menace of worldly sophistry. With St. Paul he could say (*II Cor.*, xi, 29) "Who is weak and I am not weak? Who is scandalized and I am not on fire?" Such was his marvelous ability to give the utmost possible strength, in his statement of them, to the theories he combatted. And none more perenduring than he in his influence for good. For there are rivers that have no delta country. Like the majestic St. Lawrence of our Northern boundary their pellucid waters flow from the snows of their birthplace into the ocean, untainted and undiminished, because contained within banks of imperishable granite. Such has been the happy history of the example and doctrine of St. Thomas. Having for his teacher the Crucifix, his learning has merited perpetuation through God's indefectible Pillar and Ground of Truth, the Holy Catholic Church, whose devoted sons may always be trusted to give voice to his wisdom in every crisis of the world's thought.

The answer of St. Thomas to the riddle of belief is not transient, suited to the needs of one age and obsolete as soon as a generation has passed away. He did not merely reply to this or that question of his day, as one sophist might solve the difficulties of another. His was a higher task, his the work of a true Philosopher, the knowledge of things in their ultimate causes. His view of Faith aids us now with all the difficulties of modern science pressing upon us simply because it is the vision of its true essence made known in the light of revelation.

The doctrine of St. Thomas on Faith is founded upon the

perception of the profound psychological truth that the opinions of mankind are not solely determined by processes of formal logic. Scholasticism recognizes that the errors of human judgment do not come entirely from the intellect. A will that is subject to the impulses of its emotional life can lead the intellect into error.¹ The mind may be mistaken because of a lack of due attention to the grounds of its assent. Still, even in this case, if one would ask whence the hurried judgment, why is the mind made up before it has time to think, the answer must be because there is a desire to come to some conclusion and under the influence of emotion a hasty judgment is passed. If logic alone determined our conclusions, all men would think alike. Recognizing, as St. Thomas did, that as a matter of fact, the opinions of men are dependent on their emotions, it is not surprising for us to find that in his analysis of faith, the intellect is not the ultimate court of appeal. It is indeed the intellect that believes, for faith is but the beginning of that intellectual vision of God which will constitute our blessedness in Heaven. Even now God, the first Truth, shines upon our souls, producing the supernatural act of Faith as light gives rise to the vision of color, and as the demonstration effects in our minds the proper conclusion.² But we see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. (*I Cor.*, XIII, 12) "But vision is of the intellect, therefore faith as well."³

¹ Ex aliquo extrinseco ratio deficit, cum propter vires inferiores quae intense moventur in aliquid intercipitur actus rationis, ut non limpidè et firmiter suum iudicium de bono voluntate proponat.

Questiones Disputatae. De Veritate xxiv, § viii. corpus.

² Respondeo: Dicendum quod nihil subest alicui potentiae, vel habitui aut etiam actui, nisi mediante ratione formali objecti, sicut color videri non potest, nisi per lucem, et conclusio sciri non potest, nisi per medium demonstrationis. Dictum est autem quod ratio formalis objecti fidei est veritas prima, unde nihil potest cadere sub fide, nisi in quantum stat sub veritate prima, sub qua nullum falsum stare potest.

2. 2. Q. I, § iii.

³ Sed contra est quod fidei succedit visio patriae secundum illud primae ad Corin. 13. *Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate tunc autem facie ad faciem*; sed visio est in intellectu, ergo et fides.

2. 2. Q. iv, § ii.

Because the vision of Faith is as yet dark, its acts are not necessitated by the Divine Light which shines upon the soul. At the same time it is not the operations of the understanding which determine the assent of Faith. If so, Faith would no longer be Faith but knowledge. "The reasons," says St. Thomas, "which are brought forward by holy writers to prove those things which are of Faith are not demonstrations but certain persuasive arguments which show that what is taught by Faith is not impossible or they proceed from the principles of Faith."⁴ Since Faith cannot be logically proved by that which is of Faith, it would therefore follow that the act of Faith is not determined by the premises of the arguments⁵ by which it is supported, but that over and above the force of such arguments there must be another factor, distinct not only from the Divine action, but also from the operations of the understanding. This factor is not, however, the blind passions and emotions which urge on the intellect to hurried judgments when evidence is lacking. In the act of Faith the intellect is not dominated by sub-conscious mental processes, nor by the feelings which are so fruitful in error, but by the will, whose operations belong to that same high level of mental activity whereon the acts of the understanding reside in transcendence of the data of sense and the motions of desire and the cloudy regions of the passions. "The intellect of him who believes is not determined to assent by reason but by the will."⁶ In fact, it is because the will commands the intellect that Faith can be called a virtue in the strict sense of the word. "The intellect," says St. Thomas, "can be the subject of virtue properly so called, because of its relation to the will. In this way the speculative intellect or reason is the subject of Faith. For by the sway of the will the intellect is moved to assent to

⁴ 2. 2. Q. 1, § v ad 2.

⁵ Fides non habet inquisitionem rationis naturalis demonstrantis id, quod creditur, habet autem inquisitionem quandam eorum, per quae inducitur homo ad credendum, puta, quia sunt dicta a Deo et miraculis confirmata. . . . Intellectus credentis determinatur ad unum non per rationem sed per voluntatem. 2. 2. Q. 11. § i. ad. 1 et 3.

⁶ 2. 2. Q. 11, § i. ad 3.

those things which are of Faith. For no one believes unless he wants to." ⁷

Can it be that one who lays so much stress on the dignity of human reason, as does St. Thomas, holds that in what concerns most deeply the destiny of man the human mind may assent or not according as it wills? St. Thomas says, Yes. Is, then, St. Thomas a Pragmatist? In the current sense of the word, No. He does not say that men may legitimately believe anything they will and what they believe is true because they will it, but only that if they do believe it is not because they are forced by the evidence. Belief follows upon a choice which they are at perfect liberty to make. Our will to believe does not make that which we believe true. It simply determines our assent to a truth which exists independently of our belief, which was true before we believed and which always will be true whether we continue to believe or not. What is proposed for the assent of Faith, not only appears to us as true but also as supremely good. Therefore the will exercises its dominion over the hesitating intellect and commands it to assent. This, says St. Thomas,⁸ is the obedience of Faith by which every intellect is made captive to Christ. (*II Cor.*, x, 5.)

The temper of modern thought suggests the question: In what sense is this obedience of the intellect justifiable. One is likely to feel an aversion to the attitude of St. Thomas simply because of a confusion which may exist in the mind between emotion and will, desire and duty. But St. Thomas does not make the assent of Faith depend upon emotions and desires, as has already been pointed out. We do not, we should not, assent because of party prejudice, even though in so doing we are partisans of the Church Militant of God on earth.

The strength of the position held by St. Thomas concerning the obedience of Faith depends on his solution of a more fundamental problem: Is obedience ever free? St. Thomas approaches⁹ this difficulty by an appeal to fact. Freedom con-

⁷ 1. 2. Q. LVI. § iii. The last phrase is referred to St. Augustine (26 in Joann. super illud; *nemo potest venire*. tome 4) in *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate* XIV. § i. corpus C.

⁸ De Veritate XIV, § i, corpus.

⁹ 1. 2. Q. VI, § i.

sists in perceiving the end and accomplishing the act in virtue of the power that is resident in one's self.¹⁰ It is a fact of experience that some actions are accomplished by us in just this way. We exist in a social order. From this social order arise duties. Whatever may be our metaphysical theory of life, it is a fact that we perceive these duties and act in the light of the perception of an end revealed to us by reason.¹¹

We may pause here to consider an analogy between St. Thomas and Kant. Both arrive at the concept of freedom from similar points of view. St. Thomas points to the system of ends in which the human will finds itself *de facto* involved. Kant points to the concept of responsibility which arises from the duty (in Thomistic terminology, the end, *finis*) which each individual has to perform; for both alike, freedom is a necessary consequence of these fundamental concepts.

Returning to the thread of our argument, it becomes evident that if there are moral beings in the world, then the universe in its entirety is not a mechanical system. Side by side with the machinery of the cosmos there exists the moral order, and in this moral order live and move and have their being a race of free and responsible human agents. Their end, their duty, is the pursuit of goodness. From their existence the fact of moral goodness is immediately evident. This moral goodness does not exist in the abstract but always as something good. It is man's duty, therefore, to seek that which is good, and if the good, then the Highest Good. If man must seek the supreme goodness, and if the intellect manifests to him that which is supremely good, then he must choose it.

The intellect cannot stand in the way with the assumptions of its methods of research nor with objections based upon the universality of the mechanical law of nature, for this law is not universal. There is another and a higher law, a law which has paramount claims as a fact of experience, the law which

¹⁰ 1. 2. Q. 1, § 1.

¹¹ The entire discussion of the end of human actions and happiness (*beatitudo*) of man in the first questions of the *Prima Secundae* make these points abundantly evident.

lays an obligation upon its free and responsible subjects to see and understand the ultimate end of their existence in this world and to tend to that end by the exercise of powers inherent within themselves.¹² Such was the formulation in Scholastic terms of that which Kant in a later day termed the Categorical Imperative. By this demonstration of a moral order and a transcendental freedom St. Thomas gave centuries ago the essentials of the answer which is effective today against the assumption that nothing can be known with certainty except that which can be seen and tested within our laboratories.

Do what we may, we cannot get out of the complex system of the ends of human actions. As long as we are members of a social order we have duties to ourselves, to our fellow-men and to God. The pressure of human obligation upon a member of the social order is more insistent and weighs more heavily upon him than the logical assumptions of the age. The freedom which all this implies is the most certain of facts and it is irreconcilable with the system of materialism which those hold who think they can see and explain all things in terms of motion. At the same time it contradicts the Agnostic position that freedom and all such transcendental truths are unknown and forever unknowable. The certainty of freedom, on which the obedience of Faith rests, is the consolation which in our perplexities and doubts we receive from St. Thomas Aquinas.

One more idea is necessary for the fulness of the Thomistic concept of Faith. The act of will by which the intellect is commanded to assent is the same voluntary choice by which the soul cleaves to God in preference to all the things of this world.¹³ "There is a two-fold ultimate good of man," says St. Thomas, "which as a final end is the prime mover of the will. One is commensurate with human nature because the natural powers suffice to obtain it, and this is that happiness

¹² Cf. 1. 2. Q. vi. § i.

¹³ Manifestum est autem ex praedictis, quod actus fidei ordinatur ad objectum voluntatis, quod est bonum, sicut ad finem. Hoc autem bonum quod est finis fidei, scilicet bonum divinum, est proprium objectum charitatis: et ideo charitas dicitur forma fidei in quantum per charitatem actus fidei perficitur et formatur. 2. 2. Q. iv. § iii. Cor.

of which the Philosophers have spoken. . . . The other good of man surpasses the power of human nature because our natural strength does not suffice to obtain it—nor to conceive of it nor desire it. Only by the generosity of God is it promised to man.” (“Eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man what things God hath prepared for them that love Him.” *I Cor.*, *II*, 9.) This is eternal life and by this good the will is inclined to believe those things which it holds through Faith. Hence St. John (*VI*, 40) says: “He who sees the Son and believes in Him, he has eternal life.”¹⁴

There is no real break between the life of Faith and the Life Eternal, for “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not.” (*Heb.*, *XI*, 1.) The substance of things to be hoped for, because it is essentially the same as our blessedness in Heaven. “This is eternal life,” said Our Lord in the prayer for His disciples, “that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent.” (*St. John*, *XVII*, 3.) Already in the dark knowledge of Faith we have the substance of eternal Glory.

It is the evidence of things that appear not. It leads us to knowledge. Therefore it is evidence. But it does not demonstrate that which we believe, and so the doctrines of Faith are known, and still they appear not.

Deep is the spiritual import of this concept of faith, and consoling to him who loves God and spiritual things. As the soul grows in prayer it approaches nearer and nearer to eternal life. Its Faith grows ever stronger. A new vision is dawning within the mind. That which the powers of logic could never accomplish growth in spiritual perfection brings about with ease. The reason for this is, that the act by which the will commands the intellect to assent to that which is of Faith is the same act by which it consecrates itself to God. It follows, then, that anything, little or great, which interferes with the communion between our soul and God, to that extent is a weak-

¹⁴ *De Veritate* *XIV*. § *ii*. Corpus.

ening of the bond of Faith. "Therefore there are many infirm and weak among you, and many sleep." (*I Cor.*, xi, 30.)

Let us tarry no longer in things temporal that blind our vision and pass away and leave us wandering to and fro and carried about by every wind of doctrine (*Eph.*, iv., 14). Step by step with the fleeting moments of time we trudge on to the life beyond the grave. That life is inevitable. Let us then delay no longer with the makeshifts of the hour and the bewitching of trifling, but set out at once in the dim twilight of Faith along the road which leads to our Eternal Good, God, the First Truth Who quickens with hope the dark night of the soul.

THOMAS VERNER MOORE, C. S. P.

THE TENDENCY OF RECENT WORK ON THE SYNOPTIC PROBLEM.

Of late years an immense amount of labor has been expended on the Synoptic Problem, and though it may safely be said that no solution will ever claim the suffrages of the whole body of critics, it is yet certain that the thorough and painstaking investigations which are now occupying so many scholars cannot be without fruit. Confining ourselves to England we need only mention the names of such scholars as Wright, Hawkins, Stanton, Sanday, and Allen. All these have devoted a great deal of time to the examination of the Gospels with a view to arriving at some acceptable statement which shall embrace all the facts of the problem.

We are not going to discuss here ¹ the various theories which have been propounded; we wish rather to dwell upon one point in recent methods of investigation which calls, we think, for comment.

While earlier theories involving the elaboration of one or more 'Ur-Marcus' are on their way to extinction and the 'Requiem' of the 'Ur-Marcus' has been sung, there is an ever-growing consensus of opinion that our Second Gospel, viz., S. Mark in its present state, is the foundation of the First and Third Gospels. We hold no brief for or against this view, strong arguments on both sides can be brought forward; but we feel that the line of argument adduced in its support has of late taken a turn which is hardly in accord with sound principles of exegesis.

The argument in favor of the view that the present Second Gospel is the base of the First and Third rests on the minute and careful statistics published by Hawkins in his *Horae Synopticae*.² Scholars have freely availed themselves of the

¹ For a very compact summary of these, see Jackson: *The Present State of the Synoptic Problem*; Cambridge Biblical Essays, 1909.

² *Horae Synopticae*, Hawkins. Oxford. 2nd ed., 1909.

material thus accumulated and there is a tendency nowadays to regard the whole function of the commentator on S. Matthew as merged in that of the mere tabulator of the steps by which the First Gospel has absorbed into itself the Second. This is particularly noticeable in Mr. Allen's volume on S. Matthew in the *International Critical Commentary*.³ The opening words of the author's Introduction strike the note of the whole subsequent Commentary:—"Almost the entire substance of the second Gospel has been transferred to the first." In support of this Mr. Allen brings forward an immense amount of evidence covering pages xiii-xxxv of his Introduction. He concludes by saying:—

"It is hoped that the facts collected above will be sufficient to convince the reader that of the two Gospels, that of S. Mark is primary, that of S. Matthew secondary. They seem to point all in the same direction. That is to say, whilst it is not inconceivable that such changes should have been made by a later writer in the text of Mark, it is extremely improbable that the author of the second Gospel should have been dependent on the first, and have made the changes in the reverse direction. From every point of view, whether it be of linguistic style, of reverence for Christ, of esteem for His Apostles, or of consideration for the reader, the alterations made by Mt. give the impression of belonging to a later stage of Evangelic tradition as compared with that represented by Mk. Isolated cases may seem open to question, but anyone who reads through the first Gospel with Mk. before him, asking himself why it is that Mt. differs from the second Gospel, will, I believe, be led to the conclusion that, taken as a whole, his deviations from Mk's text can only be explained as due to motives which interpenetrate every part of his work."⁴

³ *The International Critical and Exegetical Commentary*. The Gospel of S. Matthew, by W. C. Allen. Clark, 1907.

⁴ P. xxxv.

In other words: modern students of the Synoptic Problem, having convinced themselves of the dependence of Mt. on Mk., have perforce to cast about for an explanation of the diverse presentation by Mt. of material he derived in substance from Mk. And once granting that Mt. is dependent on Mk. some explanation of the divergencies from his 'source' which Mt. has apparently thought fit to allow himself is urgently called for. The Tübingen School sought the explanation of many Gospel problems in the existence of what they were pleased to call the rival Pauline and Petrine parties of the Second century. Critics have now consented to push back the dates of the Gospels into the First century⁵ and they seek to explain the varying presentation of the data not so much by the individual prepossessions of the Evangelists as by the demands of the second generation of Christians who called for a presentation of Christ and His Apostles which should accord with the dogmatic notions due to the catechetical teaching they had received.

Thus Mr. Allen, after an examination of S. Luke's relation to the other two Gospels concludes that: "of these changes many of the more important might well be due to independent revision of Mk. by Mt. and Lk., *especially those relating to Christ and His Apostles.*"⁶ It is evident that contemplation of the life of the Lord, and reflection upon His Person and work, and all that it meant for human life; and the deepening reverence that springs spontaneously from the life of meditation upon His words, and from spiritual communion with Him, and from worship of God in His name, was gradually leading Christian writers to refine and purify, partly to make careful choice of the language in which they described His life. In connexion with His Sacred Person the choicest words only must be used, choicest not for splendor or beauty of sound or of suggestion, but as conveying in the simplest and most direct way the greatest amount of truth about Him with the least admixture of wrong emphasis. In this respect the Synoptic

⁵ Cf. Jackson, *l. c.*, p. 440.

⁶ Italics ours.

Gospels present in miniature the same process that afterwards took place on a larger scale in the history of the creeds. Already the Gospel writers found themselves committed to the task of describing the life of One whom they knew to have been a truly human Person, whom yet they believed to have been an incarnation of the Eternal. The task, in which it could never be possible to attain more than a relative amount of success, was increased by the fact that the books to be written were intended not for Christians with years of Christian thought and instruction to soften apparent inconsistencies, nor for men trained in the art of so softening the intellectual paradoxes of life as to escape from mental paralysis, but for the average member of the Christian congregation, simple-minded and matter-of-fact, to whom the narrative of the Lord's life with its double-sidedness would repeatedly suggest hard questions, until use and custom blunted their edge. How could the Lord, if He was divine, ask for information? How could He wish or will things that did not happen? How could it be said that He could not do this or that? Did God really forsake Him in the garden? Could it be that He had prayed a prayer which was unfulfilled? Was it possible that Peter had rebuked Him? Why was He baptized if baptism implied repentance and forgiveness of sin? The first and third Gospels prove themselves to be later than the second by the consideration which they show for the simple-minded reader in questions like this, and it is quite possible that Mk., Mt., and Lk. may often have agreed in a quite independent revision of Mk. in these respects."⁷

But it is one thing to establish a relationship between the framework of Mt. and that of Mk.; it is quite another to say that Mt. modifies accounts given in Mk., corrects his statements, and softens away impressions which might be derived from a perusal of the second Gospel.

The main lines of proof that Mt. has so treated Mk. may be summarily stated as follows:—(we give, where possible, Mr. Allen's own words, making use, however, of italics for the sake of convenience.)

⁷ P. xxxviii.

1. **Mt. abbreviates** the narratives in Mk.⁸
 - a. he removes his redundant expressions.
 - b. he drops out details.
 - c. 'sayings' are omitted from the discourses.
 - d. a whole section is sometimes abbreviated.
2. **Mt. amplifies** some of the narrative sections.⁹
3. **Mt. makes** a number of changes in the peculiar **linguistic** details of the second Gospel.
 - a. he omits or changes Mk's characteristic words.
 - b. he changes his historic presents into aorists.
 - c. he avoids Mk's use of ἡρξάτο with an infinitive.¹⁰
 - d. also his use of εἶναι with a participle.
 - e. he changes Mk's Active and Middle verbs into Passives.
 - f. he omits his redundant words, *e. g.*, his double negatives and compound verbs.
 - g. he corrects the harshness of Mk's syntax, especially in the use of adverbs and prepositions.¹¹
4. "More important, however, than changes in language, are alterations which seem due to increasing feelings of **reverence for the person of Christ**. The second Evangelist had not scrupled to attribute to Him human emotion, and to describe Him as asking questions. Such statements are almost uniformly omitted by the editor of this Gospel."¹²
5. "Due to the same causes are, without doubt, changes made in regard to the **miracles**."¹³
6. "In view of the facts recorded above, it may perhaps be not too fanciful to see a striving after a **reverential** attitude in the following changes"¹⁴—and a series of minute differences between the two Gospels are brought forward.
7. "Side by side with these changes in expression dealing

⁸ P. xvii.⁹ P. xix.¹⁰ P. xxii.¹¹ P. xxxiii.¹² P. xxvii.¹³ P. xxxi.¹⁴ P. xxxii.

with the person of the Lord runs a series of somewhat similar alterations in favor of the disciples."¹⁵

8. Changes or insertions are made in order to qualify a statement of the second Evangelist.¹⁶
9. Certain changes are also made for the sake of greater accuracy.¹⁷
10. Lastly, come certain noticeable changes in point of fact.¹⁸

We have given the above scheme of proof in full so that our readers may see at a glance the nature of the argument. It is clear that if this series of statements is capable of anything approaching proof we shall have to throw away as useless encumbrances many ideas which we have hitherto held regarding the composition of the Gospels. And this, needless to say, we should be prepared to do were proof forthcoming.

But is proof forthcoming?

The argument, to repeat, runs thus:— Mt. has absorbed Mk.; an examination of the two Gospels shows this—so it is claimed—incontestably. A further examination shows the principles which have guided him in his treatment of the material thus taken over. It is with the results of this further examination that we quarrel and with the principles on which it is conducted. For we are asked to believe this modification of Mk. by Mt. because some such explanation is necessitated on the hypothesis that Mt. has absorbed Mk. But the very startling view of Mt's procedure must make us pause before accepting the hypothesis unconditionally.

It will be noticed that the arguments given above fall into two distinct classes: (a) the purely literary, viz., nos. 1-3; and (b) those which indicate a distinct moral or dogmatic tendency on the part of Mt., viz., nos. 4-10.

Now, while we could imagine such literary changes being made by Mt. in the process of adapting Mk., we instinctively shrink from the view that Mt. has been led by dogmatic or moral possessions to change his 'source.' The point with which

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ P. xxxv.

¹⁸ P. xxxiv.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

we are concerned here is not whether such modifications could have taken place, but whether the grounds for asserting that they have been practised are really convincing.

Let us examine first of all some of the arguments brought forward in favor of literary changes.

1. Mt. abbreviates Mk's record by the **removal of redundant expressions**. We are referred, among other places, to
 - (a) Mk. iv. 1, "And all the multitude were by the sea on the land"; Mt. puts this much more briefly: "and all the multitude stood upon the beach," *xiii*, 2.
 - (b) Mk. vi. 35, "And when the day was now far spent, His disciples came unto Him and said, The place is desert and the day is now far spent." Mt. *xiv*. 15, has "And when even was come, the disciples came to Him, saying, The place is desert, and the time is already past"; he is therefore said to avoid Mk's repetition of the words 'far spent.'
 - (c) Mk. *xiv*. 3, "a woman having an alabaster cruse of ointment of spikenard very costly—*μύρου νάρδου πιετικῆς*." Mt. *xxvi*. 7, "an alabaster cruse of exceeding precious ointment *μύρου βαρυτίμου*."
 - (d) Mk. *xv*. 32, "that we may see and believe *ἴδωμεν καὶ πιστεύσωμεν*." Mt. *xxvii*. 40, omits 'believe'—writing merely "let us see whether Elias cometh to save Him."¹⁹

Forty-nine examples of such abbreviations are given; we have taken the above instances at random. Do they prove a deliberate revision of Mk. by Mt.? It is hard to believe it. However, it must be conceded that the argument is cumulative, and before condemning we must analyze some of the other instances brought forward.

2. Mt. abbreviates Mk. by **dropping out details from his narrative**. Seventeen instances are brought forward in support of this assertion; Mt. omits the following:—

¹⁹ P. *xxiv*.

- Mk. I. 13, "He was with the wild beasts."
 I. 20, "with the hired servants."
 I. 29, "with James and John."
 III. 17, "Boanerges."
 IV. 17, "upon the cushion."
 VI. 39-40, "by companies green in
 ranks, by hundreds and by fifties."
 IX. 3, "so as no fuller on earth can whiten."
 XIV. 51,—the young man who fled naked.
 XV. 21, "the father of Alexander and Rufus."

To these should be added the eight statements in Mk. relative to the immense numbers who flocked round Our Lord and caused great inconvenience to the disciples; cf. I. 33, I. 45, II. 2, 4, III. 9, 10, 20, VI. 31; all these Mt. omits.²⁰

But it will be evident that we have here, especially in the nine last-mentioned instances, just those priceless touches which individualize the Second Gospel and are proofs of its 'eye-witness character'; they show us the impress of S. Peter who saw the events as they happened; it is noteworthy that in five of these instances, viz., those referred to in I. 20, 29, IV. 38, VI. 39-40, and in IX. 3 (not included in the above), S. Peter himself was undoubtedly present and, in some cases, a particularly interested spectator.

But upon what possible view of S. Matthew's aim in absorbing the Second Gospel into his own can we explain such omissions as the above? We are talking, of course, only of the literary changes just given. It will be allowed that the clauses wanting in Mt. are precisely those which give life to the Second Gospel. To them is due its peculiarly vivid character and they go far towards proving or rather confirming the tradition that S. Mark, 'interpres Petri,' actually took down his Gospel as Peter preached it. But if this tradition is well founded, the hypothetical editor of Mk. i. e., the author of our First Gospel, would probably have known it and would almost certainly not have tampered with it. Neither should

²⁰ P. xvii.

we forget that S. Luke has just the same omissions, *i. e.*, he seems oblivious of just precisely the same striking features of Mk's narrative which, in common with Mt., he has omitted. Can this mean that both Mt. and Lk., as Mr. Allen seems indeed to suggest, agree in a series of most extraordinary 'omissions' of all that was most life-like in the 'source' they had before them?

But to continue with our examination of the 'proofs':—

3. Mt. abbreviates Mk. by omitting 'sayings' from the discourses.²¹

It is evident that, since Mt. and Mk. are so much alike, a very large series of instances would have to be examined in order to establish such a conclusion. As a matter of fact only nine are brought forward. The argument is that when Mt. and Mk. have the same context and contents, Mt. frequently omits 'sayings' *which he has already given*; thus, for example:—

- (a) Mt. XIII. 23-24, omits Mk. v. 15, the quasi-parable of the 'candle,' because already given in v. 15.
- (b) Mt. XIII. 23-24, omits Mk. iv. 22,—the words '*nothing hidden which shall not be made manifest*,' because already given in Mt. x. 28.
- (c) Mt. XVIII. 5, omits Mk. ix. 36,—'*And whosoever receiveth Me, receiveth not Me but Him that sent Me*,' because already given in Mt. x. 40.
- (d) Mt. XVIII. 5, omits Mk. ix. 41; the words about a cup of water, &c.

It would take us beyond our limits were we to examine each of these passages but we fancy that anyone who will be at the pains to do so for himself will feel convinced that the view that Mt. has omitted these 'sayings' because he gives them elsewhere is well-nigh inconceivable. It is too artificial by far. If Mt. could do it he could have written the whole of his Gospel without the assistance of Mk's framework.

²¹ P. xviii. c.

But a far more serious objection to the theory lies in this that the argument can only hold good if it can be shown that this is Mt's usual procedure. Yet it can easily be shown that the reverse is the case and that Mt. has repeatedly preserved 'sayings' occurring in the same context in Mk. and yet also given by Mt. elsewhere. Thus cp. the 'sayings' about Beelzebub in Mt. xii. 22, = Mk. iii. 22, and also occurring in Mt. ix. 32. Another notable instance is found in Mt. xviii. 8-9, = Mk. ix. 43-48, yet already given, though in inverse order, by Mt. v. 29-30. See also Mt. v. 32, = xix. 9, and Mk. x. 11-12; Mt. vi. 14, = xviii. 35, and Mk. xi. 25; especially see Mt. xvi. 12, = xi. 14, and Mk. ix. 13.

We may pass over the next two sections, viz., the assertions that Mt. has now abbreviated, now amplified, whole sections of Mk. It is very hard indeed to conceive that Mt. has deliberately pared down, for example, Mk's vivid account of the cure of the 'Lunatic Boy,' cp. Mk. ix. 14-29, and Mt. xvii. 14-20; Mk. is so vivid, his details are so full of interest, that it is well-nigh incredible that if Mt. had this narrative before him in the form in which it is presented in Mk. he should not have preserved it for us intact. If Mt. gives it as he found it in his 'source', i. e., in a non-Markan 'source,' then his account is meagre but sufficient; if, on the other hand, he extracted it from Mk., then he has emasculated it and his account must be set down as bald in the extreme. The same must be said of the accounts of the murder of S. John the Baptist in Mt. xiv. 1-12, and in Mk. vi. 14-29.

4. Mt. has made certain linguistic changes in the material he has taken over from Mk.

- (a) Mt. omits or changes Mk's characteristic words, *εὐθύς*, for example.²²
- (b) he avoids Mk's use of *ἤρξατο* with the infinitive.²³
- (c) he changes Mk's historic presents into aorists.²⁴
- (d) he avoids Mk's use of *εἰπαι* with a participle.²⁵

²² P. xix.

²³ P. xx.

²⁴ P. xxi.

²⁵ xxii.

- (e) he changes Mk's **Active and Middle** verbs into **passives**.²⁶
- (f) he omits Mk's **double negatives**.²⁷
- (g) he corrects Mk's **syntax**, especially in the use of adverbs and prepositions.²⁸

In critical investigations all *a priori* notions have to be rigorously set aside, but even when we have laid all bias on one side it is hard not to ejaculate at this point, What an artificial Gospel Matthew's must be!

We will only examine one of these 'proofs' of consistent linguistic changes wrought by Mt.

"Sir John Cæsar Hawkins²⁹ (*Hor. Synopticae*, pp. 114 ff. in Dst. ed., pp. 143 ff. in 2nd ed., 1909) reckons 151 historic presents in Mk., of which Mt. retains only 21. Mt. has about 93 such presents, 21 of them being from Mk. About 66 are cases of λέγει or λέγουσιν, about 11 of them being from Mk. Nine of the historic presents retained from Mk. occur in Mk. xiv. 27-41 = Mt. xxvi. 31-45. It seems clear, therefore, that Mt. generally avoided the historic present when reproducing Mk., and some of the 21 cases where he retains it may be due to assimilation. In reproducing other sources he seems also to have avoided the present, except in the case of λέγει and λέγουσιν. The small number of other exceptions occur in parables (but in the nature of things the Logia would not have many such presents), and in chs. ii-iv. 11, the presence of some nine presents not including λέγει, in this section is very curious, and would be naturally explained by the theory that this section was drawn from a source in which such presents were a marked feature, if there were sufficient corroborative evidence."

And further on we find:—

"The editor of the Gospel shows a distinct tendency to

²⁶ P. xxiii.

²⁷ P. xxvii.

²⁸ P. xxv.

²⁹ P. xx.

remove historic presents from a source before him. In Mk. there are 151 such tenses. Of these, 72 are cases of λέγει or λέγουσιν. Of the remaining 79 the editor of the first Gospel omits or alters 69, retaining only 10. Yet in iii. 1-47, iv. 17, there are 7 such tenses, viz., iii. 1, 13, 15, iv. 5, 8 (bis), 11. This would be explicable if the editor were following a source of which the use of the historic present was a marked feature."²⁰

Yet it seems to us that the data furnished would, on examination, point to another conclusion:—

- a. As Mt. has, when all allowances have been made, 93 acknowledged historic presents, it is not easy to see how he can be said to avoid those of Mk.
- b. It is conceded that he *has* retained 21 from Mk.
- c. It would be wrong to conclude from the above statement that the remaining 139 historic presents of Mk. have all of them been avoided or omitted by Mt., for it is manifestly not the case that Mt. has in all these instances anything parallel to Mk.
- d. It is conceded that there exist in Mt. two sections parallel to Mk. in which Mt. has retained an extraordinary percentage of historic presents found in the Marcan parallel; thus in Mt. xxvi. 31-45, we find 9 without counting λέγει; similarly in Mt. xxvi. 31-45, there are 9 more. And it should be noted that in this latter section Mt. has one example which does not occur in the corresponding section of Mk., though it is true that it is only a case of λέγει and that Mt. does use this particular present frequently.
- e. The concluding words of the above-quoted statement are certainly remarkable: "The presence of some 9 presents not including λέγει in this section (viz., Mt. ii-iv. 11, to which we must add the 9 from Mt. xxvi. 31-45) is very curious, and would naturally be explained by the

²⁰ P. lx.

theory that this section was drawn from a source in which such presents were a marked feature, if there were sufficient corroborative evidence."

It is hard to understand what is meant; for the Second Gospel, the supposed source, is characterized by precisely such presents as the whole argument is intended to show. Would not the more logical conclusion be that in these two sections we have proof of Mt's use of a source remarkably akin to Mk. and that he is faithful to his source and copies it correctly?

But if this is the true conclusion from the facts and it seems impossible to avoid it—what becomes of the hypothesis that our present Mk. is Mt's main source and that he modified it consistently all the way through?

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So far we have dealt with what we have termed the 'literary' modifications of Mk. by Mt.; we now pass to the consideration of those modifications said to be due to 'dogmatic or moral prepossessions' viz., nos. 4-10 supra.

(a) "More important, however, than changes in language, are alterations which seem due to an increasing feeling of reverence for the person of Christ. The second Evangelist had not scrupled to attribute to Him human emotion, and to describe Him as asking questions. Such statements are almost uniformly omitted by the editor of this Gospel."³¹

Nine instances are given:—

1. Mk. III. 5, 'And when He had looked round about on them with anger, being grieved' is omitted from Mt. XII. 13. Cp. "the way in which Mt. XII. 49, avoids περιθλεψόμενος of Mk. III. 34."
2. Mk. x. 21, 'looking upon him loved him' is omitted in Mt.

Apropos of these instances it should be noted that though in XII. 49, Mt. has not got the words 'And looking round on them'

³¹P. xxxi.

he yet has something quite as anthropomorphic, 'And He stretched forth His hand towards His disciples.'

3. Mk. i. 41, 'And being moved with compassion' is omitted in Mt. viii. 3. It is acknowledged, however, that Mt. uses the very same expression verb, *σπλαγνίζεσθαι*, four times of Christ elsewhere.
4. Mk. i. 43, 'And He strictly charged him *ἐμβριμῶσάμενος*' is omitted in Mt. viii. 3.

Yet how untrustworthy such deductions are may be gauged from the fact that in ix. 39, Mt. uses the very same expression in his account of the charge to the two blind men. We need not examine the other instances; an unbiassed scrutiny of those given above will perhaps show that in these so-called 'anthropomorphisms' which Mt. is said to reject or avoid we only have an additional indication of the 'eye-witness character of the Second Gospel.' And it should be noted, too, that if Mt. had been really so anxious to avoid undue emphasis of the human aspect of Christ he should surely not have written his account of the Temptation, iv. 1-12, where see especially ver. 2, 'He afterwards *hungered*,' cp. xxi. 18; neither should we expect to find in his Gospel such passages as viii. 10, where Christ is depicted as *marvelling*; nor xxvi. 37-38, where we are told that 'He began to be *sorrowful and sore troubled*.'

(b) "Side by side with these changes in expression dealing with the person of the Lord runs a series of somewhat similar alterations in favour of the disciples."³²

Fourteen instances are given; we will content ourselves with giving a few of them in extenso and will, for convenience sake, arrange the parallel narratives in double columns.

- (a) Mk. viii. 17, 'Have ye your heart hardened? Having eyes, see ye not? and having ears, hear ye not?' is omitted in Mt. xvi. 9 and in ver. 12 a statement is inserted to the effect that the disciples did understand.

In order to estimate this statement at its true worth let us put the two passages in parallel columns:

³² P. xxxiii.

Mt. xvi. 8-12.*Mk.* viii. 17-18, 21.

"O ye of little faith, why reason ye among yourselves, because ye have no bread? Do ye not yet understand . . . ? How is it that ye do not perceive that I spake not to you concerning bread? . . . Then understood they how that He bade them not beware of the leaven of bread, but of the teaching of the Pharisees and Sadducees."

"Why reason ye because ye have no bread? do ye not yet perceive, neither understand? Having eyes see ye not? and having ears, hear ye not? and do ye not remember? When I brake five loaves. . . ? Do ye not yet understand?"

It must be confessed that it requires considerable ingenuity to see how *Mt.* tones down this rebuke in favor of the disciples.

Again, we are told to compare:

Mt. viii. 25-27

and

Mk. iv. 38-40.

"And they came to Him and awoke Him, saying, Save, Lord; we perish. And He saith unto them, Why are ye fearful, O ye of little faith? . . . And the men marvelled. . . ."

"And they awake Him and say unto Him, Master, carest Thou not that we perish? . . . And He said unto them, Why are ye fearful? have ye not yet faith? And they feared exceedingly. . . ."

The comment made on this is that 'Have ye not yet faith?' becomes 'Ye of little faith' in *Mt.*

This may be perfectly true, but it is hard to see in this slight change a hint that *Mt.* tones down harsh expressions given by *Mk.* as used by Our Lord to the disciples. The argument would only hold good if there were really less of rebuke in *Mt.*'s presentation of the incident—which can hardly be maintained.

And once more, if this had been the habitual tone of *Mt.* he should not have written *xxvi.* 8-9, where the *disciples murmur* at Mary's act; neither should he, with apparently needless emphasis, have told us how they *slept* in the garden, *xxvi.* 40-

45; least of all should he have told us that 'all the disciples leaving Him, fled,' xxvi. 56.

We may conclude with two general remarks:

(a) Mr. Allen calls attention to Mt's peculiar 'closing formula'—"And it came to pass that when Jesus had fully ended these words. . . ." cp. vii. 28, xi. 1, xiii. 53, xix. 1, and xxvi. 1. Mr. Allen remarks that "These . . . form one of the most striking features of this Gospel." We venture to think that they constitute a feature entirely destructive of his main thesis, namely, that Mt. was dependent on Mk. for his framework. For they certainly belong to Mt's framework, and equally certainly they do not belong to that of Mk. Nay, more: they do not merely belong to Mt's framework, they are that framework. It has even been suggested that we are to see in this formula a vestige of the division of the 'Logia' into Five Books as mentioned by Papias. Whether this view is justified or not it is at least certain that it must give pause to those who hold that Mk. is the frame used by Mt. and therefore are compelled to hold that the latter has, by means of a most minute process of manipulation, adjusted Mk. to his requirements.

(b) The Greek of Mt. and Mk. is often identical, cp. for example, Mt. iv. 18-22, and Mk. i. 16-20; Mt. viii. 15-16, and Mk. i. 30-34; Mt. xv. 32-38, and Mk. viii. 2-9; also Mt. viii. 2-4, and Mk. i. 40-45; Mt. xv. 8-9, = Mk. vii. 6-7a, should be especially noted, for the quotation from Isaias there given does not agree with the Lxx and yet—allowance always being made for subsequent adaptation—is the same in each Evangelist.

But this fact must not blind us to another fact which is too often disregarded, viz., that though in all these passages the Greek is the same in words, &c., yet the *whole cast* of the sentences is different. If, however, it be true that Mt. has absorbed Mk. we shall have to suppose that in such passages as these, Mt., with the Greek of Mk. before him, recast every sentence he found in the original. Is such a proceeding probable?

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THE SPIRIT OF MEDIEVALISM.

In his lecture on Pre-Raphaelitism delivered at Edinburgh in November, 1853, Ruskin said: "The fact is that modern art is not so much distinguished from old art by greater skill as by a radical change in temper." This change took place "about the time of Raphael, in the spirit of Roman Catholics and Protestants alike; and that change consisted in the denial of their religious belief, at least, in the external and trivial affairs of life, and often in far more serious things." The change is noticeable chiefly in art, which now is not as of old brought into the service of religion. "This is," according to Ruskin, "the great distinction between medieval and modern art; and from that are clearly deducible all the other essential differences between them."

Surprising as was that statement to English hearers, so long accustomed to regard the Middle Ages as a period of unredeemed darkness and superstition, it will hardly be contradicted now by any serious critic, despite contemporary art's more or less affected religious sentiment. But, true though it be, perhaps it does not adequately express the fundamental difference between the medieval and modern temper; it hardly reaches to that ultimate quality of mind which characterizes medievalism from modernism. Because, even supposing that modern art would again become what it was in the days of Fra Angelico, namely the joyous hand-maid of religion, nevertheless it would still remain modern since it would inevitably reflect the mental hue of the modern man, and be fundamentally unlike medieval art,—despite the most skilful imitation in color and draughting and selection of subject. Besides, peoples of various ages and races can profess the same religion and love it as passionately and habitually as even a medieval saint, and yet their expression of it whether in art or politics or devotion will necessarily be differentiated by temperament, by

their way of looking at life, at everything. So that, though the medieval man—be he artist or warrior—differed markedly from us by the intensity and universality of his religious fervor; nevertheless, it seems to me that we must probe deeper than this in order to put our finger upon that more general, more characteristic quality of soul which made him so very different from us in all things that he said and did.

Now one does not need to study those past ages very long before noticing something which by its peculiarity stands unique in the world's history, something which is absolutely absent from contemporary life, and which is present only occasionally in the classic civilization of Greece and Rome. I mean a constant, almost pathetic contradiction between *theories* of life and actual facts, between ideas and deeds, between aspirations and their realizations—in a word, *contrast*. Everything medieval was painted on the canvas of life in decided but contrasting colors. The old Cathedrals—those inimitable marvels of architecture—rise most often out of the dirt and wretchedness of the city slums. Rude soldiers, whose swords were habitually stained with human blood, founded monasteries and churches for the honor of God. Philip the Fair, though a staunch Catholic in faith, hesitates not to perpetrate that shameful outrage at Anagni upon the spiritual head of Christendom. Henry II, Plantagenet, is accessory to the murder of à Becket, but then in penance bares his back to the scourge of a priest. The kings of England as Norman vassals of the kings of France do feudal homage on the eve of warring against them. The Emperors of Germany are the feeblest of sovereigns in fact even when the highest of all earthly rulers in theory. Frederick II, the “wonder of the world,” leads a crusade against the very Saracens with whom he fills his court, and cynically mocks in secret at the religion for which he has a superstitious veneration. Francis of Assisi weds his “Lady Poverty” in the astonished face of an age of comparative luxury. Fra Angelico's sweet angels and Giotto's serene tower look down on the blood-feuds of wonderful Florence.

Why was this? The answer will, I venture to say, give us the real clue to the essential spirit of medievalism. Nor is the answer difficult.

I. IDEALISM.

This constant contrast was due to the *idealism* of the medieval mind. Ruskin came very near this truth when he observed in the above quoted lecture that what differentiates medieval from modern art was *thought*. That is, with the medieval artist thought, the idea to be expressed was foremost; whereas with the modern form, the manner of expression is that upon which he expends most of his labor. Yes! your typical medievalist was above all things an idealist, in fact, a dreamer. Whatever he might have been in fact, however low he might have sunk in the strata of civilization, whatever his vices, nevertheless at all times his ideals were high, his aspirations were sublime, his yearnings spiritual, his theories superbly magnificent, his whole temper of mind fundamentally non-materialistic or lilliputian, but intensely spiritual and ennobled by a stupendous, heroic, Catholic encyclopedism such as is possible only to a magnificent idealist. There then is the word—idealism; there you have the clue that will lead you through the maze of those baffling medieval contradictions. There is that one universal quality of mind which stamps a man as medieval and not modern or classic.

The cause for such a habit of mind lay in the conditions in which men lived. It was an age when even the richest had to put up with hardships which to us of gentle times seem insuperable. Every man's hand was ever at his sword-hilt. War was seldom humanized by such amenities as a Red Cross Society. Travel by land was rendered no less insecure by princely and beggar bandits than it was on sea by the piratical Northman or Saracen. The rich man's castle was hardly as comfortable as the humbler cottage of a modern farmer. Amusements were comparatively rare such as we understand them. Education was largely a clerical distinction. Dread

pestilence habitually stalked through Europe, destroying sometimes a half of the population as it did in England in the fourteenth century. Verily, it was then a struggle for existence, an heroic struggle of mankind to rise up again from out the world-wide ruins of that mighty Roman Empire which had been synonymous with civilization.

To men living under such depressing conditions, battling against such seemingly hopeless odds, *idealism* necessarily became part and parcel of their mental make-up. Because they simply *had to aim high* in order to rise at all. They had to be dreamers, (if you prefer the word), in order to liberate themselves from the dead weight of crass materialism weighing upon their spirits, benumbing their courage, fighting them at every cross-road of progress. Had they not been dreamers, that is, had they not been firm believers in the possibility of their accomplishing great things they would not have accomplished but a fraction of what they actually did; they would perhaps have given up the struggle in despair and lapsed farther and farther into the semi-savagery of their impenetrable German forests or wind-swept sand-dunes of the North Sea.

Moreover they were young races—peoples in the first flush of rejuvenation when blood ran red and strong through their veins, and they dreamed, as all the young dream, of ideals to be accomplished. The old classic “*taedium vitae*” was gone like a poison out of the system. The very hardships of life were tempering the new Teutonic steel and refurbishing the ancient Latin element. Mankind was young again and once more dreamed those blessed visions, felt the tingle of those iridescent ideals which must ever be the driving power behind and in every great work. Were I given my choice to live in any one particular age it seems to me now that it must have been sweet indeed to have been present in the plaza in front of the Cathedral of Clermont when Pope Urban delivered in the eloquent Provençal tongue perhaps the most effective address to which the world has ever listened—his appeal to Christendom for the First Crusade. How must the quick blood of those Franks have leaped at his opening words as given

by Robert the Monk: "Oh! race of Franks, race from across the mountains, race chosen and beloved by God, set apart from all nations!" Words, too, falling from the lips of the revered head of all Christendom! No wonder the arm-clad multitude of Franks—the main strength of the Crusading spirit—felt this compliment run through their ranks like a living fire and responded with that supreme cry of idealism, "God wills it." The whole scene brings before us the fresh youthfulness and immature daring and heedless almost reckless enthusiasm of a race still young, still uninfected by the halting, calculating, paralyzing doubts and fears of a maturer age. Over by the Golden Gate and the Orontes and in the silence of the Arabian and Egyptian deserts that Christian battle-cry was answered by a no less ideal even if fanatic challenge, "God is God and Mahomet is His Prophet." Both represent idealism carried to an intensity hitherto and since never equalled in the world's history. And whatever the critical student may now think of the wisdom of this tremendous clash of two different civilizations, he must be material indeed, if he cannot at even these latter days of crass commercialism feel a thrill of that wonderful idealism which produced that conflict, and envy the youthfulness of an age which could be so ideal.

These two causes more than any others were responsible for that typical characteristic of medievalism. Now observe how this idealism colored every act of those times.

a. In Religion.

Naturally, we should expect to note it foremost from the religious side, considering with Ruskin how habitually the medieval man was religious in temperament and views of life. Even a modern non-Catholic will, I doubt not, concede that Catholicity in the Middle Ages was an ideal even if (to his way of thinking) an erroneous conception of the due relations between God and man. For surely what more ideal could that conception be than that of a universal faith binding all, noble and serf, Frank and Saxon and Dane and all other races

into one gigantic system, presided over by the heir of the Ancient Imperial Rome and the first of the Apostles, before whose white throne all men were at least theoretically equal from the Hohenstaufen and the Capetian and the Plantagenet down to the cotter and the jongleur? By the side of such a magnificent conception of religion our modern hopeless division into warring sects seems no less ridiculous than saddening. So, too, the practical expression of that encyclopedic faith was no less ideal at times, even Quixotic. Take in instance that most ideal of men, that "Sir Galahad" among the Saints, that "Troubadour" among the Monks, that "Patron-Saint of Democracy," that unsullied spouse of the "Lady Poverty"—the sweet Francis of Assisi. Point out if you can any figure in all history which was so essentially ideal, who by his life and words ever contradicted so flatly, so uncompromisingly the spirit of worldliness or materialism! Or take the Crusaders themselves—with all the princely political intrigue and Venetian selfishness only too often permeating them—what were they, what *could* they have been in the hearts of the rank and file but the military expression of the religious idealism of martial races? They are inexplicable on any other grounds: easily intelligible on this.

b. In Politics.

When we enter the region of politics the same idealism meets us even there precisely where we least expect it, so disheartened are we by the shameful banality of our own politics. Not that even the Middle Ages did not have their "graft" and all other incidents of a low state of political morals. The contrary is only too vividly illustrated by the careers of a Philip the Fair, a John Lackland, above all by that of the arch-priest of heartless, shameless politics, Nicolo Machiavelli, —and all the miserable crowd of "quattrocentisti," if such "moderns" *can* be classed as medieval. But I do say that with all its failings medieval politics was ennobled in some ways by an idealism to which modern politics can lay no

claim. And in proof note that political conception which crowned medieval politics with a real glory, even though it had little practical effect upon everyday politics outside of Germany and Italy—I mean the theory of the Holy Roman Empire, that strange, hopeless medieval dream.

It is difficult for us of these days of almost universal civilization to understand the feelings of dismay which filled the old world when it heard the horrifying news of the fall of Rome. Lactantius had said that "When Rome, the head of the world, shall have fallen, who can doubt that the end is come, of all things, aye, of the earth itself." So it literally seemed to many according as horde after horde of Goths and Vandals poured across the Rhine and the Danube, destroying for some two centuries that ancient civilization, until the dark cloud of feudalistic anarchy settled down. Cæsar falling dead at the base of Pompey's statue caused less a shudder than the fall of the eternal city before Odoacer's warriors. It was so terrible that after a while its awfulness terrified the invaders themselves. Ataulf, the Visigoth, dreamed of the glory of "renewing and maintaining by Gothic strength the fame of Rome," desiring to go down to posterity as the "restorer of that Roman power which it was beyond my power to replace." The idea outlived the actual empire. It persisted in men's imaginations and hopes until it gradually revives again in the person of the Great Charles and still more so in the person of that imperial dreamer, Otho the Great. I say the *idea* persisted, because it was never much more than an idea, a theory, at least outside of Germany where it eventually involved in disaster the great house of the Hohenstaufens, and of Italy where it involved in a temporary ruin of its political prestige the very Papacy which had renewed its life. That it was a failure, a necessary failure, in many ways, few will deny. Henry standing at the gates of Canossa, Boniface lying half dead in his palace at Anagni some two centuries or more later are the alpha and omega of that world-wide duel between Pope and Emperor which testifies to the inherent impossibility of realizing such a magnificent ideal. It as well

testifies unmistakably to that inherent characteristic of the medieval mind which grasped at theories amidst the crudest of facts, and sincerely believed in a theory with an almost pathetic persistence long after experience had proved the hopelessness of its realization. Here, indeed, was idealism in politics carried to an extreme whose very audacity and simple-minded trust is one of the most amazing things in the world's history. Beside it the imperial dreams of Alexander or "Greater England" seem comparatively petty, because in none other political scheme was the driving idea so stupendous, so encyclopedic, in none was or is the practical realization so pathetically in contrast with the theoretical ideal. It stands unique among mankind's rare acts of political idealism.

c. In Industry.

Surprising as it is to note this in politics, far more astounding is it to see the same persistent idealism in that department of life which is of all others by its nature the most likely to be animated by materialistic principles—namely—the industrial. Yet even this received a tinge of that same spiritual color which beautified religion and politics.

With us labor is labor: work is work; work which we engage in from necessity though we hate it; dull work in which there is no enthusiasm or love except that springing from the desire of payment. But your medieval craftsman carried to his work a broad, generous, Catholic spirituality until his work often became synonymous with his religion and his art, so that at times it became difficult to say which was foremost in the order of ideas leading up to a given production—the artisan, the artist or the saint. The guild for instance which was the unit, the foundation of the entire industrial system, was it not always a *religious* association? A standing proof that even a labor organization could not become purely material. And those marvellous Cathedrals whether at Westminster or Cologne or Milan or Strasburg, what are they but expressions in stone of a mysticism, an idealism which alone made them possible of construction under what would now be considered insuper-

able obstacles! Steam and electricity—those two great mechanical forces at our command—were unknown to them. Yet year after year, century after century these artisans patiently worked away whether as individuals or as members of a gild, careless of whether or no posterity heard of even their names, satisfied with the proud consciousness that their labor was a labor of love in the service of a sublime religious ideal done under the all-seeing eye of the Master Architect of the world. No wonder then, that these Cathedrals rose from amidst the slums and the market-places and din of the daily toil. That was precisely where they should logically have been built, because they were the expressions in stone of the idealism which spiritualized the every-day toil and threw around labor a joyous, serene beauty it has never since felt.

d. In Art.

Of the idealism of medieval art little need be said. That is almost a threadbare subject. Every modern sentimentalist knows how to rave over the angels of Fra Angelico and the wistful Madonnas of Botticelli, and can tell you glibly of how this sweet spirit of art passed away with the Middle Ages to be replaced by the classicism of Raphael's degenerate imitators, to be partially revived again some sixty years ago by the English Pre-Raphaelites—Rosetti, Burne-Jones, Madox Browne, Millais, and others. But how many of these more or less sincere devotees of medieval art believe in or can realize the marvellous mysticism and idealism of the race which gave birth to such painters? J. A. Symonds thus expresses the thought: "The April freshness of Giotto, the piety of Fra Angelico, the virginal purity of the young Raphael, the sweet gravity of John Bellini, the philosophic depth of Da Vinci, the sublime elevation of Michael Angelo, the suavity of Fra Bartolommeo, the delicacy of Della Robbia, the restrained fervor of Rosellini, the rapture of the Siennese and the reverence of the Umbrian masters, Francia's pathos, Mantegna's dignity and Luini's divine simplicity were qualities

which belonged not only to these artists but also to the people of Italy from whom they sprang." True! He is speaking of a period when medievalism was somewhat on the wane but his words apply literally to every other artistic expression of life in all medieval times. Because medieval art of any period was part of and knit inseparably with life, not separated from life as is modern art. Ruskin calls attention to this "historic" quality of medieval art, when he notes how these painters preferred to portray not past events but "acts of their own days," to paint not imaginary portraits of past celebrities like Cæsar or Pericles or Alexander, but likenesses of their contemporaries—Can Grande, Dante, Leo X, St. Francis. Nor did it shock their artistic sense of harmony to place the living in even imaginary paintings clothed in the customary dress of the day. Art was so familiar to them in every act, at every turn, not merely in grand Cathedrals but in their very sleeping apartments; the artists themselves were so often of the common people that art and life became one. Or rather art was rendered sane, truthful, sincere by the realities of life, and life was beautified, spiritualized, idealized habitually by the infusion of art, of beauty.

The medieval man was therefore fundamentally an idealist whether with Godfrey at the Crusade, or with Hildebrand at Canossa, or with the artisan carving a gargoyle on a cathedral, or with the gildsman at his factory, or with Giotto working on his tower, or with Angelico in his quiet cell at St. Mark's. This is the secret of that curious, persistent contrast between his heroic virtues and his terrifying vices, between his theories and their practical failures. This is what marks him off clearly from both the classic Greek and Roman and the modern man.

II. MENTAL SANITY.

But even his idealism was different from ours. With us unfortunately much passes for idealism which is either mere artistic sentimentality or unhealthy introspection or Puritan fanaticism. Somehow we—I mean Americans above all—do

not seem to possess the saving gift of sanity so essential towards restraining idealism within its proper limits. Perhaps in lieu of a better explanation this may be due to our over-specialization which blinds us to the "perspective" of things. Mr. Edward Howard Griggs in his University Extension Lecture on "The Cities of Italy" suggests indirectly this observation:

"Of all men of the period Leonardo (da Vinci) is the culminating example of this myriad-mindedness." He is speaking of certain Renaissance types. "The greatness of these men was not an *exaggerated or over-cultivated talent*; but an essential greatness of spirit, a fundamental creative power that showed itself readily in any channel to which they turned their energies. Our system of specialization is measured upon the abilities of small and uninspired men. . . . If our educational system is to serve the highest life we must seek to awaken the creative spirit from within instead of fashioning a narrow talent or multiplying an *unrelated erudition*." (The italics are mine.)

No one surely would deny that we have idealism, a real yearning for the spiritual despite our commercialism. But it seems to go to our heads like strong wine and lead us often to ridiculous extremes. The Puritan was an idealist after his fashion. So is the present-day Prohibitionist or Christian Scientist or Doweyite. But it was and is idealism unbalanced, un-related to the other facts of life. Because we have lost that sense of harmony springing from that spirit of encyclopedism typical of mentality not only in Da Vinci's age but throughout every medieval century.

The critic above quoted misses this cause. In the same lecture he says that "the sense of proportion was utterly lost in the Middle Ages," that peculiar mental balance so characteristic (in his view) of classic Greek Life. This seems an unjust criticism. For, to my mind, medieval life really had such a sense to a greater extent than even the Greeks. The latter indeed, had it in some directions perfected. Upon what more absolute calm and harmonious proportion has the human eye ever rested than upon the façade of the Parthenon? But this

sense stopped at art. Greek life in its other more serious phases, for instance, in its views upon women, slaves, religion—in these it was fundamentally one-sided, doubting, disproportionate, not at mental rest.

But medieval life with all its striking contrasts of lord and serf, Cathedral and hovel, even in the bizarre costumes of the people; despite all this it *was* harmonious in all directions because of its encyclopedism, its catholicity. Because in its system of thought all men and all things had their due place from the Emperor and Pope down to the serf and priest, even down to the very brute creation. The rights and duties of each were carefully regulated by their relations to all others. Nothing was left neglected in this vast spiritual Empire, nothing was left unsolved, nothing regarded as in Greek life as useless or unimportant. The modern age may and does consider many of these relations unjustifiable by experience. But the fact remains that, whether correct or incorrect, those medieval men *did see things in perspective* and arranged them in a marvellous even if theoretical harmony. And therefore, no one idea excelled to the exclusion of the attention due the rest. And no one idea became exaggerated and consequently “unhealthy.”

So its idealism, vast and intense though it was, nevertheless remained sane, avoiding sentimentality, fanaticism, morbidity, or that peculiarly modern vice—diseased introspection. This is what can be termed the second fundamental quality of medieval thought—sanity, a consideration of which in its effects upon the various phases of life will bring us about as near to an intelligent appreciation of the spirit of the Middle Ages as we can hope to reach concerning ages so distant and different from our own.

a. In Religion.

There are five infallible tests of the mental health of any man, any age; namely, his attitude towards religion, philosophy, morality, art and nature. Because if there be any weakness at all in a given character, it is sure to manifest itself in one

of these directions, however hard-headed and cool and self-collected a man may be in all other ways.

Take first religion. Daily experience as well as past history proves that in no other department of life is mankind as a whole cursed with such an unlimited capacity for making a fool of himself as when he is in the presence of the mysterious questionings of the soul regarding the next life; and that if he avoids this extreme he is endowed with a correspondingly great aptitude for lapsing into the opposite extreme of total neglect. Seldom is he able to steer a middle course and keep his religion in harmonious sympathy with the other relations of life. Nor do I think the future historian will be able to detect any great success on our part. Rather will he observe that one of the characteristics of present life will have been its apparent religious helplessness. For verily we have in this direction lost all sense of harmony. We alternate perpetually between cynical indifference and downright fanaticism. Nominally Christians we follow in practical life principles which are thoroughly pagan. We have accomplished that extraordinary feat hitherto unknown in the world's history, of utterly disassociating religion from public life and largely from private morals. Faith and reason we regard as radically opposed. And in consequence of the soul of man being thus spiritually starved he turns in his hunger to the husks of every wild religious tenet which his troubled brain can excogitate. In a word, the religious man, taken pretty generally, is in a state of religious chaos, bewilderment. An utter absence of harmony and of rest characterizes his religious life.

How different when we turn back almost with a sigh to the Middle Ages. Whether you be Catholic or Protestant you cannot fail to note the calm, the rest, the sweet confidence, above all the easy harmony existing between religion and life. True, there were then discordant notes which the orthodox stamped as heresies. The Albigenian, Waldensian, Bogomile, Arnold of Brescia, Giordano Bruno, the Fraticelli and others had their day and disturbed men's souls for a time. But all in all it was an era of universal and deep religious peace, some-

thing for which it would seem any one might sigh, whatever his religious opinions. Above all there was that peculiar *harmony* between religion and life. What Ruskin says of medieval art being religious applies to everything medieval. A man of Dante's age was religious at all times. When he entered his Gild-Hall or traded at the "fairs," or went a-crusading or frescoed a convent he carried his great "faith" with him. He sinned, of course, did not always live up to that faith, but it walked ever with him and colored his thoughts on week-days no less than on Sundays. Moreover, it fell in easily, harmoniously, as if it were as natural as trading or painting or fighting.

For that reason it was seldom unbalanced. Even the monk shut off from the world did not lose his "perspective." Various and bizzare as were some of the superstitions of those curious days, I am confident that never in the Middle Ages could possibly have been tolerated among at least educated people such a philosophico-religious excrescence as the modern Christian Science. No! all ages have their superstitions and Godfrey and Richard Cœur de Lion had theirs. But humanity had to wait for this latter day of enlightenment to give birth to that and other such unspeakable contradictions of reason. Medieval superstitions at least had some philosophic foundation, some dignity, even at times some historic grandeur, some artistic beauty. Romance has grown its ivy around the tragic ruins of the Albigensian heresy on the field of Muret. There is a Wagnerian grandeur in the Hussite Wars. The crude justice of Ordeals by water and fire were ennobled by a sublime faith however distorted. But it remained for this age of reason, of Erastianism, to produce religious absurdities unadorned by romance or historic tragedy or philosophic apparel or religious fervor or even common-sense. Even in their superstitions the Middle Ages retained a certain saving sense of sanity.

b. In Philosophy.

Of their philosophy the same is to be said in spite of a feeling

of hopelessness at trying to say anything good about scholastic philosophy in an age accustomed to look upon it as barren logic. But whether you be a disciple of Spencer or Darwin or Hegel or just a pure empiricist, you will admit that Scholasticism in its hey-day, in the times of Aquinas and Bonaventure and Albertus Magnus and Roger Bacon was at least "sane." At least these truly great men kept their metaphysics cooled or rather warmed by the infusion of a more practical philosophy based upon human experience. In which connection let me quote a significant remark of Professor Fisher concerning Scholasticism.

"Mysticism and Scholasticism were not antagonistic. Among the theological leaders, the great mystics were Scholastics, and the most eminent Schoolmen, who are not classified with the Mystics exemplified mysticism in their own experience and found a place for it in their teaching. But in certain of the Schoolmen Mysticism is elaborately explained and wrought into an articulated system. Such are the "Victorines," Hugo and Richard. Such is Bonaventura." (*History of Christian Doctrine*, p. 230.)

Medieval philosophy like politics and religion sought to classify *all* thought. Aquinas, the chief of Scholastics, is the friend of Bonaventura, the greatest of Mystics. Albert the Great, master of Aquinas, was at once a practical scientist, an Aristotelian Realist and somewhat of a Platonist. With these wonderfully broad minds all philosophies had their respective merit and attention. However strongly they all clung to the Scholastic method, they were not slaves to any one order of ideas. And their philosophy with all its limitations possessed in consequence a breadth, a dignified sanity, a calm reasonableness, an unruffled majesty to which no other subsequent system of thought has so far even approached. With us philosophy, with all its brilliancy and really great advances in some directions, nevertheless impresses the general public as more or less erratic, likely to run into any extreme, whether of Hegelian idealism or the Positivism of Comte along with the intermediate Cartesianism, the scepticism of Hume, the mysticism of Swedenborg and

so on ad infinitum. It is out of touch with life at least on its practical side. And no modern thinker, not even the most pretentious of them all, Herbert Spencer, possesses that fine sense of harmony or healthy composure so characteristic of Aquinas.

c. *In Art.*

In the domain of art the lack of harmony is painfully evident. I mean its dissociation from life. To the average man art is held to be a mere luxury chiefly of the rich, the vehicle for the expression of what strikes him as more or less sentimentality or else of downright sensualism. To him an artist is "queer," a sort of helpless dreamer of dreams. Such a man will hardly believe you if you tell him, as Ruskin would have you do, that art should go hand in hand with life, should express life in its most serious as well as light phases, should be the instrument for expressing the deepest emotions; that above all it should be a potent influence in ennobling, beautifying and teaching and strengthening that life. Your efforts are likely as not to be rewarded with a smile of something very akin to pity.

But it was not so before Raphael's day. This great function of art was universally recognized by the poor as well as the rich. Art and life then indeed walked together and the artist was held in as high esteem as the man of affairs. And because of this that art avoided becoming sensual or sentimental—maintaining even a golden mien or serious dignity even when most sportive. Run down the long list from Cimabue and Giotto, the pioneers, on through the intermediate Fra Angelico, Perugino, Botticelli down to the perfected masters Michael Angelo, Da Vinci, Raphael. In all of them there is a seriousness of purpose, a quiet dignity as of men who believed that art did not exist for art's sake, but for life's sake; who worked joyously as men who felt convinced they were doing a noble work and did it well. Only when this sad modern world once again realizes this high mission of art will it produce equally great art; will the "people" again take into their daily life the

inspiration and gentle teachings of beauty as they did when they watched Giotto laboring on his tower or Botticelli in his shop.

d. In Morals.

A fourth general test of a man's sanity is his attitude towards virtue and vice. Judged by this standard modern life presents here also the same persistent lack of balance. That we of to-day are as virtuous or more so than a man of the time of either Godfrey de Bouillon or Lorenzo the Magnificent is not in question. I am speaking rather of the different way in which we look at morality, or to be more correct, at certain vices. And I say we have lost the proper perspective—we have lost sight of that harmony which should exist between grace and nature, between morality or virtue and natural enjoyments. For instance. With us a man swings from the extreme of asceticism to that of sensualism. Take your modern Prohibitionist as a type. In his sincere and commendable efforts at uprooting drunkenness, he goes to the extreme of labelling all drinking as essentially bad; so with some religious sects the ban is put upon many really innocent enjoyments like dancing and card-playing.

Now we find only solitary instances of such Puritanism in the Middle Ages. The Cathari for example. But such sects were sternly frowned upon by public opinion. The Church, so to speak, took part in the fun of her children. The people's holidays were their holydays and vice versa. The church was often their theatre with its mysteries and Miracle Plays. Piety was joyous like the piety of little children. Mankind had to wait for the sombre genius of Calvin to teach them that God was not the loving Father who took pleasure in watching His children at play, but the awful Judge who saved or damned pitilessly, in whose eyes human enjoyments were an abomination. Whatever their faults the Middle Ages were never sad. That is a modern vice, largely the result of our unbalanced piety.

c. *In the attitude towards Nature.*

A last test remains. Rather an indirect, but I venture to hold none the less sure,—*i. e.*, a man's attitude towards nature. How does nature affect him? It is a commonplace with modern writers that the medieval man was insensible to nature; that he had lost the classic gift of interpreting it; that he did not enjoy nature as we do to-day. A word as to the correctness of these statements.

As mere statements of fact they are false. Your medieval man *did* love nature passionately. The knights going to the tournaments bedecked themselves with flowers; likewise at their banquets. Most of their lives were spent in close contact with nature. They practically lived out of doors. Their pleasures were almost exclusively out-door sports, like hunting and riding. And what more ardent lovers of nature has the world ever seen than Francis of Assisi and Catherine of Siena, who would talk to the field-larks and sit for hours weaving garlands of flowers. Wordsworth himself never loved a flower more passionately.

But the above statements are true in this sense, namely, in so far as they indicate a difference of interpretation of nature. Upon Francis and his contemporaries nature had the same influence as upon children. They loved it for its own sweet sake and romped about it with all the abandon of happy innocent natures. Why? Because they *were* children. They were, as I have already pointed out, yet young peoples to whom the classic disgust of life as well as modern maudlin sentimentality were equally unknown.

But we? How does nature affect us? We are introspective. We love a flower no longer as a child does, but as a mature man with a sort of mild-minded melancholy. The freshness and innocence and beauty of hue and shape are alas! only too often but symbols of our own lost innocence, of departed ideals, shattered hopes, general disillusionment of all the beauty which shrouded us about when *we* too were children by our mother's knee.

Now, of the two attitudes which is the healthier? The

answer is ready enough. Ah! Yes! Wordsworth is indeed nature's Poet-Laureate, but to understand him well you must first have been by affliction touched and saddened; you must first have lost much of that childishness that beams on the faces of Angelico's angels and which runs like a child's laugh through the measures of a troubadour's lay.

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This then, is the second great characteristic quality of all medieval life—sanity, health, which is itself but the outcome of essential harmony. I will close this somewhat tedious description with a remarkable quotation from a monograph on "Botticelli," by A. Streeter. Speaking of the "Quattrocento" he says (p. 29):

"It was an age of affirmation the immediate impulse was to reject nothing that had ever claimed the allegiance of the human heart but to reassert all things afresh and harmonize them into fuller concord. And their characteristic effort was to combine all antagonistic ideals sanction the full and equal development of man's nature alike in its spiritual, its intellectual and its physical aspect. This effort found its most logical expression in what is known as the Humanistic Philosophy of which Pletho, Ficino and Pico were eminent exponents, and the essence of which has been defined as the belief that nothing that has ever interested living men and women can wholly lose its vitality. . . . The whole struggle of the early Renaissance was the struggle to find a mode of escape which should not involve the integrity of their actual beliefs and which should satisfy the highest needs of the spirit of man, while it yet allowed free scope for the uncontrolled development of his intellectual and imaginative powers. This in the realm of reason inspired the Humanist philosophy in its laborious efforts to reconcile paganism and Christianity."

We can add that such was the inspiration back of all medieval life. Otho with his dreams of a universal Empire, Aquinas writing his stupendous *Summa*, Urban preaching the

Crusade, Pico dello Mirandola discoursing at a Florentine Academia, Dante penning the *Divina Commedia*—all were inspired by a veritable passion for unity in which all things were to be harmonized and assigned their proper sphere. And though their magnificent dreams proved futile in much, nevertheless, the very effort stamped medieval character with a sanity, a sturdy robustness, a fine sense of perspective and general mental and moral health such as humanity has never since known.

III. NAÏVETÉ.

There is a third and last general characteristic of medievalism which must be noted if we are to adequately cover the ground. A quality far more delicate than the preceding, and for that reason perhaps more pleasing; a something which perhaps leads us to the very intimate heart of hearts of the Middle Ages. I call it for the want of a better word "naïveté," a sort of sweet, childish innocence or happy boyish abandon and literalness which were a direct result, rather the ultimate expression in detail, of the preceding deeper characteristics—of its idealism which clothed in spirituality everything from an Emperor's crown down to a flower or an insect; of its sanity which, like Jacques, saw good in all things and carelessly sucked the honey of joy from them or at least looked with a child's wondering interest upon them, however insignificant, because they were harmonious parts of a great wonderful creation, in which they were all somehow intimately related one to another in a universal harmony of an all-seeing Divine Providence, parts affecting one another even when apparently disassociated, as they would be to our modern separatist and narrow method of microscopic observation.

For instance what could be more absolutely medieval and at the same time less modern than that exquisite tale of "Our Lady's Tumbler"—the poor acrobat who, as a penitent monk, not being able to sing in choir or in fact to perform any useful function, sought to please God and His sweet Mother with the

one only art he knew—that of tumbling before her statue as he was wont to do in the old wandering sinful days. How exquisitely simple and naïve! Yet how wise with the wisdom of the lilies of the field who just grow lovely in the warm sun and rains of spring—the only thing they know how to do—and yet Solomon in all his glory envied them and their simple faith and beauty. A modern circus rider converted would rather give up his one art thinking to please God by dully imitating the more educated, stripping his human heart of all its joy and grace in a vain awkward attempt to force it into the common mold, losing sight of that great truth so firmly grasped by the medieval mind that all things however mean and small have their use in God's sight—the very spirit of encyclopedism.

Or take the story told by Cæsar of Heisterbach (*Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of European History*. Edited by Dana Carleton Munro. Vol. II, No. 4, p. 19) about the little church built by bees for the consecrated Host which their owner placed in the hive to induce them to raise more honey. To a modern how superstitious! And yet what a great truth underlies the story. The truth that all things from God Himself down to the lowest in His creation are indissolubly linked by bonds of faith and love and obedience; that even the insects recognize their God, even as the burning bush near which stood Moses, and the Red Sea waters that divided at God's command—a truth somewhat childishly expressed but none the less a truth. And then too, how deliciously naïve! We moderns after all hunger for this same childish imaginative ecstasy when we adorn our green Christmas trees, pleasing ourselves with the temporary illusion of Santa Claus often with our eyes dim for brooding over our lost childhood. But your medieval man was ever a child, his heart ever young and light, his imagination ever fresh—because of his great faith that saw God in all things.

Even the dry officialdom of the Church was inspired by the same naïveté. Take for instance the formula of "Excommunication of Animals" (*Ibid.*, Vol. IV, No. 4, p. 25). A modern

listens aghast to an ecclesiastic gravely cutting off from communion with the Church of God the locusts and caterpillars that were laying waste the vineyards of Troyes unless the aforesaid pests departed from the same within six days or else amended their ways. The editor, being a modern, takes occasion to refer to the "tendency of excommunication to become a mere curse or magic rite"—that is all he can see in this instance. And yet how much delightful simplicity and poetic imagination and childish trust in Providence are also contained therein? What a sublime conception of the nature of the Church of God whose firm hand, with such tremendous audaciousness and infinite self-confidence born of faith in her divine mission, could stretch not only up to an Emperor and tear off the crown from his unworthy brow but also down to the very insects of the vineyards and bid them serve the human creatures as their Creator intended they should. What a marvellous grasp of the logical interdependence of all things in the scheme of Divine Providence. How magnificent, even if boyishly expressed, faith beside which our modern separatist concept of creation seems so small, so illogical, so disturbed, so bewildering. Then, too, how sweet! Ah! here again—it is like watching the little children playing about the Christmas tree or looking for Santa Claus stealthily creeping in through the moon-lit windows laden with toys. Yes! *that* is what we have lost—the eternal youth and childishness and boyish imagination and light-hearted joy that go with a magnificent faith. But the laborers in the vineyard at Troyes had it and I warrant they were happier and, with all due respect to the modern editor and critic, were more "enlightened."

And this spirit of naïveté runs through all the life of those wonderful centuries. The old Saxon Chronicler sees the devil "making his way" south-west towards Canterbury; Fra Salimbene wanders up and down Europe with his keen eye ever detecting the fun in life albeit he forgets not his rosary or his office; Francis of Assisi preaches to the little fishes and calls the "jewel-bedecked water" his sister and the "generous" sun his brother; Catherine of Siena, when not in consultation

with Cardinals or Popes, weaves garlands for herself and daughters out of daisies and sits among them in the fields singing for sheer joy.

In the heart of all these people whether king or pauper, monk or troubadour, runs a song. Vigorous though they were, yet somehow we cannot help looking upon them so often as just rollicking boys and girls or little children playing (somewhat roughly at times) in the big glorious garden given them by their heavenly Father ere He called them back to eternal rest in His beautiful home up in the sky-land.

CONCLUSION.

Such then were the three characteristic qualities of the medieval man—idealism, sanity, joyous simplicity; they mark off distinctly a man of the days of Hildebrand from a man of Cicero's days and from every man since Luther's day. There is nothing like him in the world's history. And now, looking back at him in the light of our own mistakes, can we not say that with his passing much has gone out of life that was very beautiful and very great and strong? True, we have grown older and richer and crammed with more actual knowledge, but has not humanity gained these material blessings at a terrible expense of the spiritual such as I have described? And are we not perhaps the weaker for it?

Because I call the medieval man an idealist, a child, do not draw the false conclusion that he was thereby a weakling, an impracticable dreamer, an unsophisticated idler. Why, it was precisely this idealism and simplicity of soul that gave him such tremendous strength and courage. Mark you all that he did. He carved modern European nations out of the fragments of the ruined Roman Empire, civilized the barbarous hordes that had ruined it, wrote new languages, elaborated new systems of government, discovered a newer art and architecture and philosophy, cleared the forests into fructifying fields, blazed new routes of commerce—laid the foundations for everything that we have to-day; did more than any other man

did before or has since done and did it under difficulties which to us now seem simply unsurmountable. No stronger type of man can be found in history's record. And what made him strong were precisely this healthy idealism which ever made him aim high and this boyish simplicity which kept his heart stout and undismayed by difficulties.

So then if the human race has lost these qualities—and surely we have largely lost them—then it seems just to temper our pride with the sober reflection, that, with all our progress and inventions and increased store of knowledge, we have lost much that was both beautiful and strong. Yes! We have lost much. We have lost the key to the unity of life in our mad specialism. Religion has become divorced from the practical affairs of life; art a pastime of the wealthy; work mere drudgery; politics the profession of the ward-leader; philosophy a hopeless labyrinth of irresponsible elucubrations; the once glorious world-wide Church of Christ a jargon of sects, some of them bordering on the fantastic and blasphemous—everywhere and in all things there is confusion and in consequence a strange soul-hunger. Our wealth and our knowledge are poor substitutes indeed for the idealism of a Godfrey and a Hildebrand and a Fra Angelico. Like the classic pagan of Cato's or Cicero's day, we grow ever more and more restless even with the world at our feet, or like King Midas we starve amidst our riches.

LUCIAN JOHNSTON.

BOOK REVIEWS.

The Life of Cardinal Vaughan. By J. G. Snead-Cox. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1910. 2 vols. Pp. xii + 483 and 498.

The author of this biography of Cardinal Vaughan has kept faith with his readers in giving as he promised in the Preface "an absolutely candid book, without reserves and without suppressions, describing the man as he was, in his strength and in his weakness, with his gifts and his limitations." The plan which is followed of grouping the activities of the Cardinal under appropriate headings rather than following the strict chronological order of events, though without absolutely abandoning the natural sequence, allows the reader to form his own judgment regarding the character and purposes of the Cardinal as they were manifested in different emergencies. With abundant documentary sources in the form of letters and diaries of the most intimate character which unquestionably were never intended for publication, it was a comparatively easy task to reveal in a strong light the career of the English boy who ended his days as the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. No effort is made to exalt either his spiritual or intellectual attainments and no praise or flattery attached to the large measure of success which crowned his efforts. The two large volumes are made up of thirty-two chapters, all or nearly all of which are chapters in the history of contemporary English Catholicism. While the aims and ambition of the Cardinal confined his work very largely to the grinding routine of the missionary priest and bishop, the circumstances in which he labored called forth at times the manifestation of qualities which cannot fail to affect profoundly the destinies of Catholicism at large. He had no aims except for the well-being of religion and the spread of education. He established a missionary college to prepare apostles for the heathen and he strove incessantly to provide for the spiritual needs of the Catholics at home. With no endowment from nature or training to become a leader in diplomatic or intellectual circles, he shirked neither diplomacy nor controversy when the interests of religion were at stake.

For those who are not intimately acquainted with the condition of Catholicism in England or especially interested in religious or educational matters there, the chapters which will prove most entertaining

are those which deal with the Founding of the Missionary College and Society at Mill Hill and those which concern the promulgation of the Bull "*Romanos Pontifices*" with which Bishop Vaughan was so closely connected. The main interest of the book, however, is the personality of the man himself. His character and his creed were simple. "Herbert's Vaughan's simple rule of conduct, his easy test for Catholic loyalty was always and under all circumstances, to stand on the side of Rome. Instinctively in any controversy he would be for the Pope against all comers. To uphold and strengthen the authority of the Vicar of Christ was one of the guiding motives of his life." His actions reveal him as a singular combination of reserve and impetuosity, of ascetism and detachment joined with the most practical and businesslike instincts. He dreamed great dreams but he worked hard and successfully to make those dreams come true, and he possessed wonderful powers for collecting money. Speaking of his success in finding funds for the Cathedral in Westminster, his biographer says with truth, "Certainly among the assets of the Catholic Church in this country during the closing years of the nineteenth century the personality of the Cardinal Archbishop was not the least important." It is only natural that the Cardinal's position in matters of general interest to the Church should at times have aroused opposition and that his decision of character and a habit which he referred to himself as a "liking for prodding his neighbors" should have raised up opponents for him; but the delicacy and tact with which those things are related ought to save the susceptibilities of those who were most opposed to him. For one distant in time and place and consequently unable to understand the fine shading of character or the minute points of controversy which are described, this biography produces an effect, which will probably be the verdict of history, when time has softened any animosities that may have arisen during the lifetime of the Cardinal, and when his monument will be found in the enduring effect that his life and zeal made on the Catholicity of England. He revived the spirit of missionary activity and gave it permanent form in his great society of Mill Hill; he established a noble cathedral as a center for the liturgical life of the Church, and he has left the memory of a career of sincere piety, of noble and unselfish effort, and of unswerving devotion to high purposes. While very little is said regarding the Cardinal's family—in fact with the exception of the first chapters, the names of none of his relatives appear except incidentally, the description of his saintly mother is the finest portion of the work and the key to all the rest. Eliza Vaughan, to

whose piety and example the Cardinal owed everything, deserves to rank with the nobler women of an earlier time, Monica and Macrina, to whose influence the roster of Christian saints owes the names of Augustine, Basil and Gregory.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Le quinzième centenaire de S. Jean Chrysostome (407-1907)
et ses conséquences pour l'action catholique dans l'orient greco-slave, par le P. Cyrille Charon. Ouvrage publié par les soins du comité romain des fêtes du centenaire. Collège Pontifical Grec, 149 Via del Babuino, Rome. Pp. xvi, 413.

This remarkable work from the pen of P. Cyril Charon was published during the past year under the auspices of the Committee in charge of the celebration in Rome of the fifteenth centennial of St. John Chrysostom. The preface is by the Rev. Hugo Athanasius Gaisser, O. S. B., the learned president of the Greek College in Rome. The book is divided into six chapters and has appended an interesting collection of documents and official papers and a statistical table of the Byzantine Church, both Catholic and separated; fourteen illustrations adorn the work.

The first five chapters are devoted to a description of the well-known festivities which took place in Rome at the end of 1907 and the beginning of 1908, in which Pius X not only assisted but took an active ceremonial part, and that in Greek, in the Liturgy which takes its name from the Saint. This act by which the Holy Father showed his solicitude for the countries of Oriental Rite, cannot fail to have a powerful and far-reaching influence on Catholic action in the Greco-Slavic Orient. There is much of interest to the churchman and especially to the liturgist in these vivid descriptions of the imposing ceremonies which graced the celebration. The detailed account, especially of the Eucharistic service, containing text and translation, is invaluable for purposes of comparative liturgical reference.

Chapter VI—nearly one-half the work—deals with the prospective effects of the celebration. Under different headings are treated: the history of the famous Patriarchal See of Constantinople with all the causes of its growth and decadence; the manifestations of unity, Christian charity and Apostolic life in the Orthodox Churches; the various schisms in the Orthodox Church; a comparison between the Uniate Byzantine Church and the separated branches; and finally the progress being made at present towards unity.

The conclusion is in harmony with the rest of the book; it is a touching appeal for prayers for the reunion of the Churches. The constitutional era just being inaugurated in the Ottoman Empire seems to justify hopes for a more fruitful action of the Holy See in the Orient in the near future. Though this work may seem to the casual reader optimistic in the extreme, still to one acquainted with the Eastern Churches it is sufficiently conservative and full of interesting and important material.

PAUL SANDALGI.

La Vie et la légende de Saint Gwennole, texte publié par Pierre Allier. Paris, Librairie Bloud et Cie. s. d. Pp. 63. Prix, 0, fr. 60.

It is impossible to write the history of Brittany in the fifth and sixth centuries without devoting a large part of it to her Saints. Most of them fled from Great Britain before the invading Angles and Saxons, and appeared in the country at the head of migrating tribes. They not only evangelized the land of their adoption, but cleared the forests and became the founders of numerous towns. One of the most illustrious was Gwenno^lé (Winwallus) the most popular of Breton Saints. His life was written in the ninth century by Wrdisten, one of his successors, Abbot of Landévennec, a monastery founded by him. The biographer derived his information from oral tradition and existing written documents. Pierre Allier publishes in modern French Wrdisten's Life together with what is known as the legend of Ys. His purpose was not to give us a critical edition of the text, but merely to place before the reader an account of the life and the miraculous deeds of Gwenno^lé, and he has produced a charming little book.

N. A. WEBER, S. M.

Liturgie. I. **La Dédicace des Eglises**, par Jules Baudot. 3^e édition. Paris, Librairie Bloud et Cie, 1909. Pp. 64.

II. **Le Pallium**, par Jules Baudot. 2^e édition. Paris, Librairie Bloud et Cie, 1909. Pp. 64. Prix, 0, fr. 60.

These works form part of the popular liturgical collection published under the direction of Dom Cabrol, the learned abbot of Farnborough. The "Dedication of Churches" treats exclusively of the more excel-

lent and permanent form of dedication, viz., consecration. It is divided into two parts, of which the first deals with the intricate problem of the historical development of the consecration ceremonies, and the second considers, in as many chapters, the canonical, liturgical and symbolical aspects of the present rite. A similar division obtains in the little study on the "Pallium." After a brief description of its nature, the author considers, in two parts, its historical and its liturgical aspect. Although the use of the pallium is, by right, reserved to the Sovereign Pontiff, it was, at a comparatively early date, granted as a mark of special favor to archbishops and other prelates. An ecclesiastical ornament of minor importance thus helped to strengthen the bond of union between the hierarchy and the Apostolic See. Numerous references enhance the value of both studies. They are not always, however, for practical reasons, we presume, references to the latest and best editions of the works cited.

N. A. WEBER, S. M.

Jehanne la Pucelle, Revue documentaire bi-mensuelle, Organe du Comité de la Statue Monumentale de Jeanne d'Arc. 6 Rue Garancière, Paris.

This alert bi-weekly, devoted solely to the glorification of Joan of Arc, has more than fulfilled the promises of its inaugural issue of January last.

One of its winsome features is the critical editing of precious MSS. that have long lain in the dust of public libraries, within the sole reach of archivists and antiquarians. Thus Canon Dunand is at present publishing serially through the pages of the magazine the oldest extant life of the youthful Saint: "Histoire inédite de la Pucelle d'Orléans, par Edmond Richter.—MSS. de 1628." Other documents are forthcoming that will make clear many of the obscure details of this brief but epoch-making life. Studies of exceptional interest also from the pen of the scholarly Canon are: "La Chronique Morosini"; "Après le Procès de Jeanne d'Arc: l'attitude du Saint Siège de 1431 à 1450"; etc.

Every number contains a review up-to-date of the publications which are monthly added to the three thousand works already written on Joan of Arc.

What, however, gives the Review its original character is that it gathers up the choicest thoughts of writers of the whole world,

inspired by the supernatural beauty of Joan of Arc. America is represented by Archbishop O'Connell's masterly articles and by Miss Rose E. Cleveland's delicate and uplifting portrayal of the valiant Maid. Poets and scholars of every tongue and tribe have promised their collaboration.

Besides being a scientific and literary contribution to the study of Joan of Arc, "Jehanne la Pucelle" is also the organ of the "Comité de la Statue Monumentale de Jeanne d'Arc." It is the staunch hope of this Committee to erect to Joan of Arc a statue of heroic size that will rival the statue of Liberty of New York Harbor and the Charles Borromeo Monument near Lago Maggiore. After much deliberation a high hill at the gate of the City of Rouen has been selected as the site upon which the bronze image of France's saintly Liberator will stand, an inspiration to every Catholic and patriotic heart. This bold project has secured the whole-hearted approval of the most distinguished members of the hierarchy in every land and the devoted coöperation of influential Catholics in both hemispheres.

It is hoped that such a noble idea will gain a wide notoriety and a still more generous support.

JOHN DELAUNAY, C. S. C.

Theories of Knowledge: Absolutism, Pragmatism, Realism.

By Leslie J. Walker, S. J., M. A., sometime Professor of Philosophy at Stonyhurst College. New York, Longmans, 1910. Pp. xxxix + 696.

This is a valuable addition to the "Stonyhurst Series" already so well and favorably known to students of scholastic philosophy. In content and method, however, it differs from the volumes which have preceded it. They, or most of them at least, should be classed as text-books, and have been used with success in the class room of philosophy. The volume before us is written, apparently, for the advanced student, and enters into contemporary controversies in philosophy with such a wealth of detail and elaboration of argument that one is more inclined to set it over against Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, Schiller's *Studies in Humanism*, and James' *Pragmatism* than to give it a place beside Maher's excellent text-book, *Psychology*. Philosophical literature of this kind is very much needed. The case for scholasticism cannot be adequately argued in a text-book, in which pedagogic principles have the first claim. A certain amount of room is required in an up-to-date exposition and defense of scholastic teach-

ing, room for explanation, room for illustration, and room for refutation of current philosophical errors. This latest volume of the Stonyhurst series is on the roomy plan, and the author is to be congratulated on the success with which he has used the space at his disposal. The secondary title, "Absolutism, Pragmatism, Realism" indicates the range of topics discussed, though it does not, of course, show the details of the arrangement, some of which, for instance, the psychological analysis of cognition and the metaphysical conditions of knowledge, are among the most important contents of the volume.

The style of the work is pleasing and not too over-laden with technicalities. It is worthy of special commendation that the author, although he is quite familiar with the writings both of the absolutists and the pragmatists, has escaped the influence of the stylistic extravagances of both schools. In quotation and in exposition, naturally, he is obliged to use the jargon of the Bradleyites, and condescends occasionally to the linguistic unconventionalities of James, or to the latest phraseological façon of Schiller. In his own statement, however, and in his argument, he uses the technical language of the schools, which is neither so abstruse as that of absolutism nor so journalistic as that of pragmatic humanism. He is a proof that it is possible to be a philosopher, even a scholastic philosopher, and write good English.

It would be invidious to call attention to minor flaws in a work of undoubted merit. When, however, one reads that "Sensations as such are neither true nor false, but only become so when integrated into percepts and referred to objective Reality" (p. 28), one would like to know whether, in the author's view, a sensation may not be referred directly to its objective cause, and so become true without having been first integrated into a percept. And does not Vailinger (p. 77 and Index) stand for the well known Kantian editor and critic, Vaihinger? Again, one wonders whom the author means when he refers (p. 567) to "the French pragmatist M. Sauvage," and gives a quotation from the "Rev. Métaph et Morale, 1901, p. 144." Finally, are we to take the remarks on pp. 350, 351 as an admission of the real distinction between essence and existence in created things?

WILLIAM TURNER.

S. Thomas d'Aquin, par A. D. Sertillanges, Professeur de Philosophie à l'Institut Catholique de Paris. 2 vols. Paris, Alcan, 1910. Pp. vii + 334 and 348.

This latest contribution to the series entitled *Grands Philosophes*, which is edited by Abbé Clodius Piat, Professor of Philosophy at the Catholic Institute of Paris, brings the total number of volumes of the series up to seventeen. The publisher of the series is the well known Paris house of Alcan et Cie, and the prices of the volumes range from five francs to seven francs and a half. The volumes before us are from the pen of Father Sertillanges, the Dominican, who for several years has held the chair of scholastic philosophy at the Institute, which in everything but name is the Catholic University of France.

Father Sertillanges' work cannot be too highly recommended to all who are interested in scholastic philosophy. In writing it he had, he tells us, a twofold purpose in view. He wished, in the first place, to enlighten those Thomists whose admiration for their master is sometimes a matter of sentiment rather than a result of discriminating study, and he desired, in the second place, to present the Thomistic system of philosophy in such a way as to enlist the interest of those whose leanings in philosophical matters is towards some other master besides Thomas, or (as they think) towards no master at all. To expect that this twofold purpose shall be fulfilled to the letter would be, perhaps, to expect too much. We have no doubt, nevertheless, that Father Sertillanges will attain his purpose, at least in part. There is much in these volumes to enlighten the Thomists, and there are many things that will not fail to interest even the opponent of scholasticism. The exposition is clear, the defence able, and the illustrations well chosen. There is just a sufficiency of erudition, enough for thoroughness and not enough to give the impression of display. The style is easy, and brings to the reader the conviction that only in French could the thoughts of St. Thomas be expressed so vividly and at the same time so concisely. Much as we need a work of this kind in English, the man who tries to render Father Sertillanges' paragraphs into English paragraphs of the same length will set himself no easy task. For the student who reads French there is, so far as we know, no better introduction than this to the study of the text of St. Thomas' philosophy.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Etude sur l'imagination auditive de Virgile, thèse présentée à la Faculté des Lettres de Paris par F. X. M. J. Roiron, S. J. Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1908. 8o. pp. iv + 690.

ΚΡΙΤΙΚΑ ΚΑΙ ΕΞΗΓΗΤΙΚΑ περὶ τριῶν ΟΤΕΡΓΙΑΙΟΥ ΣΤΙΧΩΝ A 10.857, 4.430, 0.242 ΚΑΤΑ ΚΑΙΝΗΝ ΜΕΘΟΔΟΝ ΠΕΙΡΑΣΑΜΕΝΟΣ τῷ τῆς ἐν Παρισίοις πανακαδημείας Μουσείῳ παρέθηκε Φ. Ξ. Μ. Ι. ΠΟΙΡΩΝ ἐκ τῆς ΕΤΑΙΡΕΙΑΣ ΙΗΣΟΥ. ΕΝ ΠΑΡΙΣΙΟΙΣ. Ernest Leroux, 1908. 8o. pp. ii + 94.

In the second of these theses, entirely written in Greek, the author proposes to illustrate from three verses of Vergil's *Æneid*, a new method of textual criticism, the principles of which he has already established in the first thesis. The new method seems to consist in applying to variant readings the test of two laws of the Vergilian style discovered by Fr. Roiron, to wit, the resumption of words (analeipsis rêmatôn) and the coupling of words (syneirmos rêmatôn). Vergil was in the habit of repeating over again in a given passage one or more words or syllables either entirely identical or at least similar and often in the same order; as for instance the word *nomen* which occurs five times in some form or another in a series of nineteen verses (E. 6. 758-776), *lactus*, three times in thirteen verses (G. 3. 310-322) and three times also in eleven verses (G. 3. 375-385). In E. 9. 733-751 we find *micantia* and *emicat*, *media* and *mediam*, *Turnus* and *Turnum*, *incipe* and *excepere* (both containing *capio*), *dextram* and *dextra*, *immania* and *immani*, *intorquet* and *detorsit*, *viribus* and *vi*, *telum* and *teli*, *uolnus*, *uolneris* and *uolnere*, etc. If now we turn to the first passage selected by the writer for his demonstration,

. attollit in aegrum
se femur et, quamquam uis alto uolnere tardat

we find that it belongs to just such a series of analeipseis rêmatôn as we have just described. This series begins E. 10. 846 and winds up E. 10. 864. *Uolnus* reappears four times, *uictus* or *uictor* three times, *uiuo* four times (all beginning with the syllable *ui* or *uo*, a favorite recurrence in Vergil). The reading *quamquam uis* in the verse 857 seems now required to complete with *uiam uis* of verse 864 this remarkable series of resumptions of

words as well as of syllables, while the reading *quamuis* would contribute solely to the analepsis of syllables. But not only does Vergil resume in this way favorite words or syllables. He likes also to repeat them in conjunction with one another (syneirmos rêmatôn). For instance *nitor* and *hasta* are often repeated coupled together in wide apart passages. Thus also *uis* and *uolnus* and *uis* and *tardare* which again is in favor of the reading *quamquam uis*. The presence of *uis* as a separate word in the verse in question not only eliminates the proposed readings *tardet* and *ardet*, but makes the reading *quamquam* certain, thus doing away with the necessity of supplying a missing word as *dolor(alto)* or *ex(alto)*.

This will suffice to give an idea of the nature of Fr. Roiron's thèses, both of which ought to be read carefully by all interested in Vergil's stylistic.

H. HYVERNAT.

La religion assyro-babylonienne, conférences données à l'Institut catholique de Paris, par le P. Paul Dhorme des frères Prêcheurs. Paris, Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1910. 12o., pp. xii + 319.

This volume, the second of the *Etudes palestiniennes et orientales*, published by the Librairie Victor Lecoffre, may well be considered as a partial expansion and a complement of the *Etudes sur les religions sémitiques*, by Fr. Lagrange, in the sense that Fr. Dhorme treats exhaustively, but from the same high point of view, one of the several semitic religions so masterly sketched by the learned Director of the Ecole pratique d'études bibliques, at Jerusalem. That Fr. Dhorme was well qualified to undertake the treatment of so difficult, and we might add, of so abstruse a subject as the one to which this volume is devoted, is evidenced by the universal commendation his *Choix de textes religieux assyro-babyloniens* had received in orientalist circles.

The book with which we are now concerned represents a course of nine lectures delivered before the Institut Catholique de Paris, during the past summer, only somewhat more developed and supplemented with quite an array of notes and references to the sources. These, however, are presented *en bloc* at the end of each

of the lectures to which they severally belong, so as not to frighten the general public, for whom the book is intended as well as it is for the specialist. The author does not attempt to treat all the aspects of the religion of the Assyro-Babylonians. He has deliberately excluded from his plan mythology, magic and divination, the importance of which, in his estimation, has been much overrated by his predecessors too anxious to prove that all religions have slowly evolved from the crudest forms of animism and fetishism. He has rather endeavored to bring to light the essentials of religious psychology with the Assyro-Babylonians, their ideas on divine beings, the relations they professed to exist between the gods and the world, the sentiments of fear and piety that religion aroused in their hearts, and how such sentiments influenced their public and private life. The book is clearly conceived and carefully written, which does not detract from its scientific character. We cannot but commend it to the attention of all students of religious antiquities and in particular to scripturists and students of apologetics.

H. HYVERNAT.

I have intended for some time writing a general review of the several volumes published in the *Nouvelle collection d'Etudes Bibliques*, by Père Lagrange and his confrères of the *Ecole pratique d'études bibliques* at Jerusalem. Owing to various circumstances I have not yet been able to carry out this design, and lest the readers of the *Catholic University Bulletin* should suffer from further procrastination, I now wish briefly to mention, at least such of those volumes as to the matter of which I am less incompetent.

- 1°. *Etudes sur les religions sémitiques*, par le Père Marie-Joseph Lagrange des Frères Prêcheurs, deuxième édition revue et augmentée. Paris, Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1905. 80., pp. xvi + 527.

The author studies more particularly the aspects under which the Semitic religions stand in more striking resemblance or contrast with the religion of the Israelites. The fact that this work was crowned by the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres speaks highly for its merits.

Points treated: Origin of religion and mythology, the Semites, the gods and goddesses, saintliness and impurity, sacred things and persons, sacrifice, the dead, Babylonian myths (cosmogony, poem of creation), Phenician myths.

- 2°. *Le Messianisme chez des Juifs* (150 av. J. C. à 200 ap. J. C.), par le P. M.-J. Lagrange des Frères Prêcheurs, Paris, Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1909. 8o., pp. viii + 349.

I have myself too much to learn from the author on Messianism, to do aught but encourage others to read it.

Divisions of the book and chief points treated: I. Messianism according to hellenistic Jewish writers (Josephus and Philo). II. Messianism according to apocryphal Apocalypses.—Cosmic eschatology (temporal, transcendental); Messianic eschatology (historic, transcendental); synthetic eschatology. III. Messianism according to Rabbinical Phariseism,—kingdom of God; future life; resurrection; Messianic times; the Messiah (coming of Elias; names, nature of the Messiah; the Son of Man; manifestation of the Messiah); the suffering Messiah and the Messiah son of Joseph.—Apocalyptic and rabbinism compared. IV. Messianism in action.—Attitude of Judaism toward the Gentiles; attitude of the masters toward Christianity (opinion of rabbis on Jesus; discussions between rabbis and Christians); Messianic disappointments (after the ruin; wars under Trajan; Messianic war; Judaism in Arabia).—Epilogue.—Various documents Greek and Hebrew.—Indices.

- 3°. *Canaan d'après l'exploration récente*, par le P. Hughes Vincent des Frères Prêcheurs. Paris, Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1907. 8o., pp. xii + 495.

By *exploration récente* the author understands above all the excavations uninterruptedly carried on in Palestine since 1890, mainly by the Palestine Exploration Fund and the Deutscher Palestina Verein; and also all surface archaeological investigations for the past fifty or more years. The treatment is perfectly thorough and the exposition is remarkably clear.

Divisions and chief points treated: History of research in Palestine, and general archaeological principles (introductory)—Canaanitic cities (how situated, built and fortified); Places of worship in Canaan (pre-Canaanitic of the neolithic period and Canaanitic sanctuaries); idols, cultural objects and religious practices; the dead (sepultures of various periods—neolithic, Canaanitic, Israelitic; the tomb and its furniture, funerary offerings)—Ceramic of various periods (indigenous up to XVI. century; Aegeo-Canaanitic, XVI-XII. century, Israelitic, XII-IX. century, Judeo-Hellenic, IX-v. century. Geology and prehistoric archaeology; the place of Canaan in general history—copious indexes of Biblical quotations, contents and illustrations.

- 4°. Choix de textes religieux assyro-babyloniens, transcriptions, traduction, commentaire, par le P. Paul Dhorme des Frères Prêcheurs. Paris, Victor Lecoffre, 1909. 80., pp. xxxvii + 406.

Biblical scholars who of late have heard so much of the great profit that can be derived from the modern discoveries in Babylonia and Assyria for the right understanding of history as contained in the Bible, will certainly welcome a book which allows them to study the most important religious texts of those two ancient countries in their forms as definitely established by the latest and best critics. The texts transliterated into the current modern alphabet are accompanied with a French translation and a philological commentary. They include such documents as the poems of creation, various cosmogonies, all the texts relating to the deluge, the epic of Gilgamesch, the myths of Etana and Adapa, the descent of Ishtar to Hades, various psalms and hymns and several other religious texts. Most of those documents are to be found in the *Mythen u. Epen* of Professor Jensen. Here, however, they are more complete and the author had the advantage of some valuable recent publications. The book opens with a general introduction and closes with an index of the proper names.

- 5°. Le livre des Juges, par le P. Marie-Joseph Lagrange des Frères Prêcheurs. Paris, Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1903. 80., pp. xlviii + 338.

The sections of the introduction concerning textual criticism and chronology of the book of Judges as well as the French translation and philological commentary, are excellent. All we can say of the section on literary criticism (not being competent in that line) is that it contains a luminous exposition of the many various theories so far excogitated to solve the much debated question of unity of composition in this book.

H. HYVERNAT.

MISCELLANEOUS.

ECCLESIASTICAL MUSIC AT THE UNIVERSITY.

The Catholic University has this year undertaken the work of creating a school of genuine ecclesiastical music, with a view to putting into practice the earnest wishes and the wise legislation of Pius X. Its new Instructor in Ecclesiastical Music, the Reverend Abel L. Gabert, was born August 4, 1861, at Longechenal in the diocese of Grenoble, France, and from his earliest youth has been an ardent student of religious music. After his ordination to the priesthood in 1884 he was for ten years music professor, organist and choirmaster in the College of La Cote Saint André. Later, his bishop, Monsignor Fava, sent him to Paris for more thorough training. For seven years he was organist and choirmaster at Notre-Dame-du-Travail, and for six years at the important church of St. Peter's Neuilly-sur-Seine, a large suburb of Paris. In 1907, at the invitation of his friend, the late Dean Flynn, he came to the United States as choirmaster for the Church of the Assumption, Morristown, New Jersey.

In all, Abbé Gabert has devoted some thirty-five years of his life to the science of ecclesiastical music. He is a disciple of the Spanish "maestro" Joseph Alemany, one of the great masters of religious music, a man of profound knowledge, noble character and pure faith, and of Alfred Rabuteau ("Grand Prix de Rome" in 1868), both of whom led the young composer through all the mysteries of the highest musical processes. The Gregorian Chant always found in the Abbé Gabert a resolute and skillful champion, especially since the appearance of "Les Melodies Gregoriennes" of Dom Pothier. He is a specialist in Gregorian Chant, and for three years (1898-1900) conducted his own review, the "Avenir de la musique sacrée," and is now one of the writers on the new "Revue gregorienne française" of Dom Mocquereau. He is intimately convinced, however, that daily practice is far better than any amount of writing. In the College of La Cote Saint André he transformed into a large choir his community of 200 pupils, and had the whole community every day singing choral music in four parts, to say nothing of their beautiful Gregorian perform-

ances during liturgical offices. In Notre-Dame-du-Travail, Paris, along with the work of choir training, he developed in a high degree the practice of congregational singing. At Morristown, N. J., on feast days, he added a large gallery choir to the regular sanctuary choir. His fluency of musical composition is an efficacious auxiliary to his musical apostolate: indeed, as he wrote the music for his many singers, he was able to utilize fully their abilities, without ever going beyond them. The masses he wrote for the double choir of Morristown are a striking illustration of the musical possibilities afforded by any parish of medium standing.

The leading idea of Father Gabert's life is "A Musical High School and Academy, for the benefit of the clergy, in order to provide some priests, were it only one in each diocese, with the highest religious musical training and to make them, each one in his own neighborhood, leaders in ecclesiastical music, in connection with the central Academy, the secondary duty of which would be to unify, and direct, and protect the whole body of musical workers." Since 1892 Abbé Gabert has cherished this idea and in 1894 interested so deeply his own ordinary, Bishop Fava of Grenoble, that he sent the young musician to Paris to prepare for the work. But the politico-religious condition of France forbade the execution of his plans, and after thirteen years' service in two of the larger churches of Paris he came to this country at the invitation of his friend, Dean Flynn of Morristown, N. J., and in that parish for the last four years acted as organist and choirmaster. He retained, nevertheless, his original hopes for the creation of a central school of ecclesiastical music, and when in October, 1910, he was called to the Catholic University, there seemed a chance of realizing the plans of twenty years' standing.

In the United States, so far, there are few, if any, places, in which our future organists and choirmasters may receive their proper musical training; and there are no places where they may specialize in Gregorian chant and Liturgy. The Catholic University of America seems the best place for the creation and development of such a school.

Meanwhile the special duty of the new Instructor in Ecclesiastical Music is to prepare the way and to quicken the time, and that by musicalizing the place itself where the work is intended to start. His first care has been to gather the musical forces of

our affiliated Religious Houses, and to put them in touch with one another. On October 4, some fifty students had a meeting in Divinity Hall for the preparation of the solemn opening of the University with the Mass of the Holy Ghost, October 9. They were handed plain-chant books of the Vatican Edition, and invited to practise the pure Gregorian Chant. Several of our affiliated Religious Houses had already followed the pure Gregorian Chant for years; and the Musical Instructor was delighted to realize that these students were able to sing very well at sight. The Mass of October 9 was a success. Every Sunday the High Mass is sung according to the same Vatican Edition, in our Divinity chapel, by our Divinity students, with the help, by turns, of one of our Religious Houses: in this way, the Gregorian training will progressively pervade the whole body of the University, and heighten its liturgical life.

Unfortunately, the Divinity chapel is very small, as it was intended only for Divinity Hall, and we are obliged to limit the number of our singers for ordinary offices. If we had a large chapel, we could every Sunday gather a very large male choir of clerical and lay students, and afford splendid liturgical offices, in accordance with the importance of the University. God grant us the large chapel of our dreams, and the Gregorian training will take on in this place a wonderful development. Just now, the general gathering of our musical forces cannot take place, except on the more solemn feasts that bring together the whole University.

The rehearsal of October 4 gave Father Gabert an idea of the musical capacities of the University. For the Feast of the Immaculate Conception, December 8, he planned the composition of a mass in figured music, for male voices in two choirs: first choir, tenor I, tenor II, and bass; second choir in unison for voices of medium range. On October 5, he started his composition; on October 26, the vocal score was printed; and immediately, all the groups of singers, including many lay students, were invited to rehearse apart, then to attend general rehearsals during the last days before the feast. This new mass, inspired by the good will of our students, and written for them, and enthusiastically prepared by them, added a special interest to our feast of the Immaculate Conception. It was the first attempt of the kind in this place: let us hope it will not be the last. Sometimes good works are symbols, and the new mass seems to represent the cohesion of the apparently scattered, but really well connected,

musical forces of the University. In many of our parishes the choristers sing, and the congregation listen and do not participate in religious singing. Now a mass for two choirs is an open invitation to congregational singing. In many of our seminaries, a select body of a few students practise plain-chant or figured music, while the community itself refrains from musical exertion and training in spite of the importance of such a matter for future priests: a mass for two choirs is a direct invitation to community singing.

The new mass composed for the University, with its second choir in mere unison of medium ranged voices, would be very practical and effective in seminaries, the select singers singing the first choir, and the community devoting their care to the second. In matters of the kind, the main point is to get easy music, adapted to the voices, written for the purpose. And this is precisely the case with the mass written for our students.

When the full score of this mass is published the *Catholic University Bulletin* will make known the fact. We may add that the growing enthusiasm of our students for true Gregorian Chant allows the Abbé Gabert to begin in January, a series of lectures on the traditional music of the Church, its history, nature and practice. In this way some at least of our future parish priests will be enabled to control and help the work of their organists and thus aid in carrying out the wishes of our Holy Father Pius X for the restoration in all churches of the true ecclesiastical music.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Public Lectures. Shortly after the opening of the University the free public lectures, which during the last Academic year proved so attractive to the students and also to the people of Washington, were resumed. The Fall course, which has just closed, consisted of a series of seven lectures, three of these being a study of the life and writings of Dante. All were given before a very large audience and were well received. The lecture of Bishop Burke, of St. Joseph, Missouri, on Dante and The Papacy, was an admirable apology for the Catholic faith of the great Florentine exile. Bishop Burke, it is well known, has few if any superiors in the English-speaking world in all that pertains to the writings of Dante. He is equally esteemed at home and abroad for his intimate knowledge of all Dante texts. Dantists of the calibre of Professor Poletto, the well known commentator on the *Divina Commedia*, hold in the highest esteem both the erudition and the judgment of Bishop Burke on all questions connected with Dante and his times. A very large attendance from the city of Washington gave evidence of the attractiveness of the subject, and all present were delighted with the Bishop's handling of it. The students, in particular, were present in large numbers and a very large delegation from Trinity College enjoyed this rare treat. It is worthy of note that during 1910 six Dante lectures have been given at the University. They form an excellent introduction to the study of the great Catholic poet, philosopher and theologian, and for the first time gave him due public honor at the National Capital. The following is a list of the lecturers and their subjects:

October 20—Spanish American Literature.

REV. CHARLES W. CURRIER, PH. D.

October 27—South America: Its Peoples and its Problems.

REV. CHARLES W. CURRIER, PH. D.

November 3—The Development of Writing and Printing.

MR. FREDERICK B. WRIGHT.

November 10—Italian Literature before Dante.

JOSEPH DUNN, PH. D.

November 17—Dante and The Papacy.

RT. REV. MAURICE F. BURKE, D. D.

December 1—Symbolism of Dante.

REV. WILLIAM TURNER, D. D.

December 15—Some English Women Writers of the Fifteenth Century.

PATRICK J. LENNOX, B. A.

During the next three months the following lectures will be delivered, forming the Winter Course of Public Lectures:

January 5—The Catholic Church and the Prohibition Movement. [Father Matthew Lecture.]

VERY REV. A. P. DOYLE, C. S. P.

January 12—The Ruined Cities of Asia Minor. [Illustrated.]

DAVID M. ROBINSON, PH. D.

January 19—The Work of the Public Library in the District of Columbia.

MR. GEORGE F. BOWERMAN.

January 26—The Power of Example in Temperance Reform. [Father Matthew Lecture.]

REV. PETER J. O'CALLAGHAN, C. S. P.

February 2—Socialism: An Interpretation.

REV. WILLIAM J. KERBY, PH. D.

February 9—Is the State a Divine Institution?

REV. JAMES J. FOX, S. T. D.

February 16—Medieval Guilds and Education.

VERY REV. EDWARD A. PACE, S. T. D.

February 22—George Washington.

CHARLES H. MCCARTHY, PH. D.

March 2—Economic Significance of Socialism.

FRANK O'HARA, PH. D.

March 9—Moral Aspects of Social Problems.

REV. JOHN W. MELODY, S. T. D.

March 16—The Doctrine of the Fathers on Private Property.

VERY REV. CHARLES F. AIKEN, S. T. D.

March 23—The Materialistic Interpretation of Early Christian History.

REV. P. J. HEALY, S. T. D.

March 30—Communist Societies in America.

CHARLES H. MCCARTHY, PH. D.

Mr Herbert G. Squiers, formerly United States Minister to Panama and a convert to the Catholic Church, has donated two Scholarships, worth Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars each. These Scholarships are available to worthy lay students for a period of ten years. The present holders are Edward Dan-

naher of Nashville, Tenn., and Vincent Scully of Albany, N. Y. Mr. Squiers has chosen a most efficient way of rendering service to the Catholic Church. Our non-Catholic universities abound in such means of helping, entirely or in part, worthy youth. It is notorious that many of the men now foremost in every walk of American life obtained their collegiate education through the aid of some generous patron. It is to be hoped that many Catholics will follow the admirable example of Mr. Squiers and endow in perpetuity or by annual gift numerous scholarships for the deserving graduates of our Catholic high schools and colleges.

The Catholic Educational Review. An important step forward has been taken by the University in arranging for the publication of a periodical dealing with the problems of education from a Catholic standpoint. "The Catholic Educational Review" will appear in January and each month thereafter with the exception of July and August. It is primarily an outgrowth of the Department of Education which the University Trustees desire to build up; but in its larger scope it will include all that affects the welfare of our Catholic schools, academies and colleges. It will also give due consideration to the various movements in the educational field, to methods, historical questions, current discussions, new textbooks and courses of study. Quite naturally, the teaching of religion will hold a prominent place in its pages. Generally speaking, the aim is to keep our teachers informed in regard to everything that marks an advance in education and at the same time to insist on Catholic principles as the soundest that any school can adopt.

What first suggested this publication was the desire of the University to make its work helpful to the thousands of devoted men and women who are keeping alive the spirit of Christianity in our parochial and elementary schools, to uphold them in their struggle against materialism and in their keen competition with other schools. The project was therefore explained in a circular sent out last summer; and it is very gratifying to note

that it met with cordial approval on all sides—the Hierarchy, the religious orders and the pastors who bear the burdens of our most important institution, the parochial school.

From foreign countries also, notably from the Bishops, the most encouraging letters have been received, showing that, as Catholics, we have a common cause, of world-wide interest, to support. There is, consequently, every reason to hope that the new "Review," while it is an evidence of progress on the part of the University, will find ample justification in the service it renders to education of the right sort, to religion and to the Catholic Church.

New Instructors. Two new members have recently been added to the teaching staff of the University. Mr. J. B. Parker, a graduate of Ohio State University and formerly of the Kansas State Agricultural College, has been appointed instructor in the Department of Biology. His courses, for the present, deal with general biology but gradually will extend to various important fields of special biological research. Mr. Amri Brown, a graduate of Harvard (1902) has been appointed instructor in the School of Law and together with Judge De Lacy carries on the undergraduate work of this Department. There are at present seventy-four students, graduate and undergraduate, attending the courses in Law. Besides his regular classes in Law, Judge Robinson, Dean of the Law School, is at present conducting a course for priests on the Law of Personal and Family Rights and next semester will give his usual course in Legal Oratory. Judge Robinson is one of the most distinguished of our American law teachers, a convert to the Church of many years standing, and when called to the University at its inception was one of the most beloved professors in Yale University. He is the author of several text-books, the latest of which, "Elements of American Jurisprudence," is one of the manuals most largely used by students of law in all parts of the United States.

NECROLOGY.

REV. AMBROSE McNULTY.

The Alumni of the Catholic University of America, especially those of them who were among the first students at Caldwell Hall, will learn with deep and sincere sorrow the news of the death of Father Ambrose McNulty at St. Paul, Minn. Ambrose McNulty was born at Darwin, Minn, in 1869. He made his early studies at the school of his native district, from which he went to St. Thomas' College, St. Paul, and later to St. John's University, Collegeville, Minn., for his studies in classics, philosophy and theology. The years 1890-1891 he spent as post-graduate student of theology at the Catholic University of America. After his ordination in 1891 he was successively pastor at Ortonville, Minn., assistant at St. Joseph's Church, St. Paul, and secretary to Archbishop Ireland. In 1896 he was appointed pastor of St. Luke's Church, St. Paul, where he remained, honored, revered and loved by all his parishioners until his death, November 28, 1910. He was for many years editor of the *Northwestern Chronicle*, in the editorial pages of which he gave evidence of unusual ability as a writer and a thinker. With great talents of the intellectual order he combined exceptionally amiable qualities of heart. His career was singularly successful in the lines of duty marked out for him; his priestly zeal, his ready sympathy, his power to make and keep friends, and his splendid courage amid many sufferings marked him as an exceptional man whose natural gifts and acquired accomplishments were devoted without stint to the service of God and of His Church. Father McNulty was a faithful friend of the Catholic University, and by word and deed promoted its interests whenever he had an opportunity of doing so. May his gentle, generous soul rest in peace!

MICHAEL CUDAHY, Esq.

By the death of Michael Cudahy, Esq., at Chicago, November 27, the Board of Trustees has lost one of its most devoted members and the Catholic University a sincere friend and a signal benefactor. His rugged but direct and natural character, his honesty of purpose and action, his gifts of perseverance and organization, and his business foresight and courage are too well known to insist on them here. Despite the temptations of great wealth he never ceased to live as befitted a sincere Catholic, and by word and example gave evidence at all times that his religious faith was a living and efficient element of his daily life. From its inception he was a generous benefactor of the Catholic University which owes to him the Michael Cudahy Chair of Mathematics, improved library facilities, and frequent contributions to its support. Unostentatious in manner and frank and simple in speech, he was always deeply concerned for the superior training of our younger clergy, and was wont to say that he considered it the most important part of the work of the University. He has left behind him something more durable and worthy than earthly possessions, the memory of an upright, believing soul, a heart that was never closed to the needs of the poor and the lowly, and a life replete from beginning to end with good deeds whose number is surpassed only by the quiet, self-effacing way in which he executed them. May he rest in peace!

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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit.* c. 6.

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THE NEW SCHOOL OF AMERICAN HISTORIANS.

PART I.

During the past summer many important works were added to our library of American history. Of these accessions perhaps the most useful are the twenty-seven volumes entitled, *The American Nation: A History. From Original Materials by Associated Scholars.*¹ This coöperative work was edited by Dr. Albert Bushnell Hart, an eminent professor of history in Harvard University. An advertisement informs the reader that the editor was advised by committees representing several historical societies. These volumes, prepared by specialists, are designed to form a consecutive history of the United States. Those that appear to require notice will be examined in the pages of *The Bulletin*.

The first volume of the series, the *European Background of American History*, was prepared by a very competent scholar, Professor Edward P. Cheyney, of the University of Pennsylvania. An appropriate portrait, Henry, Infante of Portugal, has been chosen for the frontispiece. Much is suggested by his armorial cross and by his motto, *talent de bienfaire*. Henry the Navigator, indeed, may be fairly regarded as the author or originator of continuous modern geographical discovery. His work will presently be noticed.

¹New York and London : Harper & Brothers, Publishers.

In the idea of introducing a work on American history by an ample narrative of conditions preceding the era of Columbus there is nothing new. Such a method of treating United States history was in the mind of this writer when, in 1892, he prepared for *The Catholic World* an article entitled, "The Church as A Geographical Society." That re-study of familiar topics was not printed, however, until 1897, and it is mentioned now merely to show that in many Catholic schools something of the subject matter of Professor Cheyney's interesting book has long been taught. Moreover, an examination of this old essay will show that while it ascribed to the apostolic spirit of the Catholic Church a considerable share in the extension of geographical knowledge, this new book places the chief emphasis upon the influence of commerce. Were the writer to re-state his conclusions, he would put a little more stress on the influence of commerce and scientific curiosity in making known the extent of the world, but with his present information he could not assign to the missionary spirit a smaller share in effecting the result. Though the essay was brief, it suggested an ample field. Indeed, several of the topics then noticed have not been considered in Professor Cheyney's splendid summary. *His* volume looks forward to the Columbian discovery of America, and in justification of his method it might be readily admitted that the contact of Irish monks with the island of Iceland was so early in point of time and so remotely connected with the Columbian discovery of America that any principle of composition which would require its inclusion would also necessitate at least a brief account of the siege of Troy. With an account of the influence of the apostolic spirit of the Christian Church in extending the limits of geographical knowledge the sojourn of Irish monks in Iceland is very closely connected. It was, in fact, an emanation of missionary zeal, and it does not diminish the merit of that act even if Iceland's shores had been trodden still earlier by Norwegian castaways.

Though a discussion of Norse activity in Iceland, Greenland and Vineland might seem to lie within the scope of this volume,

that interesting episode is passed almost without observation. The reason for this is plain. Professor Cheyney does not believe that traditions concerning Vineland had any influence on the mind of Columbus, even if he had ever visited Iceland and had learned there something of the contents of those sagas that mention the voyages to *Vineland the Good*. In ecclesiastical history this epoch is of very great interest, and in the extension of geographical knowledge it forms a very important chapter. Taking for a guide the fine monograph of the Jesuit Fischer it would have been easy to prepare a few pages concerning Iceland, Greenland and Vineland, in that part of our planet the lonely outposts of Christianity.

School children generally arrive somehow at the conclusion that before the great era of discovery Europeans knew little of Asia beyond its western coast. As a matter of fact, they had learned much concerning its extent, its resources and its people. After a perusal of the *European Background of American History* no writer of a school history of the United States will have any excuse for his failure to devote at least a few pages to the actual condition of geographical science during the boyhood of Columbus. This, however, was not the only topic that the plan of Professor Cheyney compelled him to discuss, and of necessity he could sketch this part of this theme only in outline. This he has done admirably.

What the people of southern Europe knew of the orient has been skillfully summarized in his chapter on "Italian Contributions to Exploration (1200-1500)." The work of the Neapolitan Friar, John de Plano Carpini, is briefly related. There is also included a sketch of William de Rubruquis, a Fleming sent by Louis IX to visit the Mongol emperor. Odoric de Pordenone and John of Monte Corvino are also named. The author tells us that they wrote rather full accounts of India, of southern Asia and even of China. In this connection the article in *The Catholic World* might have suggested to Professor Cheyney a page that would have been new to most of his readers. Among other things, it says that Marco Polo "had scarcely quitted his royal employment at

Pekin when, in 1295, a Franciscan friar, John of Monte Corvino, began his labors in the most populous part of the pagan world. Years of sacrifice and toil were finally rewarded by a multitude of converts; the faithful missionary was joined by numerous coadjutors, and, soon after, consecrated Archbishop of Pekin, then called *Cambulac*. The beginning of the fourteenth century saw Christianity flourishing in all the principal cities of eastern China; the fair province [of Cathay] was illuminated by the light of the gospel, and it then seemed as if the religion and civilization of Europe was about to become permanently established among the disciples of Confucius." For the remainder of this strange story the reader is referred to *The Catholic World* of February, 1897. From this excerpt he will be at no loss to understand why people in Avignon and in Rome knew so much about Cathay.

The activity of Italian explorers in the west also is properly emphasized. The author mentions Cadamosto, Columbus, Cabot, Verrazzano and Vespucci and states that they were simply the most famous. In developing this thought he says: "Educated men from Venice, Genoa, Pisa and Florence emigrated to other lands, carrying with them science, skill, and ingenuity unknown except in the advanced and enterprising Italian city republics and principalities. Italian mathematicians made the calculations on which all navigation was based; Italian cartographers drew maps and charts; Italian ship-builders designed and built the best vessels of the time; Italian captains commanded them, and very often Italian sailors made up their crews; while at least in the earlier period Italian bankers advanced the funds with which the expeditions were equipped and sent out."

Another interesting section discusses the "Pioneer Work of Portugal (1400-1527)." Of course this chapter is chiefly devoted to the explorations directed by Prince Henry. It is sufficiently ample, but it is rather unfortunate that the author does not emphasize one of the most important of the influences that sustained Henry during his two-score years of continuous interest in discovery. That prince promptly conveyed to the

Pope an account of his discoveries, solicited an approval of these enterprises, and, foreseeing that many voyages would follow, prayed for a "concession in perpetuity to the crown of Portugal of whatever lands might be discovered beyond Cape Bojador to the Indies inclusive," especially submitting to His Holiness that "*the salvation of the natives was the principal object of his labors.*" It should be remembered that Prince Henry died in the year 1460, yet he states distinctly that one of the objects of his systematic exploration was to reach the Indies, that another, and a principal one, was "the salvation of the natives." In the frontispiece his portrait shows an armorial cross. Those captains whom he sent from Point Sagres, says Professor Cheyney, marked by "stone pillars six feet high" the limits of their successive voyages along the African shore. According to very good authority these stone pillars were *crosses*. It may have been what the author calls the somewhat "grotesque piety of the fifteenth century" that marked the progress of discovery by the emblem of Christianity. But what was the motive that led on June 1, 1491, *more than fifteen months before the discovery of America*, to the dedication by the Portuguese of a Catholic Church on the banks of the Congo?

The development of the African slave trade is mentioned in the same connection. It might have been added that not a few of the negroes were brought to Portugal, carefully instructed in the Christian faith and returned to their old homes to do missionary work among their respective tribes. The expectation of results from these efforts appears to have been disappointed. Unfortunately this was not the only purpose for which negroes were kidnaped. As the narration of these facts fixes upon a Catholic nation the odium of developing that detestable traffic, it should have been stated that the institution of human slavery has been condemned by a long line of Popes. Bancroft examined the record and Wendell Phillips ratified that historian's conclusions. Races that have, as well as races that have not been accused of "grotesque piety" imitated and even surpassed the Portuguese in organizing this unnatural

trade. Both France and Spain were implicated, and, if the writer's memory be not at fault, Hawkins' vessel, the *Jesus*, engaged early in the guilty traffic. The career of that connoisseur in negroes suggests the existence elsewhere, and at a time far later, of something resembling "grotesque piety." One may be allowed to suspect that Turner's *slave ship* was suggested by occurrences beyond the sphere of Portuguese influence. It is a familiar fact of our colonial history that the Dutch were the first to offer *negars* for sale in Jamestown. Even in the twentieth century it needs no microscopic eye to discover traces of the grotesque in any one of a multitude of creeds. To a considerable extent the matter seems to depend upon one's point of view. All this was very clear to the keen insight of Robert Burns.

Orthodox, orthodox,
All who believe in John Knox, etc.

The author's interesting discussion of the pioneer work of the Portuguese would have been a little improved by the addition of at least a brief notice of the attempts of early Genoese mariners, the brothers Vivaldi and others, to explore the African coast. Those voyages, it is true, were made more than a century before the Portuguese took up the work. The spirit of research that marks our own age may yet recover some dusty parchments that will establish a more substantial connection between the early explorations of the Italians and the later maritime activity of the Portuguese. It is not a little suggestive of Italian enterprise in that early age that the very decade (1290-1300) which saw Friar John of Monte Corvino treading a dangerous path through Tartarian wilds to his destination at Pekin also beheld Ugolino de Vivaldi, a Genoese seaman, following southward a perilous course along the shores of Africa.

It was not seriously to be expected that a non-Catholic author, even a scholarly one, would see all these topics precisely as a Catholic writer would, or, seeing them, that he would estimate them as of the same worth. It is true that they are

equally impressed by the remarkable enterprise of the Portuguese. Nevertheless, one considers slavery the economic basis of African exploration, and in his account gives it the place of prominence, while in the enthusiasm of Prince Henry and his successors the other perceives motives less sordid and more powerful. Remembering many achievements of those times, he would linger with pleasure on the force of scientific curiosity, on the passion for fame and on the hope of converting to Christianity countless multitudes of heathens. The expectation of territorial accessions and the hope of ultimate profits from the oriental trade might fairly be classed as economic motives. To a Catholic the participation of the Portuguese in the African slave trade seems no more than a tragic episode in the mysterious drama that the centuries were unfolding.

In different ages there have doubtless been Catholics of nearly every station who have declared their belief in human slavery, and not a few, perhaps, who have labored to perpetuate the institution. Nevertheless, it has not been the policy of their Church nor has it been the teaching of their great moral leaders. Slavery, indeed, is far more ancient than the Christian Church. It was chiefly the commercial greed of the Portuguese that led them temporarily to turn aside from exploration and legitimate trade. At the very worst, they did not continue forever to sport with Amaryllis in her tropic shades. They resumed their lawful enterprises and by means no less honorable than those of rival nations built up a splendid colonial empire. Moreover, in this peculiar Guinea trade they appear to have been, even in their palmy days, mere retailers compared to those later *entrepreneurs*, who developed the business on a bolder and grander scale.

The author's succeeding chapter, "The Spanish Monarchy in The Age of Columbus," is not inferior in interest to any of those that have been discussed. Among other topics it considers very fully the *hermandads* or brotherhoods, quasi-military societies revived after the accession of Isabella. The objects of their organization, as well as their powers and functions, are correctly stated. It would seem that the reader is

carefully prepared for a very important announcement, but the matter is not even alluded to. Nor has its consideration been adjourned to the third volume of the series. We are told that the *Santa Hermandad* was empowered to lay and collect taxes, and the author should have added that it was from the treasury of this useful society that Isabella obtained the funds with which to equip the first expedition of Columbus. If there is any event in the European background of American history that is intimately connected with the discovery of the New World, it is that which relates to the manner of financing this memorable enterprise. Oftentimes the assertion is made that "it was not jewels but Jews" that furnished the funds for the equipment. In his exhaustive volumes John Boyd Thacher has made popular the documentary proofs concerning it. "In the archives of Simancas," says that author, "are still preserved the account books of the Hermandad, whose treasurers were Luis de Santangel and Francisco Pinelo."² Thacher pays a high compliment to the Spanish Jews, the converted as well as the unconverted; he describes with much detail the various systems by which they were punished; the murder by them of Canon Arbués, the chief Inquisitor, and the confiscations that followed. Indeed, his digression on Spanish Jews extends about as far as the rules of rhetoric would justify. Nevertheless, though he mentions Luis de Santangel, the Escribano de Racion, and Gabriel Sanchez as important among the *dramatis personae*, nowhere does he state that the cost of that expedition was borne, or even in part subscribed to, by members of that enterprising race.

The entire fund may be divided into two parts, viz., the *one eighth* part contributed by Columbus himself and the *seven eighths* supplied by the Crown of Castile. It is not known from what source Columbus received the one eighth that, it is universally admitted, was advanced in his behalf. It has been surmised that it was obtained from the Duke of Medina Celi, who was himself greatly interested in exploration, and whose guest Columbus had been for nearly two years

² *Columbus*, I, p. 457.

preceding the voyage of discovery. With the royal seven-eighths it is different. This portion came from the treasury of the *Santa Hermandad*, and there are several records of the transaction.³

In one of the account books of Garcia Martinez and Pedro de Montemayor, constituting Bulls of the Bishopric of Palencia from the year 1484 and following, Navarrete found this entry:

"Dió y pagó mas el dicho Alonso de las Cabezas (tesorero de la Cruzada, en el Obispado de Bajadoz) por otro libramiento del dicho Arzobispo de Granada, fecho 5 de Mayo de 92 años, á Luis de Santangel, Escribano de Racion del Rey, nuestro Señor, é por él á Alonso de Angulo, por virtud de un poder que del dicho Escribano de Racion mostró, en el qual estaba inserto dicho libramiento, doscientos mil maravedis, en cuenta de cuatrocientos mil que en él, en Vasco de Quiroga, le libró el dicho Arzobispo por el dicho libramiento de dos cuentos seiscientos cuarenta mil maravedis que hobo de haber en esta manera: un cuento y quinientos mil maravedis para pagar á D. Isag Abrahan por otro tanto que prestó á sus Altezas para los gastos de la guerra, *é el un cuento ciento cuarenta mil maravedis restantes para pagar al dicho Escribano de Racion en cuenta de otro tanto que prestó para la paga de las carabelas que sus Altezas mandaron ir de armada á las Indias, é para pagar á Cristobal Colon que va en la dicha armada.*"⁴

In English the italicized part of this entry reads: "and the 1,140,000 maravedis remaining to pay the said Escribano de Racion on account of a like sum which he loaned to pay for the caravels which their Highnesses ordered to go as a fleet to the Indies, and to pay to Christopher Columbus, who went in the said fleet." Luis de Santangel, a converted Jew, in his capacity as an officer of the Hermandad advanced the seven eighths contributed by the Crown of Castile. He did not put his hand into his own pocket, as John Fiske conjectured, but merely loaned money of which he was one of the custodians. This *with interest* was subsequently repaid to the Hermandad.

³ Thacher's *Columbus*, I, pp. 457-463.

⁴ Thacher's *Columbus*, I, p. 459.

Professor Cheyney tells us nothing of all this, though he does find space for an account of that characteristic Spanish institution, the Inquisition. *That* is treated at length because of its supposed connection with the decline of Spanish glory.

Other contemporary records show that it was *by* the *Santa Hermandad* that seven eighths of the sum necessary for the equipment was furnished, and that it was *to* this organization that the sum of 1,140,000 maravedis was repaid. This amount included interest, which at that time seems to have been paid as well by sovereign as subject. The historian Thacher assumes that the cash cost of this famous expedition was:

Advanced the enterprise by the Crown of Castile, .	1,000,000 maravedia.
Advanced the enterprise by Christopher Columbus, .	167,542 "
Total,	1,167,542 "

The same authority has undertaken the very intricate task of converting this sum, 1,167,542 maravedis, into its present equivalent in United States money. On that subject he says that the actual amount expended was \$7,203.73, and that "it is doubtful if \$80,000 would to-day accomplish what was then done." ⁵

It is highly probable that the researches of the future will throw still more light upon the details of the equipment. Even now we know the names of the intrepid companions of Columbus, and from ship-boy to captain can calculate to within a dollar or two what was paid to each. "Not jewels but Jews:" it goes sore against us to spoil a flashy phrase, but, like the Ancient Mariner, the muse of history rests uneasily until her tale is told.

In its conquering age Spanish heroism performed memorable deeds. It broke the military spirit of the Caliphs and saved Gaul not only from a second invasion but from possible Mahomedan domination. In the first quarter of the fifteenth century there was in France no Charles Martel, and the shepherdess of Lorraine might have found it a far more difficult task to

⁵ Thacher's *Columbus*, I, pp. 480-490.

expel a Moorish, than it actually was to defeat an English army. The capture of Constantinople in 1453 struck terror into the powers of Central Europe but that event, though momentous in its consequences, was almost balanced by the fall of Granada nearly forty years later. By engaging the enemy in Spain, the other states of western Europe were free to carry the war into the land of the Saracen and the Turk. Thereafter, Europe was not often in danger from the hordes of Asia. When it was menaced, the chivalry of Spain was conspicuous among the defenders of Christian civilization. With the gallant Venetians and the legions of the Pope the Spaniard met the Turk at Lepanto. Other victories not less renowned were won on other fields.

Spain discovered a new world; she opened up to European commerce the trade of the Pacific and she circumnavigated the globe; her dauntless mariners traced the winding shores of the Atlantic from Nova Scotia to Cape Horn and the coast of the Pacific from Magellan's Straits almost to the Columbia. Spain, too, introduced into northern Africa most of those elements of civilization that are now to be found there. In the New World she established an empire stretching from the prairies of the Missouri to the plains of Patagonia. These achievements are among the venerable commonplaces of history.

In the field of early exploration, 1492-1576, the triumphs of England and of France seem insignificant if compared with those of Spain. In conquest and in colonization they were as far behind her. It was not in its New World seminaries of learning, though they were numerous and, for the time, admirable, that Spain stood, as she did, without a peer. It was in her grand endeavor to lift millions of Indians in their aboriginal forests to the plane of European religion and civilization, one of the grand achievements of recorded time.

This is not the Spain of our day nor is it the Spain that Americans have been taught to know. The country so familiar to us was the tender nurse of Anti-Semitic prejudice, the country whose entire literature is comprised in a fantastic story by Cervantes, and whose military glory commenced and cul-

minated in the exploits of General Weyler. The adventurers that crowd and jostle one another in the pages of our school books, and of whom, even yet, a few survive in the columns of our Sunday newspapers, were monsters of cruelty, who destroyed in America two civilizations each superior to their own. Such a nation could easily and with impunity be despoiled of its honors and its triumphs. The *real* Spain is as different from this caricature as were the Christian churches, founded by the Spaniards, from those fearful Aztec temples that forever smoked with human sacrifice and dripped with human blood. *This* was the spiritual side of the civilizations effaced by the *conquistador*.

Spain broke down in the endeavor to achieve what no nation, ancient or modern, has ever attempted. For the loss of her colonial dependencies she consoled herself by the reflection that before surrendering them to mankind she had implanted in them the elements of civilization. It needs no prophetic eye to behold the future of Latin America and to see in that part of the globe the development of colossal nations.

Amidst the wildernesses of mighty continents, on unnumbered islands in the watery waste, in remote and unknown archipelagos the Spaniards sought to civilize a multitude of races of whom even the most advanced had scarcely attained to the upper stages of barbarism. In that grand undertaking they fell short of perfect success. If, to-day, there are to be found in the former colonial empire of Spain millions of dusky people with a tincture of civilization, let them, and let their rulers thank the patient, toilsome friar. With his acknowledged limitations this spiritual hero achieved in apostolic fields triumphs as unique as they were grand. In a little while he will everywhere be superseded in his sublime office. To him the new missionary methods speak feebly. The rush of innovation affords no breathing-space for readjustment. Let him continue still to face his old horizon and with radiant nimbus pass onward into the realms of light.

It has long been known that members of the oppressed Jewish race were friendly to the projects of Columbus but it

is only within recent years that there has been any serious attempt to represent his grand achievement as a result of Jewish philanthropy or Jewish foresight. At this moment there are indications that such an endeavor is encouraged. Men of much enthusiasm and of some scholarship are making the American people familiar with the idea that it was not the rulers and the natural leaders of Spain but the stranger within her gates that patronized the most memorable of maritime expeditions. The friendship for Columbus of a few members of their race is a fine circumstance of which Jewish people generally may well be proud. The incident, however, is no more than a brief and fleeting scene in a drama of many acts. In all the great maritime movements that preceded the discovery, the share of the Jews may be set down as almost a negligible quantity. In all the great nautical events that followed it, they were not more conspicuous. Of course, intelligent Jews were to be found among the crews of many enterprises of that great epoch, but they were serving in stations more or less subordinate. They did not furnish the mathematicians, the cartographers, the naval architects, the captains or even the bankers concerned in those ventures. Collectively the exceptions form no lengthy list.

The species of historical interpretation that seeks to withhold from the Latin races the renown that they have won in the field of geographical extension pleasantly reminds us of that school of literary criticism which isolates Shakespeare and then endeavors to understand him. It has developed an ingenious and indefatigable band of mutineers, who have misapplied their talents and forged for our entertainment Baconian and other extravagant theories. If we would understand the art of gentle Shakespeare, we must first become familiar with the great literary movement that extended from the days of his boyhood to the accession of Charles I. Shakespeare was the greatest representative of our greatest literary epoch; possibly he *warbled his native wood-notes wild*, though we don't believe it, Milton to the contrary. Not a little of Shakespeare's poetry was surpassed by the best work of the ablest of his predecessors.

Though in the great bulk of his writings he towers above them all, he does not stand apart—preëminent and unrelated. Columbus, too, was a product of his times, the greatest among a giant race of nautical heroes. He was not, however, the only mariner of that day who voyaged through strange seas. Five years after the discovery of America, Vasco da Gama, when only half-way to India, had made a voyage which, in its extent, surpassed any that Columbus had ever known. Still later Magellan performed a deed of equal note. The Portuguese explorations, suggested no doubt by those of the Italian mariners of the thirteenth century, had no connection with the cherished projects of Spain. Indeed, one of their expeditions to India discovered South America as early as the year 1500. In other words, the Portuguese made an independent discovery of our southern continent. That epoch was one of marvellous nautical activity among several of the Latin nations. The maritime glory of England, of France and of Holland had not yet reached its full noon-day splendor. It was Italy, Portugal and Spain that were then winning renown in the field of exploration. The aims, the ambitions, the achievements of navigators were merely the elements of mighty movements—movements that disdained the control of obscure sects, of cities, of councils or even of governments; mysterious forces that were broadening all the realms of knowledge.

Of all its sections perhaps that most valuable part of this book is that which treats of the system of chartered commercial companies, 1550-1700, and the more important of the colonizing companies. By his power of condensation the author carries his reader over large and sometimes pathless tracts of literature. His sketch of *The Protestant Reformation on the Continent* does not, of course, discuss the causes of the revolt of Luther but it does set forth clearly how the spiritual unrest from 1500-1625 influenced the character of those continental emigrants who had concluded to build new homes in America. There is likewise a good outline of the religious wars in the Netherlands and in Germany. The progress of the Reformation in England and the rise of Puritanism are concisely related.

As an acquaintance with the author's introductory chapters is nearly indispensable to the acquisition of any scientific knowledge of the political history of the United States, so will his concluding sections on local government in England (after 1600) be of great assistance to students of our constitutional history. The final chapters offer to the reader a splendid epitome of those units of local government that were soon to reappear in modified form in the North American colonies of England.

Many readers of American history have doubtless observed that the time-honored method of introducing it has been marked by more or less abruptness. The writer believes that, at least in part, our civilization has descended from the foremost files of time and that if we are to comprehend it, we must search out and examine the early memorials of the nations. As it has been with civilization so has it been with many epoch-making events, they have been matured by the process of the centuries.

While engaged, nearly twenty years ago, in a study of Bancroft and other historians of our colonial era, the writer was impressed with the isolation of American history and then suggested some of the older movements with which he believed it to be connected. Now that this idea has had the practical approval of academic authorities he may be pardoned for quoting from an almost forgotten essay.

Every thoughtful student of American history must have observed with surprise the abruptness with which it is invariably introduced. This criticism applies with equal force to all writers upon the subject, whether eminent or obscure. A brief eulogy upon the genius and character of Columbus, a rapid sketch of the more important voyages of the Spanish, English, and French navigators, and the reader finds himself, after the perusal of a few pages, entertained by a minute and often a tedious narrative of the struggling settlement at Jamestown. The hardships endured by the early colonists taught them to rely upon their powers, and accustomed them to those habits of self-government that laid the foundation of their future greatness. Indeed, if we wish clearly to comprehend the growth of civil liberty in America, no fact in any way affecting the first settlers is too insignificant to be recorded, and no objection is made to the fullness which characterizes nearly every work on this portion of our country's history; but if it be granted that the career of the United States has exerted an influence upon the progress of liberty and civilization, the nature of the forces which made known to

Europeans the existence of a new world is worthy the most patient investigation. Of the causes which led to the discovery of America at least one was remote; others had their origin long before the birth of Columbus. An attempt to trace the growth of all would form a lengthy introduction to a history of the United States. The historian must commence at some point, and it is objected only that he begins too near the middle of his subject.⁷

The study from which is quoted the preceding paragraph touched lightly the early voyages of the monks, the impetus given to discovery by the Crusades, and the splendid labors of the Franciscans in China. The essay also noticed the maritime activity and the religious zeal of the Portuguese, as well as the motives that solemnized the dreams of Columbus and Magellan. Many, *but not all* of these themes have been treated by Professor Cheyney. More than that, he has discussed them with fairness and ability.

The first volume of this new history of the United States is welcomed for the improvement that it brings, for its sincerity, for its scholarship. The reader will not fail to observe that though men of many nations participated in early overland journeys or in maritime exploits, the Italians far surpassed all other races. They were equally active in the remote East and in the seas beyond the Pillars of Hercules. With a few exceptions their adventures have been carefully described. It was not unreasonable to expect that a mass of testimony so overwhelming as that collected by the author would force him to pause in his labors long enough to record his admiration of a race that in our time it has not been the fashion to praise. Believing, apparently, that glory is an insubstantial thing, he writes without emotion, and prefers to let his muster of facts declare Italian intelligence and enterprise in the long epoch from the middle of the thirteenth to the beginning of the sixteenth century. Be it so. If the temple of History is guarded by the Angel of Research and the Angel of Meditation, Italy has little to fear from the chroniclers of the future.

A similar enumeration of achievements shows Portugal to have been a ready pupil of the progressive Italian states and

⁷ *The Catholic World*, Vol. LXIV, p. 602.

to have accomplished works that to a less enterprising posterity must look like miracles. Less gifted descendants have not husbanded the grand inheritance transmitted to them, and the vast colonial empire founded by the immediate successors of Prince Henry, of Diaz and of Gama has been lost forever.

When Italy had trained the nations in navigation, the trident passed into the strong hand of Castile; thereafter epoch-making events traced their clear signatures upon the scroll of history. In recording even these the author's pen is touched by no gleam of inspiration. He announces the wonders of the modern world in a style as tranquil as if he were describing some trifling improvement in the rotation of crops.

This severely scientific method would have been justified, if the author were relating the triumphs of imperial Rome with her 120,000,000 people. Great deeds would have been expected from her boundless power. The style would not have been inappropriate if he were enumerating the successes of France, when for a quarter of a century she defied the might of continental Europe. It would not have been a theme for criticism, if he had been recording the splendid deeds of our own favored republic, in extent greater than the Rome of the Cæsars and almost as great in population. One could not fairly object to his manner, if he had been preparing for us a synopsis of German achievement. From the fine intelligence and the high social efficiency of that great nation we have a right to expect, whether in war or in peace, a long list of victories. With the least among these great states the Spanish monarchy of the era of Ferdinand and Isabella is not for a moment to be compared. Though in area somewhat large, its population, diminished by centuries of war, could not have been above 6,500,000. Nevertheless, it was this handful of people that won for Spain a splendid immortality and for Christianity vast realms where Chaos still held sway, regions that from the first had been consecrated to the powers of Night and Darkness.

CHARLES H. MCCARTHY.

THE PERSONALITY AND GENIUS OF ARISTOTLE.

We are nowadays very far removed from the customs and habits of thought which prevailed when Chaucer described the typical student as having

At his beddes hed
Twenty bookes clad in blake or red
Of Aristotle and his philosophie.

In those days Aristotle's influence was at its maximum, and his philosophy was at the zenith of its popularity. To-day, it may safely be said, only the special student here and there, the student of Greek literature, or of philosophy, or of the history of science, is more than remotely interested in the man, and even the special student is very seldom interested in the philosophy of the man. If he is, his interest is purely critical or philological: he is a student of the letter and hardly ever sympathises with the spirit of the Aristotelian philosophy. Yet, it is possible even for the present day student to put himself frankly, though, not, I hope, uncritically, at Aristotle's own point of view. We cannot, even if we would, stem the tide of modern progress, or stay the onward movement of modern thought. But, we can, I believe, disregard them for the time being, go back in imagination and sympathy to Aristotle as he was, and study his philosophy as it is contained in his own writings. In this way, we may, perhaps, understand him, as he was understood by his own school, and criticise him as they did, appreciatively.

In some respects, the task before us ought to be an easy one. Common sense and our fixed habits of speech are on the side of Aristotle. It is true that all philosophy in the accepted meaning of the word, since the days of Hume, or, I may say, since the days of Descartes, is against him. Yet common sense is stronger than genius, even than philosophical genius, and I cannot but believe that the day of common sense will

come again, and, Aristotelianism, in spite of all the funeral orations pronounced over it, will come into its own once more. Besides, the philosophy of Aristotle is in agreement with the conclusions of natural science, as well as with common sense. It is in harmony with the spirit of investigation, and confirms when other philosophies tend to upset, the verdict of physical science. What it does not agree with is the metaphysics that happens to be in vogue. If we rid ourselves for the moment of metaphysical prejudice, put ourselves at the point of view of common sense, and concern ourselves for the time being with the verdict of common sense and the conclusions of modern science, we shall be in a position, I hope, to judge the Aristotelian philosophy on its own merits, and not be too hasty to condemn it.

On the other hand, there are difficulties in the way. Chief of all is a difficulty which is, to say the least, paradoxical when formulated. I mean the very familiarity of Aristotle's conclusions. In nine cases out of ten, the answer that Aristotle gives to the most profound questions of philosophy is the answer that would be given by a person who had never studied philosophy at all. In this respect, he is disappointing. He brings nothing new, nothing startling, nothing (shall I say?) sensational. He tells us, in effect that, like M. Jourdain, who for fifty years had been speaking prose without knowing it, we have been Aristotelians all our lives without suspecting that we were. He has moulded our thoughts, fashioned our forms of speech, and traced the lines along which we must reason if we are to reason validly. He has fixed the meanings of such terms as substance, quality, action, motion and so forth. He has even furnished the phraseology in which our formularies of Christian doctrine are drawn up. In a word, the Alphabet, so to speak, of the language in which the Western world thinks is Aristotelian in its origin. We must try to get out of this inheritance in order to appreciate its value. We must not be like him who could not see the wood for the trees. We must endeavor to go back in thought to the time when all this was new, to see what the world of thought

was before Aristotle came into it, to appreciate what he contributed, and to trace the subsequent working of that contribution as it leavened the mass of human knowledge. Briefly, I am asking the trained student of philosophy to forget, for the time being, his Descartes, his Hume, his Kant or his favorite pragmatist author. And I am asking the reader, whether he is or is not a trained student, to forget for the moment much that we all take for granted but which was really first said, or explained, or fixed as an acquisition of thought, by Aristotle. It is only in this way that the Aristotelian system may be observed in the making.

Aristotle, although a typical representative of the Greek spirit was, in one sense, not a Greek at all. He was born in 384 B. C. at Stagira, a seaport town of the colony of Chalcidice in Macedonia. He was, therefore, a native of that country which, in recent times receives mention every now and then in the news columns on account of its conflicts with Turkey. In the fourth century B. C. Macedonia was as yet almost unheard of in general history; its ruler was Amyntas, who was succeeded by Philip, as he, in turn, was succeeded by Alexander, the Conqueror. Strictly speaking, however, Aristotle was a Macedonian only in the sense in which the son of an American consul in Paris might be said to be a Frenchman. His father was Nicomachus, physician to the Macedonian king, and his grandfather, also a physician, had emigrated from Greece as one of a colony from Chalcis in Euboea. The language of Aristotle's home was, consequently, the Greek of Attica, and the education which he received, probably at home, was such as he should have received had he gone to school in some Greek city. When he was eighteen years old he went to Athens, and there, for the space of twenty years he listened to the lectures of Plato. Stories, originating for the most part from Aristotle's enemies, were current in antiquity to the effect that the relations between master and pupil were far from pleasant. Not only were there, as we shall see, differences of opinion between them on the most important points of doctrine, but there was also a fundamental disparity

of temperament which made it impossible that they should adopt the same or similar views. Plato was the dreamer, the poet, the seer; Aristotle was the scientist, the investigator, the observer of facts. Their outlook on life and on knowledge could not but be different. We need not, however, believe the legends which represent Aristotle as disrespectful and impertinent, and Plato as taking refuge in a dignified sense of insult and ingratitude. Aristotle's own works are our best evidence that his attitude towards his master was correct. "Plato is my friend, but truth is dearer even than Plato" may have been his motto. At any rate, there is a passage in his *Ethics* (I, 6) which reads like a commentary on that famous saying. Speaking of the theory of Ideas, which was Plato's most distinctive doctrine, he remarks, "Perhaps it would seem to be better, and even necessary, at least for the preservation of truth, that we should even do away with private feelings, especially as we are philosophers; for both being dear to us, it is a sacred duty to preserve truth." This, we should like to believe, was the sentiment that governed his conduct towards his aged teacher; and theirs, if it was the first, was not by any means the last, instance in which two great men succeeded in preserving mutual respect and esteem in spite of a fundamental difference in character and convictions. Plato, we are told, referred to Aristotle's home as "the house of the reader," bearing ready tribute to the industry of his pupil, and the pupil on his side was never lacking in respect for the ripe wisdom of his master.

After Plato's death in 347 or 348 Aristotle spent some time at the court of Hermias, ruler of Atarneus, whose adopted daughter, Pythias, he married. From Asia Minor he returned in 343 to Macedonia at the invitation of Philip of Macedon in order to become preceptor of the young Alexander, who was destined to be the founder of one of the greatest empires in the history of the world. Alexander was then thirteen years old. There is extant a letter supposed to have been written by Philip thirteen years earlier in which the king says that "he is grateful to the gods, not so much because an heir is born

to his throne as because he is born in the time of Aristotle, trusting that, being nurtured and trained by such a philosopher, the boy may one day be a worthy successor to his father's glory and the conduct of affairs." The document can hardly be genuine, though there are scholars who maintain that it is. It seems to take too readily for granted the great fame both of Aristotle and Alexander, which is enough to justify the suspicion that it was written later. However this may be, Aristotle was invited by Philip to undertake the education of Alexander, and the relation was, as we know, beneficial to both. There are wanting details as to how Aristotle discharged his office as teacher. It is evident, however, that he paid attention not only to the intellectual but also to the moral training of his pupil. Alexander inherited from his father a violent, impetuous and passionate disposition. The excesses to which Philip was addicted—as is evidenced by the famous appeal "from Philip drunk to Philip sober"—left their impress in the temperament and disposition of Alexander. Too often, as we know, his tempestuous temper got the better of his prudence. But if he yielded at times to these impulses, it must be said that on the whole, he held them firmly in check, and in the most serious crises of his career he showed that the conqueror of the world could also be conqueror of his own worse nature. This moral victory—his greatest conquest, in our estimation—he owed in large measure to the lessons he received from Aristotle. On the other hand, the master profited by the generosity and friendship of his royal pupil. With the funds which Alexander placed at his disposal Aristotle was enabled to collect the writings of his predecessors and contemporaries and to bring together what was probably the first great library in ancient times. In that collection were many books now irretrievably lost, works on philosophy, physiology, botany and other branches of nature-study, which Aristotle put to good use in his study of natural phenomena, as is evident from his allusions to them in his own writings. Besides, Aristotle was an indefatigable investigator of facts in every department of knowledge. There were no limits to

his interest. Sea and land, mountain, river and forest, the deserts beyond the Euxine Sea and the busy marts of trade along the Mediterranean, were all teeming with phenomena that held an interest for him. He could not personally investigate them all. He could talk with the deepsea fishermen, learn the secrets of their craft and listen to their description of the wonderful creatures that inhabit the ocean's depths; he could frequent the marketplace and the slaughterhouse of the cities which he visited and see for himself the structure of various animals. But the horizon of his field was immeasurably widened when, as we learn, his royal patron and pupil decreed that imperial gamekeepers and foresters, governors of provinces and rulers of cities, captains of the royal fleet, and officers of the army of conquest should supply the scientist with material, and conduct investigations along the lines which he suggested. It was only by these means that one man could gather together that immense mass of facts about nature in all its phases which we find recorded in the Aristotelian works on nature and on living things. Thus the relation of master and pupil in the case of these two, each of whom was, so to speak, supreme in his own line of excellence, resulted in benefits for both and redounded to the advantage of science and the advancement of knowledge.

When Alexander was twenty years old he succeeded to the throne of Macedonia. Two years later, that is, in 334, he set out for his famous Asiatic campaign. Thereupon, Aristotle returned to Athens, where he opened a school of his own, and where, for a time he enjoyed the full measure of his pupil's friendship and generosity. A favor conferred on a friend of his was the occasion of a coolness which ended in Aristotle's unmerited disgrace in the eyes of the royal patron. The friend was a certain Callisthenes, whom the philosopher recommended to the king as a courtier. Callisthenes was one of those persons who imagine that in order to be honest it is necessary to be rude of speech and blunt in manner. He had been warned by Aristotle in a line from Homer,

"Swift is the fate, my child, such words as thine bespeak."

Il. xviii, 95.

The man was obstinate as well as rough, and his disregard for the forms of court etiquette brought down on him the suspicion of being implicated in a conspiracy against the king. How far he may have been guilty we cannot determine. In any case, his punishment involved the loss by Aristotle of all the favor he had enjoyed at the Macedonian court.

Meanwhile, Aristotle was quietly teaching his classes in philosophy at Athens. He chose for his place of meeting a grove near the gymnasium of Apollo the Lyceian. There, in the shaded walks, he taught, while he and his disciples sauntered up and down. This is the origin of the name *Peripatetic*, by which his school is known. Another name for the school is Lyceum, because, as has just been said, it met near the building sacred to the Lyceian Apollo. In the forenoon he received only his more intimate friends and advanced students, whom he addressed in more technical style and on more abstruse topics. In the afternoon he admitted a more general class of hearers, and his discourse to them was naturally in more popular style and treated the less difficult subjects. His writings, as we shall learn later, fall into this same twofold division, although, unfortunately all his more popular discourses are lost. The success of these meetings provoked jealousy among Aristotle's rivals. For, even philosophers can be jealous of one another. It was easy to find a peg on which to hang accusations. The Macedonian party was unpopular at Athens, where the voice of Demosthenes was still vibrating in his fervent efforts to fan the dying embers of patriotism into a flame of revolt. Aristotle was identified with the Macedonian party. Still, although it must have been known that he and Alexander were friends no longer, such was the magic of the conqueror's name that so long as he lived no one dared openly to attack his former teacher. When Alexander died in 323 B. C. the storm broke loose, the charge of impiety was levelled against Aristotle, and, referring to the fate of Socrates, he remarked that he would not allow the Athenians to offend a second time against philosophy. Accordingly, yielding to the storm of opposition, he left the city and retired to a country house of

his at Chalcis in Euboea, where he died, the following year, 322 B. C. The story that he committed suicide, "because he could not explain the tides" is, for many reasons, unworthy of credence. It is altogether likely that he died of a disease of the stomach from which he had suffered for many years.

In appearance, if tradition is to be relied on, Aristotle fell far short of the Greek ideal of physical perfection. His head was rather below than above the normal in point of size, and his whole body was excessively slender. His eyes were small and, as we should say, ferret-like in the rapidity with which they moved, an index, possibly of the ceaselessly inquisitive mind of the man. His voice was feeble and hesitating: in a word, his whole personality was lacking in what we nowadays call impressiveness. His health was infirm, and sustained, we are told, by means of the extraordinary skill in medicine which was one of his characteristics. These items are matters of tradition merely, and should, as in all such cases, be accepted with caution. When, however, we come to the moral picture handed down to us, we have need of more than caution. As represented by his friends, he was ideally perfect, a pagan saint; as pictured by his foes, he was the impersonation of all that is unlovable in human nature. The truth lies somewhere between these two. If we abandon tradition and turn to the writings of Aristotle, if we admit as evidence his will which seems to be genuine, the fragments of his letters which have come down to us, and the treatises in which he unconsciously betrays his own inner nature, we shall be able to form a tolerably complete and reliable picture of his personal character. His nobility of nature, his loftiness of mind, his single-hearted devotion to truth, his courteousness towards his opponents, his fidelity to his friends, his kindness towards his slaves and, the unusual tenderness of his affection for his own family—all these place him among the ethically best types of human excellence, and show him to have attained, or very nearly attained, the ideal of perfection which he sketched in his treatises on morals.

A word now about Aristotle's writings. I mentioned a

moment ago two classes into which they are usually divided, and which we may call the popular and the technical. All the works that have come down to us are technical. His popular writings seem to have perished. They include *Discourses*, the loss of which cannot be too much deplored, both because they would naturally be expected to throw light on many a difficult question of interpretation, and because it is presumed that they were written in a style far more pleasing than that of the technical works. These latter are written in the most severe scientific style, are not in fact attractive at all by reason of the form, and can be studied only by him who has a compelling interest in the contents or matter. The popular works it was that warranted Cicero in speaking of "the golden stream of eloquence" in Aristotle's writings. Certainly none of the extant works deserve that description except, perhaps, some passages in the ethical treatises. Among the lost works, also is the treatise *On the Constitutions of States*, containing the constitutions of one hundred and twenty-five Greek states. Of this a portion, dealing with the constitution of Athens, was discovered in Egypt in 1891 and published that year. The circumstances of the find were, to say the least, peculiar. It was discovered in the ruins of an old farmhouse, and on one side of the papyrus were the farmer's and steward's accounts—so many loads of hay, so many bushels of grain, so many oxen or sheep—and on the other a fragment of Aristotle's work. The technical writings that have come down to us, include a great many treatises. I will mention only the most important: the *Metaphysics* in thirteen books, the work *On the Soul*, the *Physics*, the *Histories of Animals*, the *Ethics*, the *Politics* and the work *On Poetry*. These are not only important in themselves but also of great historical interest, because each of them is the first of its own line and entitles its author to be called the Founder of Metaphysics, the Founder of Psychology, etc. Unfortunately, the text is in a very imperfect condition, and I am now going to tell you the reason, before we dismiss the subject of Aristotle's writings.

Before Aristotle left Athens he was obliged to decide on a

successor to take his place as the head of his school. There were, we are told, two candidates for the position, Menedemus of Rhodes and Theophrastus of Lesbos. Unwilling to wound either of them by a pointed rejection, the philosopher called for two cups of wine, one, the wine of Rhodes, and the other, that of Lesbos, and having tasted them both, pronounced his choice, *ἡδέων ὁ Λέσβιος*, "the Lesbian pleases me better." In this way, Theophrastus took his master's place as head of the school. As literary heir, he succeeded, naturally, to his master's library. When he came to make his will, however, he bequeathed the books, not to his successor in the Aristotelian school, but to a certain Neleus of Scepsis, in Asia Minor. In those days, as in our own time, there were bookhunters who would stop at nothing, and, when, as in Pergamos, on which Scepsis depended politically, the bookhunter was the king himself, it was time to hide such a treasure as Aristotle's works, for sake keeping. Accordingly, Neleus, or his descendants, put them in a cellar, and there they remained for one hundred and thirty years. From Asia Minor they found their way to Athens, and thence in 84 B. C. were carried by Sulla to Rome. At Rome they were examined, the spoiled portions restored mostly by conjecture, and edited for the first time in 70 B. C. No wonder, then, that the text of these works is in a poor condition; many passages are filled in by the editor, and his conjectures as to what Aristotle should have said in the passage destroyed by dampness are not always the happiest. Besides, there are many of these works which, in whole or in part, are merely notes for lectures made either by Aristotle himself or by his pupils. Yet the whole collection is one which, in spite of these drawbacks, has had a decisive influence on the course of human thought in the Western world. So great was the genius of Aristotle that his ideas, thus inadequately expressed, imperfectly transmitted, and only partially understood, held undisputed sway in Christendom for at least five centuries and have leavened the mass of human knowledge for all time.

To characterize that genius satisfactorily one should first

study it in its antecedents and afterwards in its contemporary environment. Aristotle sums up his own and preceding generations of thinkers in such a way that unless we understand them we cannot hope to understand him. Leaving out now, the less important of his predecessors and contemporaries, there are two to whom above all others he is closely related and with whom he must be compared. I mean Plato and Socrates. In fact, these three, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, are associated not only historically, Aristotle having been the pupil of Plato and Plato of Socrates, but also logically, it being hopeless to try to understand one without understanding the other two. This is particularly the case with Aristotle, who, coming last, is the heir to all that the others brought, and is, moreover, a spirit more complex, more comprehensive and more inclusive than either of the others.

Socrates, the educational and moral reformer, appeared at a critical moment in the history of Greek civilization. The old order had disappeared, and a new order had not yet been established. Athens had become, and was destined for a brief period to remain, the dominant city in Greece and, indeed, along the whole Mediterranean border. She had come out of her isolation as a city-state, and was not yet accustomed to her dignity and responsibility as a metropolis. Old traditional ideas were being abandoned, in the contact with strangers, and from the same contact new ideas were being introduced. The old religion was no longer venerated, the traditional ideas of morality were no longer respected, the sense of increased political prestige descended on every son of Athens and made him more self-assertive, less docile, less amenable to discipline. Then appeared the sophists, professed teachers of wisdom, who did more than any other force to upset the ancient order and bring confusion into the new. They held as a fundamental principle that we can know nothing for certain about anything, that man himself is the measure of all things, that that is the true which appears to be true, and that, consequently, that is good which seems to be good. They boasted that, by subtle reasoning by the juggling of words and the display of a certain cheap kind

of erudition, they could make the better cause appear the worse and the worse cause appear the better. Their instructions were well attended; they gathered the youth of Athens around them, and they were the kind to make the most of every advantage that thus came their way. Perhaps Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were unjust to them. This much, at least, is certain; their influence at that particular crisis in Athenian affairs was for evil rather than for good. They demoralized, both intellectually and ethically.

It was the aim of Socrates' life to offset the influence of the sophists, to thwart them in every direction and to repair as far as was feasible the evil they had done. This he hoped to accomplish in two spheres, the moral and the intellectual. In other words, he thought he had a remedy both for their skepticism in the intellectual order and for their theoretical laxity in the moral order. But he was convinced that his task was essentially one. If he could save the intellect from skepticism, he could, he thought, save the conscience from moral anarchy. "Salvation through knowledge" was his motto. Once you lay deep and firm the foundation of intellectual knowledge, you have, he would say, a solid basis for conduct. Let us see what he meant; it is worth our while, and will repay us when we try to understand his influence on Aristotle. To his way of thinking, the knowledge which most men seek is fragmentary, incomplete and, therefore, misleading. The rhetorician, the poet, the man of affairs, the tradesman—all are equally guilty in this respect. They see but one side of a thing and they imagine they know it. Let the subject be courage; the rhetorician sees its power to move an audience, the poet sees its nobility and sublimity, the statesman sees its value in public life, the tradesman feels its practical utility and, perhaps practices it more than any of the others. Even the soldier, whose specific prerogative it is, does not study its inner nature; he does not try to get a definition of it. There, says Socrates, you have the key to the whole question. Rid your mind of the notion that a partial knowledge of courage is true knowledge; try to define it, and then you know it truly. For then you

have a concept of it, that is a mental representation in which all other views and aspects of the subject are articulated, organized and vitalized. It is a good thing to know that courage is beautiful, or noble, or useful, but if that is all you know about it, the sophist will catch you in the meshes of his subtle quibbling, and before you know it you are taking true courage for false and false for true. But, if you build up in your mind a concept of courage, you know the definition of courage, you know it as it really is, and no amount of mental jugglery can betray you into taking the true for the false or the false for the true. If, now, you treat all the other moral notions in the same way, you have a sure foundation on which to build a science of morality based on principles. Before Socrates' time morality was taught; but it was taught by means of examples, by heroic types or by citation of moral maxims and proverbs. Thus, courage was inculcated by an appeal to the example of Achilles or Hector, or by quoting such ethical proverbs as "God hates a coward," "The brave die only once, the coward, fearing death, dies a thousand times," etc. Socrates first sought a definition of courage, and used that as a point of departure in moral instruction. Thus he reformed the Athenian world in regard to conduct by insisting that knowledge, true knowledge, is the foundation of all right living. We need not inquire here how far he was right and how far he was wrong. He was partly one and partly the other. Let us pass, rather to his successor, Plato and so come to the Socratic influence as it was brought to bear on Aristotle.

Plato was the dreamer, the poet, the metaphysician. What Socrates laid down as a principle of ethical reform, he extended into wider fields and applied to the problem of the nature of reality. The concept, said Socrates, is true knowledge. We know a thing truly when we can define it. Therefore, concluded Plato, the core of reality in the thing is what the concept represents, namely an ideal element, a something that is not imperfect, fragmentary, changeable, evanescent, but perfect, integral, unchangeable, eternal. What makes courage to be courage is this ideal element in it. The same is true of

justice, goodness, beauty and even of concrete things, such as plants, animals and men. There is, in each case an Idea, as Plato calls it, which, participated in some way, by the object of our experience, makes it to be what it is. There is somewhere complete, absolute, perfect, unchangeable Justice, which makes that action or this man to be just. There is, somewhere, complete, absolute, perfect, unchangeable Beauty, which, communicated, somehow, to objects here on earth, makes them to be beautiful. The "somewhere" is further defined by calling it the World of Ideas. That is a world which moves in viewless majesty above the heavens. It is the home of all that is perfect, of all that is noble, sublime and grand. There, in that world above us, there is no imperfection, no change, no decay. When we are dissatisfied, as we all sometimes are, with things as we find them in our own world, when we discover the flaw in what is beautiful, the taint in what is noble, the rift in the lute which makes the harmony of earthly happiness, we turn with relief to that other world where Beauty is flawless, nobility is without taint, and harmony complete and unmarred. Thus Plato's World of Ideas is a response to a need which the human heart has always felt, and will always feel, as is evidenced by the universal belief in a land of the ever blessed, the Golden Islands of Atlantis, the Tir-na-n'og, or land of everlasting youth, in which our Celtic forefathers believed. Moreover, Plato teaches, this World of Ideas is our original home. We dwelt there once, at least our souls did before they were cast into the prison of our bodies, in punishment for some primordial crime. In that happy existence, our souls had immediate and fully satisfying vision of the Ideas, of the eternal perfect prototypes of all things. When they fell, our souls were steeped in the river of forgetfulness so that all distinct memory of those visions was wiped out. When, now, we see in the world around us the feeble imitations of those Ideas, when we see a just action or a just man, when we behold a beautiful scene or listen to a sweet strain of music, there comes over us a memory of the original Justice and the original Beauty which we saw long ago. And it is almost certain that

our first recollection will be the recollection of Beauty; for of all the Ideas that is the one that shines out most strikingly in the imitation of it. "A thing of beauty is a joy forever." An action may be just, a person may be good, and we pass them by unnoticed. But let a thing be beautiful, and we all perceive at once that it is beautiful. Therefore, says Plato, the recollection of our vision of Ideas begins with our appreciation of the beautiful; the love of the beautiful is the beginning of all philosophy, for philosophy is the quest of the knowledge of Ideas.

You see now to what an extent Plato was a poet and a dreamer. He wraps his thoughts in myth and allegory, and tries by the persuasive beauty of the picture he draws to lift us up from the sordid cares of this material world to a contemplation of the spiritual truth and beauty in the perfect world above us. There was something grim, determined, even highbanded about Socrates, the reformer. He would stop you in the street and compel you to listen, and if, like Alcibiades, you felt yourself chained to the spot, and feared "to grow old sitting at his feet," it is because of the earnestness which lends burning eloquence to his words. Plato's method is different. He does not believe in throttling an acquaintance and forcing him to become a disciple. He would rather lead you than drive you. He throws around your soul the subtle silken filaments of his allegory; sirenlike he lures you by the sweet harmony of his style and the music of his thoughts until, if you do not agree with him, you would at least wish to agree with him, and if you decline to follow, it is with a sigh of regret that you stay your steps and redescend to solid earth. He is more concerned to please you and console you than he is to convince you. In fact, he sometimes wishes not to convince you. He would be disappointed if you took him seriously. For there is a subtle irony in many of his arguments, and you must be on your guard against it. He is, therefore, a genius "at once ironical, dramatic, allegorical," and we may add analogical, by which I mean that his chief concern is to lift us to a higher viewpoint from which we may contemplate without

sorrow or despair the shortcomings, the imperfections, the disappointments and disasters which come into our lives from the waywardness and the sordidness of the world in which we live.

If Socrates is the reformer, rough, earnest, grimly determined, and Plato is the poet, ironical at times, dramatic, allegorical, and always sweetly persuasive in the direction of better things, Aristotle is the cold, calm, matter of fact scientist, a genius, as Newman says, "curious, fertile, penetrating, analytical." He has none of the rugged earnestness of Socrates; he lacks the poetic fire of Plato; he takes for granted that we desire to know, that we share his grand and comprehensive curiosity, and he tries to satisfy that craving in us. He does not compel us, as Socrates would; neither does he take the trouble to persuade us, as Plato does; he is content with convincing us, since he knows that we are endowed with minds open to conviction. Thus, he does not trace the beginning of philosophy to our love of the beautiful; he ascribes it to a certain inquisitiveness which, as he says in the opening sentence of his *Metaphysics*, is common to all men. "Knowledge for the sake of conduct" was the motto of Socrates, the reformer. "Knowledge for the sake of the higher life of the spirit" was the motto of Plato the poet and metaphysician; "Knowledge for its own sake" is the supreme principle with Aristotle. Socrates sought to reform human conduct; Plato tried to reconstruct human life on a spiritual basis. Aristotle was content to reorganize human knowledge on the basis of science. Socrates relied on his earnestness; Plato derived his power from his aspiration and inspiration; Aristotle sought to succeed by definiteness and systematization.

There was, then, in these three great men a difference of temperament which was fundamental. There was also a difference in their conceptions of their own lifework. There was even a difference in their ideas of the scope and aim of philosophy. Nevertheless, there is a thread of historical continuity and, I might even say, of logical consecutiveness running through the succession of their systems of thought. We have seen how Plato depended on Socrates and at the same time

advanced beyond Socratic concepts to his theory of Ideas. In like manner Aristotle depended on Plato, and improved on the Platonic explanation of reality. The Concept is a universal representation in the mind. Let us describe the work of Socrates by saying that, in opposition to the sophists, he established the universal as the basis of knowledge and conduct. Plato's Ideas are also universal. But they not only serve as a basis of knowledge and as ideals of conduct; they also exist by themselves in the world above us and enter somehow into things in the world around us, making those things to be what they are. Aristotle accepts the universal as an acquisition, so to speak, already acknowledged. He does not need to fight over again the battles won by Socrates. Furthermore, he agrees with Plato that the universal has a metaphysical application; in other words, that it is a constituent of the reality of things. But here, he parts company with his master. The universal is not an ideal in a world above us: it is an essence in the world around us. There is, if you will, a world of universal forms of things, there is Justice as well as just actions, there is Goodness as well as good deeds, there is Beauty as well as beautiful things, there is Humanity as well as human beings. But these universals are essences in the things which we experience; they are not separate forms existing in a world of their own. For Aristotle the Platonic world of Ideas is beautiful (no one can fail to pay it that tribute); for him, as for most of us, it is persuasive, attractive, consoling. But, he thinks, it is unreal. There is no proof that it exists. Nay more, there is no need of its existence; for the forces, if we may so call them, which are supposed to exist there, really exist in the world around us; if we could only convince ourselves that they are there, we can have, without believing in the Platonic world, all the advantages that such a belief would confer. You remember how in the school of Athens, Rafael makes Plato and Aristotle to be the central figures in that masterly grouping of the ancient philosophers. Plato, the idealist, the dreamer of beautiful dreams, points upward to the world of better and happier existence, where we once dwelt, and to which by philosophy we can once more return. Aris-

totle with extended palm seems at once to check the enthusiasm of Plato and to indicate by his gesture that the world which Plato seeks above us is around us and beneath us. Volumes could not describe more accurately the difference in the fundamental tenets of the two philosophers. It is a difference which was temperamental as well as logical, reaching down into the abysmal depths of genius in both cases. It is a difference which is, so to speak, structural, reaching out in the two systems into every branch of philosophy and every department of science.

Resuming, now, what has been said about the relations of these three men to one another in the region of thought, let us try to understand clearly the technical terms used. By *Concept* I mean a universal, as distinct from a particular, or fragmentary, representation of a thing in the individual mind. It is such a representation as is expressed by the definition of a thing. If I were to draw a triangle on a blackboard before you, your mental image of that would not be a concept, but a percept. But you know what a triangle in general is; you can define a triangle by saying that it is a figure having three sides. The mental image corresponding to that is a Concept. Now, that is as far as Socrates went. He did a good deal when he brought us to the point where, realizing that we can attain such mental images, we have nothing to fear from the sophist or the skeptic. By *Idea* (always with a *capital I*) I understand a form, or prototype, according to which things are made—perhaps *ideal* would be a better word than *Idea* here—which exists in a perfect world above us, and is somehow also in the world around us, participated, fragmented and in a sense debased by its union with matter, but always performing a metaphysical function, making things to be what they are. By *Essence* I understand also a form, universal like the concept and the Idea, existing, not apart from things, but in them, and like the Idea making them to be what they are. *Concept, Idea, Essence*; these are the three words which concisely but accurately sum up the work of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, and show how each one stands related to the others. Aristotle, coming last, should have profited by what his prede-

cessors had achieved. He did so; and his formula, *Essence*, is consequently, more complex than the other two, embodying, as it does, what is in them, and adding, as it certainly does also, something peculiarly Aristotelian.

The peculiarly Aristotelian element will be studied later, as to content in logic, in natural science, in metaphysics, in psychology, in ethics, in art, in the theory of the state. Here we shall be satisfied with describing its spirit. And that spirit is, in a word, the purely scientific. If the philosophers of all time were to be classified as apostles of warmth and apostles of light, Plato would be preëminently the type of those who bring to philosophy the fire of poetic, and almost prophetic, inspiration. Aristotle would be just as preëminently the type of those who illumine. Plato's philosophy is the furnace in which human life is passed through the purifying flames and freed from all the dross of passion and matter, until nothing but the pure gold of spiritual sentiment remains. Aristotle's philosophy is like a searchlight that is turned successively into every department of human experience, into every nook and cranny of the world in which we live, revealing the unpleasant as well as the pleasant, the unlovely as well as the beautiful, the passionate as well as the pure, the material as well as the spiritual, the sordid, the imperfect, the diseased as well as the noble, the perfect and the healthy. And in all the revolving of this merciless light, and in all the surprise, the pain, the disappointment, which, as human beings, we experience when we follow those penetrating rays, there is one principle which, to Aristotle's way of thinking, justifies everything, the principle, namely, that knowledge is always and everywhere better than ignorance, that the highest activity of the soul is reason, and that the endeavor to see things as they really are is the noblest pursuit in which a human being can engage. How far this is true, and how far this view of knowledge is justifiable, and, on the other hand how far it is untrue and unjustifiable, is proved by the influence for good and evil which Aristotle exerted on those who came after him. That, however, will be the subject of another study.

WILLIAM TURNER.

THE POETIC CREED OF FRANCIS THOMPSON.

All great poetry, in the words of Matthew Arnold, is "a criticism of life." Whatever be the truth of the test, the poems of Francis Thompson do not fail when tried by this touchstone. Their keynote is to be sought in some words of the essay on Shelley: "With many the religion of beauty must always be a passion and a power; it is only evil when divorced from the worship of the Primal Beauty." They deal, then, with the problem whether the aesthetic sense suffices to discover the true meaning of life, how it may be disciplined and touched to its finest issues. In this respect they recall the theme of Pater's "Marius the Epicurean" who, through the strayings of a restless sense of beauty, kept the whiteness of his soul and attained to the Vision Beautiful. Of such an ordeal *The Hound of Heaven* is a touching record. It describes the ascent of love through material objects to God. The sense of flight through infinite spaces, the ardor of pursuit and hurry of avoidance until the bourne is reached in "the hid battlements of eternity," are conveyed inimitably in the speed and impulse of matchless verse. The passion for beauty, not satisfied with love of Nature or of creature, gradually becomes spiritualized and seeks its proper object in God. Such is the conclusion at which the poet arrives in his verse as in his life, the theme on which his poems are but a commentary.

One of the stages of his ascent to the divine was through his love of Nature. He loves it with an affection as passionate and personal as Keats' or Shelley's, rather than with the austere cult of Wordsworth. To him it is a living thing with whom he joys and sorrows in turn. With the abandon of a lover, he colors it with the changing hues of his own fancies, and shapes it with his varying thought:

"What wild Dionysia, I, young Bacchanal,
Danced in thy lap! . . .
I brake through thy doors of sunset,

Ran before the hooves of sunrise,
 Shook thy matron tresses down in fancies
 Wild and wilful
 As a poet's hand could twine them;
 Caught in my fantasy's crystal chalice
 The Bow, as its cataract of colors
 Flashed to the downward."

It is peopled by bright beings (such as the Greeks loved to fancy) whom he sees again, as in some "renascence of wonder," with fresh undimmed eyes, and senses still virgin. He addresses them with a regret as poignant as Wordsworth's for their passing:

"Must ye fade—
 O old essential candours, ye who made
 The earth a living and a radiant thing—
 And leave her corpse in our strained, cheated arms!"

Yet how vital these nature-presences were may be judged from their fresh renewal in Thompson's verse. How subtly for instance a stormy sea is suggested in the exquisite lines:

"The Nereid tip-toe on the scud o' the surge
 With whistling tresses dank athwart her face
 And all her figure poised in lithe, Circean grace."

or the peeping forest life in the picture of

"The Dryad at timid gaze by the wood-side"

how he evokes

"The silver-stoled damsels of the sea,
 Or lake, or fount, or stream.

 The glimmering shapes of its dim-tressed daughters."

Such glimpses of a dream-world beneath the sea recall inevitably Shelley and Walter Savage Landor. Like them, Thompson reveals to us the viewless creatures of the elements, denizens of earth, air, and water, the spirits of the seasons, and interprets Nature's changes in terms of their moods. Thus "A Corymbus for Autumn" represents it as a lusty

maiden, a Bacchante scattering with riotous largesse all the falling wealth of the year. Similarly he shows us, with a feeling of human pity,

"the maidens of the mist
Clinging the necks of the unheeding hills."

He is strangely divided between the pagan and Christian manner of envisaging Nature. The splendid "Ode to the Setting Sun," which is a presentation of both, may be likened to the overture of "Tannhäuser." It is an expression in a subtler measure and a more ærial scale of the pagan and the Christian *motif*. The pagan view yields completely in the "Orient Ode," to the vision of the whole earth swung like a thurible before "the embannered Throne." So the seasons have their ritual, the dawn and day-fall their special rubrics. The heavens declare to him the glory of God. He sees Him figured in the blood-red sunset, in the white ministry of the frost and snow in

"The moving waters at their priest-like task
Of pure ablution round earth's human shores."

To this delight in Nature he adds a humanity as ardent as Charles Lamb's. He is rooted by a thousand fibres to the kindly earth: his poems are saturated with this human quality. To children he has dedicated a whole chaplet of verse which recalls the musical titles of the seventeenth century: "To Monica thought dying," "The Making of Viola" and *Sister Songs* with their burthen "For Singing to Sylvia." They breathe innocence and the Spring. And he approaches them with such tender delicacy for their flower-like bloom that his treatment of "The Child-Woman" deserves Landor's self-tribute:

"The ever-sacred cup
Of the pure lily hath between my hands
Felt safe, unsoiled, nor lost one grain of gold."

They are the earthly links which connect him most nearly with heaven. So his brief meeting and parting with the child

"Daisy" by the sea-shore was for him an incident full of the pathos of "the whole woeful heart of things." Readers will remember that other incident of one of his homeless nights in London when he was befriended by a waif

"A child, a spring-flower; but a flower
Fallen from the budded coronal of Spring,
And through the city streets blown withering."

and the utter fervor of humanity which throbs in his after-yearning for

"The healing harms
And whitest witchery, a-lurk in that
Authentic cestus of two girdling arms."

In general his love for his fellows is sublimated and refined, redeemed from the animal camaraderie of Whitman. He has interest only for "the human face *divine*." All earthly beauty is a symbol; the fair shows of sense but broken lights of the divine—the keys, he loved to say, on which God modulates through the universe. Thus he writes of the lady of "Her Portrait,"

"God laid his fingers on the ivories
Of her pure members as on smoothed keys,
And there out-breathed her spirit's harmonies."

It is interesting to compare the poem of this Catholic mystic with the pagan mysticism of Shelley's "Epipsychidion." How far removed are both from the frankly sensual inspiration of Swinburne's "Dolores" and "Laus Veneris"!

Francis Thompson's poetry has been called "sacramental." There is no other word to express its peculiar quality. To him all finite things are symbols, their beauty but a revelation of the unseen, a means by which it becomes visible to us "as in a glass darkly." It is his very realization of natural loveliness which leads him to God, the Author of it all. He has learned the law of its caducity:

"Whatso looks lovelily
Is but the rainbow on life's weeping rain."

and, with Keats and Herrick, knows only too well the fleeting character of

"Beauty that must die:
And Joy whose hand is ever at his lips
Bidding adieu; and aching Pleasure nigh
Turning to poison while the bee-mouth sips."

He must needs pass through it and beyond to cry with St. Augustine: "Thou hast made us for Thyself, O Lord, and our hearts are restless till they rest in Thee." Thus he learns the lesson of renunciation, and ascetism becomes his gospel. His bright Hellenism had availed nothing for "earth with heavy griefs so overwhelmed." "The Anthem of Earth" is like some grand organ voluntary on this sombre theme. It is Hamlet's dark vision of mortality: *pulvis et umbra sumus*. Yet this problem of evil only serves to make possible a synthesis which embraces and resolves all human sorrow and affection in a higher unity. The return is effected by a deeper consideration of life and mortality which finds "admirable the manner of our corruption as of our health." In "The Mistress of Vision" and other poems he teaches us, in common with all the great mystics, the amenities of the Cross. The poet, become anchorite, has penetrated its inwardness:

"The essence of all suffering which is joy."

and refers it to the mercy of God. For it is naught but 'Shade of Thy Hand outstretched caressingly.' Such is the goal of his quest, the spiritual note on which he closes. Thus his poems may be called, in an application truer than Swinburne intended,

"the golden book of spirit and of sense,
The Holy Writ of Beauty."

FLORENCE MOYNIHAN.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC QUESTIONS IN THE EARLY CHURCH.

It is futile to hope to find in the writings of the early Christian authors the delineation of any scheme of life expressed in terms of modern economic science. At the time there was not only no technical language of economics but profound ignorance of the principles and workings of economic forces. This ignorance was universal. The utter failure of the highly trained officials of the Roman Imperial administration to grasp the significance of economic law brings on them the ridicule of modern students of the subject. Schiller is never tired pointing out how frequently they made the fatal mistake of attempting to relieve the fiscal necessities of the state by the fatal expedient of debasing the coinage.¹ When remedial legislation was resorted to, it arose from no conception of the magnitude of the economic heresy which had been committed, but from sad experience of the evils which had resulted therefrom.

Economic forces, however, operate and make themselves felt as potent factors in life independently of any knowledge or investigation of their character. Thus, while the early Christian writers may offer no light on the scientific side of economic questions, they, as exponents of the Christian scheme of life, show what attitude was taken towards the industrial and commercial activities of their time. Their position was invariably that of moralists, not economists. When they expressed themselves it was to oppose injustice or to combat ideas which conflicted with the Christian concept of duty and destiny. Their unsparing denunciation of evil, however, and their insistence on the practice of Christian virtue placed them in a position of constant antagonism to certain conditions which could not be changed without affecting the social and economic

¹ *Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit*, Vol. I, pp. 361, 380, 752, 770, 843.

life of the community. They preached no new social doctrines but they waged a determined propaganda against the vices inherent in the slave system, against the laziness and contempt for labor among the masses, against the luxury and sensuality in the lives of the wealthy, against usury, against materialism, etc., all of which were regarded as obstacles to the attainment of Christian perfection.

The position of the early Christian teachers towards matters of an economic character offers at the outset one general source of difficulty which may be taken as the root of all the misunderstanding which exists regarding their teaching. To properly interpret their words in this as well as in all matters bearing on conduct, a sharp distinction must be made between what is laid down as of *precept* and what is inculcated as being merely of *counsel*. This distinction is all the more pertinent in the present case because the things of counsel are nearly always intended to promote individual perfection and rarely meant for the community at large. Thus the high regard in which celibacy is held in the Church does not conflict in any way with her equally high and well defined historical attitude towards matrimony.

The failure of many writers to grasp the significance of this necessary distinction has led to much confusion of thought at the present time. This, however, is not surprising because, even in the early church, the lack of perception between what was purely ascetical and what was of general application led to irregularities of thought and conduct which called forth sharp denunciation from Christian writers and frequently the condemnation of the Church. Because of their rigorism and their inculcation of a fantastic scheme of life, the Montanists laid the foundation for their separation from the general body of the faithful. In the same manner the anti-social teachings of the Gnostics, especially in regard to marriage and property, marked them off as completely from the orthodox Christians as did their peculiar doctrines on Dualism.

So widely and with such little discretion were these Gnostic doctrines preached that they became a positive obstacle to the

spread of Christianity and a source of anguish to many zealous Christians. Clement of Alexandria felt himself called on to write a special treatise which he entitled "What Rich Man shall be Saved?" to show that riches were not necessarily a bar to the attainment of eternal happiness. The purpose of the work was to reassure those Christians who did not feel themselves capable of observing the ascetic rigors which were said to be the true exposition of Christian conduct and morality.

Misapprehensions of a similar character are found to-day. Statements of the early Christian writers are torn from their context, and expressions of hostility to riches and property and pleasures resting purely on spiritual grounds are used as a basis for the inference that the possession of property or wealth was held to be incompatible with true Christianity. Other statements bearing on the duty of the wealthy towards their weaker and less fortunate brethren are frequently taken to mean that in the minds of these authors fraternal charity was synonymous with communism. As a matter of fact the Christian teachers seldom troubled themselves about purely temporal things. They were preachers who, weighing the present life against the life to come, naturally spoke with harshness of wealth and power and earthly attachments which might hinder men from attaining their real destiny, eternal happiness.

Hence denunciation of wealth and power cannot place the early Christians in the position of desiring the destruction of the old and the establishment of new economic conditions. Their insistence that perfection could be attained only by abandoning all undue attachment to material things cannot be made to apply to any social scheme in preference to others. What was preached in the highly centralized and absolutistic Empire of Rome with its gross poverty and tremendous riches would be equally valid under a communistic régime or in any form of society where the indulgence of physical cravings might stifle spiritual aspirations.

Historic considerations must also at times be borne in mind in order to understand some statements of the early Christian

writers on the subject of wealth and property. In many cases possession was acquired or accompanied by violation of the moral law. Where such was the case the Christian moralists were not sparing in their denunciations.

No analysis or discussion of the social teaching of the early Christians can offer satisfactory results which does not take into account their general teaching on human life and destiny. In their minds the attainment of eternal happiness was the paramount object of all human activity. Man had been estranged from God by sin, and to be reinstated in the divine favor and friendship was an object which transcended every other consideration. Salvation and future happiness threw all other problems into the background. The visible and the earthly lost all significance when compared with the invisible and supernatural. The ceaseless and bitter struggles in this world had no meaning except in so far as they were related with eternal happiness or eternal woe.

Such beliefs could not fail to affect profoundly their views on all the relations of life. But they as well as their contemporaries were entirely lacking in the historic spirit. Paganism and profane philosophy had never attained to the concept of a world-history. And at a time when the very existence of the Church was at stake, when all the faith of the Christians was required to enable them to bear the ills of life, and when their ranks were recruited largely from the poor and ignorant, it is not natural to expect that they should concern themselves about formulating theories of the ideal state. Christianity, with its wonderful power for the regeneration of society, was moulding and forming their lives and through them was influencing their whole environment, but they were themselves, perhaps, not conscious of the magnitude of the transformation which was taking place. Their writings, called forth by special exigencies, were designed as a general rule to break down the force of pagan opposition rather than to give a systematic exposition of the Christian concept of life in all its bearings. The consciousness of the world mission and social values of Christianity worked itself out gradually, but found no com-

plete expression until St. Augustine expounded his Philosophy of History in the *De Civitate Dei*.

The problems connected with organized society and especially in the form which these have assumed in the hands of modern investigators did not present themselves to the minds of the early Christians. The truths of Biology or History as affecting social theory did not help to mould their opinions and they had no conception of the purely technical meaning attached to such questions as Capital and Labor, The Inter-racial Struggle for Existence, the Principle of Population, the Force of Competition or the evils and advantages of Cosmopolitanism.

A distinct advantage however accrues to their position from the fact that they viewed the world and its activities from the standpoint of religion. In this way they escaped the one-sidedness which ignores the action and interaction of different spheres of effort. The universal application of Christian teaching to all activity either of the individual or the community compelled them to view life in all its phases, and thus saved them from the danger of narrowness.

Taking religion as the basis of all their ideas concerning the relation of man to his physical environment the early Christians looked on the possessor as merely the steward of earthly goods. For these he was responsible to God the Creator who was the supreme Lord and Master. In themselves, worldly gifts were not an end but a means to the sanctification of the soul through proper use and the service of one's neighbor. "For whatever we receive rightly and honorably," says Origen, "we receive from God, and by His Providence, as ripe fruits and the corn which strengtheneth man's heart, and the pleasant vine, and wine which rejoiceth the heart of man. And moreover the fruit of the olive tree, to make his face to shine, we have from the Providence of God."²

² *Contra Celsum*, VIII, 67. It is difficult to understand how Brentano can take this doctrine of the Fathers to mean that they regarded all property as a "verdammenswerte Usurpation." "Die wirtschaftlichen Lehren des Christlichen Alterthums." *Sitzungsberichte der Bayer. Akademie. Philos-philol, und Histor. Classe*, 1902, p. 159.

This belief which finds the meaning of life, not in its relation to its environment, but in its bearing on ultimate union with God, was revolutionary of old Greek methods of thought but not necessarily productive of a new social order. It is true that the sense of responsibility to the Creator for the use made of His gifts would tend to remove much of the inequality and injustice which had prevailed, but this could be brought about without changing essentially the character of the social structure. Not the possession of earthly goods but the use made of them was the question of paramount importance.

Not less striking was the view taken of man's place in organised society. Here too the supernatural destiny of man was taken as the measure of his relations to his fellows, and because all were sharers in the same high destiny all were considered equal. The true character of this equality is most fully discussed by Lactantius who placed justice at the basis of the perfect life. "Although justice embraces all the virtues together, yet there are two, the chief of all, which cannot be torn asunder and separated from it—piety and equity."³ Explaining piety to be nothing more than knowing and worshipping God he expounded his views of Equity "The other part of justice therefore is equity; and it is plain that I am not speaking of the equity of judging well, though this also is praiseworthy in a just man, but of making himself equal to others which Cicero calls equability. For God, who produces and gives breath to men, willed that all should be equal, that is, equally matched. He has imposed on all the same conditions of living. He has produced all to wisdom; He has promised immortality to all; no one is cut off from His heavenly benefits. For He distributes to all alike His one light, sends forth His fountains to all, supplies food, and gives the most pleasant rest of sleep; so He bestows on all equity and virtue. In His sight no one is a slave, no one a master; for if all have the same Father by an equal right we are all children."⁴ The same was the view of Cyprian. "You share the same lot in respect of being born,

³ *Divine Institutes*, v. 15.

⁴ *Ibid.*

the same condition in respect of dying; you have like bodily substance and a common order of souls, you come into this world of ours and depart from it after a time with equal rights.”⁵

In the opinion of Lactantius “neither the Romans nor the Greeks could possess justice, because they had men differing from one another by many degrees, from the poor to the rich, from the humble to the powerful; in short, from private persons to the highest authorities of kings.” Even though similar conditions might exist among the Christians, he shows how there could be no real inequality among them. “Some one will say, are there not among you some poor and others rich, some servants and others masters? Is there not some difference between individuals? There is none; nor is there any other cause why we mutually bestow upon each other the name of brethren, except that we believe ourselves to be equal. For since we measure all things not by the body but by the spirit, although the condition of bodies is different, yet we have no servants, but we both regard and speak of them as brothers in spirit, in religion as fellow servants.”⁶

In the words *Omnia humana non corpore, sed spiritu metimur* is to be found the real meaning of the early Christian doctrine of equality. Social distinctions were merely relative, and material prosperity counted for little when viewed from this standpoint.

The idea of the equality of men was associated with another of equal importance, Fraternity, which also rested on a religious basis. Lactantius, expounding at length this doctrine, says: “But the change of the age and the expulsion of justice is to be deemed nothing else than the laying aside of divine religion, which alone effects that man should esteem man dear, and should know that he is bound to him by the tie of brotherhood, since God is alike a Father to all, so as to share the bounties of the common God and Father with those who do not possess

⁵ *Ad Demetrianum*, 8.

⁶ *Divine Institutes*, v. 16. See also Minucius Felix, *Oct.*, xxxviii, *Omnes pari sorte nascimur; sola virtute distinguimur.*

them; to injure no one, to oppress no one, not to close his door against a stranger, not his ear against a suppliant, but to be bountiful, beneficent and liberal. This truly is justice and this is the golden age.”⁷ Pursuing this idea that justice is the centre of all virtue, he shows the duty of loving God necessarily implies love of one’s neighbor. “The first office of justice is to be united with God, the second with man. But the former is called religion; the second is named mercy or kindness; which virtue is peculiar to the just and to the worshippers of God, because this alone compromises the principle of common life.”⁸ How this idea for fraternity and kindness to others is rooted in the very nature of men he points out by showing their comparative defencelessness as compared to other animals. “But because He made him naked and weak that He might rather furnish him with wisdom. He gave him besides other things this feeling of kindness; so that man should protect, love and cherish man and both receive and afford assistance against all dangers. Therefore, kindness is the greatest bond of human society; and he who has broken this is to be deemed impious and a parricide.”⁹ Such doctrines are of course unintelligible and meaningless unless viewed in connection with the general law of charity which bound men to God and through Him to one another.

As a natural result of this doctrine that men are equal and that they are brothers, there follows that other doctrine of the solidarity of the human race, a theory of the entire interdependence of all men, which first found practical expression in the writings of the early Christians and by which they may be said to have anticipated by centuries the conclusions of students of anthropology and history. “For,” says Lactantius, “if we all derive our origin from one man whom God created, we are plainly of one blood.”¹⁰ For mutual protection men have been given this affection of pity;¹¹ as in all other cases the motive for the exercise of this affection comes from religion; for:

⁷ *Divine Institutes*, v. 6.

⁸ *Ibid.*, vi, 10.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Divine Institutes*, vi. 10.

¹¹ *Divine Institutes*, iii, 23.

"whatever a man has bestowed upon another hoping for no advantage from him, he really bestows upon himself for he will receive a reward from God."¹² The obligations involved in this relation of solidarity none could escape, "for God since He is kind, wished man to be a social animal."¹³

From the beginning the practice of the Christians was in conformity with this doctrine and this ideal of social conditions, "Thou shalt not turn away from him that is in want, but thou shalt share all things with thy brother, and shalt not say that they are thine own, for if ye are partakers in that which is immortal how much more in things which are mortal."¹⁴

How far the early Christians, notwithstanding their insistence on the equality of men, were from committing themselves to any system of collectivism is clear from the stress which was constantly laid upon the worth of the individual. Individualism is the very essence of their moral teaching, laying, as it does, all weight upon the question of salvation which can be attained only through individual effort. In addition to insisting on the independent worth of the individual they were equally vigorous in urging both by word and practice the objectionableness of Communism. The classic theory of Communism in antiquity was that of Plato. Lactantius states it as follows: "Under the teaching of Socrates it did not escape the notice of Plato, that the force of justice consists in equality, since all are born in an equal condition. Therefore (he says) they must have nothing private or their own: but that they may be equal, as the method of justice requires, they must possess all things in common."¹⁵

Conceding in the beginning of his argument that Communism might be endured if there was question only of money, he shows how repugnant it is to the Christian mind because it involves the hideous doctrine of free-love, because it destroys family life and reduces human society to the level of the herds and beasts. In essence it is destructive of the very object it sets out to attain "because there is no more violent cause of

¹² *Ibid.*, VI, 12.

¹⁴ *Didache*, IV, 8.

¹³ *Ibid.*, VI, 10.

¹⁵ *Divine Institutes*, III, 21.

discord than the desire of one woman by many men." The practical results of attempting to impose such a scheme on society would be to introduce adulteries and lusts, to remove temperance and chastity and modesty and frugality "which has no existence when there is no property of one's own." Turning to the economic side of the question he argues: "The ownership of property contains the materials both of vices and of virtues, but a community of goods contains nothing else than the licentiousness of vices." That the scheme was visionary and impracticable was evidenced to his mind by the fact "that no nation has existed in the world so foolish or so vain as to live in this manner." The true idea of equality, the real communism, is to be found "by taking away not marriage and wealth but arrogance, pride and haughtiness, that those who are powerful and lifted upon high may know they are on a level even with the neediest."¹⁶ These express statements coupled with the fact that among the early Christians no one dreamt of regarding the Church as a communistic society, show that their social ideals did not extend to collectivism or the abolition of private property.

On this latter question of private property and the cognate subject of riches, the mind of the early Christians finds such full and complete expression that their words on this matter are a real touchstone to their concept of social relations. The only one of the early writers who devoted a special treatise to the subject was, as has been said, Clement of Alexandria. In the work, "What Rich Man shall be Saved?" he combats the views of some rigorists, who, confounding use and abuse, maintained that the possession of property was incompatible with the true and real practice of a Christian life.¹⁷ His treatment of the subject is especially valuable because he speaks not as a philosopher or economist, but as a theologian aiming to remove a misinterpretation of a Scriptural passage. (*Mark* x, 17-31.)

¹⁶ *Divine Institute*, III, 21.

¹⁷ See Funk, "Klemens von Alexandrien über Familie und Eigentum," *Kirchengeschichtliche Abhandlungen und Untersuchungen*, Vol. II, pp. 45 seq.

The words of Our Lord regarding the difficulty with which the rich attained salvation had been interpreted by some to mean that the possession of wealth entailed of itself exclusion from the kingdom of Heaven, and that the rich who desired salvation should accept the gospel literally and sell all they had or otherwise rid themselves of their earthly possessions. Clement refutes this interpretation by showing in the first place that the possession of riches is not in itself blameworthy or sinful. "Christ," he says, "does not, as some conceive off-hand, bid him throw away the substance he possessed, and abandon his property; but bids him banish from his soul his notions about wealth, his excitement and morbid feeling about it, the anxieties which are the thorns of existence, which choke the seed of life. For thus those who have nothing at all but are destitute and beggars for their daily bread, the poor dispersed on the streets, who know not God and God's righteousness, simply on account of their extreme want and destitution of subsistence, and lack even of the smallest things, were most blessed and most dear to God, and sole possessors of everlasting life."¹⁸ That poverty and the renunciation of earthly possessions were enjoined upon all he considers to be contrary to many statements and facts in the words and life of our Lord. If all Christians were to abandon their property what was to be said about this command regarding the giving of alms, making friends of the mammon of iniquity, etc. "How could one give food to the hungry, and drink to the thirsty, clothe the naked and shelter the homeless, for not doing which He threatens with fire and outer darkness, if each man first divested himself of all these things."¹⁹ To throw away riches would be to deprive ourselves of the power of aiding our neighbor; they must be regarded merely as instruments which God has placed at the disposal of mankind to aid in the pursuit of good.²⁰ Christ does not forbid men to be rich, but to be insatiably and unjustly rich.²¹ From the moral point of view to be rich or poor, just as being handsome or ugly, is a matter of

¹⁸ *Quis Dives*, XI.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, XIV.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, XIII.

²¹ *Stromata*, III, 6.

indifference.²² The mere casting away of wealth is not in itself meritorious: "for he who casts away worldly wealth can still be rich in the passions, even though the material for their gratification is absent, for the disposition produces its own effects, and strangles the reason, and presses it down and inflames it with inbred lusts, it is then of no advantage to him to be poor in purse while he is rich in passion."²³ Clement thus sees no incongruity between the possession of earthly goods and the practice of the Christian religion, and looks on private property as an aid rather than an obstacle to the attainment of eternal happiness.

The same doctrines are found in Origen, who, notwithstanding his iron rigorism, does not seem to consider the condition of the poor as more conducive to salvation than that of the rich. Neither riches nor poverty can save men from the temptation to sin;²⁴ nor do riches exclude men from heaven.²⁵ In fact they can be considered as a means to obtaining greater merit as in the case of rich martyrs.²⁶ The word "rich" in the text, "It is hard for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God," means "rich in the simplest sense as referring to the man whose mind is distracted by his wealth, and, as it were entangled with thorns, so that it brings forth no spiritual fruit, or rich in the sense of abounding in false notions."²⁷ Private property, in the opinion of both, is the essential condition to the maintenance of society, the necessary means of binding men together.²⁸

While thus maintaining that men, without detriment to the sincerity of their faith as Christians, might hold property and enjoy riches, the early Christian writers never lost sight of the fact that the right to property meant something more than the *jus utendi et abutendi*, in the sense of being permitted to use their possessions without any sense of responsibility. The only reason why men enjoyed the good things of the world was because God by creation enabled them to do so. He made the

²² *Quis Dives*, XVIII.

²³ *On Prayer*, 29. 5.

²⁴ *Exhortation to Martyrdom*, XIV.

²⁵ *Quis Dives*, XIII.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, XV.

²⁷ *Comm. in Matth.*, 19. 23.

²⁸ *Contra Celsum*, VII, 23.

world subject to them and gave them power to rule over everything under the sun.²⁹ Property rights thus derived did not contain the further right of allowing the fortunate possessors to live in unsocial isolation, nor to be callously indifferent to the general welfare.³⁰ The interests of society at large predominated over those of the individual or any group of individuals, and the welfare of mankind and the common good were more important than the special interests of any class.³¹ The possession of wealth implied a divinely imposed obligation towards the poor, and even poverty was not without its obligations towards wealth. "The poor man makes intercession; a work in which he is rich, which he received from the Lord and with which he recompenses the master who helps him."³² So strict was this obligation of assisting the poor, that it was considered improper for the wealthy to use their resources in gaining additional property as long as there were needy and helpless fellow beings in need of assistance. "Instead of lands, therefore, buy afflicted souls, according as each one is able, and visit widows and orphans, and do not overlook them, . . . for to this end did the Master make you rich that you might perform these services to him."³³

The principle of solidarity implied in this doctrine of mutual aid was eminently characteristic of Christian thought and conduct from the beginning. "A mutual sharing of kind offices," says Lactantius, "is the preservation of society."³⁴ "We," says Justin, speaking of converts like himself, "who valued above all things the acquisition of wealth and possessions, now bring what we have into a common stock, and communicate to every one in need."³⁵ That no ideas of a collectivist character

²⁹ Hermas, *Pastor, Mandatum*, XII, 4.

³⁰ Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, VI, 12. "This is the chief and truest advantage of riches, not to use wealth for the particular pleasure of an individual, but for the welfare of many; not for one's immediate enjoyment, but for justice, which alone does not perish."

³¹ Origen, *Contra Celsum*, VII, 59.

³² Hermas, *Pastor, Similitude*, II.

³³ *Ibid.*, *Similitude*, I.

³⁴ *Divine Institutes*, VI, 10.

³⁵ *Apol.* I. 15.

underlay this practice is clear from the fact that the voluntary character of these offerings is constantly insisted on. Irenaeus, comparing the custom of offering gifts which prevailed among the Jews with that of the Christians, says the Christians offered not as slaves but as freemen.³⁶ "Each of us," says Tertullian, speaking of the Christian congregation, "makes a small donation; but only if it be his pleasure, and only if he be able: for there is no compulsion; all is voluntary."³⁷

The strongest argument, however, from the practice of the Christians regarding their views of the constitution of society is that which may be derived from their official recognition of a dependent class and their schemes of organized relief. In a condition of society where all are equally entitled to share in the general stock, there can be no question of rich and poor; for Communism excludes Charity. So striking, however, was the activity of the Church in this matter that it did not escape the notice of the pagans who, as Tertullian tells us, used to exclaim: Behold how they love one another;³⁸ and as exemplifying the idea that almsgiving was not rooted in any idea of the Church as a socialistic organization the Christians did not confine their benefactions to those within the fold. "Why do you select persons?" says Lactantius, "He is to be esteemed by you as a man, whoever it is that implores you, because he considers you a man."³⁹

Though there were rich men and women in the Church, no one dreamt of depriving them of membership because of their riches. When the charge was made that the Christians were for the most part drawn from among the poor and needy, the accusation was not considered a disgrace, neither was it regarded as being distinctive of the Christians as a body.⁴⁰ In fact the existence of different classes was considered to be a necessity. "The great," says Clement of Rome, "cannot subsist without the small, nor the small without the great. There

³⁶ *Adv. Haer.*, iv, 18. 2.

³⁷ *Apol.*, Chap. 38.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Divine Institutes*, vi, 11.

⁴⁰ Minucius Felix, *Octavius*, Chap. xxxvi.

is a kind of mixture in all things and thence arises mutual advantage." ⁴¹

From this belief in the existence of classes there arose the practice of social service, the *διακονία*. From the very beginning the giving of charity was as indissolubly associated with the activities of the Church as was that of preaching and administering the sacraments, and for each set of duties special ministers were ordained. Thus, by her very organization, the Church may be said to have committed herself to the acknowledgement of a state of society in which there were classes, differing because of their greater or less acquisition of worldly wealth. Nothing, furthermore, is so distinctive of Christian life as the organized effort to relieve distress. In thus adopting her constitution to the requirements of a social condition in which there were rich and poor, and by her systematic efforts in aid of the weak and unfortunate, the Church took a decided stand against collectivism, except in so far as Christian charity voluntarily exercised is collectivist. Thus the teaching and practice of the early Christians shows how far they were from considering the Church as a society of communists, and how futile it is to consider them the forerunners of modern socialism.

Hence, though they formulated no theories of social science as such, it is possible to derive from their writings, at least in outline, the social scheme which engaged the minds of the followers of Christ in the days before Constantine. They envisaged human society as a unit bound together by faith and charity. The fundamental law of all human relations was love. Because of this bond of love each individual in the community was obligated to each other individual by mutual ties of duty and service. When the general good was at stake the rights of the individual, such as they were, were subordinate to those of the body at large, and thus in every sense modified by the idea of a community of interest. The possession of riches and property was in no way incompatible with the spirit of Christianity. Though there were dangers connected with ownership, men were not therefore bound to renounce their

⁴¹ *Ep.* xxxvii.

possessions. Even from the moral and social standpoint, the possession of property was not without its advantages. It might be used as a means to aid in the exercise and development of certain virtues, besides being a source of allaying the distress of the helpless and the dependent. The true riches of life, however, were those which conduced to eternal happiness, and hence the goodness or evil of earthly things was always merely relative.

God is the real Lord and Master of all things earthly. He it is to whom men owe what they have: to Him must they be responsible for the use they make of the gifts, material as well as spiritual, with which He has endowed them. The true measure of right use is found in the law of charity. What has been justly acquired must be spent honestly. Hence, to desire wealth immoderately, to use it carelessly or sinfully, to see in it only a means of promoting luxury and excesses, are all in contradiction to the spirit of Christian ownership.

Because, too, of the other-worldly spirit which dominated them, the early Christians took a view of wealth and property which gives their economic and social outlook its peculiar Christian character. External things meant little, provided a man was not constrained from the service of God or the pursuit of virtue. Not the increase of wealth and easy living were the paramount object of society, but the attainment of conditions favorable to the growth of the spiritual life.

The assertion and observation of these principles was inseparable from the practice of the general maxims of Christian conduct. Though such a scheme of life may have led to confusion of thought at times, and though the social character of Christianity was slow in finding conscious expression, the seeds for social regeneration sown in the preaching of the gospel bore fruit much earlier in the lives than in the words of the faithful.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

BOOK REVIEWS.

The Life and Legend of the Lady Saint Claire: Translated from the French version, 1563, of Brother Francis Du Puis, by Charlotte Balfour. With an Introduction by Father Cuthbert, O. S. F. C. (Longmans, Green and Co., 1910), pp. xi + 154.

The Legend here presented in an English dress is a quaint sixteenth century French version of the primitive Latin biography of St. Clare usually ascribed to Thomas of Celano (1255-1261). Mrs. Balfour was well inspired when she decided to translate this version into English, for there is a beauty of diction all its own in Du Puis's rendering. What is better, her translation is exceedingly well done and in every way is worthy of the original. Besides the Legend proper, which is enhanced by valuable notes, Mrs. Balfour gives an English version of some important passages from the *Fioretti*, the *Speculum Perfectionis* and Thomas of Celano bearing on the life of St. Clare as well as of four charming letters addressed by the Saint to Princess Agnes of Bohemia, thus placing all lovers of St. Clare under an additional obligation to her. To students of the Franciscan Legend, however, Father Cuthbert's Introduction will doubtless prove the most interesting portion of the present volume. It deals with the winsome and wonderful personality of St. Clare and with her long struggle against the world's prudence to maintain the life of "Most High Poverty" which was the ideal of St. Francis. Apart from the graces of style which we are accustomed to associate with everything coming from the pen of Father Cuthbert, her treatment of the whole subject reveals the sympathetic historical insight of one who has made it peculiarly her own and is a finished piece of criticism. A most attractive feature of the volume are the illustrations. They include Collaert's well-known engravings from photographs specially taken in the British Museum and excellently reproduced. The material make-up of the book—printing, paper and binding—reflects great credit on the publishers. In every respect "The Life and Legend of the Lady Saint Clare" is a work for which

English readers of Franciscan Literature may well be grateful and for which it is reasonable to predict a wide welcome.

FR. PASCHAL ROBINSON, O. F. M.

Bossuet et les Protestants, par E. Julien. Paris, Beauchesne et cie., 1910. 8vo., 382 pp.

The leading idea of this volume is the one so eloquently and forcibly set forth in the numerous controversial works of Bossuet, that true Christianity is to be found only in Catholicism, that Protestant principles necessarily lead to the denial of all dogma and hence to irreligion, that only in the Catholic Church does the promise of Christ's assistance have its fulfilment, so that to be a Christian in the full sense of the word is to be a Catholic.

With this idea in mind, the author expounds the Catholic notion of the Church, tradition, justification, good works, the sacraments, the sacrifice of the Mass, and veneration of the saints, at the same time contrasting and refuting the erroneous views of Protestantism. The last two chapters are given to the consideration of the moral and social consequences of Protestant principles.

There is little that is new in this work. It shows solidity without breadth of treatment. In style it is not above the average treatises of its kind. It is highly praised both by the examiner, Mgr. Loth, and by the archbishop of Rouen. Their laudatory letters form the introduction to the volume. While the book has merit, it will hardly win a name as a notable addition to French ecclesiastical literature.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Orpheus et L'Evangile, par Pierre Batiffol. Paris, Gabalda et cie., 1910. 12mo. 284 pp.

Last year Mr. Solomon Reinach, Jew, scholar, and atheist, published a book entitled, *Orpheus*, in which, with much specious show of erudition mingled with many inaccuracies and unwarranted statements, he pretended to account for all religions,

Christianity included, as more or less refined outgrowths of primitive superstitions, especially of totemism and taboo restrictions. Defining religion as an assemblage of scruples hampering the exercise of free will, he sought with ill disguised hatred to bring about, if possible, the utter discrediting of the Christian religion, particularly that form of it which rejoices in the name Catholic, and which to-day is the strongest bulwark against atheism and anarchy. With the view to undermine the very foundations of Christian faith, he has devoted not a few pages to the attempt to show that what is recorded of our blessed Lord in the Gospels, Acts and Epistles, is not the testimony of eye and ear witnesses, and that consequently there is nothing in the story of Christ that merits the name of genuine history.

It is to refute this portion of Reinach's book that the Abbé Batiffol delivered eight lectures at Versailles last winter. He has now published them under the title, *Orpheus et l'évangile*. A beautiful volume it is, solid, erudite, clearly arranged, treated with a breadth of view that marks the true scholar, and written in a style that makes it a delight to read. With good taste, he rises above the plane of sharp polemics and gives a calm, dignified exposition of the grounds for accepting as truly historical the contents of the Gospels, Acts, and Pauline Epistles. After discussing in the first two lectures the much debated testimony of Josephus and the references to Christ in the teachings of the early rabbis and in the writings of Pliny and Tacitus, he treats in successive lectures of the Catholic Canon, of the value of St. Paul's testimony, of the author of Acts, whom Harnack in harmony with the traditional view has brilliantly proved to be Luke, the physician and companion of St. Paul, of the Synoptic Gospels, which he contends may be safely placed in the years 60-70 A. D., of the undoubted authenticity of Jesus' recorded sayings, of the truly historical character of the Gospel story of Jesus. *Orpheus* is rarely mentioned except in footnotes, where its inaccuracies, misstatements, and use of antiquated and discredited arguments are exposed and turned to the discomfiture of the author. Apart from its refutation of Reinach's anti-Christian theory, the book has a permanent value as perhaps the very best Catholic presentation in succinct form of the historic character of the Gospel record. The high reputation of the Abbé Batiffol as a Catholic scholar will not fail to be enhanced by this delightful and useful volume.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Essays in Pentateuchal Criticism, by Harold M. Wiener, M. A.,
LL. B. Oberlin, O., Bibliotheca Sacra Co., 1909, pp. 239.
Price, \$1.50.

The Essays consist of a series of investigations, with the broad result that the substantial integrity of the Pentateuch as a production of the time of Moses, is asserted. In the main, they form a critical inquiry into the principal difficulties alleged by some scholars concerning the narratives of the last four books of the Pentateuch. The first chapter contains an interesting textual study in connection with Astruc's clue to the documents in Genesis. The last chapter is devoted to a test of the Wellhausen theory.

A vast amount of critical matter is covered in the Essays, and that within a comparatively small compass. This is effected through the rather forensic style which covers the treatment. Like Wellhausen and Robertson Smith, the author has brought his case before the bar of the ordinary mind. He, however, uses some three or four critics as his chief resource, and in running his quarry to the ground, he does it too lightly for a work that aims at being a positive contribution to conservative literature.

JOSEPH A. NELSON.

Our Lord's Last Will and Testament. Thoughts on Foreign Missions—Adapted from the German—By a member of St. Joseph's Society, Mill Hill, London.

This is a valuable little book, savoring of the true Missionary spirit. Some works on foreign missions are occasionally somewhat open to criticism on the ground that they are tacitly intended to show forth the merits of some particular society as being preferable to others. This book cannot be accused of any shadow of so-called selfishness on that score. The merits of all missionary societies are honestly acknowledged. It contains useful information upon the work of Foreign Missionary Societies, especially of the three great societies of The Propagation of the Faith, The Holy Childhood, and that of St. Joseph, Mill Hill, London, as well as a short epitome of all the foreign Missionary Societies established in the last century.

Our Lord's last command—"Go and teach all nations, etc.," is the foundation upon which the author bases his missionary claims for the Church. The line of thought is well preserved, setting forth the manner in which this command was obeyed by the Apostles, by the Popes throughout the ages, and is being carried out by the Church of to-day; and the oft-raised objection—the primary necessity of home missions and the lack of means to procure their success—is adroitly refuted and explained. The whole world was to be the field of Apostolic labor; the Apostles were to go to the Gentiles, even though the majority of the Jews remained unconverted. There was to be no limitation in the effecting of the divine mission entrusted to them. Freely had they received, they were to give freely in return. The author makes it clear that it is incumbent upon every Catholic to interest himself, according to his means, in the work of Foreign Missions. It is a useful and instructive book in the hand of Catholic and non-Catholic alike, more especially to the Catholics of the British Empire, to whom the appeal is primarily made.

The Formation of Character. By Ernest R. Hull, S. J.
Sands & Co., London; B. Herder, St. Louis, Mo. Pp. 123.

To educate without developing character is with Father Hull, like building a cathedral without a sanctuary. The present treatise was written in response to many requests from young parents for direction in the training of their children. While meeting their needs, however, the author has also spoken to teachers and to those generally who are engaged in the work of character formation. His book is concisely written; perhaps too much so for popular reading. It contains instructive chapters on the nature, principles, and ideals of character, and gives special attention to the "all-around ideal" of the cultured Christian gentleman. Many helpful and illuminating suggestions appear on watching the growth and development of character. Some chapters on psychology and physiology will offer difficulties to those not familiar with the terminology of scholastic and modern philosophy, but the practical direction and counsel with which these and other chapters abound will be readily understood and appreciated.

Outlines of Bible Knowledge, edited by the Most Rev. S. G. Messmer, D. D., D. C. L., Archbishop of Milwaukee, with 70 illustrations and four maps. Herder, 1910, pp. xii, 298.

These Outlines, based on Dr. A. Brüll's *Bibelkunde*, are a welcome contribution to our Catholic Biblical literature. The Most Reverend Editor has improved the German original in many respects and has made it "a comparatively complete, though still elementary manual of the Bible." He has added two excellent chapters of his own on the political and domestic antiquities of the Jews, and, by way of Appendix, the Encyclical Letter of Pope Leo XIII on the study of Holy Scripture. The work is divided into three parts: Biblical History and Literature, Biblical Geography, and Biblical Archæology. The first part is confined to a clear and precise statement of the great biblical questions, leaving aside the modern controversies which, as the editor points out, are not wholesome food for the faithful at large. We notice with pleasure that the second half of the book is devoted to Biblical Geography and Archæology. Rightly so. To acquire even a common knowledge of the Bible, the student must possess exact information about the countries and places where the Bible was written, and about the manners and customs of the Jews, who were the depositaries of the Old Testament Revelation. The book is intended especially for teachers and students of Catholic theology, but we heartily recommend it as a text-book for our Catholic High Schools and Colleges, for it is the only elementary work of its kind in our Catholic English Literature.

A. VASCHALDE.

A History of the United States for Schools. By S. E. Forman. Pp. 420 + lxxi (appendices and index): The Century Co., New York, 1910.

In a volume of moderate size Dr. Forman has prepared an excellent outline of the history of the United States. Inside the first cover is a map showing the distribution of the aboriginal races when the white men began to explore this country. This classification is based on linguistic differences among the Indians. Throughout the work are many good maps which indicate the

territorial growth of this republic. The illustrations are both attractive and abundant.

Of the era of discovery and the succeeding period of exploration there is a clear, correct and interesting account. The Norse discovery is disposed of in a footnote. Though the voyages of the Northmen had no permanent results, they appear to deserve a little more consideration. The remarkable activity of the Franciscans and other Friars is passed over without observation. It is to these spiritual heroes that we are indebted for our first knowledge of Central Asia and for much of our information concerning China and other eastern countries in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

The familiar legend about Queen Isabella's jewels is given a place in the section that treats of the discovery by Columbus. Some historian should set this pretty fable at rest. Seven-eighths of the cost of that expedition was furnished by the *Santa Hermandad*, a quasi-military organization that was empowered to levy and collect taxes. Who furnished the remaining one eighth, the share of Columbus, we do not yet know.

The colonial era is treated in a concise and interesting manner. In the author's accounts of the early settlers in England's colonies the "Scotch-Irish" appear to be given the place of prominence. This is not strictly correct, for while a majority of the settlers from Ireland were of Scotch descent, a great number of Celtic Irish came to America even at that early period.

The sketch of the Revolutionary war mentions the spectacular flight of John Paul Jones but fails to notice the many useful services of Captain (subsequently Commodore) John Barry. In this as in some other particulars the author follows the dusty path that has been trodden by generations of text-book writers. The extent of French assistance during the war for independence could hardly have been suggested to the student by a brief description of the splendid fleet that had defeated the British off the capes of the Chesapeake before the surrender at Yorktown.

The author's explanation of the causes of the Mexican War is not that given in his extended work by Hubert Howe Bancroft. The pro-slavery party in the United States desired more territory for the expansion of their peculiar institution, and in the chaotic condition of affairs in Mexico they found a pretence for wresting from that feeble power a considerable portion of her territory.

It is true that the sister republic was given for the southwest a considerable sum of money.

In discussing the Civil War, Lincoln's plan of reconstruction is passed without observation. That was the mode under which Tennessee was restored to her normal relations in the Union. To comprehend fully the actual reconstruction instituted and guided by Congress it is necessary to know what Lincoln had done to bring about a restoration of former conditions.

Teachers who are not well acquainted with their American history will find of much value the prepared questions following the successive chapters. The "Review and Reading References" have been prepared with no little skill. The volume, which is profusely illustrated, contains a series of excellent colored maps. In a few instances, indeed, the author follows the time-honored though unscientific method of treating topics; however, on the whole, the narrative is clear and accurate.

CHARLES H. MCCARTHY.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Patronal Feast of the University. On Thursday, December 8, the Patronal Feast of the University was celebrated by a Pontifical High Mass in the Assembly Room of McMahon Hall. The celebrant was Right Reverend Bishop O. B. Corrigan, Auxiliary Bishop of Baltimore. The preacher was Reverend John Webster Melody, D. D., Professor of Moral Theology,

Feast of the Conversion of St. Paul. The feast of the Conversion of St. Paul, the patronal feast of the Faculty of Theology, was celebrated by a Solemn High Mass in the Assembly Room of McMahon Hall on Wednesday, January 25. The celebrant was the Rev. Charles F. Aiken, D. D., and the preacher was Reverend Patrick J. Healy, D. D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History.

Lectures on Aristotle. A series of six lectures on "Aristotle and His Influence in Modern Times," is being delivered in Brooklyn, N. Y., at the Academy of Music, under the auspices of the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences, by Reverend William Turner, S. T. D., Professor of Philosophy. The following is the list of dates and subjects:

Jan. 6—"Aristotle's Life; His Relation to Socrates and Plato; His Influence on His Own Times; His Writings; the Character of His Genius."

Jan. 13—"Aristotle as Founder of Logic; Aristotle as a Scientist; Subsequent Development of Aristotelian Logic; Aristotle's Influence on Subsequent Scientists."

Jan. 20—"Aristotle as a Psychologist and Metaphysician; His work on the Soul; His Metaphysics; Later Interpretations of His Doctrines in the Commentaries."

Jan. 27—"Aristotle's Ethics, Theory of the State and Theory of Art."

Feb. 3—"Aristotle in Relation to Medieval Christianity."

Feb. 10—"Aristotle and the Humanists; His Influence on Modern Science, Philosophy and Literary Criticism."

Publications by Professors. In the November number of the *Psychological Review* there appeared a study from the Psychological Laboratory of the University, by Rev. Dr. Moore, entitled "The Influence of Temperature and the Electric Current on the Sensibility of the Skin." It is an attempt to investigate the relation between mind and body in the sphere of tactual sensation. That some such relation exists is a fact of experience. The value of the present article consists in making use of the methods of the modern science of physical chemistry to show on what precisely that relation depends. Strictly speaking, it is a physiological rather than a psychological study, for it is concerned with the organic conditions of sensation. The author finds that the sensibility of the skin is a function of the concentration of cathode ions in the tissues and that the same laws hold for the sensibility of the skin as for the irritability of muscle and nerve.

About the same time there appeared an article by the same author, which appeared as Vol. 1, No. 2 of the *University of California Publications in Psychology*. This is a long experimental study of the old metaphysical problem of abstract ideas. It gives a history of the experimental literature of the problem which has grown only within the last few years to considerable dimensions. It then proceeds to show by purely experimental methods that in the process of abstraction there is, as a matter of fact, more than sensations and mental images, thus lending empirical evidence to the truth of one of the most important positions of scholastic philosophy.

William C. Robinson, LL. D., Professor of Law at the Catholic University, has recently published a new and greatly enlarged edition of his deservedly popular work on *Elementary Law*, now widely used by students throughout the United States. In this text-book, especially in this new edition, Professor Robinson has endeavored to set before the student the universal and established rules of law, now in force in this country, in such detail and with such exactness as to dispense the student from a further study of a number of its ancient and well established branches, and to equip him for recourse

to larger text-books and leading cases in his investigation of the more important and more progressive departments of the law. For use in connection with this statement he has collected several thousand valuable collateral readings from the standard treatises, thus opening to the student a vast field for legal research, to be explored by him according to his opportunities and zeal. Professor Robinson was for many years in the Law School at Yale University and is the author of many important works, among them being "American Jurisprudence," "Forensic Oratory," and "Law of Patents."

The Department of Celtic. The Department of Celtic at the Catholic University has recently received from the Gaelophone Company a complete set of phonographic records of Irish, for which Dr. Dunn, head of the Department, has prepared a book of texts in Irish and English; the book was printed in Ireland with Irish ink and on Irish paper.

These records and the text-book should be a boon to Gaelic classes as well as to the private student who has not a good native teacher at hand. One of the greatest advantages of the system is that it can be used for a few spare minutes or for hours at a time. The records were made in Ireland and consist mostly of dialogues between a Connachtman and a Munsterman. The method followed is the natural one by question and answer based on actual everyday topics in which occur the very words a speaker of Irish has most need of. There are, besides, typical folk-tales, and songs with Irish words and master-recitations by the leading men of letters in the Gaelic movement in Ireland.

The Gaelophone Company has brought out a neat little leaflet of "Pithy, pointed Paragraphs for every Irishman to read," which will be sent free on request to their address, K. of C. Building, New Haven, Connecticut.

Department of Oriental Languages. The Rev. Dr. Vasschalde of the Department of Oriental Languages is preparing for the *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium* an

edition of the "Book of the Union," written by Abbot Mar Babai (569-628). This treatise is one of the most important in Syriac literature. It discusses many interesting questions concerning the union of the two natures in Christ, and throws considerable light on the great Christological controversies which divided the Syriac Church in the fifth, sixth and seventh centuries; for example, on the definition of nature, hypostasis, person, and union. This book is still considered by the historians of the East as their official theology on the Incarnation. Its publication will be a valuable contribution to Oriental patrology.

Society of St. John Chrysostom. Within the past few months a Society known as the St. John Chrysostom Society has been formed at the University. Its purpose is to study historical and liturgical questions bearing on the Oriental Churches. The officers recently elected are: Honorary President, His Eminence, James Cardinal Gibbons, President, Rt. Rev. Monsignor Thomas J. Shahan, Rector of the Catholic University; Vice-President, Rev. Henry Hyvernat, S. T. D., Professor of Semitic Languages and Biblical Archæology at the University; Treasurer, Rev. Paul Sandalgi; Secretary, Rev. Sigourney W. Fay.

The Catholic Convert League. The Catholic Convert League of Washington, D. C., which was formed last year at the Apostolic Mission House on the feast of the Immaculate Conception and has now a membership of over one hundred, meets, every month in McMahon Hall, Catholic University.

The principal method of carrying out the expansive apostolic work which the League holds out to all Catholics, whether they be converts or not, is to extend the hand of welcome to converts who have sacrificed friends and much that is dear to them in order to embrace the true faith. It has also appointed four committees; a correspondence guild for the purpose of answering inquiries from prospective converts; a book-rack committee for the purpose of disseminating Catholic literature

at the doors of churches; a press committee, and a library committee, which is endeavoring to stir up the interest of Catholics in placing Catholic books in public libraries.

The appeal which this autumn was sent out by the committee, inviting the coöperation of Catholics in twenty-three cities of the United States, has been the means of arousing interest in a number of quarters.

The New Gymnasium. The new gymnasium of the Catholic University has been recently completed and placed at the disposal of the students. This building satisfies a long felt want in the life of the undergraduates, who were before this without the necessary means of developing their physical activities during the winter months.

Already, great interest has been made manifest attending indoor sports and the organization of the Freshman, Sophomore and Junior class teams in basket-ball has aroused class spirit to its highest pitch. The Athletic Association of the University, grasping the opportunities afforded by the new gymnasium has recognized basket-ball as a major sport, and a Varsity team, composed of the most efficient athletes registered in the various departments, will make their debut in this branch of sport.

Indoor running has also been materially aided by the newly acquired place to train, and the track team will attend all the indoor athletic carnivals given in Washington, Baltimore and Richmond in the Spring. However, the greatest advantage of the gymnasium lies in the fact that the numerous candidates for the baseball team will be able to secure an early start in throwing the ball under cover during the colder months. This will enable the batteries to be in prime condition by the opening of the season, which will start during the latter part of March.

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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit.* c. 6.

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IS EXTERNAL PERCEPTION AN ULTIMATE FACT?

A disappointing feature of modern, as distinct from scholastic philosophy is the ease with which it has allowed Idealism to discredit the doctrines of Common Sense. Take, for instance, the subject about to engage our attention—the venerable doctrine of external perception, which leaves us with or without a material world, according as we accept or reject it. Only one modern philosopher since Hegel's time has struck a blow in its defense, but so feebly was the blow delivered that those at whom it was aimed and upon whom it fell could afford to let it pass unnoticed. Thomas Reid affirmed quite boldly that we have an immediate perception of external objects; but he seems to have taken fright at the boldness of his own statement—perhaps he thought himself an unjust aggressor—for we find him suddenly denying, almost in the same breath, that we are at all *conscious* of any such immediate knowledge of reality. Not a very impressive show of resistance to the encroachments of idealism, this voice of one Scotch philosopher crying in the wilderness!

A spirit of opposition to the abandonment of 'common sense' on this pivotal point was not lacking, however, from another quarter. The natural scientists, as they are called, refused to barter away the material world and to accept in exchange for it from the idealist a world that is spiritual from centre to circumference. Physical nature meant more to them than a

mere shadowy envelope of spirit, a mysterious ground crossed and recrossed by the interplay of spiritual forces and ideas. And though no art of subtle criticism was left untried to win over to universal spiritualism these students of the great world of things, such efforts seemed all foredoomed to failure. The enchanting view of idealism that matter and force are but thought and will in thin disguises, through which reflection easily penetrates to the spiritual reality hidden beneath, left these professed observers of the ways of nature cold and unimpressed. They could not be induced to join the great anti-realist federation of the philosophers.

SCIENCE AND IDEALISM.

But the eleventh hour usually brings strange faces into the vineyard, and so it has proved in the present instance. Scientists themselves are now deserting the realistic position for that of idealism, and the strangeness of a new speech is on their lips; for they stoutly maintain in considerable numbers at present that the object of the natural sciences is, not real things and their qualities, but our own personal *sensations* in their regard. At first sight, it would seem indeed that idealism had at last succeeded in making a very stubborn convert, but this turns out not to have been the case, when the impelling motives of this sudden change of front are traced to their source. These are found to lie, not in any previous conviction of the truth or strength of the idealistic position, whether absolutism or pragmatism, but in a peculiar working-principle which has so long gone the rounds of acceptance with scientists that they have at last begun to regard it as an exhaustive account of the nature of human knowledge. We refer to the theory of symbolism—proposed at first, it would seem, as a truce or compromise between scientists and idealists, and now without further ado imposed as a doctrine to be universally accepted—that scientific formulas are nothing more than convenient mental symbols, certainly not real knowledge at all, of the actual things we see, handle, and live among.

It must be easy to fall into the error of making a universal philosophy of the world out of a partial method of investigation, so many are guilty of it, with such dire results, in other instances than the one we are here considering, where an account of the development of human knowledge is clearly mistaken for an account of its origin and value. There are two distinct sets of conditions or principles operating in human knowledge—those which govern its original acquisition before our powers of reflection have come fully into play, and those which control its scientific elaboration after it has once been acquired. We elaborate the notions of matter, force, thing, man, self, and God; we round them out and we fill them in all our lives; even the notion of ‘externality’ is no exception to this rule, but rather a brilliant instance of its working. But this work of elaboration and construction has nothing whatever to do either with the original acquisition, or the ultimate value of these concepts. The history of their growth yields us no account of their origin—that is a distinct problem to be studied separately. Its solution is not involved in, nor affected by any theory we may frame to show in detail how our ideas grow and develop; and the fact that scientists employ a kind of mental short-hand to register and summarize a mass of data that would otherwise prove intractable because of its rich variety, is without any significance for or against the doctrine of natural realism; unless, of course, we should be so narrow as to understand by knowledge explanation only, in which case we should be guilty, with many others, of confounding a particular part with the greater whole, of mistaking a profile for the full-faced portrait of reality. Many a man has lost his faith in realism through exclusive attention to the fact that the human mind is a great productive and constructive power. It is time to awaken from this hypnotic sleep, to recover from this partial eclipse of consciousness. There is another side altogether to knowledge; we not only *produce* our ideas, we also *undergo* them; acquisition precedes elaboration and development.

The scientist is the latest to join the already great number

of those who can see but one side to human knowledge. He found himself an idealist, almost without knowing it, the moment he mistook his own particular theory of the nature of scientific knowledge for a real limitation of man's knowing powers in general. This mistake came from overemphasizing one fact at the expense of another fully as great and equally entitled to consideration. For instance: the much heralded fact that knowledge is subject to internal laws of growth and development is perfectly compatible with the ignored companion-fact that knowledge also has an extrinsic source and norm, being determined, in part, at any rate, by its objects, and never completely escaping the prod of an external stimulus. So far from being exclusive, as is so often alleged, these two facts are complementary in their mutual bearing. Reality and Knowledge are as two concentric circles, a wheel within a wheel, the former the greater, the latter the smaller of the two. The circumference of neither can be made to coincide with that of the other, though it is the end and aim of idealism to bring this coincidence about by inflating the inner to the size and sweep of the outer ring. Only by so doing can room be made for the exclusive doctrine of immanence, and all objects, known and knowable, be brought entirely within the charmed circle of mind, conveniently inflated for their reception and inclosure. But this inflating process is all on paper, and does not succeed in point of fact, the reason for the failure being that the outward relations of human thought to objects cannot be included under any system which says that the mind of man is in relation only with itself. To just such a process of inflating, ignoring, and overlooking does the fallacy of considering a theory of knowledge equivalent to a theory of reality owe its persistent reappearance in the pages of philosophy and science.

THE PRINCIPLE OF THOUGHT ECONOMY.

Strange to say, history repeats itself even in the general *principle* which these recent scientific converts to pragmatism

invoke to rid themselves of the encumbering notion of an independent physical world, with which their formulas would have, of necessity to be in strict accordance. To justify their rejection of this realistic notion, and also to prove their right to substitute in its stead the more easily managed world of human sensations, they fall back on the already over-worked principle of Thought-Economy, better known as 'Ockam's razor' or the law of parsimony,¹ which forbids in a scientific explanation the use of all unnecessary suppositions, and lays down the rule that of two explanatory theories the more simple one is also the more true. From this selective principle, as if it were the final and only criterion of truth that could be said, of right, to demand conformity with its pronouncements, the conclusion is drawn—a supposition, by the way, from another unproven supposition—that the notion of a perceived, independent world of things, really distinct from our sensations of it, is an unnecessary, superfluous assumption for scientists to entertain.

Kant thought so, too, and the student of the history of philosophy will easily recognize in the foregoing line of reasoning a rather belated revival of the old argument by which Kant sought to displace the doctrine of physical realism, and to secure a solid footing at the same time for the doctrine of critical idealism which he proposed to establish in its stead. But the father of German philosophy evidently forgot that a limited principle, like Ockam's, cannot be *extended* to a special case, such as that of the realistic notion of an independently existing physical world, unless that case is first shown to fall well within the sphere of application to which the operation of the mental law in question is necessarily confined. It is easy for a man to be right in his general principle, and wrong in his particular instance, and the present case goes far toward showing that it is also equally easy for a man to be wrong in both. Kant seems to have regarded Ockam's famous maxim with all the fondness Archimedes had for his lever, when he said of it: "Give me where I may stand, and I will move the

¹ Non sunt multiplicanda entia sine necessitate.

world." But the trouble is in finding just such a point of vantage for the accomplishment of this ambitious design.

As a protest against extreme formalism, such as that which the Scotists practised when they needlessly multiplied metaphysical entities, and created more difficulties by their explanations than existed in the original facts to be explained, the principle of simplification which Ockam introduced had much to be said in its favor at the time. But the process of simplifying suppositions may easily be pushed too far, and made to exclude as useless any and all metaphysical attempts to account for the notion of external reality which is clearly one of the original data furnished by consciousness; in other words, the rules for explaining reality may be misused to explain it away. Philosophers are prone to forget, as did Kant, that Ockam's maxim is neither a necessity of thought, nor yet a limitation imposed by experience. Were it proven veritably to be a *universal rational principle*, which manifestly it is not, we might hesitate before denying its relevancy and applicability to the doctrine of realism. But since it is on this prior question of *the right to extend* a limited principle that the whole argument against realism clearly hinges and depends, we are left pretty much in the air, not only by Kant himself, but by his latter-day revivers as well.

What necessity is there, whether of thought or fact, compelling us to think of the universe as simple rather than complex, as individual rather than dual in its structure, as organic "unity-in-difference" rather than a system of distinct persons and things? The supposition that only a world of sensations need be reckoned with is, of course, more simple than the supposition that there is an additional world of things to be taken into account, because in the latter case duality is implied, and in the former some sort of monism. But what obliges us to choose either of these alternatives of simplicity or duality in preference to the other? That is the heart of the whole issue. What logical or real compulsion is there to accept for guidance in this choice of alternatives the well-worn adage of Ockam, which was intended originally for the inventors

of minute realities that did not exist, and has no meaning when applied to the great world of reality about us which we do not invent, but discover? None. The compulsion is all the other way. The facts of experience and the testimony of consciousness are a standing protest against the attempt of Kant and the pragmatists to put the moderate and the extravagant realists in one and the same boat, and to sink them both together with a single shot of criticism. The facts of experience and the testimony of consciousness are also a perpetual protest in this particular instance against the venturesome supposition that the doctrine of Monism, because more simple, is, by that fact alone, made more true than the more complex doctrine of dualism.²

THE DOCTRINE OF SIMPLICITY.

Alas! the worship of simplicity, which is only another name for monism, has all the force and attraction of a religion with modern philosophers; and complexity, duality of any kind, is banished as a superstition. Simplicity, they tell us, forbids the useless doubling of the universe into a world of sensations, and a world of things. Like Thoreau when dying, they would be troubled with but one world at a time, and would justify this exclusiveness of taste, when pressed for a rational account of their attitude, by an appeal to their favorite doctrine of the simplicity of truth, and the truth of simplicity. It is interesting to think in this connection how different might have been the course of modern philosophers had this presupposition been examined and properly discounted, instead of having been uncritically accepted and admiringly glorified. Surely, the meaning cannot be that the adage of Ockam is of more binding force than the testimony of consciousness regarding the existence of an outer and real world! And yet, that seems to be the

²The *fact* of Dualism is not refuted by refuting the *theories*. Idealists invariably proceed to refute the psychological, metaphysical, and epistemological theories of Dualism under the false impression that the fact is thereby overthrown.

surprising sense in which idealists have always interpreted the so-called law of parsimony or economical thought; with them the simple passes for the true, and the complex for the illusory, at least until it has been reduced to its supposed original simplicity. Hegel tried to write history as if all were mind and nothing matter. An attempt was made by Spencer to read even prehistory in the light of Ockam's formula, when he reduced religion to its crudest terms, and argued that the lowest forms must also have been the first to occur historically. The axiom of simplicity is carried into other fields, especially into that of the Scripture, where a host of writers are to-day engaged in the hunt for simple forms of thought and expression, on the gratuitous supposition that our Lord's words, say, at the Last Supper, or on the destruction of Jerusalem and the Second Coming, could not have been complex, but must have been simple in their original utterance and bearing. Proof of the necessity of any such supposition in each individual case is generally conspicuous by its absence. Nor need we be unduly surprised thereat, for the very existence of the physical world is sacrificed to-day in the name of this Moloch of Ockam's, and we are now told, largely on its unsupported authority, that sensations make the only world we either can, or need care to know; and all because Explanation is put before Knowledge instead of after.

But what interests us principally in the present situation of thought, which we have just been engaged in describing, is the significant fact that the latest repudiators of the doctrine of external perception have but freshly reproduced the mistakes of those who long ago preceded them in the ways of idealism, seeing only the developing side of human knowledge, harping on this half-truth as if it completely exhausted the subject, and then turning around contemptuously to deny the existence of any ready-made world. After this recital of the present trend and triumph of idealistic thought, we may well ask ourselves if the arguments urged against external perception and the known reality of the physical universe do not illustrate and exemplify a great fallacy rather than disestablish a truth

as old as philosophy itself. And this brings us by slow, perhaps also by illuminating stages to the discussion of the question proper.

TWO METHODS OF PROCEDURE.

The problem of perception has both a conscious and an unconscious side—the former an evident fact of psychology that shines by its own light, the latter an inevident physiological process on which an artificial light has to be thrown. Two distinct lines of inquiry branch out naturally from this double phase of the problem; we may ask *what* we perceive, or *how* our perceptions occur.

The answer to the first question, *What?* is made by psychology, and consists in the frank acknowledgment that we actually perceive external objects, this admission amounting to no more in the end than an explicit statement of the consciously experienced result of perception in all minds. There can be no legitimate doubt of the witness of psychology to this fact of external perception. The data of individual experience, if not darkened by the counsel of the critic beforehand, leave no real room for doubting that the primary object of knowledge is, not sensation, but objects or their qualities. The only plausible way to discredit this plain fact of psychology is to attempt to go behind it in some manner or other, and to employ metaphysics, or the natural sciences, or physiology for the purpose of depriving it of all real worth and significance. To this roundabout method of evasion the opponents of realism have always had recourse, never more so, perhaps, than at the present hour of writing. Idealist and pragmatist alike endeavor to circumvent the evidence by appealing from it to supposedly prior stages or conditions of our mental life, where it is not to be found. This appeal is sometimes confined to the sphere of consciousness, as when we are given to understand by the pragmatist that there existed in original man, and still exists in the mind of the babe, a state of pure experience where everything appears as a perfect blank, and none of the distinctions, later drawn between subject and object, self and

not-self, have as yet made their indelible scribings on the virgin page of consciousness. Sometimes the appeal is carried completely over into the region of the unconscious, and the evidence of our knowledge of reality is made to depend entirely on the inevidence of the physiological processes which go before or along with it. In either case the appeal is to a silent court, the decisions of which are not handed down, but framed beforehand by the appellant to suit himself. The first of these appeals does not rightly belong here for consideration. The second alone invites our attention at present—the attempt, namely, to discredit the matter of our perceptions by contrasting it with the manner of our perceiving.

The answer to the second question, How do these real perceptions occur? takes us out of the range of conscious knowledge altogether, and compels us to reconstruct, by means of science and analytic reason, those underlying processes of nerve and brain which do not, at the time of their happening, appear above the surface of consciousness as public events of which we are aware, but pass unnoticed beneath, playing a rôle of such complete self-effacement that not a glimmer of conscious light is left burning on their trail. Which of these two sides of the problem—the conscious result of perception, or the unconscious processes underlying and conditioning it—deserves to occupy the first place in philosophic attention? The settlement of this priority of claim to consideration confronts us at the very threshold of the problem, and must be decided one way or the other, before we are at liberty to proceed further in the discussion of the subject.

Shall we imitate Descartes, and begin by entertaining provisional doubt concerning the known results of perception, until we have examined the unknown processes, and satisfied all our theoretical misgivings as to the reliability of the previous sense-channels, through which our knowledge of reality comes? Or, shall we accept the results straightway at the outset, and then turn about to consider what additional information concerning the processes may be gathered from the positive sciences of physics and physiology? In plainer terms, which of these two

available lights is the ultimate one to be taken for guidance—the natural light of evidence, or the artificial light of explanation? On the answer to this question depends the choice of roads to idealism, or beyond it to the world of independent reality. We are at the dividing of the ways.

The realist regards the perceptive power of human consciousness as an ultimate or irreducible fact; one, that is, which can not be reduced to more simple, or explained in more intelligible terms than itself. There is no possible way by which we may go around, or under, or ahead of the simple fact of experience that we and the objects of our attention are really different items in the universe; that somehow we do know a reality that is not identical with ourselves, or with the consciousness of the race. This fact has to be accepted at once on its own evidence just as it stands. Everybody understands the meaning of an existing world of things, and recognizes his actual ability to perceive such a world, those alone excepted who practice the art of self-sophistication in preference to that of knowledge, who so train themselves to marvel at the obvious that they end by seeing a metaphysical impossibility where there is only an attested and accomplished psychological fact.

The history of idealism for the past three hundred years has all too plainly shown that no philosopher who disregarded or refused this light of evidence ever succeeded afterwards in making his way to reality. Hooded this light may be at times by the screening effect of theories advanced to account for it, or rather to explain it away, but extinguished never. Interesting sidelights of explanation may be thrown upon it, but these can no more take its place than a candle that of the sun. Nothing more illuminating than this conscious evidence has been discovered by its many critics, though scarcely a nook or corner of man's mental life has been left unexplored. Why, then, one may well ask these worshippers of the light that fails, should the acceptance of the results of perception be postponed until the processes themselves have been laid bare to scrutiny? No legitimate purpose is served by the adoption of any such Fabian policy of delay, but, on the contrary, a fictitious prob-

lem is created, and a real one ignored, by the very attempt to postpone the inevitable. The facts of experience, when completely stated, as they should be before we begin to treat them methodically, absolutely forbid our separating the process of perception from its product or result. The physiological argument against realism owes, as we shall see, all its insidious plausibility to this fallacy of wrenching apart and separating things that belong unitedly together; it loses its apparent strength, when the false gap, opened up between product and process is closed, that is, when the evidence is reported and stated as a whole, instead of being arbitrarily split, as it is by all idealists, into incomplete, opposing halves. Let us at least start with a real problem, one that grows out of our actual experience, not one that is created by our desire to be methodical rather than open-minded and receptive.

SHOULD CRITICISM DISPLACE EVIDENCE?

The simple facts which give rise to the problem of procedure here under fire are these: in the act of perception, objects are present *to* consciousness, and are seen outside; in the act of reflection which follows, objects are present *in* consciousness, and are contemplated under the relation of this inner or immanent presence. There is therefore a dual aspect to human consciousness; it is plainly self-transcendent as well as self-referent; it has external no less than internal relations; its power ranges outward to things, and is not confined to inward acts of self-contemplation. This double fact affords all the proof really needed to show that consciousness is primarily the instrument, not the object of knowledge; that sensation is not a *limiting term* at which consciousness is always and forever forced to stop, but rather an *enabling means* by which the mind enters into communication with a reality distinct from, external to, and independent of itself. Can this double fact be simplified? Can these two aspects of consciousness be reduced to one? That is the problem which the facts create, or rather, which the idealist *thinks* they create, because for the

realist such a problem is fictitious, arising only when we ourselves summon it into being by the biased prejudgment that knowledge must have only one side, and cannot possibly have two. The result of this high-handed procedure is to create a false opposition between the internal and the external aspects of consciousness, and to compel the latter to justify itself by means of the former—a manifest impossibility, and a preposterous problem, in the original meaning of this much abused word.

The realist sees no reason for bristling up with suspicions all aroused in the presence of the given fact that we know objects distinct from our sensations and ideas. The beginnings of our knowledge are neither the time nor the place for the exercise of our powers of suspicion, doubt, or criticism, but rather for their suspension. Critical questions cannot and should not be introduced at this initial stage, not only because they are conspicuously out of place, but also because neither criticism nor explanation can, by any manner of means, be made to precede the evidence, to anticipate it, or to function vicariously in its stead; for clearly, before the data of consciousness are studied, there are no facts, but only a lot of preliminary fictions, for criticism to work upon, and these are surely no fit substitutes for the evidence plainly put before us by consciousness. It would have been much better therefore for philosophy if the assumed necessity for doubting everything in advance had itself been made a matter of doubt, instead of being erected into a dogmatic preamble to all subjects of philosophic inquiry. There are some cases to which the Cartesian method of provisional doubt is inapplicable, and no idealist has ever paused long enough to inquire if the present case fell under the head of an exception to his favorite rule.

The realist does not object to the employment of criticism during the later stages of knowledge, to sift subjective elements from real, for there is no doubt that such a winnowing process is necessary, since the mind does not take up the objective order of things in a photographic flash, and errors of judgment are always a contingency to be reckoned with. But knowl-

edge is not merely a constructive activity, it is also an apprehensive power. These two functions go together as mutual companions, but that does not mean that Nisus is Euryalus, or Damon, Pythias. Each is clearly entitled to distinct treatment, for the reason that the construction which ever goes on in knowledge is an accompaniment of the process of knowing, and not the whole thing. The point which the realist wishes to make is that criticism cannot be extended to this perceptive or apprehensive power of consciousness, so as to envelop it with the same anticipative doubt as its companion-process of imaging or representing the known. There is no parity between the two cases. We are conscious of knowing (perceiving) objects externally present, before we become conscious that the mind has also represented them by an image within itself, which adds an inner presence for reflection to the outer presence of which alone perception takes hold. Knowledge is therefore more than a mere process of imaging or representing, and it is "this little more and how much it is" which condemns the representative theory of knowledge as about the most prejudiced account that could be taken of the matter, and the most dangerous kind of quicksand on which to lay the foundations of philosophy.

The theory that knowledge is reducible to a *mere* function of copying explains why modern philosophers insist on writing critical prefaces to the self-introducing facts of consciousness, why they accept the immanence of objects and deny their externality, why they prefer sophistication to evidence, why they begin to philosophize by discussing abstract possibilities instead of accepting concrete facts. Now the fact that philosophy starts with evidence rather than with criticism does not compel it to remain uncritical ever afterwards—a sort of rustic attitude adopted in the beginning and never overcome to the very end. But the persistent prejudice of idealists that philosophy should start with criticism rather than with evidence really cuts philosophy off thereafter from all healthy contact with the well-spring and controlling principle of objective experience. There is a lost sense of actuality pervading the writings of

idealists, which no amount of roundabout reasoning can successively conceal or overcome. An attempt is made to cover up this defect, and to restore the broken connection, by the theory that truth is, after all, only the experience of the individual made over and corrected by the enlightened experience of the race. But this belated admission of social agreement as the criterion of truth, so far from relieving the unnaturalness of the situation, only serves to bring it out into still bolder relief. For what, pray, is this description of truth but an incomplete account of the internal relations of human experience as a whole, with the external relations of that whole to reality left out of the reckoning unconsidered?

The idealist thus ends his philosophy by stating and proving the existence of a problem, which he refused to admit when he started out, namely, the problem of the relations of Knowledge to Reality. A strange state of affairs, a peculiar pass indeed, to find a problem ignored at the beginning more clamorous than ever for solution at the end, and denied that solution, because it is complacently supposed to have been already solved, when the fact of the matter is that it has only been stated over again more clearly than ever. Banquo's ghost returns to the feast, to torment the intellectual patricians responsible for "the deep damnation of his taking off." Could any better proof than this be asked for the old scholastic thesis that the immediate perception of reality, the evidence of consciousness to a known and knowable world, is a fact which needs no introductory preface, and brooks no delay in acceptance on our part.

CURIOSITY VERSUS SKEPTICISM.

This view of perception as an ultimate fact to be admitted at once on its own evidence without preliminary explanation, the idealist refuses to share. According to him the question of possibility takes precedence over the question of fact, and the knowableness of reality has to be first established before actual knowledge of it can be scientifically admitted. This premature adoption of a critical attitude, not only makes a

philosophical mystery out of a plain fact of psychology, but also relies on the glaring fallacy of separatism for its justification. For instance, the two questions of fact and possibility, though distinguishable, are not separable in treatment. The separation of these two questions is decidedly against the empirical evidence which answers both at once, impliedly at least; and also against the laws of logic, which plainly show that possibility presupposes reality, and that a derivative notion like the former cannot be employed to criticize and undermine a primary notion like the latter. *A posse ad esse non valet illatio*. But let this high-handed procedure in inverting the given order of experience, and the logical priority of original notions over derivative, pass without further comment for the moment. Another question presses. The idealist contends that such an extraordinary fact—he alone has made it so by investing it with spurious mystery—as the mind's power to transcend itself and veritably perceive external reality, should not be accepted without having been previously explained. All facts of experience, it is claimed, need explanation, and none more so than the first with which human knowledge is supposed to begin.

It all depends on what is here meant by 'explanation.' The term may imply a sincere desire to know more about the details, accessories, and incidentals of this self-transcendent power of consciousness, or an ulterior design to find some way of getting rid of it altogether; in other words, the inspiring motive may be either legitimate curiosity, or downright skepticism. That the desire to know more about a thing may be cleverly feigned to hide a skeptical intention, anybody can clearly see for himself who first takes the pains to inquire whether it is possible to entertain a universal methodical doubt. Clearly everything cannot be doubted, everything cannot be explained. We have a rational assurance of first principles and fundamental facts to which no validation-process is applicable, because the assurance in question is as prominent in our denials as in our attempted proofs, and stares back at us in either case like an untroubled sunbeam from waters which we have stirred and sullied. Suspicion rightly attaches to those who endeavor to

make their doubts universal in sweep, proving by reason that we should renounce reason, showing by explanation that the original fact to be explained has disappeared, blissfully imagining that, if the objective reference attached to all perceptions can be identified with some purely inner feature of experience, say, with our percepts rather than with the perceived, the case against realism is argued and won.

Such men do not effectually conceal their hand when playing the game of methodical doubt, and advocating experimentation to the utter exclusion of introspection. It is not explanation, but elimination for which they are really holding out. This skeptical intention may not be formal or explicit; it is enough that it be objectively implied in the rules under which the so-called game of explanation is to be played. To start out with the preconceived idea that Reality is either Thought or Experience, as idealists and pragmatists do; and to accept as the guiding principle of research that Explanation alone is Knowledge, how, pray, can such prejudices as these be otherwise rightly described than as skeptical attitudes? It is this indefensible method of prejudging the *nature*, instead of first investigating the *facts* of human cognition, which secures for idealism the winning hold it seems to have on the minds of many. "The not distinguishing where things should be distinguished, and the not confounding where things should be confounded," says old John Selden, "is the cause of all the mistakes in the world." The everlasting attempts at fusion, reduction, and simplification going on in the philosophy of the hour are the best indication of the truth of this apothegm. The Schoolmen knew how to distinguish without separating, and thus escaped the perpetual treadmill of Monism, into which, it would seem, by making confusion worse confounded, modern philosophy has fallen. There are some questions which answer themselves, because they are questions only in form. And knowledge is one of these, until we seek to confound it with something altogether incidental, with the merry-go-round process of mere symbols, with explanation, purpose, or utility, and, by this attempted transfer of identity from whole to part,

make knowledge appear as a huge impostor—forgetting that our suspicions themselves may be the one rightful object of suspicion. Philosophy must have its Frankenstein, it would seem, not to be outdone by literature.

The ulterior design of anti-realist philosophers is, therefore, not to explain the self-transcendent character of consciousness, but to explain it away, so as to leave not even a wrack behind. It seems to them absurdity personified that the human mind should have for its objects outer things no less than inner impressions. Such a mental leap out of one's self into the great beyond ought to leave some record or traces in reflection, if it be the notorious fact which realists claim. But reflection, so far from countenancing any such extraordinary occurrence, is altogether silent concerning it. Some way must therefore be found for eliminating this paradox, some means devised for reducing to more elementary terms the realistic notion that consciousness has reference to objects distinct from itself. A separatist conception of sensation furnishes the means desired. Accordingly sensation is viewed in complete abstraction and severance from reason which always accompanies it in man. The result of this abstract, incomplete way of regarding sensation is naturally the disappearance of all objective reference, because the latter is due to reason and sense working unitedly together, and, of course, fails to appear when a division of labor is surreptitiously introduced. But room has to be created for an idealistic interpretation of consciousness, and the end here justifies the means. Having secured a start by the trick of stating the facts and factors incompletely, the idealist next detaches objective reference from perceptual experience, and triumphantly exhibits it as an appurtenance of conceptual thought alone. Instead of pointing to the perceived, as it actually does, the objective reference now points only from concepts to percepts, and the transcendence of consciousness fades away into a mental echo of absent objects, no longer indicating a cognitive relation to objects actually present and perceived. This restrictive interpretation of objective reference converts the act of knowing into the objects of knowledge,

identifies experience with reality, and blots out the physical universe from consideration altogether.

IMMANENCE VERSUS TRANSCENDENCE.

Reviewed in order, the statements of the preceding paragraph represent conclusions distilled out of the fallacious method of separatism rather than inferences scientifically established. Not a shred of proof is anywhere advanced, the whole question is begged. First of all, with regard to the negative argument drawn from the silence of reflection concerning a perceived and perceivable world of things, that was made a matter of special inquiry in a previous study,³ and need not detain us further here. It was there shown that the attempt to contract consciousness into sensation and to limit knowledge to acts of self-reflection was a deliberate evasion of the entire perceptive stage of experience which precedes the formal exercise of our reflective powers. Furthermore, that it was based on a misconception of the function of reason as following instead of accompanying the work of sense, this division of the mind's labor being both untrue to fact and false in principle. It is simply a case of calling the wrong witness to testify.

The second part of the argument rehearsed is apparently more serious. It represents a positive attempt to reduce to absurdity the common-sense doctrine of consciousness by showing that the so-called external reference of thought is only from one point within experience to another further back, or higher up, but not to anything beyond or outside at all. Can the conviction which we all have of the transcendent power of consciousness be thus made to vanish through the agency of some exorcising formula of explanation? That is the question brought before us, and we propose to let the idealist furnish the proof of the possibility of accomplishing any such task.

³ *The Catholic University Bulletin*, June, 1910, "Reality from the Critic's Standpoint."

He has been so long engaged in the work of providing substitutes for the external world that one's curiosity is whetted to know if his mimicking 'understudies' can play the heavy rôle assigned them, and still leave nothing lacking in the performance.

The absolute idealist interprets objective reference as wholly an inward, and in no sense an outward relation. For him there is no fact, being, or thing which does not fall within the circumference of mind, or which may be said to lie outside what Bradley calls 'psychic existence.' Matter as such, mind as such, are abstractions, which have no existence apart. There is no such thing, therefore, as an independently existing object, whether material or mental. Mind is the sole reality—mind existing under the two indivisible aspects of spirit and matter; and, consequently, what we know is, not independent, but related reality. Consciousness indeed refers to objects, but these are within itself, not in another order of existence all their own. Its so-called transcendence is, not the power of knowing an external world of things, but of discovering within itself a divine world of ideas. The reference is not to something beyond at all. It means, not that an independent physical world, but that an absolute divine mind, is really before us, making itself directly known to human spectators. Instead, therefore, of perceiving individual objects externally present, we are rather being bought face to face with the intellectual structure of reality itself in our acts of perception.

Does this extension of the theory of immanence, so as to bring all real objects wholly within the mind, actually amount to the reduction or simplification of consciousness intended? Is it really a successful explanation of the fact of transcendence? Or, is it merely the substitution of an inner and more mysterious transcendence still for that external reference which attaches to all our knowledge? The latter. The desired reduction is as far off as ever. The immanence of all objects in consciousness is first *assumed*. and then *employed* to explain the fact of transcendence. But the fact overlaps the explanation altogether, and remains more conspicuously than ever

outside its reach. This is not the place to go into a detailed refutation of idealism. Our sole concern at present is with the question whether idealists have succeeded in reducing to lower terms the fact of the self-transcendence of human consciousness, which our perceptive acts reveal. The answer must be decidedly in the negative, for the convincing reason that the notion of externality which we all have with regard to perceived objects, could never have arisen in consciousness, much less be accounted for afterward, if the idealist's doctrine of the immanence of all reality in mind were true. The very fact that we have such a notion, that it is an essential part of the disclosure made by consciousness, and that idealists perpetually ignore or overlook it, is a sufficient commentary on their inability to face the problem which its presence raises. Immanence is neither the first, nor the last impression which we receive of reality. The most ultimate notion of all is left out of the idealist system.

THE FAILURE OF IMMANENCE.

The boasted reduction of consciousness from "a one-to-two to a one-to-one" relation thus turns out to be nothing more than the substitution of immanence for self-transcendence, or rather for external reference. This substitution is not equivalent to reduction. Insuperable facts stand in the way of its actually being or ever becoming such. First of all, the actual presence of objects *to* consciousness, when we perceive, is neither reduced, eliminated, nor explained by pointing to the presence of these same objects *in* consciousness, when we reflect. These two relations of presence, outer and inner, cannot be made to merge in one. Polaric in their opposition, they are incapable of changing places, or of assuming each other's rôles. So true is this that, to nullify its pertinent significance, idealists invent the theory that all relations are intrinsic, thus reviving extravagant realism in their efforts to avoid moderate. But try as they may, the meaning of the prepositions 'in' and 'to' in this connection remains irreducibly opposed. Even

in the revealed doctrine of the Trinity, where the relations and the substance inwardly related are infinite, these two aspects still defy all our attempts at reduction.

Our perceptive acts bring us face to face with the presence of something more than a Relation, and that something more is Reality. The philosopher never lived who could rid himself of the idea of this 'something-more-than-a-mere-relation,' seen through relation itself; and no realist ever held, what the straw man usually buffeted by the critics is made to hold, that the notion of a reality not ourselves came to us in any other way than through the channel of mutual relatedness and relationship. Instead of being the term and limit of our perceptual knowledge, relation is disclosed to us in experience rather as the manner and means and condition of our knowing something else besides ourselves. The fact that we can know only related things does not in the least imply that we can know relations only. It implies that we can know reality, if we know it at all, only through the relations of self-manifestation which it has and sustains to ourselves. And this fact has no favorable significance whatsoever for idealism, although it is usually quoted as if it put the realist to the rack. It proves, this fact of interrelationship, not that relation pure and simple is the object of human knowledge, but rather that relation is the appointed means of all our knowing, whether it be ourselves or something else that is known. It is only by converting a means into a disability, a method into a limitation, a street into a blind-alley that the idealist is enabled to cut the human mind off from all relations to independent reality. No real reduction has taken place at all. Things remain just as they were before. The external reference is still there unexplained, and so is the physical world to which that reference points. All that has happened, if we may speak of such a thing as happening, is that "absolute mind" has been made to take the place of the world of things. The forbearance and moderation of scholastic realism is succeeded by the intemperance of Gnosticism.

To maintain his favorite thesis that it is a spiritual, not

a physical world which we perceive, the idealist is put to severe straits. He uses the words "mental" and "physical" as interchangeable, in utter despite of the fact that these two words made a distinction which no man, plain or polished, fails to recognize. He has to hold that we know the minds of our fellow-men directly, though it is clear that only by way of analogy and inference can any such knowledge be gained. Confronted by the objection that it is absurd to maintain a direct power of scrutinizing the minds of others, man or brute, the idealist falls back on the vague theory that consciousness was 'social' from the beginning. But even this theoretical place of refuge is denied him, for, when he tries to think this social theory out into explicit and definite particulars, nothing survives but words. And, if it be the distinguishing trait of the mental that it is not open to direct general inspection, but only to that of its "private proprietors," what shall we think of the idealist's attempt to deny to the Divine Mind that privacy which we are all forced to acknowledge as distinctive even of the human? "We perceive trees and houses," says Professor Fullerton pointedly in this connection; "we infer our neighbor's sensations and ideas."⁴ Evidently the idealist is hard pressed to maintain the spirituality of the world. Externality has such a peculiar feline habit of returning.

Has the pragmatist, with his gospel of universal relativism, succeeded any better than his elder idealist brother, with whom he is at such bitter odds? There is this to be said of the latter: while an opponent of external reference, he always believed that experience transcended the fleeting impressions of the moment, and pointed to something of the very eternities themselves. This partial compliment cannot be paid to the pragmatist, whose avowed purpose it is to banish all permanent or absolute features from human thought, to do away with transcendence altogether, and to seek nothing more ultimate than the 'experience of the perceptive moment.' Thus Professor James explains 'objective reference' as 'a mere incident of

⁴ *Essays Philosophical and Psychological*, "The New Realism," p. 24.

the fact that so much of our experience comes as insufficient, and is of process and transition.”⁵ In other words, the so-called reference is, not to any distinctly perceived objects at all, but to experiences once had, which thought retrospectively considers and overhauls. Professor Strong is inclined to think that perceptibility, not actual perception is all that is implied.⁶ Likewise Professor Dewey, who leans to the opinion that memory has something to do with the matter, because it not only recalls past events, but at the same time anticipates their future recurrence.⁷ Objective reference is thus interpreted, not as a cognitive relation through which things are known, but as a mere matter of functional utility, prevailing between concepts and percepts, the former being regarded as instruments or tools for fashioning and shaping the latter. All relation to the perceived has thus been made to disappear.

The most striking feature about all these pragmatic accounts is the studied attempt to transfer ‘objective reference’ from our perceptive acts, where it is more to be found than elsewhere, to the reflective memory which recalls the past and anticipates the future. The problem of knowledge is thus made falsely to appear as a problem of absent rather than of present objects, and knowing sinks at once to the level of a form of musing. The result of this arbitrary mode of procedure is naturally, as has been said, the substitution of possibility for fact, of perceptibility for actual perception. At most, it is with possible ‘brain-events’ not with external objects, that our acts of perception are or can be concerned. But this shortening of ‘objective reference’ is a begging of the whole question. Restrictive interpretations such as these should be justified in advance by proofs of the restriction, and yet not a semblance of argument to this effect is anywhere to be found among these writers, who first gratuitously assume that consciousness is identical with sensation, and then use this unproven assumption to disestablish the fact of objective reference. What is offered

⁵ *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 117.

⁶ *Journal of Phil., Psy. and Sc. Methods*, 1904, pp. 543 ff.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1907, p. 259.

as a solution is therefore no solution at all, but an unsupported prejudgment of the whole nature of consciousness and of knowledge. For if consciousness is distinct from its objects, objective reference is all that these men say, and something more besides into the bargain. That consciousness is so distinct, may be seen from the fact that sensation is not always the object, but sometimes also the instrument of our knowledge—a telescope, not a mere shimmering camera. And just as one might wrongly expect to be rewarded with the vision of stars if he looked at a telescope and not through it, the same may be said with equal force of those philosophers who look at sensation and not through it to the world beyond. Who has ever proved that consciousness is a stained glass rather than a transparent window? or that, if betimes our gaze should happen to rest on the window, the panes marked the limit of our power of seeing?

A PECULIAR CROSS-PURPOSE.

There is, therefore, plain to be seen, a large residuum of fact left over unassimilated and unexplained by all these theories. Idealists and pragmatists are both "short in their accounts," and a shortage always calls for additional explanation and still further investigation. They have made the problem smaller than it really is, and put forth the explanation of a part, as if it actually amounted to an explanation of the whole. They have not diminished one whit the externality of objects to consciousness; they have merely stated without proof the immanence of all objects in mind, and made this favorite prejudice of theirs an article of faith. The very liberties which they are forced to take with ordinary experience and the accepted meaning of language go clearly to show that these critics of human knowledge have accepted the controlling influence of their own methodical prejudices rather than that of the empirical evidence which, in great part, they either dismiss or disregard. And the result could not well have been otherwise than it is. From being partial and not thorough in his preliminary survey of the problem, the idealist, or the prag-

matist, as the case may be, could not prevent his originally exclusive attitude towards the parts omitted from becoming more and more so, as he went along; and that, perhaps, explains why he thinks he is at the end of a problem when in very truth he is only at the beginning, having gone round all the while in a circle without really advancing a step. It is only by beginning with a completely stated analysis of the concrete, actual facts of perception that we can avoid running into the cross-purpose of ending one problem with the statement of another which we thought off our hands for good. Philosophic thought could never have come so deviously to such a signal defeat of its own intentions but for the premature raising of a question of possibility and the undue postponement of a question of fact. The critic believed he was solving two problems, when he was occupied only with one, and we accordingly invite him to take up the pretermitted problem of reality, and thus make amends in a measure for centuries of oversight and neglect. Neither as a concrete fact, nor even as an abstract conception has the self-transcendence of consciousness been reduced, or the objective reference of our knowledge been explained away. It still awaits its due meed of consideration; for it has given ample proof of its power to resist being made identical with anything else, and has shown a distinctness of individuality against its aggressors which no "merger theory" has been able to diminish, much less destroy. And for evidence of the truth of this latter statement, we appeal to the fact—made clear, we hope, by the foregoing criticism—that, in attempting to reduce to absurdity the realist's notion of a self-transcending consciousness, the idealist has actually put himself in the awkward position and undesirable category which he intended for the realist. It is a poor rule that does not work both ways.

WHAT IS ULTIMATE KNOWLEDGE?

Is external perception, then, an ultimate fact, shining by its own natural light of evidence, and needing no artificial light of explanation thrown upon it in advance to make it appear

more brilliant and acceptable in critical eyes? From all that has been said and argued, there can be no doubt that the answer must be affirmative. Why then is it that this fact is so persistently called in question, so unhesitatingly denied by philosophers of the modern school? The answer to this query is not far to seek, and, when discovered, lets in a flood of light on warring spirits. Some men there are who refuse to think unless they can do so in terms of the imagination. Thought pure and simple, the pale white light of reason, is not brilliant enough for such as these, and so they decompose it into some one of its accompanying colors. Thinking is perversely regarded as dead feeling, and they would galvanize it into life anew. Should you happen to mention the word 'reality' to men of this type, they turn upon you with a patronizing air, and ask, what does that *mean*? They know fully as well as you the meaning of the word, but they are not content with understanding simple meaning, they must also, it would seem, imagine and represent it, before they can be brought to the point of acceptance and admission. Simply to know is not enough for those who believe with Napoleon that imagination rules the world. They want to know what knowledge is *like*, before they will yield assent to its utterances.

Unwilling to consider knowledge as a process distinct from imagining and representing, they identify it with some form or other of these latter, and thus completely destroy its distinctive character. The majority of mankind want pictures, says Macaulay somewhere, and from present indications, it would seem that some of the enlightened minority desired them too. Otherwise how explain the constant efforts of idealists and pragmatists to translate into the visual imagery of sense the simple meanings which thought discovers everywhere? How account for the insistent demands made on the realist to show how the perception of reality may be imagined, to tell whether it is to be likened to a photographic process, a reaching out to the stars, or a physical 'grasping' of the things that lie about? How explain the expenditure of emotion for three centuries, and the mocking plaint over 'reality' as an

emaciated barebones and starveling? Is it not there, at any rate, whatever its condition be, thick or thin, rich or poor? And it is not known to be there, whether the manner of its making itself known to consciousness can be imaginatively reconstructed, or not? Should we not therefore face, instead of shirking the problem which this real presence raises? And if, as a matter of fact and experience, we apprehend the meaning of reality, are we at liberty to deny that we do, merely because, forsooth, we cannot reproduce in the imagination any colored likeness of the meaning? Suppose we could vividly reproduce in images all the simple meanings which we understand—eternity, say, and infinity, for instance, not to mention the contraband concept of ‘reality’—would we know any more than we did previously, or merely have found illustrations of a very deficient sort for what we already knew?

Why all this appeal from thought to the ‘sympathetic’ imagination? Who has ever established the critical canon that human thought must have a dramatic quality before it can have the value of knowledge, or that visualizing is explanation, and illustration proof? Is it not high time that men should cease reaping a harvest of conclusions from the fallacious notion that thinking is only a dream of feeling, a pale replica of sense, and return to the true conception of it as an interpenetrative power working through sensation to something beyond, and not on sensation to something wholly within, as if all that thought did was to take a second impression fainter than the first, and give us ghosts instead of substantial realities for company? And if we correct this chronic misconception of the function of thought and reason, what becomes of the supposed ultimateness of the imagination, its supposed greater nearness to reality? It disappears at once with the misconception on which it is based. No scholastic realist holds that sense, apart from reason, knows reality; the knowledge of reality is due to the simultaneous functioning of these two distinct, but united powers; and that power is surely the ultimate one of the two, which goes further than the other, and is capable of understanding the real meaning of things other than itself. Because an

artist's brush acts between him and the picture which he is painting, one would hardly be justified in inferring that the brush was the principal agency concerned. And if art can work outward through instruments, and still retain its principalship, why cannot knowledge do the same? From the fact that I set myself to study the vehicles through which the notion of reality comes, it does not follow that I am obtaining a more intimate knowledge, or a more basic explanation than when I directly inspect the meaning conveyed through their agency to my scrutinizing intellect, which the French so aptly call 'the sense of the real.' It merely follows therefrom that I am wilfully seeking in instrumental processes below intellection illustrations of what has taken place, not in, but through them. How, pray, could I even attempt to reduce knowledge to another process altogether than that of apprehended meaning, if I did not already know what I was trying to reduce or relate to something else? The best witness for the defense in some cases is evidently the opposing counsel, and so it is in this particular instance, the prosecution developing the very point which it attacks, namely—the distinctive character of human knowledge as a simple apprehension of meaning.

Search the scriptures of idealism from Hegel to James, and the conclusion is borne in upon you that here are men who want illuminated meanings before they will consent to read the mind's message, who have fallen under the spell of picturesque thinking, and persuaded themselves into the belief that knowledge, when illustrated, is more ultimate than when it comes to us unadorned in the simple form of thought. Was it not Professor James who said that he could feel his 'ands' and 'buts' and 'fors,' thus substituting relations felt for relations known? It would make an interesting volume to collect the question-begging metaphors and images in which philosophers have sought refuge from a world which they did not create, and cannot make over to their suiting. What changes have been rung on the idea of imagination as painting, and of thought as sketching! How the representative theory of knowledge has led even the elect astray! How the effort to add a

colored supplement to thought has made the noblest of our faculties subservient to its ministers and handmaids! But we forbear further. Only one more thought remains to be added, and it is this: the concept of Existence means infinitely more than the mere existence of a Concept; Reality is not Knowledge.

“We figure to ourselves
The thing we like, and then we build it up
As chance will have it, on the rock or sand;
For thought is tired of wandering o'er the world,
And home-bound fancy runs her bark ashore.”

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

INTELLECTUALISM AND PRAGMATISM: THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

Contemporary Philosophy has centered its thoughts on the theory of knowledge. It is the problem of the nature and value of knowledge—a problem which occupied so great a place in the philosophy of Greece with the Sophists, Plato, Aristotle and their respective theories of Skepticism or Relativism, Idealism and Realism, in the Philosophy of the Schoolmen with their theory of Universals, in the Philosophy of Kant with his Criticism of pure reason, of practical reason and of judgment,—that contemporary philosophy is subjecting anew to examination and to the solution of which it is looking as the key to the solution of the various problems of Psychology, Logic and Metaphysics.

While Aristotle, in opposition to Protagoras' relativism and Plato's idealism, and the great Schoolmen under the leadership of St. Thomas, in opposition to medieval ultra-realism and nominalism, solved the problem by appealing to both intuition and concepts as essential factors of human knowledge, and by assigning to each of these its true place, function and value, contemporary schools have separated these two elements. They have opposed one to the other and come to the conclusion that philosophy must ultimately be either a philosophy of mere concepts or a Philosophy of Pure Experience or Intuition,—Absolutism in one case, Pragmatism with Radical Empiricism or Intuitionism in the other.

Since our purpose is to present a criticism of Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism and a defence of Realistic Intellectualism, it will be useful, for the sake of clearness, to begin by determining the meaning and content of these two terms.

Pragmatism is that philosophical theory which identifies truth with usefulness or practical consequences (the word "practical" being taken in its most general meaning and including intellectual satisfaction as well as particular results

of any kind); considers concepts and discursive reasoning as mere intellectual hypotheses devised by man, not to represent reality but to lead us to use and experience it; and points ultimately to immediate experience as the only way to reach the real. *Intellectualism*, as we take it here, namely Realistic Intellectualism, is that philosophical theory which defines truth as an agreement of the mind with reality and subordinates usefulness to truth; considers concepts and discursive reasoning as truly, although inadequately, representative of reality; and stands for intellectual or conceptual knowledge as superior to and explanatory of, although dependent on and derived from, empirical knowledge. In this theory, both intellectual and empirical elements are essential to true human knowledge.

In the first part of this paper we shall present, as exactly as we can, the pragmatist account of knowledge; and if it is true that the right understanding of a false system is half of its refutation, we shall have then done much by this exposition towards showing its erroneous principles. In the second part we shall point out its defects and fallacies, state and defend the intellectualistic theory of knowledge, as it is maintained in the traditional philosophy especially in Scholasticism.

Although we are not directly concerned here with Absolutism, it will be well, nevertheless, to state the general principles of this system, since Pragmatism presents itself largely as a reaction against it. Such a statement will have the twofold advantage of helping us to understand better, by contrast, the pragmatist theory and also to determine more precisely the moderate Intellectualism which we defend.

Strange as it may appear at first, both systems, Absolutism and Pragmatism, whatever may have actually been the more immediate or remote influences which have inspired them, are the logical development in different directions of Kant's philosophy.

THE GENESIS OF ABSOLUTISM.

Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, had reached the conclusion that we perceive things, not as they are in themselves, but as they appear to us, as we make them; it is our reason,

with its concepts, that makes the cosmos. True it is that he speaks only of the phenomenal cosmos; that he maintains the existence of the noumenal cosmos (the thing-in-itself), in which all antinomies are reconciled, where the mechanism of pure reason and the teleologism of judgment are unified through immanent teleology which assimilates the final causes of nature with the efficient causes. There was, however, in this theory an impetus to go farther, and farther his successors went. Fichte identified the thing-in-itself with the Moral Ego, which produces the phenomenal world by a necessary act of creation, and overcomes it by a free act of effort. Schelling identified the thing-in-itself with the Absolute, the common source of the Ego and of the Non-Ego and transcendent to both. Finally, Hegel held that the Absolute, common source of the Ego and Non-Ego, is not transcendent, but immanent in them. It is not the principle from which nature and Ego proceed, but it is the very processes through which Nature and Ego proceed and evolve. Reality or the Absolute is one, and all things are but various stages of its realization. The Absolute is a becoming which has its end and rule immanent in itself. It is Reason, the Idea realizing itself through the various stages of inorganic and organic nature to end in consciousness and personality in man. Reason or the Idea is then both objective reality and subjective faculty, essence of things and form of thought. Hence the Kantian categories are not only an instrument of thought, they are the very substance of things. Thought and Reality, Logic and Metaphysics are identified. The Absolute is the synthetic unity of experience, the sum-total of reality, the ground of all things with structural differences.

These were the principles that influenced and animated the English neo-hegelian school with the Cairds, Green, McTaggart, Bradley, etc. . . . They have found their systematic expression in Mr. Bradley's philosophy as exposed in his work *Appearance and Reality* and more recently in divers articles in *Mind*.¹ Since Mr. Bradley is generally pointed to by Prag-

¹ "On our Knowledge of Immediate Experience," N. S., No. 69; "On Truth and Coherence," *ibid.*, N. 71; "Coherence and Contradiction," *ibid.*, N. 72.

matists as the present leader of that school, the type of the "thought-minded" intellectualist, and his system considered as the genuine representative of Absolutism, it may be well to state briefly the fundamental propositions of his philosophical system.

THE ABSOLUTISM OF MR. BRADLEY.

Postulating the existence of Reality and our power of knowing it, Mr. Bradley starts with two fundamental principles: the formal principle that *Reality is non-contradictory or self-subsistent*, and the material principle that *Reality is sentient experience*, that is, is given in "this immediate unity which comes in feeling."² Hence comes the immediate conclusion that Reality is one, not many, for several realities must be independent; independence is irreconcilable with relation implied in plurality; and relation means inconsistency: Reality then is an individual organic whole, an Absolute all-inclusive and all-coherent. To comprehend this ultimate reality is the goal of philosophical knowledge. We must start with our sentient experience, for it is our only apprehension of reality. Our sentient experience is reality, since it is immediate and self-subsistent; but it is not absolute reality, since it is confused and subject to change: it asks for explanation. Judgment must intervene; "it transcends and must transcend the immediate unity upon which it cannot cease to depend"; it has to qualify it *ideally*.³ In order to do this, it has to use *ideas* (an idea being "any part of the content of a fact, so far as that works out of immediate unity with its existence"),⁴ to break up the unity of reality, to separate in it the existence and the content, the "that" and the "what," and to separate the content into its various elements. Thus judgment is essentially relational; it replaces the unity of reality by relations, both external and internal. But relation involves essentially

² *Mind*, N. S., N. 72, p. 497.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 498.

⁴ *Appearance and Reality*, 1st ed., p. 163.

dependence and inconsistency (consistent meaning that which is consistent *with itself*, as contradictory is that which is inconsistent *with itself*). Judgment then and thought, ideas and relations, are merely "appearances," an appearance being "anything which comes short when compared with reality."⁵ Thought therefore must attempt both to preserve the immediacy of unity and to maintain the result of analysis without its relational character. It must go beyond relations and appearances and transcend them; it must state the predicate ideally and include it in the subject, that is, predicate appearances of the subject or Reality in such a way that they may be conceived in it as integral parts of a Whole supremely individual, supremely independent, unrelational and coherent. Ultimate reality must indeed include appearances; otherwise it would not be self-consistent, since it would be either a thing-in-itself related to them or else it would not account for them. How is this possible? In order to be conceived as elements of ultimate reality, appearances must be *transmuted*. This is possible through the theory of the "degrees of Truth and Reality." We may remark that appearances are partly unreal and partly real. They are unreal as compared to the whole or total reality, that is, as appearances; they are real as existing, for "the absolute appears in its phenomena and is real nowhere outside them; it has no assets beyond appearances."⁶ Their reality is measured and valued by their degree of comprehensiveness and coherence; their unreality may be corrected by supplementation and rearrangement. That appearances may be included and transmuted in Reality is possible, for there is no proof that any one of them is irreconcilable with the Absolute. On the other side, the Absolute demands that all shall be reconcilable, since it cannot be otherwise understood as consistent with itself. Therefore they must be transmuted, for "what may, if also must be, assuredly is." Thus all appearances can be and must be included and transmuted in the Absolute, and boldly but logically Mr. Bradley attempts to show how appear-

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 485.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 489.

ances, like pain, evil, space, time, etc., are included in the Absolute. They are transmuted in such a way that they are in the Absolute, but ceasing to be pain "as such," evil "as such," etc. . . . "on the whole."⁷ Their defect as mere appearances comes from their inconsistency, that is, from the fact that they were apart from the Whole; but, when considered in the Absolute as integral elements in the Whole, they are consistent. Thus, "all is appearance and no appearance or any combination of these is the same as reality," yet, "the Absolute is its appearances, it is really all and every one of them," although it is not "any one of them as such." Thus the Absolute is conceived as all inclusive, all-coherent, immanent within the Whole and distributing to each appearance its part of Reality and truth.⁸

Such a philosophy indeed, whether it is called Idealism or Absolutism, is the triumph of a priori concept and of purely logical construction over concrete reality and facts. Actual reality is consulted, but its answer is found deficient. In order to be true and absolute reality, it has to be transmuted into what my concepts demand for their consistency; it has to come to realize "somehow" what my concepts think as the Absolute consistency which "can be," "must be" and "so certainly is."⁹ "This," Mr. Bradley says, "I take to be the way of philosophy, of any philosophy which seeks to be consistent. It is not the way of life or of common knowledge. . . ." ¹⁰

THE REACTION OF PRAGMATISM AND EMPIRICISM AGAINST ABSOLUTISM.

A reaction against such an extreme Idealism and ignoring of actual reality was to be expected; and it was not rash to conjecture that it would end in its extreme opposite, Nominalism, Empiricism or Intuitionism. And so it happened, at

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 198-199.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 486-487.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 199; see also p. 196.

¹⁰ *Mind*, N. S., N. 72, p. 501.

first as a method of discerning truth from error under the name of Pragmatism, then as a Metaphysics of the nature of reality and of knowledge, under the name of Radical, Immediate Empiricism or Intuitionism.

As a priori Absolutism had sprung from Kant's critique of pure reason and of judgment, so Pragmatism, logically if not actually,—for many Pragmatists repudiate Kant's paternity,—was an application of the principles of the critique of practical reason. It appeared almost at the same time in various countries suggested by divers circumstances and subjected to different influences.

In English speaking countries, Pragmatism took more especially the character of a reaction against Idealism and of a return to empiricist Positivism. It defined itself as a philosophical protest against mere intellectual speculation in favor of the demands of practical life, as an appeal to concrete and particular realities against the invading of general notions and abstract speculations. It found its expressions in works such as James' "The Will to believe," "Pragmatism," etc. . . . , Schiller's "Axioms as Postulates," "Humanism" and "Studies in Humanism," Dewey's "Studies in Logical Theory," etc.¹¹

On the Continent, it was more particularly interested in and influenced by the philosophy of sciences and the criticism of scientific notions and theories. It is found, in Germany, in the scientific studies of Mach and Ostwald, in R. Avenarius' empirio-criticism, in Simmel's "Philosophie des Geldes," etc. . . . , in France in the philosophy of Bergson and of his school. In the present paper, we are concerned only with its notion of concept and its theory of experimental knowledge.

¹¹ Those who wish to have a clear view of the pragmatist movement in England and America will have to consult also the numerous articles which have filled the philosophical magazines of the last ten years, especially *Mind*, *Journal of Philosophy*, *Psychology and Scientific Methods*, *The Philosophical Review*, etc. . . .

THE PRAGMATIST NOTION OF CONCEPT.

A point on which all Pragmatists agree concerning the notion of concept (and the same may be said of judgment which is made of concepts), is that its primary function and meaning is not one of representation, but one of practical value and usefulness. Concepts, according to Pragmatism, are above all means and instruments devised by man, under the influence of his practical needs, to handle reality.

According to the French school, common needs of daily life, the scientific aspiration to dominate nature and foresee its course, the intellectualistic desire for distinct, analyzed and systematized communicable knowledge, are the factors that guide man in the selection and construction of the concepts with which he builds respectively common sense, scientific laws and theories, philosophical systems. Under the influence of these practical needs and aspirations we select, among the data of experience, the elements that satisfy them, and we neglect the others. We shape and express these elements into those notions and principles which, in our handling of reality, give the best results and satisfaction for our practical needs of action, clearness and systematization. So our concepts and judgments are primarily useful and efficacious, rather than true; they are means of action rather than representations of reality. Hence their character as distinct, clear-cut, static notions, so different from the continuous dynamism of real experience.

We meet with the same notion of concept in the American and English schools of Pragmatism. For Professor James, our concepts are not representations of reality; they are *substitutes* for sense experiences; they are "tools" fashioned by the human mind for the manipulation of experience. "Our notions of time, space, matter and mind, etc. . . ." he says, "are definite conquests made by our ancestors, at historic date, in their attempt to get the chaos of their crude individual experiences in a more shareable and manageable shape. . . ."

They proved of such sovereign use as "*Denkmittel*" that they are now a part of the very structure of our mind. No experience can upset them. By them we may the better see the course of our experience, communicate with one another and steer our lives by rule; we may also have a clearer and more inclusive view. . . . They are an accumulation of our own intellectual inventions in our struggle for truth"¹² "Without abstract concepts to handle our perceptual particulars by, we are like men hopping on one foot."¹³

In almost the same words, Dr. Schiller tells us that concepts are "tools slowly fashioned by the practical intelligence for the mastery of experience,"¹⁴ that "Reason is not a faculty, but a group of habits which men have acquired and which we may find extremely useful, nay necessary, for the successful carrying on of life. . . . Thinking and judging is a highly artificial manipulation of experience; . . . it uses concepts and axioms which reveal themselves as postulates to a voluntaristic theory of knowledge which tries to understand them. . . . The fallacy of a priori dogmatism does not lie in its deductive procedure, but in its tacit assumption that the conceptions it argues from are final and not to be revised."¹⁵

Professor Dewey defines "idea," that is concept and judgment, as a "plan of action" devised under the influence of a "doubt-inquiry-answer experience." Its function is not to represent reality, but to serve to direct observation, to colligate data and guide experimentation. Its value consists in its effective working, in its fulfillment of the plan.¹⁶

Thus concepts and judgments are primarily instruments of action. Have they not, then, any value as knowledge? We may say, Pragmatists answer, that they have a certain value as knowledge, not in the sense that they contain or represent reality, but in the sense that they indicate a direction to follow,

¹² *The Meaning of Truth*, pp. 62, 63, 65.

¹³ *Id.*, p. 246; see also pp. 110-113; *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 217-19.

¹⁴ *Studies in Humanism*, p. 64.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 356.

¹⁶ *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. IV, v.

suggest a certain attitude to take, a "dynamic scheme" to fill in order to reach experimental reality. The successive perfections of our concepts, the French pragmatists say, the successive changes in the scientific theories and philosophical systems furnish us with a starting point and a directive suggestion in our attempt to reach reality. In themselves, however, they are merely "a common or average image accompanied by a name."¹⁷ Professor James tells us that they are words, symbols, images; "what the intellect knows clearly is only the word and its steering function."¹⁸

Pragmatism is plainly then, in its view of concept and conceptual knowledge, a return to nominalism.

THE EMPIRICISM OF PRAGMATISM.

Pragmatism could not stand merely as a method by which we discern error from truth, and as a criticism of the intellectualistic theory of concept and judgment. As a method it had to prove its legitimacy; as a criticism of intellectual knowledge, it had to ascertain the principles and ground of its attack; even as a theory of truth it had to clear up the problem of reality and of our relations with it. So it was ultimately led to elaborate a theory on the nature of reality and on our way of knowing or experiencing it. If my concept of "man" is merely a substitute for my various sense-experiences about men, the questions naturally arise: what kind of a reality is man? in what way and how far do my sense experiences reveal that reality? Pragmatism had logically to accept or build a system of metaphysics.

Dr. Schiller may say that metaphysics is "really luxuries";¹⁹ that "neither Pragmatism nor Humanism necessitates a metaphysics";²⁰ yet he comes to confess that it "may, some-

¹⁷ Bergson, *L'évolution créatrice*, p. 327.

¹⁸ *Pragmatism*, p. 185; see also *The Meaning of Truth*, *passim*, especially pp. 20-29.

¹⁹ *Studies in Humanism*, p. 11, 17.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

what definitely, point to one" and that it "implies ultimately a voluntaristic metaphysic."²¹ And, although his thought is not yet clear on this point, we may, however, divine his metaphysical principles in his very definition of Humanism²² and in such articles as the one on "The Making of Reality."²³

Leaving aside, for the moment, the problem on the nature of reality, we shall consider here only the problem of knowledge.

PROFESSOR JAMES' RADICAL EMPIRICISM.

On this problem of knowledge, Professor James has been more definite and he has given us the fundamental principles of his theory which he calls "Radical Empiricism."

Let us quote the typical example used by him to illustrate his theory. "Suppose me to be sitting here in my library in Cambridge, at ten minutes walk from "Memorial Hall," and to be thinking truly of the latter object. My mind may have before it only the name, or it may have a clear image, or it may have a very dim image of the hall, but such intrinsic differences in the image make no difference in its cognitive function. Certain *extrinsic* phenomena, special experiences of conjunction, are what impart to the image its knowing office. . . . If I can lead you to the hall, and tell you of its history and present uses; if in its presence I now feel my idea to be *continued*; if the associates of the image and the felt hall run parallel, so that each term of the one context corresponds serially, as I walk, with an answering term of the other; why then my soul was prophetic, and my idea must be, and by common consent would be, called cognizant of reality. That percept was what it *meant*, for into it my idea has passed by conjunctive experiences of sameness and fulfilled intention. Nowhere is then far, but every later moment matches and corroborates an earlier. In this matching and corroborating, taken *in no transcendental sense*, but denoting *definitely felt transitions*,²⁴ lies all that the knowing

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Italics mine.*

of a precept by an idea can possibly contain or signify. Whenever such transitions are felt, the first experience *knows* the last one. Knowledge thus lives inside the tissue of experience. It is *made*; and made by relations that unroll themselves in time. Whenever certain intermediaries are given, of such a kind that, as they develop toward their terminus, there is experience from point to point of one direction followed, and finally of one process fulfilled, the result is that their starting point thereby becomes a knower and their terminus an object meant or known. That is all that knowing (in the simple case considered) can be known as, that is the whole of its nature put into experiential terms. Whenever such is the sequence of our experiences, we may freely say that we had the terminal object "in mind" from the outset, although *at* the outset nothing was then *in us but a flat piece of substantive experience like any other*,²⁵ with no self-transcendence about it, and no mystery save the mystery of coming into existence and of being followed by other pieces of substantive experience, with conjunctively transitional experiences between."²⁶

Thus knowledge does not consist in an agreement between an experience and its object, it consists of continued experiences. It is "made by the ambulation through the intervening experiences";²⁷ it is "ambulatory" not "saltatory"; it implies continuity not transcendence. The meaning of an idea or image does not imply a leap—the "salto mortale"—to its object; it is a process of leading from one experience to another. The process is perceptual or "knowledge of," if "the knower and the known are the self-same piece of experience taken twice over in different contexts"; it is conceptual or "knowledge about," if the knower and the known are "two pieces of *actual* experience belonging to the same subject with definite tracts of conjunctive transitional experience between them"; "or the known is a *possible* experience, either of that

²⁵ Italics mine.

²⁶ "A World of Pure Experience," *Journ. of Phil., Psy. and So. Methods*, Vol. I, pp. 539, 540.

²⁷ "A Word more about Truth," *ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. 399.

subject or of another, to which the said conjunctive transitions *would* lead, if sufficiently prolonged.”²⁸

Thus knowledge consists of a continuity of pure experiences in which “things and their relations of conjunction and disjunction ‘is,’ ‘isn’t,’ ‘then,’ ‘before,’ ‘in,’ ‘on,’ ‘beside,’ ‘between,’ ‘next,’ etc. . . flower out of the stream of experience” and are immediately felt.²⁹

PROFESSOR DEWEY’S IMMEDIATE EMPIRICISM.

Professor Dewey’s theory of knowledge is very much like Professor James’. Knowledge, for him, is “a doubt-inquiry-answer experience.” At first we have a “mere experience” which is in no way knowledge. This experience is found to be inconsistent and unsatisfactory; it puts our mind in an attitude of “doubt,” with the consciousness of a needed reorganization. To the attitude of “doubt” then succeeds the process of “inquiry.” An “idea” or a “plan of action” suggests itself for the reorganization of experience and is tried. The plan is found to work satisfactorily and, for the first time, we have a “cognitive thing” although not yet a “cognitional thing.” Here is one of the examples used by Professor Dewey to illustrate his theory. I smell a sweet odor. My experience is then “just a floating odor, nothing more.” I ask myself what is *meant* by this odor. A certain “plan of action” then suggests itself, as to the meaning of that odor—perhaps the odor of a rose—and directs me through a series of various muscular actions of my divers senses such as walking, handling, looking, etc. . . . I come there to smell and enjoy a rose. There is yet no knowledge. But if the original smell has persisted in my consciousness until the moment of gratification, then the smell is represented “with a quality, an office, that of having excited activity and thereby having terminated its career in a certain *quale* of gratification.” I have a “*cognitive thing*,” for the smell “is experienced as *meaning* gratification

²⁸“A World of Pure Experience,” *ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 538.

²⁹“The Thing and its relations,” *ibid.*, Vol. II, reprinted in *A Pluralistic Universe*, App. A.

. . . . in a fashion which operates to effect what is meant" and I "retrospectively attribute intellectual force and function to the smell" and this is what is signified by "cognitive." "Yet the smell is not *cognitional*, because it did not knowingly intend to mean this, but is found after the event to have meant it." But let the smell be present again, not as original nor as smell with gratification, but as smell "fated or charged with the sense of the possibility of fulfillment," then experience is "cognitional," for it is "contemporaneously aware that it means something beyond itself." To sum up: "The odor knows the rose; the rose is known by the odor; and the import of each term is constituted by the relationship in which it stands to the other." Hence the somewhat complex definition of the simplest form of knowledge, namely, the knowledge of the acquaintance-type, as presented by Professor Dewey: "An experience is a knowledge, if in its quale there is an experienced destination and connection of the two elements in the following sort: *one means or intends the presence of the other in the same fashion in which itself is already present, while the other is that which, while not present in the same fashion, must become so present if the meaning or intention of its companion or yoke-fellow is to be fulfilled through an operation it sets up.*"³⁰

PROFESSOR BERGSON'S INTUITIONISM.

For Professor Bergson, as we have seen, conceptual knowledge is not a knowledge of, but an interpretation about, reality, suggested and directed by our practical needs. It deals only with surfaces; it gives things *made* while reality is *in the making*; concepts are distinct, static and separate, while reality is continuous dynamism. How can we then know reality as it is or rather as it becomes? There is only one way, Professor Bergson answers; it is *to live it*; there is only one method; that of "*intuition*." Let us take our common sense notions, our

³⁰ "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge," *Mind*, N. S., 59, July, 1906, pp. 293 ff.; cf. also "The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism," *Journ. of Phil.*, Vol. II, pp. 397 ff.

scientific and philosophical concepts and theories, not as results, but as a starting point. Under their direction let us adapt ourselves to the fluent reality, penetrate inside of it and by a kind of deep sympathy become that reality itself. For our conception of time and motion as successive moments or distinct spatial points added to each other let us substitute an action, by which we move in the continuous duration, flowing and advancing forward in and with it through all its various currents; in this way and in this way only "can reality be reached in a definitive embrace."³¹

As we may easily see, Metaphysical Pragmatism is a return to Empiricism; to "Radical Empiricism" according to Professor James, to "Immediate Empiricism" according to Professor Dewey, to "Integral Empiricism" according to Professor Bergson.³² Professor James could with reason dedicate his book on "Pragmatism" to J. Stuart Mill's memory; the English positivist would have acknowledged the American pragmatist as his faithful disciple.

What is to be thought of these theories? Is there no way between the a priori Absolutism of artificial concepts and pure experience or empirical intuition? Are we bound to accept James' ultimatum: "Bradley or Bergson"?³³ There is, we are sure, a middle way and we are not coerced into the fatal ultimatum. It is the way traced and pursued by the traditional Philosophy of Aristotle, St. Thomas and the Schoolmen, the way of Moderate Realism, a way in which both intuition and concept, experience and reasoning have their necessary and legitimate places, functions and values.

This is the doctrine that we shall now state and defend.

GEORGE M. SAUVAGE, C. S. C.

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³¹ *L'évolution créatrice*, p. 371; Compare with Pierce's "Synechism" in *Monist*, 1890-1893 and in Baldwin's *Dict. of Phil. and Psych.*, s. v.

³² "Introduction à la Métaphysique," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, Janvier, 1903.

³³ *Journ. of Phil. Psychol. and Sc. Methods*, Jan. 20, 1910.

ARISTOTLE AS A LOGICIAN AND A SCIENTIST.

When it is said that Aristotle was the founder of logic, the meaning is not that he it was who first taught men how to reason. For, although logic is the science and art of reasoning, there were men and women who, for untold generations, reasoned, and reasoned correctly, about many things, before he came to tell them how to do it. Just as human beings, for countless ages, used water for drinking purposes, before the chemist appeared, and told them that water is composed of two parts of hydrogen and one part of oxygen. The chemist subjected water to analysis and thus learned how it is composed. By another kind of analysis, an analysis that is mental, Aristotle resolved the complex process of reasoning into the simpler processes which compose it, and thus was able to draw up a set of rules for right thinking, which were henceforth to form the body of logical doctrine. By logic we learn to do reflectively what we should otherwise do instinctively. And, reasoning, especially reasoning on subjects with which we are not familiar, being a difficult process when compared with walking, or eating, which we do by instinct also, a set of rules for the right conduct of reasoning is, as we know by experience, not only useful but necessary. Sancho Panza invoked blessings on the man who invented sleep; we may or may not be inclined to bless the memory of him who invented logic. But, whether we are or are not as grateful as we ought to be, we must acknowledge that the man who invented logic was Aristotle.

Before his time, the art of subtle and contentious argumentation had been brought to a high degree of perfection by Zeno of Elea. It was Zeno who undertook to prove that there is no such a thing as motion or change, that everything is in a state of rest, and that our impression of change or motion is an illusion. Thus, he argued that since that which is always in one place is at rest; and the arrow in its flight is always in one place (it is now at one place, it is now at another, but

always in *one* place); therefore the moving arrow is at rest. He proposed also the problem of Achilles and the tortoise, and tried to show that, once you give the tortoise, who is the slowest of animals, a start, let us say, of ten yards, Achilles, though he is the swiftest of runners, will never catch up with him. This was not logic. It was argumentation of a specious sort. After Zeno came the sophists, who went to all kinds of excesses in their abuse of the art of reasoning. The sophists, to amuse and bewilder their Athenian audience, gravely maintained that, since three and two are five, and three is odd and two is even, therefore five is both odd and even. With a cheap kind of humor combined with unlimited audacity, they entertained their listeners somewhat after the manner of the professional juggler or the slight-of-hand man. "If a discussion is uncomfortable for the sophist he evades it; if an answer is desired of him, he insists on asking questions; if anyone tries to escape from ambiguous questions by closer definition, he demands yes or no; if he thinks his adversary knows an answer, he begins by deprecating all that can possibly be said on that side; if he is accused of contradicting himself, he protests against 'raking up old scores'; if he has no other resource, he stupifies his adversary with speeches, the absurdity of which precludes any reply. He tries to hoodwink the diffident man by a swaggering mode of address, to surprise the thoughtful man by hasty inferences, to betray the inexperienced man into surprising statements and clumsy expressions."¹ One of the favorite sophisms was to prove that no one can learn anything: Because, everyone is either wise or foolish: If he is wise, he cannot learn, because he already knows, and, if he is foolish, he cannot learn, because he is incapable of understanding. We are inclined to think that these devices of the sophists were silly. And so they were. But the Athenian audience did not think so. They had no logic to aid them in pointing out the fallacies that lie so plainly on the surface in these arguments, and their attitude of mind was such that the cheap tricks of the

¹ Zeller, *Pre-Socratic Philosophy*, II, 463 f.

sophist, instead of disgusting, delighted them. We know for a fact that the success of the sophists was immediate and universal, until Socrates appeared on the scene. He saw at once whither matters were drifting. He saw that all seriousness of purpose was being sacrificed in the desire to amuse and be amused. He foretold impending disaster, both moral and intellectual, unless a remedy were found for the evil which the sophists had wrought. He proposed that remedy in the method now known as the Socratic Method, which was designed to develop in the mind of the learner a concept of the subject studied. In other words, he urged that the person who begins to think systematically about any subject first obtain a definition of the subject, and he promised that, once a person attained to the definition, one could defy the subtlety of the sophist. Plato, like the intellectual aristocrat that he was, spurned the whole subject of sophistry; he disdained to mingle with the sophists in the marketplace or the theatre or the banquet-hall. Fixing his attention on spiritual truth in the world above us, he clung to the vision of celestial prototypes, and "far from the madding crowd," found rest and peace and inspiration for conduct, in a world where the art of the quibbler and the mental juggler is replaced by the noblest art of them all, divine philosophy. Philosophy, he says, consists in a contemplation of Ideas. This art, he adds, is the "noblest music." It charms the soul, and like Orpheus' strains, has power to lure us from the nether world to the higher spiritual realm.

There can be no doubt that Aristotle, when he composed his treatises on logic, was actuated by the same motive which had moved in different ways Socrates and Plato. Indeed, one of his treatises, *On Sophistical Arguments*, is a direct refutation of the arguments of the sophists and a condemnation of their methods. But, while his purpose was the same as that of Socrates and Plato, his manner of proceeding was quite different. Let us suppose that all three of them are interested in amateur gardening. Let us imagine that there is a particular kind of flower which they wish to cultivate. Socrates would call attention to the rank weeds that the sophists were sowing

in the garden, and not only sowing but tending with elaborate care, to the detriment, naturally, of the rosebush struggling for existence among them. Root out the weeds, he would advise, dig up the soil, see that its natural nutritive qualities be brought to bear on the rose tree, and on that alone. Plato would approve the method advocated by his master. He would then go on to tell you of the ideal flower; he would wax eloquent on its beauty, the delicacy of its coloring, the softness of its texture, the perfect symmetry of its shape, the exquisiteness of its perfume. He would hold up to the mind of the gardener the perfect prototype of what he was striving to produce, and perhaps—for this is the inherent weakness of Platonism—the gardener, lost in the contemplation of the ideal, would end by neglecting the real task before him. Aristotle, too, would approve the Socratic method: root up the weeds, he would say, and, if you are so inclined, learn from Plato what the ideal rose is; but, above all things, study the nature of the plant you are tending, learn its constitution, habits and needs, study the soil around it, find out which elements are wanting. Be a practical botanist, but first be an analytical naturalist. Take the rosebush, or a portion of it, and find out how it is organized, observe how similar plants thrive or fail in other kinds of soil, and bring all this to bear on the particular problem of rose culture that is before you.

This is the spirit in which Aristotle undertook the foundation of the science and art of logic as a remedy against the errors to which the human mind is subject. For, observe, that by his method of proceeding you arrive at general principles which are valid, not only against this sophist or that sophist, but against all sophists whatsoever. He took the human mind, so to speak, into his laboratory; he broke it up into the different powers, the power of reasoning, the power of judging, the power of forming ideas and precepts. He studied these under the microscope of analysis, mental analysis, of course. Then he went out and studied the environment. He studied the sources of truth and error, the garden in which the mind grows. He studied language and customs and institutions. He showed

how some errors are due to our use of words, how others are due to our habits of thought, how others are due to our unreflecting opinion, and others still to our emotions, our affections, our prejudices and our peculiarities of disposition. He became, in a word, the naturalist of the mind in order afterwards to become the legislator of the mind. All the laws of thought which he formulated to guide us in right thinking were founded on an inquiry into the nature and constitution of the mind by which we think.

There is another point of contact also between Aristotle and the sophists. The sophists cultivated the art of argumentation without reference to truth and error. In fact, they proclaimed their belief that there is no absolute standard by which we can tell what is true and what is false. Their professed purpose was to prepare young men for public life. At Athens in those days, as in every democracy since then, the ability to make a telling speech, and the power to argue a case before a popular assembly were recognized as an asset indispensable to a man with political ambitions. It did not matter whether the plea was in itself plausible or not. It did not matter at all whether one was on the right side or on the wrong side. Indeed the boast of the sophists was that they could teach a young man to make the better cause appear the worse, and the worse cause the better. To lead a forlorn hope is the height of military heroism: to take up a despised, and apparently a lost, cause and by plausible arguments make it appear to be the noblest and most estimable, was the ideal of the youthful Athenian sophist. Aristotle, like Socrates, was sensible of the demoralization to which this led. He was convinced that there is a standard of true and false, as well as of right and wrong. He reached this conviction from his study of the human mind. At the same time it was a fundamental principle with him that man is ordained for the society of his fellowmen. He proceeded, therefore, to draw up the rules of logic in such a way that they would aid, not only the meditative recluse in his cell, or the lonely student in his laboratory, but also the man of business in the market-place, the orator in the forum, the

politician in the popular assembly and the man of the world in polite intercourse with his fellowmen. His logic is never out of touch with rhetoric. He tells how to reason, and he tells us also how to apply our reason. He tells us how to frame an argument, and he tells us also how to arrange our arguments in conversation or in public discourse so as to have the most desirable effect. He teaches us how to reach the truth and how, by exposition and demonstration, to teach the truth to others. His logic is not only scientific, because based on an analysis of the mind and its environment, but also humanitarian, or social, in the large sense of the word, because it takes into account the requirements of mental life in the aggregate.

I do not intend in this paper to attempt an exposition of the contents of Aristotle's logic. Some of my readers are no doubt familiar with those contents. For, of all the portions of his philosophy this is the one that has undergone the least change. Everyone who has studied logic, no matter in what school or under what auspices one may have studied it, has studied it as Aristotle taught it. One may have studied some things in logic, such as Induction, Hypothesis, the rules of Observation and Experiment, the laws of investigation of social phenomena, which, in whole or in part, are new. But, in the study of terms and their arrangement, in the study of propositions and their conversion and opposition, and in the study of the structure of arguments, the analysis of arguments and the rules for the detection of fallacies, whether one's teacher was an Aristotelian or a disciple of some later master, one is certain to have followed, not only in the broad outlines, but in many of the details, the rules laid down by Aristotle in his *Categories*, his *Perihermenias*, his two *Analytics*, and his work *On Sophistical Arguments*.

One may, however, with perfect reasonableness, desire to know what Aristotle aimed at in his treatises on logic. His purpose, as was said before, was wider than that of Socrates. He did not merely wish to counteract the influence of the sophists. He laid the foundations of his logic on general psychological prin-

ciples, which are valid universally and for all time. He may have erred in details, for he was only a human being, and not infallible; and no one would be so absurd as to maintain that his work in logic was in any sense final or irreformable. What is meant is that in intention, he legislated, within the region of rational thought, not merely for his day and generation, but for the human mind in general, in every age and in every clime. What then, was his standard of perfection? If someone were to undertake to teach you how to row a boat, you would naturally think, "What is his idea of a successful oarsman?" or you might perhaps, ask him, "When shall you be satisfied that I have attained your ideal (relatively speaking), of an oarsman?" Aristotle undertakes to teach you how to think. You may, therefore, ask him: "When is a man said to think well, or successfully?" Aristotle answers by dividing our thought processes into three kinds. There is, first of all, or, at least, highest of all, the process of reasoning. This is a prerogative of human beings. The lower animals, whatever degree of so-called intelligence they may attain, do not reason. This, at least, is Aristotle's view. Reasoning consists in passing from truths already known to a new truth, or rather to a truth that is new to the reasoner, but contained in the truth already known to him. Let us suppose that there is someone who does not know that the substance formerly called "spirit of salt" is a poison. He has learned in chemistry, or he takes the authority of a medical dictionary for the statement: "All mineral acids are poisons." Now, by experimental analysis, or perhaps again, by consulting some authority on the subject, he learns that "Spirit of salt is a mineral acid." He is now in possession of two truths: "All mineral acids are poisons; spirit of salt is a mineral acid." When he infers, as he cannot help doing, "Therefore, spirit of salt is a poison," the process by which he passes to the hitherto unknown truth is a process of reasoning. But even this comparatively simple (in the sense of being an easy) process is complex. There are three judgments involved in it, first that "All mineral acids are poisons," next, that "Spirit of salt is a mineral acid," and lastly, that

"Spirit of salt is a poison." If, now, we subject a judgment to analysis, we find that in each expressed judgment there are two terms, and that each term is a word or group of words standing for a very simple content of the mind, namely, an idea, or precept, or mental representation of some kind. The result of our analysis is that the reasoning process is made up of judgments and that in judgments there are present some kind of mental representations. Beginning with the last, the processes of thinking are enumerated as 1) The formation of mental representations, 2) Judgment, and 3) Reasoning. Aristotle's purpose in logic is to show how, by practice in the rules which he lays down, we may attain to relative perfection in each of these. The logical mind is the mind which reasons *well*, which judges *well*, which forms its mental representations *well*. But *well* in each case has a different meaning. We reason *well* when our reasoning is sound, or valid, when it has no flaw or weakness—the word "sound," or "valid" is a figurative one, and really means "healthy." We judge *well* when our judgments are consistent with one another and true. And we form mental images *well* when those images are true and clear and there is order among them. The logical mind, then, as Aristotle understands it, is the mind which reasons validly, judges consistently, has clear and orderly ideas, and, over all and through it all, conforms to the standard of truth. To go deeper into the question of truth would take us out of logic into metaphysics. Enough has, I think, been said to show that Aristotle's notion of logic is practical in the best human sense.

To trace in detail the history of Aristotelian logic would be to venture into minute questions of interpretation, elucidation, and technical exposition. Some portions of logic were improved by the Stoics, other parts were developed and explained in the course of subsequent centuries by a whole line of commentators, Greek, Latin, Syriac, Arabic and Hebrew, before we come to medieval times, and there, again, whatever additions were made were either elucidations of the text, or merely pedagogical improvements, that is to say, improvements in the technical methods of teaching logic. The same is true, com-

paratively speaking, of modern times. During all the centuries from Aristotle's day to our own, the history of Aristotelian logic is the story of minute additions, or improvements of a secondary nature. In essentials, the logic of Aristotle remained unchanged, and in practically its original form continued to be the only logic studied. Here we have a fact unique, I think, in human history—one single work remaining the standard work on an important subject for more than two thousand years. For, in every school of philosophy, whether Platonist, or Stoic, or Epicurean, or Neo-Platonic, or Medieval Christian, or Modern, no matter what estimate was placed on Aristotle's philosophy in general, his logic was held to be the norm and standard, with only an occasional voice raised in protest, and that not so much against the logic as a whole, as against some particular point. During all that time, in all the succession and variety of philosophical creeds, the Western World, and the portion of the Asiatic World that was most active, intellectually, sat at the feet of Aristotle and learned from him how to think. In all matters, save that of religion (as distinguished from theology), in all matters, one might say, where the training of the intellect counts as the important element or factor in education, Aristotle held a position of preëminence with hardly one serious rival. Curiously enough, he himself seemed to claim the distinction beforehand. For, while he was willing to grant that in the theory of government, in ethics and in rhetoric he had predecessors to whom he gave due credit, he reserved for himself the honor of having founded logic.² This honor posterity has willingly conceded him. His teaching was later to be made the matter of dispute, and even of violent recrimination. It was to be made the subject of legislation both ecclesiastical and civil; witness the decree of Francis I in 1543 forbidding the dissemination of the logic of Peter Ramus. There were to be those who, opposing logic in general, were hostile to the logic of Aristotle. But, wherever the science was taught, it was taught according to his

²Cf. concluding sentence of the *Organon*.

method and his doctrine. Even after the Reformation, and in countries where the Reform controlled the educational policy, the influence of Aristotle as a logician was undiminished. It was no medieval monk, but an English divine, a member of the University of Oxford in the sixteenth century, who declared that he would rather lose his own life than depart from the teaching of Aristotle; *prius vitam quam Aristotelem deseram*.³ The sentiment was publicly proclaimed, and met with unanimous applause at the great English institution of learning. And this was the spirit, not only of Oxford, but also of the other English universities. There logic was taught from Aristotle's text, and seldom went beyond the limits of Aristotle's teaching. The same is true of France, where, even after the Revolution, the dominant influence of the Sorbonne was always on the side of Aristotle in logic. In vain did Bacon in England and Descartes in France try to set up a rival system. The learned world welcomed their physics and their mathematics and their psychology, but in logic it still remained faithful to Aristotle. About the middle of the nineteenth century appeared John Stuart Mill's *System of Logic*, a work which, whatever its intrinsic defects, has had a very decisive influence so far as the teaching of logic and the influence of Aristotle are concerned. Mill's philosophy is now generally admitted to have been inherently self-contradictory. His superficial sensism and his latent skepticism no longer satisfy our age which, with all its faults, is seriously searching for a foundation for the higher spiritual truths. But, in spite of these defects, the *System of Logic* has worked a real, and, we may say, a needed reform. Logic continues to be taught along Aristotelian lines, as far as Aristotle's logic went. But, in the everwidening field of scientific research and the study of social phenomena the new logic has come to be recognized as a needed extension and amplification of the old. For it is not a complete innovation. Did time permit us to enter into the question, we could, I have no doubt, be led to the convic-

³ *Logicæ Libri Quinque*, Auctore R. Crackenthorpo, Oxon. 2 ed. 1641.

tion that, fundamentally and in principle, the logic of scientific research is far more Aristotelian than Mill's admirers seem willing to admit. That Aristotle, the naturalist and the founder of so many of the sciences should teach a system of logic incompatible with scientific research is antecedently improbable, to say the least. His whole philosophy rests on the investigation of facts, his method throughout is the scientific method, and the logic of the sciences, so far from being subversive of Aristotle's logic, is nothing but a natural development of his general principles, a development which, like all others, waited until the times were historically ripe.

We come now to Aristotle as a scientist. And, here there is no end of tributes willingly and loyally paid to him by those in ancient and modern times whose distinction in the natural sciences entitles them to attention and consideration. Those who have visited Mount Vernon, near Washington, have seen, no doubt, some of the floral wreaths which imperial and royal visitors from abroad have placed on the tomb of George Washington. It seems, indeed, to be custom which international courtesy imposes. Similarly, though, of course, in the figurative sense merely, scientific courtesy seems to demand that every great man of science lay his tribute of praise at the feet of the first great scientist, Aristotle. Take the distinguished men in one line alone, that of physiology and biology. Beginning with the physician Galen in the second century and coming down to the physiologists and biologists of our own day, there are the Arabian physicians, the Christian schoolmen, especially Albert the Great, and in modern times, Harvey, Descartes, Linné, Buffon, Cuvier, Agassiz, Claude Bernard, Milne-Edwards, Huxley, Brooks—and hundreds of others, less well known who, though they upset on many points the Aristotelian tradition, and changed our view on the world of vital phenomena as completely as Copernicus changed our outlook on the astronomical world, give most enthusiastic tribute to the greatness of Aristotle's genius and the truly scientific character of his work. In fact, their enthusiasm for the fame of Aristotle seems to be second only to their interest in nature itself. The

same is true of the physicists. How far their work owed its success to what Aristotle achieved in his day is a question that no man can solve satisfactorily or with any show of justice to them and to him. We are more concerned now with learning what Aristotle did to merit the praise of those, of whom it may be said in the best sense of the phrase that "praise from them is praise indeed."

In the first place, Aristotle, although he had predecessors, as is evident from his own writings, was the first to gather together into one great system the facts relating to vital phenomena. The title commonly given him is that of Father of the Biological Sciences. His works *On the Histories of Animals*, *On the Parts of Animals*, *On the Generation of Animals*, are the foundation of Systematic Classification, General Biology, Morphology (or Anatomy) and Morphogeny, (or Embryology). And this represents only a portion of what he achieved. His contributions to Physics, to Astronomy, to Physical Geography and to Meteorology are equally remarkable. How one man could, within the short span of a single lifetime, gather together the immense mass of ascertained facts which his works on nature contain, is nothing short of marvelous. He enumerates, for instance, five hundred different kinds of animals, among them one hundred and fifteen species or varieties of fishes. Well might Athenaeus exclaim; "Aristotle is a marvel to me. I should like to know from what Proteus or Nereus of the deep sea he learned what fishes do, how they sleep, how they live." We know that his information is due, in part to the generous assistance of Alexander, his pupil, and most of all to his own insatiable desire for knowledge and his indefatigable industry. And not only is his information wonderfully wide, but it is still more wonderfully accurate. Indeed, some of his assertions, about deep sea fishes especially, which were formerly set down to misinformation or malobservation, have been found in recent times to be absolutely true. For example, he says that many sharks not only bring forth their young alive, but nourish them before birth by a process resembling that of mammals. This was rediscovered by Johann

Müller in the nineteenth century. And his method is as much to be admired as the results which he attained. His desire for knowledge, that noble curiosity, of which he speaks in the opening sentence of his *Metaphysics* was insatiable. He was interested in everything. And he spared no pains to ascertain the facts in every case with the utmost accuracy. Having accumulated his data, he arranged them, compared them, sifted them, and drew his conclusion without prejudice or favor, so far as rival hypotheses were concerned. In a word, his method was truly scientific. We must remember, too, how he was handicapped compared with the modern scientist. He had none of the ingenious and accurate devices by which the investigator in our day is aided in his research. He had neither telescope nor microscope; he was obliged to ascertain differences of temperature without the aid of a thermometer, and to mark the differences of time without any timepiece other than the hour-glass. He had no finely swung chemical balance *in vacuo*, to tell minute differences of weight; no airpump to produce a vacuum; no blast pipe or electric furnace to produce high temperatures; no artificial freezer to produce the required degree of coldness; none of the delicate psychophysiological instruments of the modern laboratory, to aid him in his study of psychic phenomena. Moreover, he was handicapped in other ways too; he shared the universal classic horror of corpses; it is evident that he never dissected a human body, and it is more than probable that he never dissected the bodies even of the lower animals; all his wonderfully accurate observations on that subject were made either at the place of sacrifice or in the butcher's shambles, where the entrails of animals could be viewed. It is no wonder that he made mistakes. The wonder is that he did not make more. He believed, for instance, in spontaneous generation, thinking, as many since his time have thought, that the lower forms of life, worms for example, and insects, are bred not from eggs, but spontaneously from decaying meat or other animal matter. This question, as is well known, was not finally settled in the negative until our own day, when Louis Pasteur, by a series of brilliant experi-

ments, showed conclusively that in the present condition of nature all life comes from life. Aristotle had no knowledge of the function of nerves; those silverlike threads which he observed in the flesh of animals he believed to be fine strings used to tense and relax the muscles. It was his disciple Galen in the second century of our era who first got an inkling of the important function which those little filaments perform in carrying sensory impulses. Sometimes, it was the very honesty, so to speak, of the man that betrayed him. He says, for instance, that the cranium of the dog is solid, that it has no sutures, as the serrated lines between the bones of the skull are called. That, of course, is not true. But Aristotle probably examined the skull of an old dog, the process of ossification having in that instance almost obliterated the sutures. He told us what he saw, and drew the conclusion he believed to be warranted by the fact. His conclusion is false, but his method is that of the true scientist. Sometimes, he is misinformed. For example, he says; "Children resemble their parents not only in congenital characters, but also in those acquired later in life. For cases are known where parents have been marked by scars and the children have shown traces of these scars in the same places; a case is reported from Chalcedon in which a father had been branded with a letter, and the same letter, somewhat blurred and not sharply defined, appeared on the arm of his child."⁴ Most scientists nowadays would declare that the fact here narrated did not occur, because it cannot occur. Aristotle may have been deceived as to the fact, but he gives it, as narrated, and draws the conclusion which it seems to warrant. A modern biologist would be more cautious than Aristotle. Caution, however, comes with long experience, and it is well perhaps, for us that, though lack of caution betrayed Aristotle into more than one mistake, he did not carry caution to the point of skepticism, as some modern investigators do.

With the influence of Aristotle's scientific doctrines I should like to deal at length, did time permit. It has often been said that the authority of Aristotle delayed for whole centuries

⁴ *De Gen. Anim.* I, 35.

the dawn of the modern era of scientific discoveries. That is an assertion which it would be difficult to prove. I believe that the era of discovery dawned as soon as the discoverer appeared. The discoverer was obliged in many instances, to combat the authority of Aristotle; had he appeared earlier he would have had the same difficulty to meet, and he would have overcome it then, as he did later, by the power of personal genius and the courage which comes with a vision of the truth. In the meantime the scientific doctrines of Aristotle filled up the immense gap in history between him and those who, like Galileo and Copernicus, inaugurated the modern era. And those doctrines had more direct influence on the discoverers than we are commonly aware of. It is a commonplace in history to say that the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the age of scientific discovery, broke completely with the preceding age, which was dominated by Aristotle. Let me try to show that one important discovery, at least, was influenced directly and, so far as purely scientific antecedents went, exclusively, I think, by the teaching of Aristotle. I allude to the work of the fifteenth century navigators in general and to the discoveries of Columbus in particular.

It can, I believe, be shown that certain texts in Aristotle's works on Physical Geography had a determining influence on the resolution of Columbus to venture westward from Spain in search of a new route to the Indies. The Aristotelian passage referred to occurs at the end of the treatise *De Coelo* (*On the Heavens*). "Those who think," says Aristotle, "that the region beyond the Pillars of Hercules (Straits of Gibraltar) is contiguous with India and that the shores of both are washed by the same sea do not seem to me to put forward an opinion that taxes our credulity too much."⁵ Again, in the work *On Meteorology*, "The lands beyond the Indies and the Columns of Hercules do not appear to be united, because the sea intervenes, so that the whole inhabited earth is not continuous."⁶ The second passage is somewhat obscure; but the first very clearly

⁵ *De Coelo*, II, 14, 298 ff.

⁶ *Meteor.*, II, 5, 362b, 27 ff.

indicates Aristotle's belief that the route to India lies westward across the Atlantic from the Straits of Gibraltar. That, at least, was the interpretation put upon it by those who took any notice of the text between the time it was written by Aristotle and the time when Columbus was planning his voyage of discovery. First, the Greek interpreters, Themistius especially and Simplicius, called attention to the passage, and commented on it, drawing the conclusion that the distance across the Atlantic cannot be very great, or at least that there is but one sea, however vast, between the Pillars of Hercules and the shores of India. Later, the Arabs took the same meaning out of the text; for instance the geographer Massoudi and the philosopher Averroes. Finally, come the great medieval interpreters, St. Thomas, Albert the Great and Roger Bacon, all of whom, on the authority of Aristotle, assert that the distance by sea between Spain and the Indies is not very great. And, what adds greatest force to our argument is the circumstance that some of their contemporaries, like John of Holywood, and Robert of Lincoln, who did not rely on Aristotle, hold the contrary opinion. But, you will say, from St. Thomas to Christopher Columbus there is an interval of more than two centuries. It can be shown, however, that the tradition was unbroken. A treatise on the sphere written in French by Nicolas Oresme towards the end of the fourteenth century, and a work, of the same period, by Cardinal Peter d'Ailly, called the *Image of the World*, reiterate the same opinion and quote the Aristotelian texts. It was through the last named work by the great French Cardinal, surnamed "The Eagle of France" that Columbus became acquainted with Aristotle's texts on the subject. In his "Relations of his Four Voyages," written probably in 1498, we find these words "Aristotle says that the world is small, that the amount of water (compared with land) is small, and that one may pass easily from Spain to the Indies. Auenruyz (Averroes) confirms this idea and Cardinal Peter de Aliaco cites it—saying that Aristotle was able to know many of the secrets of the world owing to (the generosity of) Alexander the Great." It

would, of course, be absurd to say that Columbus was inspired in his great enterprise by this text of Aristotle and by this text alone. There were other and more practical considerations; his own experience, and the experience of other mariners, the advice of Toscanelli and so forth. But among the determinants, as he himself tells us, was this passage of the Aristotelian text, and perhaps that, more than any other argument, had weight with the councillors of Isabella who approved his project.

This is merely an example of a condition which, I believe, could be proved to exist in many other instances, were the documents available. The discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries did not come like a bolt from the blue; they did not spring overnight, like mushrooms, out of the soil of modern thought. They were influenced, naturally and necessarily, by the thought of the centuries that went before, and in those centuries the great master in matters scientific was Aristotle.

Leaving now the question of Aristotle's influence, and going back once more to the study of his works on natural science, we may enquire, "What was his general view of natural phenomena, What was his philosophy of nature?" In the first place, Aristotle was a firm believer in the principle of purpose in nature. It was a favorite saying of his that "neither God nor nature does anything in vain"; he believed that "Nature is always striving for the best." He observed everywhere, especially among living things, adaptation of organism to environment and of structure to function. Consequently, among the sources of our knowledge of things he considered Final Causes to be of the greatest importance. Once we know the purpose of a process in nature we are in possession of a key to understanding that process. In the next place, if nature is always striving for the best, what is it that prevents the attainment of the best in all the processes of nature? Aristotle answers by his doctrine of Matter and Form. Matter, he says, is potency or possibility of being; it is indeterminateness, incoherency, the source of limitation and imperfection.

Form is the direct opposite. It is actuality, determinateness, the principle of activity, coherency, and perfection. Formless Matter, having no determinateness, cannot exist by itself. It is found, nevertheless in all finite beings, in composition with form. God, pure actuality, is supreme form without matter, absolutely perfect, and absolutely one. At the other end of the chain of reality is formless matter absolutely imperfect, and the principle of numerical differentiation. God is the zenith, formless matter is the nadir, of reality. Between these two points are spread out all created things, as we call them, composed of matter and form, and ranging higher or lower in the scale of existence according as form or matter predominates. Matter in the amorphous state is nearest to formless matter. Next come the minerals, in which form is a definite, coherent principle. Next come plants, in which the form still further triumphs over matter. Above plants are animals, in which, by the faculty of sensation, the form (in this case, the soul), is far freer from the trammels of matter than in plants. Last of all, or rather, highest of all, is man, whose intellectual life actually transcends and, as it were, defies, all the limitations of matter, such as time and space. Aristotle has no theory of descent according to which man would be descended from animals, animals derived from plants, and plants from minerals. At the same time he binds the whole of nature together by means of his grand, widely reaching, thought, that each lower form is tending to become a higher form, and would reach a higher form by natural process if it were not for the fact that in the lower form the dead weight, so to speak, of matter, holds it down. To the speculative mind, especially to the metaphysical mind trained in the appreciation of comprehensive principles, this is a view of nature that is as satisfying as the theory of genetic evolution.

The eminently scientific character of Aristotle's philosophy of nature cannot be too much emphasized. Neither his method nor his general view of nature is in conflict with modern science. No doubt, some of his doctrines are antiquated, such as his enumeration of the four elements or his explanation of

the phenomena of gravity. Science need not on that account have broken with his philosophy of nature. There is no necessary conflict between that philosophy and the latest achievements of physical science. One may go farther, and say that no other philosophy agrees so well with the scientific explanation as his. Certainly not Idealism. For Idealism tells the scientist that his so called facts are only thoughts, and that his laws of nature are really limitations of his own power of thinking. For example, if matter is only a state of mind, then the law of the indestructibility of matter simply means that I cannot think of matter being destroyed. The conflict of the day is not so much between science and religion as between science and philosophy, because the best accredited philosophy of the day is idealistic. Between the conviction of the scientist that he is dealing with facts and the explanation of the philosopher according to which there are no facts, but only mental states, there is war, war in the din and turmoil of which, common sense never gets a hearing. The Aristotelian philosophy gives no encouragement to the idealist. Like science, it stands for facts and the common sense explanation of facts. The more one realizes this, the more one will be inclined to repeat the wish of a distinguished Scottish scholar of our day, John Stuart Blackie, who, deeply imbued with the spirit of Greek culture, and besides, endowed by nature with his countrymen's talent for metaphysics, exclaims:

"Give me no peeping scientist, if I
Shall judge God's grandly ordered world aright;
But give, to plant my Cosmic survey high
The wisest of wise Greeks, the Stagyrte."

WILLIAM TURNER.

THE SOCIAL VALUE OF ASCETICISM.

The real test of the value of any institution or organization which aims at regulating conduct is to be found in the complexion of the life produced under its influence and the character in men which it generates. By their fruits ye shall know them. Thus while the attitude of the early Christians towards the prevailing social and economic conditions was such as to merit for them neither the reproach of being rebels nor radical social reformers, the basic criterion of their activities is to be found in their own careers and character and in their outlook on life in general. This is a subject which has called forth much acrimonious criticism and which has led to much unfounded opposition to Christianity as a factor in social progress and betterment. That the world is essentially bad and that the Christian is bound to fly from it are represented as the essence of Christian teaching, and the Christian concept of life is said to be anti-social, pessimistic or impossible. Brentano finds the keynote of Christianity in the words of Our Lord to the rich young man: "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven, and come, follow me."¹ "This," he says, "is the foundation on which the early fathers rest their teaching about earthly possessions. It was this message which made St. Francis turn his back on the world, and, as in his case, so from the beginning was it looked on as an exhortation to fly from the world. It was on this basis that the anti-social view of life held by the early Christians rested, and it was against the manner of life based on such renunciation that the heathen world directed its attacks."² Professor Harnach expresses practically the same opinion regarding the manner in which the church has

¹ Matt. XIX, 21.

² "Die wirtschaftlichen Lehren des Christlichen Altertums." *Sitzungsberichte d. philosoph.-philolog. u. d. hist. Classe. d. k. b. Akademie d. Wissenschaften zu München*, 1902, p. 143.

interpreted the social import of Our Lord's teaching. "They (the Catholic Churches) recognize the world-denying character of the gospel and they teach accordingly, that it is only in the form of monasticism, that is in the *vita religiosa*, that the true Christian life finds its expression. But they admit a lower kind of Christianity without asceticism as sufficient. . . . The Catholic doctrine is that it is only monks who can follow Christ fully." ³ The unworldliness in the Christian faith has been denounced by Socialists as "a personal, introspective, and spiritualistic theory of the universe and of life." ⁴

Charges of this character are by no means new. They are as old as Christianity itself, and were never expressed with more vigor and sharpness than by the pagan opponents of Christianity in the time of the persecutions. As early as the days of Nero the Christians were accused of "hatred of the human race." ⁵ "We are called to account as harm-doers on another ground," says Tertullian, "and are accused of being useless in the affairs of life." ⁶ To the pagan opponent of Minucius Felix the Christians were "a people skulking and shunning the light, silent in public, but garrulous in corners." ⁷ Celsus censured the Christians as "men who separate themselves and stand aloof from all human society." ⁸

The prevalence of such views, notwithstanding the equal tenacity with which the communistic character of Christianity is asserted in other quarters, is due, it is needless to say, to an entire misapprehension of the Church's teaching on asceticism and the ascetic life. This misapprehension is not confined to

³ *What is Christianity* (Eng. Trans.), p. 79.

⁴ Bax, *The Religion of Socialism*, p. 25.

⁵ Tacitus, *Annals*, xv, 44.

⁶ Apology, Chap. XLII. *Infructuosi in negotiis dicimur.*

⁷ *Octavius*, Chap. VIII.

⁸ Origen, *Contra Celsum*, VIII, 2. The accusation of Celsus bears out the truth of the observation made some years ago by Uhlhorn: "In reading the '*True Discourse*' we are filled with astonishment not simply because Celsus had so accurate a knowledge of Christianity . . . but more because in this the oldest polemical writing against the Christian faith whose contents we know, every argument is to be found which has been brought against it up to the present time." *The Conflict of Christianity with Heathenism*, p. 297 (Eng. Trans.).

writers on social topics, but is shared by philosophers, moralists, and historians. "The ascetic," says Ross, "be he Buddhist, Stoic, Christian or Sufi, tames lustful, grasping, vying men and transforms them into quiet, untroublesome members of society. But he may not stop here. The tamed energy of the anchorite wasting itself in fast and penance and self-torture is socially useless."⁹ With few exceptions, Protestants have never grasped the true notion of Catholic renunciation, and though there are many outside the Church who hold lenient views, it is not surprising to find an eminent Cambridge professor expressing himself to the effect that "Asceticism is the reaction of the natural man from the grosser sins that shock him, and rests on as low a view of human nature as any sinner's."¹⁰ Statements such as these can be explained only on the ground that the authors who make them never took the pains to examine seriously what is really meant by Asceticism, and what the Church actually teaches on the subject, or that separation from the Church has so completely alienated their sympathies that they are beyond all comprehension of a system of conduct which finds no full exemplification except under her influence.

That early Christianity was far from being unsocial and that the Church did not confine the full benefits of Redemption only to those who practised the ascetic manner of life, and that asceticism itself is not the monstrous scheme of existence such as it is frequently portrayed can easily be seen from the nature and history of ascetical practices as encouraged and regulated by the Church. Asceticism (*ἀσκήσις*) is a notion brought over by the Greeks from the sphere of athletics to that of morals, and means exercise or training, while the ascetics (*ἀσκῶντες*) were the athletes, or those who by practice arrived at proficiency in some art or occupation. St. Paul frequently compared the life of the Christian to that of an athlete,¹¹ and made the idea familiar to the early Christians.¹² The appropriate-

⁹ *Social Control*, p. 312.

¹⁰ Gwatkin, *Early Church History to A. D. 313*, Vol. I, p. 240.

¹¹ I. Cor. ix, 24. I. Tim. iv, 8, etc.

¹² Die Askese, mag sie nun so benannt werden oder mag man sie, nach einer bei uns neueren allerdings seltneren Ausdrucksweise, als ein gym-

ness and force of the figure will readily appeal to those who are familiar with manly sports, and who know that the training of the athlete requires privation as well as the vigorous exercises of the gymnasium or the field, and, as in the preparations of the athlete, those of the ascetic had a two-fold character, negative and positive, one of renunciation and one of painful and unremitting labor. To the Christian mind Asceticism meant the training by which the things of the flesh could be made a sure means of attaining the things of the spirit. This view is based on the principle that man has a dual nature, animal and rational, and that he has a spiritual destiny. As an animal, his primary needs and instincts are concerned with food, drink, clothing, shelter, repose and sex, and as a rational being in an environment of civilization, he has capabilities which find expression in social, political or business activities, in the pleasures afforded by intellectual occupations, in the pursuit of success and happiness, in love, friendship, comfort, travel and the enjoyment of art under its various forms, music, literature, the drama, poetry, in sports and amusements. The question for all men, not indeed for those alone who believe in God, but preëminently for those who hope for a future life, is how are those needs of nature to be satisfied, and those capabilities to be brought into play with the purpose of gaining what each believes to be the supreme object of existence. For the Christian the question was settled by the law of the gospel. But the law required merely the minimum, anything less was sin. Over and above what was enjoined as necessary there was a wide field for the exercise of individual preference, in which the use of one's faculties and powers, animal and rational, might be made to yield more and more of spiritual profit, a field extending from the bare requirements of the law up to the highest expression of spiritual life on earth, the ecstatic rapture of the Saint.

This is the field to which the evangelical counsels were made to apply, and the observance of these counsels of perfection con-

astisches Thun (Tugend-Gymastik) bezeichnen, gehört zu den Gemeinsamkeiten des klassischen Altertums und des Urchristentums. Zöckler, *Askese und Mönchtum*, p. 2.

stituted in the main the ascetic life in its greater or less degrees of perfection.

Asceticism is therefore as inseparably connected with religion as prayer or sacrifice; in fact, it cannot be separated from human life wherever serious attempts are made to raise life or conduct to a higher level of perfection.¹³

Starting then with law as the basis of conduct all Christians are bound to observe the same standard up to a certain point.¹⁴ The counsels of perfection, or the principles of asceticism on their negative side, are concerned with curbing the purely natural desires and instincts in order to give the spiritual freer play. Primarily they deal with the animal instincts and necessities and lead to renunciation of things which in themselves are perfectly legitimate, with the purpose of reducing the domination of animal and sense life so that the higher faculties and powers may be turned into channels advantageous to salvation. In modern biology organic life is regarded as being perfect in

¹³ Professor James knew an agnostic, whom he classed as an ascetic and whom he quotes as follows: Often at night in my warm bed I would feel ashamed to depend so much on the warmth, and whenever the thought would come over me I would have to get up, no matter what time of night it was and stand for a minute in the cold, just so as to prove my manhood. *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 300.

¹⁴ *Consilium proprie dictum est regula moralis hominibus generatim commendata ad perfectius vivendum ad finem ultimum plenius et expeditius consequendum.* In hoc igitur convenit consilium cum lege, quod sit regula ad finem ultimum; differt autem a lege consilium: (a) quia lex est regula *imposita* et obligatoria, consilium autem regula *commendata* et libera; ut enim loquitur S. Augustinus, quae legis sunt exiguntur, quae consilii offeruntur: "in illis Dominus debitum imperat vobis; in his autem si quid amplius supererogaveritis, in redeundo reddat vobis;" (b) quia lex est regula *imposita omnibus et singulis*, consilium regula quidem *generatim commendata*, non tamen singulis: (c) quia lex est de actu *bono*, consilium vero de actu *meliori*, qui nempe actui opposito, seu alii sibi impossibili, praestet, per hoc tamen non significatur observationem consilii semper excellentiorem esse adimplentione legis sive in diversa materia, sive etiam in eadem; (d) quia lex est de *necessariis*, consilium de *convenientibus*; advertatur tamen, illud quod communiter est conveniens, quibusdam, ratione circumstantiarum, fieri posse in particulari vel minus bonum, vel e contra necessarium; (e) quia lex dirigit ad *finem simpliciter*, et ejus transgressio a fine consequendo impedit, consilium dirigit ad finem *melius et expeditius* consequendum. Bouquillon, *Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis*, p. 241 seq.

proportion to the extent of its correspondence with its environment. In asceticism the seeker for perfection tries to free himself from subjection to his physical environment by restraining as far as possible the instincts of his animal nature and the tyranny of sense. Thus on the side of renunciation Asceticism in its most widely diffused form concerns itself with the physical necessities of life, with food, drink, clothing, shelter and rest, as far as is compatible with the Christian conception of the sacredness of life and as far as circumstances will permit. Next in order is the curbing of the sex instinct, through continence, voluntary chastity and virginity. Because the demands of sex are not so imperative as those of subsistence this form of asceticism is not so widespread nor so generally inculcated. In addition to these merely negative acts of fasting, abstinence and continence other measures are resorted to to bring the flesh into subjection, such as scourging, the wearing of chains or hair shirts, uncomfortable postures, deprivation of sleep and, in some extreme cases condemned by the Church, even self-mutilation. Joined with these are abstinence from the pleasures of the world, from society, striving for honors and emoluments and even withdrawal from social life as a means to a fuller realization of the life of the soul; for the counsels of perfection can be applied to everything covered by positive law under the aspect of duration, mode, quantity, etc.

On its positive side Asceticism aims at turning the nobler faculties and capabilities of men to the highest account in attaining the supreme goal of life, to make such use of all that nature offers that the soul will be aided, not impeded, in its quest of the highest good. This form of Asceticism finds its fullest expression in prayer, meditation and contemplation of heavenly things and in the raptures of the mystic. A mistaken idea of asceticism is that the life of contemplation is necessarily one of complete isolation. Except in rare cases, and then only after years of striving, the most earnest ascetics made use of certain aids to enable them to attain the highest degree of disembodiment or rapture. It is true they were totally absorbed in spiritual things, as the philosopher or scientist might be in mundane matters, to the exclusion of all interest in their sur-

roundings, but they found a bond with their physical environment in the Sacred Books, in pious conversation and in works of mercy.

From this it can be seen that there are many kinds and many degrees of the ascetical life, and that it is a mistake to regard asceticism as merely renunciation. It is much more, as is clear from the fact that when it is organized, when asceticism takes on its social character as monasticism, the positive practices of perfection receive even greater weight than the negative. But though the evangelical counsels are not imperative, they are recommended to all, if not to each, and consequently the Christian body contains numbers of earnest souls to whom they have appealed, and all these, though not in the same degree, are ascetics, varying in their abstinence and their endeavors from those whose struggles barely keep them within the law up to those who have succeeded in emancipating themselves from sense domination. The course followed by all is the same vigilance and struggle, and it is because of the negative in asceticism, but more because of what is positive, that life and civilization are moulded until they become truly Christian.

That this is the natural course and result will be clear from a little reflection. The law requires merely a minimum. Violation of it is sin. But progress is never satisfied with a minimum. Its aim is perfection, and in the evangelical counsels is to be found the field for the exercise of personal initiative. While some few emancipate themselves from dependence on physical nature to a greater or less degree, the great mass of mankind are not expected to do so except in a limited manner. Each, however, in his own sphere and according to his abilities must struggle to remove the hindrances to salvation, and to make of the world and of society the kingdom of God on earth, to see that everything in human relations is permeated with the spirit of Christ, and thus to transform whatever may have been a hindrance into an aid to salvation. Thus earnestly pursuing this object the Christians, when political conditions changed and when they were free to lead their lives as they saw fit, accepted what in the days of persecution they had rejected, and from the desire to make of their earthly environment a pre-

lude to a heavenly destiny, art, society, politics, pleasures were all transfused with a new spirit.

Admitting, then, that the ascetical life was considered to be the highest type of Christian perfection in the primitive church, the question arises, how far did the Christians, because they entertained such views, deserve to be characterized as unsocial world-fugitives and useless members of society, and to what extent did the prevalence of such opinions make of Christianity an organization destructive of the ordinary business of life. The examination of this question is more than ordinarily pertinent at the present time in view of the teaching of Tolstoy and so many others in Russia who advocate this unsocial and inactive type of Christianity. Over and above this, in order to remove a serious reproach from the early Church it is of interest to know whether a Christian of those days could conscientiously take part in the business, the pleasures and ordinary pursuits of life, or was he condemned because of his religion to a career of sullen aloofness from his fellow-men and their interests.

On the assumption that asceticism in its relation to conduct differs from law not in extent, but in intensity, it becomes manifest that the gauge of Christian influence must be found in the latter, not in the former; for except in very few instances ascetical practices were not made obligatory on all the faithful. These were, on the negative side Fasting, and on the positive side rules connected with the Liturgy and Ritual. Thus fasting on certain days in the week and regular attendance at the divine offices and frequentation of the sacraments comprised practically everything of an ascetical character that was distinctive of the Christian community as a whole. These few observances cannot be considered sufficiently engrossing to have cut off the Christians from the great mass of their fellow-citizens. There were, it is true, many among the Christians who led lives of greater austerity, in fact, it is reasonable to suppose that most of the faithful did strive in some way to attain evangelical perfection; but the number of those who deserved to be considered ascetics in the strict sense of the word—men or women whose whole lives were spent in good works—was, compared to the entire body of Christians, never large, and even from the

most violent opponents of the ascetical life the example and deeds of these men and women when examined in detail receive, generally speaking, approval, not condemnation.

In all the other affairs of life the Christians were free to conduct themselves as they saw fit, provided they observed the law and kept themselves free from the contagion of error and vice. As they had no desire to segregate themselves, because they were in the world to win it, the matter of adjusting themselves to their environment was one of no small difficulty. The entire social structure was so thoroughly interpenetrated with the spirit and customs of paganism, and was based on such a low estimate of life and such a coarse conception of morality that the Christian might find himself at any moment unwittingly participating in rites or sharing in usages contrary to the spirit of his religion. As long as the Church was composed mainly of persons drawn from the lower walks of life, there was no great danger to morality from contact with luxury or from excessive indulgence in enervating dissipations. The number of converts, however, from all classes was so enormous during the comparative peace under the Antonines up to the reign of Marcus Aurelius, that the old distinction between pagan and Christian seemed to be in danger of being lost sight of. Hence after that time we find the Christian moralists outlining in detail the Christian ideal of private and public morality, of family life and personal conduct. In no case do they counsel the Christians to withdraw from intercourse with their neighbors, or to eschew legitimate pleasures. Any prohibitions which they made in their eyes arose from the special circumstances of the time, and because the tone of life and the recognized conventionalities offered a real menace to Christian faith and morality. Even such rigorists as Hermas¹⁵ and Origen¹⁶ do not discountenance intercourse

¹⁵ "Those who have never searched for the truth, nor investigated the nature of the Divinity, but have simply believed, when they devote themselves to and become mixed up with business, and wealth and heathen friendships and many other actions of this world do not perceive the parables of Divinity." *Pastor, Mandatum*, x, 1.

¹⁶ "But indeed they do, in a sense, separate themselves and stand aloof from those who are aliens from the commonwealth of God and strangers to His covenants in order that they may live as citizens of heaven." *Contra Celsum*, viii, 5.

with pagans and participation in the affairs of daily life except when these are a menace to right living. The fine line of distinction between what was right and what was wrong is nowhere better drawn than by Tertullian who will not have it that the Christians are unsocial. "But although he (St. Paul) does not prohibit us from having our conversation with idolators and adulterers and the other criminals saying 'otherwise ye would go out of the world,' of course, he does not so slacken those reins of conversation, that since it is necessary for us both to live and to mingle with sinners, we may be able to sin with them too. Where there is the intercourse of life which the Apostle concedes, there is sinning, which no one permits. To live with heathens is lawful, to die with them is not. Let us live with all; let us be glad with them out of community of nature, not of superstition. We are peers in soul, not in discipline; fellow-possessors of the world, not of error." ¹⁷

No writer among the early Christians had a more lively horror of idolatry than did Tertullian; yet he is so far from considering that Christian duty required abstention from all social communication that at times he seems to be willing to stretch a point for the sake of friendship. There were festivities of various kinds such as the conferring of the white toga, espousals, nuptials, name-givings "with which the breath of idolatry was mixed," at which to his mind it was perfectly legitimate for Christians to be present. He bases his opinion on the fact that the causes of these festal gatherings are clean because the manly garb and the marital ring or union did not originate in heathen worship, and God prohibits neither nuptials nor name-giving. "Let me be invited," he says, "and let not the title of the ceremony be 'assistant at a sacrifice' and the discharge of my good offices is at the service of my friends. . . . But since the evil one has so surrounded the world with idolatry, it will be lawful for us to be present at some ceremonies which see us doing service to a man, not an idol." ¹⁸ The same liberality of spirit was not shown by Tertullian in his views regarding marriages

¹⁷ *De Idololatria*, XIV.

¹⁸ *De Idololatria*, XVI.

between Christians and pagans. He, as did others of his time, strove earnestly to prevent as far as possible,¹⁹ such unions because of the dangers to faith and to domestic peace and happiness which they so frequently led to; but his own writings nevertheless show that such marriages frequently took place,²⁰ and yet neither he nor anyone else ever thought of urging the Christian spouse to sue for divorce.

Thus while the Christians "did not wish to abolish social intercourse,"²¹ nor to give up their gentile friendships,²² except for conscience sake, it was abundantly clear to them that, on grounds other than those of scrupulous adherence to religious requirements, it was impossible to mingle freely with the pagans as friends. The Christian and pagan conception of life were too far apart not to cause a profound difference even in matters of etiquette. The elevated views and finer feelings of the Christians showed themselves in a profound esteem of the amenities of life, so that they were constantly offended by the coarse materialism, the bad manners and the utter lack of decorum shown by their heathen associates. Clement of Alexandria gives a picture of heathen society in the third century which shows that manners have not improved since Petronius wrote his "Banquet of Trimalchio." Both depict the same vulgar ostentation, gross sensuality, ribaldry, uncouthness and excesses. The prevailing customs and fashions find in Clement an observing but unsparing critic and if he goes into detail in describing the fashions and orgies which came under his notice he does so with the purpose of pointing out how the Christian should comport himself, and how close the relationship is between manners and morals. And yet bad as was the general tone of private and social life there is no hint in the works of Clement or any other writer of the time that the Christians should abandon society or social relations as being incompatible with the demands of their faith.

¹⁹ The legislation of Callistus was made necessary because of the impossibility which some wealthy Christian matrons experienced in finding suitable husbands in their own class.

²⁰ *Ad Uxorem*, II, 2.

²¹ Clement of Alexandria. *Paedagogus*, II, 1.

²² Tertullian, *De Cultu Feminarum*, II, XI.

Infidelity and vice were rampant everywhere and had to be guarded against. The care and minuteness, however, with which rules regarding deportment and good manners are laid down, prove that unsociability was not considered to be a refuge against these dangers and that the Christians played a prominent part in the ordinary life of the time. Clement of Alexandria discusses all the various phases of private and social life, clothes, personal adornment, dining, conversation, etc., and shows how thoroughly he realized the importance of taste and good manners and thus of social intercourse.

The luxury and extravagance of the wealthy classes in the Roman Empire in matters of food and drink had not escaped the scorn of the pagan moralists and satirists, and it is not surprising to find Clement admonishing his readers "that there is discrimination to be employed in reference to food."²³ The eagerness which people exhibited in procuring for themselves lampreys from the Straits of Sicily, eels of the Mæander, mullets of Sciathus, oysters from Abydos, turbot from Attica, Egyptian snipes and Median pea fowl, etc., and "absolutely sweeping the world with a drag-net to gratify their luxurious tastes" was nothing but a disease. The Christians should look on such luxury as irrational, futile and not human, and should not "bury all the good of existence here in a life that by and by will end." They were not on the contrary "to abstain wholly from various kinds of food, but not to be entirely absorbed by them." "Food should be simple and plain—ministering to life, not luxury—and conducive to health and strength." Christians might partake of what was set before them out of respect to him who invited them, but they should avoid slavish habits and excess, and take what was offered to them in a decorous way, "keeping the hand and couch and chin free from stains."²⁴

In regard to wine-drinking, while those who adopted an austere life and drink water, the medicine of temperance, are to be admired, it is proper at times to take wine by way of physic, and even for purposes of relaxation and enjoyment. "For wine

²³ *Paedagogus*, II, I.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

makes the man who has drunk it more benignant than before, more agreeable to his boon companions, kinder to his domestics, and more pleasant to his friends." "The miserable wretches who 'expel temperance from conviviality,' and who think excess in drinking to be the happiest life, should be a warning to Christians lest they should fall into such excesses and become a laughing-stock to others. Temperance should be the rule. It was advisable to avoid imported wines, not to drink many kinds of wine" for one suffices to the temperate drinker, and it was advisable to mix wine with water.²⁵ Especial regard should be paid to decency in drinking. There should be no contortions of the face, nor greedy grasping of the cup, nor unseemly motion of the eyes. Nor should they besprinkle the chin nor splash the garments while gulping down all the liquor at once "the face all but filling the bowl and being drowned in it."²⁶


The general rule in regard to food, clothes and vessels and everything else belonging to the house was that they should be serviceable, and suitable to one's person, age, pursuits and time of life. "Costly house-furnishings and gold and silver plate were unenviable possessions, being difficult to keep and not adapted for use. Hence vessels of chased glass, so fragile that one feared to drink from them, and silver couches, and pans, and vinegar-saucers, and trenchers and bowls; and besides these, vessels of silver and gold, some for serving food, of easily cleft cedar and thyine wood, and ebony, and tripods fashioned of ivory, and couches with silver feet and inlaid with ivory, and folding-doors of beds studded with gold and variegated with tortoise-shell, and bed clothes of purple and other colors difficult to produce, proofs of tasteless luxury, cunning devices of envy and effeminacy, are all to be relinquished as having nothing worthy of our pains."²⁷

Attendance at banquets was perfectly legitimate; but there should be no burlesque singing, no choirs and dances and Egyptian clapping of the hands and such disorderly frivolities. Every improper sight and sound should be excluded. They

²⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 2.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Chap. III

²⁶ *Ibid.*



should be on their guard against whatever titillates eye and ear and effeminates, especially the music of the pipe and flute which should be left to shepherds and those engrossed in idolatry. The banquet, however, was not to be dull or lifeless, for temperate harmonies were allowable, "liquid" harmonies, however, which through pernicious arts in the modulations of tones train to effeminacy, were to be banished from the robust life of the Christian.²⁸ The subject of laughter was also worthy of consideration, but men should not laugh on all occasions because they are laughing animals, any more than the horse neighs on all occasions because he is a neighing animal. Because laughter was perfectly natural it should not be eradicated but it should have its limits and should be indulged in only at suitable times. People should not laugh perpetually, for that is going beyond bounds, nor in the presence of elderly persons or others worthy of respect unless they indulge in pleasantry for our amusement. Pleasantry is allowable not waggery, for men are entitled to release the over-tension of their serious pursuits, and one need not be gloomy, only grave, "for laughter when given vent to in the right manner indicates orderliness, but when it issues differently it shows a lack of restraint."²⁹

On some subjects the Christians should take a very decided stand, they should guard themselves against hearing or seeing what was obscene, and from filthy speaking they should entirely abstain "and stop the mouth of those who practise it by stern looks and averting the face, and by what is called making a mock of one, and often also by a harsher mode of speech." Prudery and pruriency were also objectionable and people should not hesitate to use the words knee and leg "for such members and the activity put forth by them are not obscene."³⁰

Dignity and decorum should be observed in all social gatherings. There should be no jibing and witticisms at the expense of others, no unseemly postures, people should help themselves sparingly and eat moderately; but the conversation might be lively, and joking of the proper kind was perfectly allowable; "as for instance before a bashful and silent youth one might

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Chap. IV.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, VI.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

by way of pleasantry speak thus: This son of mine (the silent one) is perpetually speaking."³¹

Though the use of unguents was permissible as a means to alleviate pain, anointing the body with perfumed ointment, and the use of perfumes by men or women was an evidence of sensuality utterly unbecoming in a Christian who should "give forth the odor not of ointments, but of goodness."³²

The gradual abolition of sumptuary regulations in the time of the Empire shows what a heavy toll Rome had paid for her conquests in thus being led to exchange the *Mores Patrum* for the luxury of the Orient. The protests of the Stoic moralists and the Satirists could not check the innovation nor restore the dignity and simplicity which had characterized the life of the Romans in times gone by. It is not surprising that the softer manners, which had received the sanction of law, should have aroused the ire of the Christians and that they should have striven to save the people from the effeminacy into which they had fallen. "What ought to be said," says Clement, "of love of ornament, and dyeing of wool, and variety of colors, and fastidiousness about gems, and exquisite working of gold, and still more, of artificial hair and wreathed curls; and furthermore, of staining the eyes, and plucking out hairs and painting with rouge and white lead, and dyeing of the hair, and the wicked arts that are employed in such deceptions."³³

To oppose such vanities is not in itself an evidence of unsociability or misanthropy. Such foibles find few defenders.

In regard to the clothing of men, Clement advises that it should show no trace of effeminacy, nor should it be cut in an extravagant style, but should be simple, of white color, clean, and substantial and "suited to age, person, figure, nature, pursuits."³⁴ The clothing of women should be like that of men, though perhaps of softer material, but not foolishly thin or of curious texture; "for these superfluous and diaphanous materials are the proof of a weak mind, covering as they do the shame of the body with a slender veil."³⁵ Except when on a

³¹ *Ibid.*, Chap. VII.

³² *Paedagogus*, II, 11.

³³ *Ibid.*, II, 11.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Chap. VIII.

³⁵ *Paedagogus*, III, 11.

journey men should not wear shoes "for to go with bare feet is most suitable for exercise, and best adapted for health and ease;" women, however for protection and for the sake of modesty should wear white shoes.³⁶ Men were permitted to wear a seal-ring on the little finger, and the device should be honorable, a dove, or a fish or a ship scudding before the wind, or a musical lyre or a ship's anchor³⁷—women should neither wear rings nor golden necklaces nor collars nor anklets nor should they allow their ears to be pierced³⁸ Men should wear their hair short unless it be curly, and they should not be seen with twisted locks resembling womanish ringlets. The beard should be unshaved, but the moustache, for the sake of cleanliness, "should be cut round, not by the razor, for that is not well-bred, but by a pair of cropping scissors." Women should "bind up their hair simply along the neck with a plain hair pin." There should be no meretricious plaiting of the hair, nor putting it up in tresses, and "additions of other people's hair are entirely to be rejected, as it is a most sacrilegious thing for spurious hair to shade the head, covering the skull with dead locks." Neither is the hair to be dyed nor grey hair to have its color changed, for "old age which conciliates trust is not to be concealed."³⁹

All the vices of the fashionable life of the period are passed in review by Clement. He speaks of the women who pass the days shut up in their rooms, curling their locks, anointing their cheeks, painting their eyes, dyeing their hair and practising the other pernicious arts of luxury, and in the evening creeping out by candle-light as out of a hole, "for drunkenness and the dimness of the light aid what they have put on;" of men who followed the same frivolous pursuits, effeminate creatures, in fine and transparent clothes, chewing mastich and smelling of perfume.⁴⁰ To give point to these denunciations there were some Christians who were falling into the fashionable vices of the time, and who as Cyprian said, lapsed because "a long

³⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 12.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 13; III, 11.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, III, 2.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, III, 1.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, III, 11.

peace had corrupted discipline." In Carthage, as in Alexandria, men defaced their beards, women dyed their complexions, falsified their eyes from what God had made them, and stained their hair with a falsehood.⁴¹

In opposition to the feverish desire for pleasure and excitement the life of the Christian should be characterized by composure, tranquillity, calmness and peace.⁴² "It is not enough for the chaste to be pure, they must give all diligence, to be beyond the range of censure, so that they may not only be faithful, but appear worthy of trust."⁴³

In words which recall Cæsar's policy of defence by aggression, Clement warns his coreligionists that mere adherence to the law was not sufficient "for those that do all that is lawful, quickly fall into doing what is unlawful."⁴⁴

To instil earnestness into the lives of people wholly addicted to pleasure, to teach them to acquire high purposes and to cast off vice and frivolity was a task requiring zeal and courage in the decadent days of the Roman Empire. But as the sword hung constantly over their heads, renunciation of pleasure was a good preparation for the sacrifice of life itself which they might at any moment be called upon to make. For, said Tertullian: "Pleasures must be discarded whose softness may weaken the courage of faith. I know not whether the wrist accustomed to the palm-leaf-like bracelet will endure the hardness of the chain; I know not whether the leg that has rejoiced in the anklet will suffer itself to be squeezed into the gyve. I fear the neck beset with pearl and emerald nooses will give no room to the broad sword. Wherefore let us meditate on hardships and we shall not feel them. Let us abandon luxuries and we shall not regret them. . . . But Christians always and now more than ever; pass their time not in gold, but in iron; the stoles of martyrdom are preparing. . . . Do you go forth arrayed in the cosmetics and ornaments of prophets and apostles; drawing your whiteness from your simplicity, your ruddy hue from modesty; painting your eyes with bashfulness, and your

⁴¹ *De Lapsis*, 5 and 6.

⁴² *Ibid.*, III, 11.

⁴³ *Paedagogus*, II, 7.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 1.

mouth with silence; implanting in your ears the words of God, fitting on your necks the yoke of Christ." ⁴⁵ To abandon the ever-inviting follies of fashionable life is neither anti-social nor destructive of social life. Christian women willingly did so, and Christian apologists compared their simple, chaste and natural lives with the vain, immodest and restless lives of the pagans as one of the indubitable triumphs of the Christian faith. "This Sappho of yours," says Tatian, comparing the pagan and Christian estimate of women, "is a lewd, love-sick female and sings her own wantonness; but all our women are chaste, and the maidens at their distaffs sing of divine things more nobly than that damsel of yours. Wherefore be ashamed, you who are professed disciples of women, yet scoff at those of the sex who hold our doctrine, as well as at the solemn assemblies they frequent." ⁴⁶

One feature of ancient life in which the distinction between heathens and Christians was absolutely drawn, was that connected with pagan festivals and public amusements. To abstain from these meant withdrawal from practically everything of a public social character in the Roman Empire. For the Christians there was no middle way. The calendar was crowded with the feast days of the various deities, processions were held in their honor, solemn banquets and public sacrifices were of frequent occurrence, and against any participation in such worship or such rites the Christians were absolutely barred. "You do not visit exhibitions," says the heathen Cæcilius, "you have no concern in public displays; you reject the public banquets and abhor the sacred contests." ⁴⁷ To have cut themselves off from pleasures and to have incurred the censure and hatred of their neighbors, was a sacrifice for conscience sake, which can hardly be classed as anti-social. ⁴⁸

Much more remarkable was the refusal of the early Christians to indulge in the various forms of amusement offered in the Theatre, the Stadium, the Amphitheatre or the Circus. In

⁴⁵ *De Cultu Feminarum*, II, 13.

⁴⁶ *Address to the Greeks*, XXIII.

⁴⁷ Minucius Felix, *Octavius*, XII.

⁴⁸ Tertullian, *De Idololatria*, *passim*.

these the passion of the people for new forms of excitement found constant satisfaction. In this regard every city in the Empire was a Rome in replica. It may be that some elements of pagan worship were connected with these shows;⁴⁹ but they were not always obvious, and it required strength and resolution not to be led by the impulses which draw men to follow crowds. In Rome the Circus or the Colosseum was large enough to accommodate all or nearly all the adult freemen. Thither the people flocked in droves. There were to be seen spectacles horrible but alluring. Frequently must the reluctant Christians have heard the arguments of pagan friends who tried to prove that there was nothing derogatory to worship in enjoyment. "God is the God of all alike," says Celsus. "He is good. He stands in need of nothing, and He is without jealousy. What then, is there to hinder those who are most devoted to His service from taking part in public feasts?"⁵⁰

Notwithstanding all these influences, the Christians, with an unerring instinct of what their faith meant to humanity, incurred the reproaches and the enmity of their pagan neighbors and isolated themselves. "We are forbidden," says Theophilus, "so much as to witness shows of gladiators, lest we become partakers and abettors of murders. But neither may we see the other spectacles, lest our eyes and ears be defiled, participating in the utterances there sung."⁵¹ "You slaughter animals for the purpose of eating their flesh," says Tatian, "and you supply a cannibal banquet for your souls."⁵² The delicate sensibility regarding the sacredness of life made the Christians feel "that

⁴⁹ Minucius Felix, *Octavius*, xxxviii. Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus*, II.

⁵⁰ Origen, *Contra Celsum*, viiii, 21. Tertullian thought it necessary to write a special treatise to combat such arguments. "Perhaps some among you are allured by the views of the heathens, who in this matter are wont to press us with arguments such as these: (1) That the exquisite enjoyments of ear and eye we have in things external are not in the least opposed to religion in the mind and conscience; and (2) that surely no offence is offered to God, in any human enjoyment, by way of our pleasures which it is not sinful to partake of in its own time and place with all our honor and reverence secured to Him." *De Spectaculis*, Chap. I.

⁵¹ *Ad Autolycum*, III, 15.

⁵² *Address to the Greeks*, xv.

to see a man put to death was much the same as killing him." ⁵³

With equal regard for the necessity of keeping free from the contamination of paganism, and preserving the purity of their morals, the Christians discountenanced games of chance ⁵⁴ and the enervating luxury of the private and public baths. The great Thermæ had become nurseries of immodesty and vice. While their purpose and usefulness were not questioned, the undoubted influence for evil which they exercised caused the Christians to avoid them. ⁵⁵ "I do not," says Tertullian, "at the Saturnalia bathe myself at dawn that I may not lose both day and night; yet I bathe at a decent and healthful hour, which preserves me both in heat and blood." Many of the prohibitions which are laid down in this matter can be understood only with reference to prevailing abuses, to cases where persons used the baths as often as seven times a day, to the presence of male attendants in the baths for women, ⁵⁶ and to the evils of mixed bathing where men and women used the same establishment. ⁵⁷

Thus to have trained the world to more serious pursuits than those of social scrambling, personal adornment and participation in brutal and immoral spectacles, and to have elevated the human mind above the pleasures of animal-baiting and gladiatorial contests, even at the cost of shutting themselves off from the life around them, may justly be regarded as a praise-worthy achievement of the early Christians. "It was one of the most important services of Christianity, that besides quickening greatly our benevolent affections, it definitely and dogmatically asserted the sinfulness of all destruction of human life as a matter of amusement, or of simple convenience, and thereby formed a new standard higher than any which then existed in the world." ⁵⁸

⁵³ Athenagoras, *Legatio*, xxxv.

⁵⁴ Even the civil authorities were compelled at times to take steps to check the evils of dicing (*Adv. Aleatores*, vi). In addition to the moral evils connected with this form of gambling, there were frequent invocations of pagan deities which repelled the Christians. *Adv. Aleatores*, vii.

⁵⁵ *Apology*, xlii.

⁵⁶ Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogus*, iii, 5.

⁵⁷ Cyprian, *De Habitu Virginum*, xix, 10 seq.

⁵⁸ Lecky, *History of European Morals*, Vol. II, p. 19.

The uniform policy, therefore, pursued by the Christians towards private as well as corporate and social activities was to elevate the tone of life by freeing it from the influences of polytheism and corruption. This was nowhere more clearly shown than in the sphere of industrial and commercial activities. No problem which arose in the early church required more careful handling than that connected with labor and business. The first difficulty arose from the fact that all manual labor was looked on with contempt. "The mechanic's occupation," said Cicero, "is degrading. A work-shop is incompatible with anything noble."⁵⁹ Productive occupations were very largely carried on by slaves who had displaced the free middle-class, and artizan and slave were considered to occupy about the same place in the social scale. How deep this contempt for workers was is luminously exhibited in the attacks made on the Church by pagan philosophers, who could find no stronger term for their contempt of Christianity than that it was the religion of "workers in wool and leather and fullers and persons of the most uninstructed and rustic character."⁶⁰ In the second place business and industry in form and method lay under the prevailing incubus of polytheism and materialism. The cultus of paganism absorbed the activities of many trades and callings and practically the entire field of art, while trade and commerce were carried on solely with a view to profit and were characterized by lying, fraud, and misrepresentation.

Not only did the Christians from the beginning assert the nobility and necessity of labor,⁶¹ but they gave practical evidence of their convictions by admitting not only artizans, but slaves to full membership in the Church.

"Among us," says Athenagoras, "you will find uneducated persons and artizans, who, if they are unable to prove in words the benefit of our doctrine, yet by their deeds, exhibit the benefit arising from their persuasion of its truth."⁶² Many callings

⁵⁹ *De Officiis*, I, 42.

⁶⁰ Origen, *Contra Celsum*, III, 55.

⁶¹ "For the Lord our God hates the slothful. For no one of those who worship God ought to be idle." *Apostolic Constitutions*, IV, 2.

⁶² *Legatio*, XI.

were by their very nature closed to Christians, but by abandoning them, they did nothing subversive of ordinary industrial activity. "I will confess, however, without hesitation," says Tertullian, "that there are some who in a sense may complain of Christians that they are a sterile race; as for instance, pimps and panders, and bath suppliers; assassins and poisoners and sorcerers; soothsayers, too, diviners and astrologers. But it is a noble fruit of Christians, that they have no fruits for such as these."⁶³

In all the other fields of business activity, except those connected with Idolatry⁶⁴ or immoral in themselves, the Christians took the ground that such activities were legitimate. Even the clergy were counselled to gain a livelihood for themselves by work,⁶⁵ with the understanding, of course, as is clear from the reproaches of Cyprian to his suffragans,⁶⁶ that such activities should not be prejudicial to the obligations of their calling. Not only were the Christians urged to engage in productive occupations, but to aid others in finding work.⁶⁷ It was necessary for them furthermore to practice righteousness in business to avoid its temptations, covetousness and mendacity.⁶⁸ They were never to be guilty of misrepresentation or deceit,⁶⁹ and they should have fixed prices. "Let not him who sells or buys aught name two prices for what he sells or buys," says Clement of Alexandria, "but stating the net price, and studying to speak the truth, if he get not his price, he gets the truth, and is rich in the possessions of rectitude." To give definite expression to their hatred of dishonesty in business they would accept no gifts from corrupt dealers.⁷⁰

⁶³ *Apology*, Chap. XLII.

⁶⁴ Tertullian, *De Idololatria*, *passim*.

⁶⁵ IV Con. Carthag. Can. 51 Clericus, quantumlibet verbo Dei eruditus, artificio victum quaerat. Can. 52. Clericus victum et vestimentum sibi artificio vel agricultura absque officii sui detrimento, parat. Can. 53. Omnes clerici. qui ad operandum validiores sunt, et artificiola et literas discant.

⁶⁶ *De lapsis*, VI.

⁶⁷ Cyprian, *Ep.* XI.

⁶⁸ Tertullian, *De Idololatria*, Chap. XI.

⁶⁹ Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, V, 18.

⁷⁰ *Apostolic Constitutions*, IV, 6.

Thus through their teaching and practice in industrial and commercial matters they laid the foundations of a new social regime by rehabilitating manual labor as an honorable calling and by insisting on the necessity of business honesty. From the wreck of a social system, reduced practically to the two classes of slave-owners and slaves, they showed how it was possible to construct a new order by fostering and defending the self-respecting middle-class. In view of the difficulties they had to contend with, it seems hardly just to refer to their influence as "social noxiousness" and to say they were "inimical to business activity."⁷¹

Hence a survey of the influence of Christianity as a social factor and of the views of the early Christians regarding personal and social conduct and the subject of amusements and pleasures gives no ground for the belief that they were anti-social or unduly introspective or that the Christian religion as they understood it was inimical to the legitimate activities called forth by the needs of society. The Christians set their faces against excesses in all departments of life, they inculcated strict morals and complete self-control. To attain these it was necessary to do more than merely to abstain from guilt in things unlawful. The spiritual heights which these early followers of Christ hoped to reach could only be attained through earnestness and discipline, through asceticism; and "the eternal truth of asceticism is that a man has to master himself, has to bring his being into subjection to the laws of health, and to the higher laws of holiness; that discipline is needed in every sphere; that the energies and appetites must be subdued and ruled."⁷²

Most persons will perhaps not object to the asceticism which shows itself in a well-regulated life free from vice and moderately directed to some intellectual or spiritual pre-eminence; but even the extreme cases of self-abnegation seen in the lives of anchorites and Stylites, and which by many writers are taken to represent the normal in ascetical effort, and which have

⁷¹ Brentano, *loc. cit.*, p. 162.

⁷² Hugh Black, *Culture and Restraint*, p. 164.

been made the object of criticism and condemnation, were not without justification. "When we think of the whole situation of men who were set to keep themselves unspotted from evil, we are not surprised to find ascetic exercises creeping in, due chiefly to the necessary protest against the terrible evils of pagan life."⁷³ It was necessary to give a world sunk in vice a striking object-lesson. If the dormant or perverted moral feelings were to be restored, heroic treatment was required. Beside, the times were times of sacrifice, faith hoped for its crown in martyrdom. Life was a *mora finis* and death the penalty of sin, why then not face the issue and meet the Terror itself. "The metaphysical mystery, recognized by common sense, that he who feeds on death that feeds on men possesses life supereminently and excellently, and meets best the secret demands of the universe, is the truth of which asceticism has been the faithful champion. The folly of the cross, so inexplicable by the intellect, has yet its indestructible vital meaning."⁷⁴ When the Romans wished to make a man expiate some crime against society they relegated him to an island and deprived him of fire and water, why should a Christian hesitate to undergo a like penalty for sin against God. He too might find a place of exile and deprive himself of creature comforts for the moral benefit of society.

Life was not held in such high esteem then as now. The pagans bartered it away for transitory pleasure; the Christian used it to gain eternal joy: both were reckless, the pagan in taking, the Christian in giving; one was dominated by egotism, the other by charity. The generosity and the charity of the Christian triumphed, and society at large was the gainer. Hence even the asceticism of the desert or the pillar was not fruitless: the courage there manifested was not lost. It found its fruition in the purer lives and more ardent faith of all who were moved by such heroism.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

⁷⁴ James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 364.

BOOK REVIEWS.

The First National Conference of Catholic Charities. Edited by The Executive Committee of the Conference. National Capital Press. Washington, D. C., 1910. Pp. 450. Price, \$2.00

In this Report of the Proceedings of the First National Conference of Catholic Charities, which has just come from the press, a distinct and welcome addition has been made to Catholic sociological literature. The Report deals with the matters which came before the National Conference of Catholic Charities, held at the Catholic University, Washington, D. C., during the month of September, 1910.

A glance at the table of contents will suffice to satisfy the reader that the Conference deserves to be called both national and general. Cities, states, and dioceses in every section of the country are represented in the reports submitted; topics touching upon practically every phase of the question of dependency are presented for discussion; while the men and women to whom the various papers were entrusted, are thoroughly representative of Catholic thought and experience along the line of charitable endeavor. The Report itself, is the story of Catholic achievement in the field of charity and, because in its pages will be found the answer to questions which, heretofore, many have asked but none have been able to answer, the volume will be sure to find a welcome.

The avowed purpose of the Conference was to determine upon the most practical methods of dealing with the various problems which present themselves to the charity worker. Still there is reflected in the papers and discussions a fixed determination to remain faithful to Catholic ideals and give due emphasis to the spiritual side of relief work. The sermon of Most Reverend Archbishop Blenk of New Orleans, on "The Spiritual Element of Charity," delivered at the opening Mass, and which appears upon the pages of the Report, is the keynote of the whole convention. The Catholic tradition of giving for the soul's sake, is not to be forgotten. Giving must not degenerate to the level of mere philanthropy.

It would be a mistake, however, to imagine that fidelity to Catholic ideals is set up as an obstacle in the way of progress. On the contrary, it is recognized that the wholesome and enduring enthusiasm which finds its inspiration in spiritual ideals may also find a most fitting outlet in the means and methods which make for real substantial progress.

That the Conference was animated by a truly progressive spirit, is evidenced by the nature and diversity of the problems discussed. The importance of preventive work, of organization, social action, method and study, received due emphasis; all the problems of modern life were taken up, and a general effort was made to constitute the experience of the past, as the teacher of the present. Turning over the pages of the Report, one finds reflected in the papers and discussions, along with the determination to abide by Catholic ideals, the determination also, to seize upon all that is best in modern methods and turn it to account. Hence we find papers upon such topics as these: The Purchase and Preparation of Food; Hygiene of the Home; Tuberculosis among the Poor; Probation Work; Social Settlements; Care of the Unemployed; Fresh Air Homes.

Aside from the Catholic and progressive spirit which characterized the sessions of the Congress, perhaps the feature which stands out most prominently is the amount of time and attention given to problems which center around the home. Faithful to the teachings of Catholic Philosophy, the Conference insisted that the unity of the family should be maintained whenever this is at all possible. Along with those already indicated which bear upon the home, we find papers upon such topics as, Legal Aid to the Poor; The Friendly Visitor; Temperance Work Among the Poor; and a general discussion concerning the dependent Family, in which men and women of wide experience took part. A thought brought out in the discussion of Hospital Dispensaries is particularly worthy of consideration. The writer urges that these Dispensaries be thrown open to a wider circle of clients, and made to embrace those who, while not dependent, are unable to secure the medical assistance which they or their families may need. Diseases and defects of children—weak eyes, bad teeth, adenoids—which are often neglected might thus receive proper treatment, and the wage-earners themselves, by a little timely assistance might be rendered better fitted to support themselves and their families.

The main discussions come under four general headings: 1. The

State in Relation to Charity. 2. The Church and Social Reform. 3. Dependency, and 4. Delinquency.

Concerning the relation of the State to Catholic Charities, it is a fact brought out in the city, state and diocesan reports submitted to the Conference, that the general attitude of public officials toward Catholic Charities is that of absolute fairness.

Perhaps the progressive spirit of the Conference nowhere shows itself more plainly than in the papers and discussions which have to do with "The Church and Social Reform." The unanimous opinion of the speakers and writers seem to be that the Catholic social worker should be in the front ranks of every movement which aims at the rational relief or prevention of poverty.

In the matter of Delinquency, another wide range of problems receive attention. Temperance Work Among the Poor, Prison Visiting, Loss of Faith Among the Poor, are among the subjects of papers and discussions, while particular emphasis is laid upon the tremendous possibilities of the Juvenile Court.

Among the problems bearing upon particular classes of dependents, the problems of the child are considered of primary importance. Juvenile Probation; The Placing Out of Children; The Big Brother; Fresh Air Homes; The Institutional Care of Children; all these are discussed with an earnestness indicating a deep and sincere solicitude for the welfare of those whose characters are in the making. The home is advocated for the child wherever practicable. The problem of "The Protection of Young Girls in Modern Cities" is also presented for consideration, and the Report offers the welcome announcement, that permanent committees have already been formed in many of our large cities for the purpose of offering protection, advice, and assistance where there is need for them.

On the whole, the Report reflects, as no previous work has done, the general trend of Catholic thought concerning the problems of Dependency and Delinquency.

Some statistical information is given concerning general conditions, but the figures are necessarily far from complete. None realize more fully than those who are back of the project that the work is only begun. Still a most encouraging beginning has been made and we shall not have turned over many pages of this Report before we realize that the right beginning has been made, and in the right way. Those who seek the inspiration that comes

from example, and those who are looking for a most satisfying if not exhaustive treatment of the general problem of charity from a Catholic standpoint will do well to look between the covers of this volume.

M. F. McEvoy.

A Medieval Garner. Human Documents from the Four Centuries preceding the Reformation. Selected, translated and annotated by G. G. Coulton, M. A., with 46 illustrations. 80. Constable and Company, Ltd., London, 1910. Pp. xvi + 727.

The learned author tells us that these records represent thirty years' study among all kinds of medieval writings, and we can well believe so, as he has certainly searched with an antiquarian's patience through a huge mass of medieval documents and thrown together some three hundred and thirty-one first-hand excerpts from the same.

But really, allowing all due credit to his patience and sincerity, one cannot help asking oneself of what real use is such a book. After all, it is just another of those dreadful books of anecdotes which, even when true, have about as much relation to history as a bizarre collection of antiques in a newly-rich man's parlor to the latter's knowledge or love of archæology. Those who flatter themselves that they do know something of medieval history are not likely to do more than idly turn over the pages, reading here and there some of the many amusing and curious incidents. For real history one would go to a work that has some order or coherence, not to such a higgledy-piggledy jumble of oddities as this is.

As for the unlearned reader, this work will do him positive harm. For, surely, such a reader can only gather from its pages that medieval peoples must have been the most grotesque race that ever laid claim to being civilized. The author says he collected incidents "specially characteristic" of the period and then adds most innocently that "in the middle ages, as now, the *evil* generally lent itself best to picturesque description." Herein lies the hopelessly incurable defect of the book. It does not, and can never, leave in the average reader's mind any impression of these past peoples except what will be grotesque. Were there a running commentary, or were the incidents grouped according to subjects

or selected with due regard to the good and noble and sane as well as to the evil and silly—it might be a fairly correct picture of medieval peoples according to first-hand documents. But, as it is, it is a misleading caricature. You could as well teach botany by dumping a load of hay on a man, as teach medieval history by this undigested archaic lore.

Suppose, by way of comparative illustration, a future thirtieth century historian wished to give his readers a chance “to get at the real” America of 1911. If he followed the present author’s method, I can well imagine him huddling together a lot of facts somewhat like the following: “I. A United States Senator in *deshabille*. II. A motorman with a glass eye. III. The Jew and the Reservoir. IV. The Policeman’s cat,” and so on. Undoubtedly true; perhaps, may be very amusing too. But what conceivable idea of America in 1911 would his students gather from such a mess? They would hardly understand the political structure of our land by the sight of said senator in unconventional garb, or its commercial activity from the motor’s glass eye, or its general morale from a view of the policeman’s cat. Well! Put this Medieval Garner in a green-horn’s hand and his understanding of Medieval peoples will be equally untrue.

It is a pity that such a really learned and painstaking student should have thus spoiled his “thirty years’” labor. Mr. Coulton is not a historian in any sense, rather an indifferent antiquarian. He is just a collector of grotesque anecdotes.

LUCIAN JOHNSTON.

Handbook of Practical Economics, by J. Schrijvers, C. SS. R., translated from the French by F. M. Capes. St. Louis, B. Herder, 1910.

It is not by any means an easy task to compress the history and theory of political economy into three hundred pages and Father Schrijvers in making the attempt has met with a fair degree of success. The book has been translated into Dutch, Spanish, German and Italian as well as English and is having a wide sale. It is written from the point of view of Christian ethics, and frequent citations of Catholic authorities are made. The practical

illustrations are taken from European and especially from Belgian experience. This will be of advantage to American readers who wish to gain a fuller insight into European institutions, but on the other hand, it militates against the use of the book in this country as an introductory text.

The brevity of the treatment makes Father Schrijvers seem to divide all non-Catholic economists into the two camps of socialism and *laissez faire* and to locate Catholic writers in the space between these two camps. This is hardly fair, but even if it were a correct representation, one must not overwork the argument that the middle ground between the extremists is the right position merely because it is the middle ground. The following statement concerning State socialism "There is one socialistic idea according to which the state interferes, without any legitimate motive, in matters of private interest" might well evoke from the State socialist the objection that this use of the word *legitimate* is a begging of the question.

FRANK O'HARA.

The Attributes of God mirrored in the perfections of Mary.
London: Burns and Oates; New York: Benzinger Bros. Pp.
203. Price, \$.90.

This book of devotion is published anonymously, but notes appended to it by the censor are evidence of its careful revision. The subject is a fascinating one: God's image reflected in the soul of Mary! It would, of course, be saying too much to assert that the present little book has done full justice to the subject. The treatment is reverent and pious and well suited for easy spiritual reading; it is somewhat lacking, however, in systematic, orderly arrangement, but it is hard to be systematic when treating of so high a subject. It is particularly encouraging in these days to come across books like the present one which deal with God's nature in a simple, confiding way, ignoring all controversy and using revealed truth without fear or apology. We commend this little book as a devout, fervent treatise on one of the most important of all topics. The binding, paper and print are attractive.

E. P. BURKE, C. S. C.

Meditations for each Day of the Month of June, dedicated to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. Translated and adapted from the Italian by Charles Santley. Benziger Brothers. Pp. 104.

This small volume may well find place among the many publications which have for their object the furtherance of devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. It offers thirty meditations upon the virtues of the Sacred Heart—His charity, patience, humility, detachment, etc., and upon the Holy Eucharist. Most of these are in the form of reflections with spiritual aspirations at the close; yet a few (VII, IX, XVIII, XX, XXVI) are made up entirely of prayers and affections. Two or more texts from the "Imitation" or the Scriptures, at the head of each meditation, suggest the chief points for consideration, and apt quotations from the Scriptures freely interspersed throughout the body of the meditations give them a special relish. The book is printed in large, clear type and is neatly bound.

E. P. BURKE, C. S. C.

Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique, sous la direction de A. D'Ales. Fascicule IV, Dieu-Église. Paris, G. Beauchesne, 1910.

The fourth fascicle of the new French Apologetic Dictionary is a worthy continuation of the work so happily accomplished in the preceding numbers. The most imposing contribution is the article on God by Father Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P. It comprises no less than seventy-two pages; and is a strong, erudite, well ordered presentation of the scholastic arguments for the existence of God, in which the notable objections put forth by Kant and later thinkers, including the Modernists of France, are met and refuted. The article on Sunday is made up of two contributions, one by Abbé Villien on the precept of the Church to keep holy the Sunday, the other by Mr. Gibon on the civil legislation concerning Sunday observance. It is natural that the writer should dwell chiefly on French legislation, but what he says of other countries, especially of England and the United States, is not as comprehensive as one would have the right to expect. Two articles contributed by authors, now deceased, to the earlier editions are left untouched.

that on Dispensations by Abbé Didiot and the very interesting account by Father Guilleux of the widely misunderstood *Jus primas noctis*. It is a pity that in articles thus retained the bibliography should not be brought up to date. Father de la Servière, S. J., contributes two lucid articles, one on the famous divorces of historical personages, the other on the Divine Right of Kings. The nine page article of Father Rivet, S. J. on the Duel is of considerable interest, but its apologetic value might have been enhanced, if the section on the private duel had been shortened so as to allow a larger treatment of the judicial duel of early times. The article on Dogma, to which Father Pinard, S. J., devotes thirty-one pages, is a masterly study, in which the true Catholic notion of dogma is distinguished from the erroneous conceptions of the present day, and ably vindicated. The long article on the Church, by Abbé de la Briere, but partly printed, takes up the closing pages of this useful and interesting fascicle.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

La Résurrection de Jésus-Christ; Les miracles evangéliques.
Conférences apologétiques par MM. Jaquier et Bouchany.
Paris, Gabalda et cie, 1911. 12mo, 312 pp.

This book is a collection of two series of lectures delivered before the Catholic faculties of Lyons in the early part of last year. The first series consists of four lectures by the Abbé Jaquier, well known for his excellent *Histoire des livres du Nouveau Testament*, and offers a solid demonstration of the reality of the bodily resurrection of our blessed Lord. In the first lecture, he treats of the sources of the story of the resurrection, the four Gospels, the Acts, and the Epistles of St. Paul, and in a summary manner shows that their historic authority is above all reasonable doubt, that they truly represent the testimony of competent and trustworthy eye-witnesses. The second lecture, sets forth the evidence for the death, burial and resurrection of Jesus. In the third lecture, the personal experience of the disciples and their preaching of the resurrection of Christ from the very beginning are shown to be a sufficient warrant of the reality of this wonderful event. In the last lecture, the futile attempts of rationalists and unbelievers, from Strauss to Loisy, to explain away the recorded

apparitions of the risen Lord as merely subjective visions are laid bare in all their weakness. In presenting the evidence for the apparitions of Christ, the author recognizes the divergencies of testimony in detail, but shows that these divergencies do not lead to mutual contradiction, and being an indication of independent testimony, do but help to give greater confirmation to the objective character of visions that the apostles had of the risen Lord.

Praise is also due to the Abbé Bourchany for his series of four lectures on the Gospel Miracles. In his opening lecture, he establishes the credibility and historic character of the Gospel miracles chiefly on three grounds, first, the undeniable testimony of the apostles who were eye-witnesses; secondly, the absence of inventive coloring and the intimate association of many of the miracles with the recognized teachings of Christ; thirdly, the impossibility of explaining the influence of Christ on his disciples and on the multitudes, if the reality of his miracles be denied. In the second lecture, he demonstrates the supernatural character of the wonderful works of Christ, refuting at some length the theory so common to-day that Christ's cures, remarkable as they were, must be set down as the natural effects of powerful suggestion. The third lecture is devoted to the proof that these miracles of our blessed Lord are at the same time the expression and the proof of His divine Sonship. In the last lecture, he depicts the supreme holiness and perfection of Jesus, and presents it as a miracle of the moral order, likewise revealing His divine nature.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Commentaire français littéral de la Somme Theologique de S. Thomas d'Aquin, par le R. P. Thomas Pegues, O. P., T. V. *Traité du gouvernement divin.* (Toulouse, Edouard Privat, 14 Rue des Arts, 1910.) This volume completes Fr. Pegues' commentaries on the first part of St. Thomas' *Summa*.¹

Those who are familiar with the order of the *Summa*² know that in the part treated in this volume—Qu. 90 to Qu. 119, inc.—there are very many interesting and very important ques-

¹ See *Catholic University Bulletin*, Jan., 1908, Jan., 1909, Apr., 1910.

² *Ibid.*, April, 1909.

tions. The origin of the human soul; the origin of the body of the first man (90-91); the production of woman (92); the transmission of the human soul (118); the condition of our first parents and of their children in the state of innocence (94-102)—these titles indicate some of the problems which St. Thomas undertook to solve; and they are more actual today than they were six and a half centuries ago. God's government of the world (103) and the immediate effects of his governing power are also considered (104-105). Then follows a study of the effects produced, not immediately by Almighty God, but through creatures, purely spiritual, *i. e.* the Angels (106-114), purely corporeal (115-116), or composed of body and spirit, *i. e.*, men (117-119). Evolution and its relations to the soul and body of the first man: God's intimate presence in creatures, conserving them, operating in and with them: the definition and classification of miracles, and the rules for distinguishing them from the deceitful works of the demons: the influence exercised by good and bad angels in the affairs of the world: the true meaning of "destiny," or "fate": the influence of a man on other men (*e. g.*, by teaching, Qu. 117, a. 1)—assuredly these are questions that all are anxious to investigate. Those who can and are willing to study them in the text of the *Summa* will be fully repaid for their labors. Those who prefer to have the assistance of a competent translator and commentator are advised to choose Father Pegues, who possesses the happy faculty of making everything very clear and interesting, and of showing all the bearings of principles established. This is the fifth volume of his valuable publication, but we must bear in mind that the work contains a literal translation of the *Summa* as well as his luminous comments on the text, and the number of volumes cannot be excessive if all are to be as precious as those that have been published.

D. J. KENNEDY, O. P.

Le schisme de Photius. Par J. Ruinaut. 16mo., pp. 64.

La pontifical. Par Jules Baudot. 16mo., pp. 65.

Vie de sainte Radegonde, Reine de France. Par Saint Fortunat. Traduction publiée avec une Introduction, des appendices et des notes. Par René Aigrain, du Clergé de Poitiers. Pp. 64.

- La vie du Saint Benoit 'Aniane.** Par Saint Ardon son Disciple. Traduite sur le Text même du Cartulaire d'Aniene. Par Fernand Baumes. Pp. 64.
- La correspondance d'Ausone et de Paulin de Nole.** Avec une Étude critique, des Notes, et un appendice sur le question du Christianisme d'Ausone. Par Pierre de Labriolle. Pp. 64.
- L'État moderne et la neutralité scolaire.** Par George Fonsegrive. Pp. 64.
- L'Évangile et la sociologie.** Par Docteur Grasset. Pp. 62.

All these pamphlets are published by the firm Bloud & Co. of Paris in their series "Science et Religion," which is intended to present in a cheap and attractive form reliable information on subjects of general interest to Catholics. About six hundred of these brochures have already been issued.

According to M. Ruinaut the religious question occupied a very insignificant part in the Photian schism. The real causes of the separation being differences in manners, culture and civilization and political antipathies augmented by the jealousy of the Patriarchs of Constantinople, because of recognition of Papal Supremacy.

In his excellent summary of the history of the Pontificale Dom Baudot presents in brief compass all the main facts concerning the origin and formation of the Pontificale in use at the present time. Because of the manner in which the sources are catalogued the work will be of value to others beside casual readers.

In addition to translating at large the account of the life of St. Radegundis by her intimate friend and correspondent Venantius Fortunatus, the Abbé Aigrain has added extracts from the writings of Baudonivia, one of her nuns and from Gregory of Tours who buried her. There is a good introductory chapter on the documents themselves.

The interesting figure of St. Benedict of Aniane and his immense influence in the church during the reigns of Charlemagne and Louis the Pious, have been sadly neglected by historians. The Life of the Saint written by a saint and translated by M. Baumes will serve to make the great monastic reformer better known and will throw much light on the condition of the Carlovingian church.

The literature of the fourth century offers no more striking insight into the peculiar relations which existed at that time be-

tween Christians and pagans than the correspondence between Ausonius and Paulinus of Nola, which was occasioned by the conversion of the latter. M. Labriolle has written a helpful introduction containing a brief presentation of the facts leading up to the interchange of letters.

The question proposed by M. Fonsegrive,—Is the modern state qualified to give a moral education?—is of more than passing interest in view of the widespread secularisation of instruction at the present time. After discussing briefly the functions of the state and its limitations, the author comes to the conclusion that in matters of moral education neither the state nor any other organization is competent to deal with the subject unless it is equipped with a complete doctrine regarding man and unless it has a definite philosophy of life. Because of the “neutrality” or “laicisation” of schools in France, some conclusions of a practical character are arrived at to meet that situation.

While defending the “Science of Sociology,” Doctor Grasset sees no hope for its effectiveness unless it is based on the Gospel, for Sociology based on science alone knows neither duty nor obligation.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Kirchengeschichtliche Apologie. Sammlung kirchengeschichtlichen Kritiken. Texte und Quellen auf apologetischer Grundlage. Herausgegeben von Dr. Theodor Deimel. Herder, Freiburg, 1910. Pp. xix + 395.

The purpose which the author of this book had in mind was to provide an armory of texts and quotations from various sources, covering the most important phases of church history, in order to furnish, especially to teachers and pupils in secondary schools, the means of replying to the usual objections against the Catholic Church. The documents are arranged chronologically and embrace extracts from sources and authorities extending from Josephus down to the Encyclical *Pascendi Dominici Gregis*. The works which are laid under contribution are not all from Catholic pens. An extremely large number of the quotations come from the works on general history such as those of Ranke, Weiss, Weber and Leo, or well-known authors like Gregorovius and Janssen.

While the quotations are well chosen the value of the work for students generally would have been immensely enhanced, had the author used works of a more special character, as *v. g.* Wietersheim-Dahn in connection with the *Völkerwanderung*, and had he, in addition to the quotations, appended a list of select readings and references. The method and the purpose of the book are excellent and it cannot fail to serve a useful purpose in the circles for which it was intended.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Jahrbuch der Zeit- und Kulturgeschichte, 1910. Dritter Jahrgang. Unter Mitwirkung von Fachmännern, herausgegeben von Dr. Franz Schnürer. Herder, Freiburg, 1910. Large 8o. Pp. 439.

The third in this series of Herder's *Jahrbücher* more than fulfills the high promise of its predecessors. It presents a thoroughly well-ordered survey of the achievements in various fields of human activity during one year. The vast subject is dealt with in six sections. I. Ecclesiastical affairs. With sub-titles; a) General, b) Germany, c) Austria; d) Foreign. II. Political affairs. a) Germany, b) Austria-Hungary, c) Foreign. III. Social and Economic Questions. a) Economic conditions, b) Social Movement, c) Law, d) Education. IV. Theology with subsections on Philosophy. History and Linguistics. V. Literature. a) Poetry, b) The Drama, c) Prose writings. IV. Art. a) Plastic Arts. b) Music, c) The Theatre. There are in addition two other sections, a chronicle of all the principal events of the year and a Necrology. The various chapters are all written by specialists and while, as might naturally be expected, more space and attention are given to Germany and its affairs, than to other countries, the work omits very little in the sections covered which is likely to be of permanent interest, and hence in it future historians will find stores of well-arranged and valuable material. The real worth of these volumes will be recognized a quarter of a century from now.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Twentieth Century Socialism. What it is not; What it is; How it may come. By Edmund Kelly, M. A. F. G. S., Late Lecturer on Municipal Government at Columbia University in the City of New York. Pp. xv + 446. New York, Longmans, Green & Co.

If the Socialist movement could be irrevocably committed to march towards its goal along the way mapped out for it in this volume, and to stop at the goal here set up, much of its menace would be dissipated. But as one reads the temperate optimism expressed for the future, as well as the equally temperate arraignment of present conditions contained in this exposition, and then contrasts the author's statement of the socialistic case with that which prevails in the abounding literature written by other socialists for the working classes, one wonders first how far the rank and file would be willing to acknowledge him as a leader or spokesman.

The first section of the book is devoted to the task of removing misconceptions about what socialism really is. Among those who are accused of grossly misrepresenting it are no less important personages than the President and the ex-President of the United States. These gentlemen, however, on the author's own showing, have drawn their data from genuine socialistic sources; but they have made the mistake of describing as socialism, he affirms, the crude socialism of the last century, which is not to be identified with the socialism of to-day. The next section is devoted to expounding the evils of the present capitalistic system, due chiefly to the uncontrolled competition which prevails in it. Can competition be replaced by coöperation? Yes, the late Mr. Kelly argues. But, in the third section containing his constructive scheme, he makes room for a limited measure of competition, and instead of the State socialism which would place all the means of production in the hands of the State, he would allow the State sole control only over the great necessities of life; and control over competition just so far as would be necessary to prevent the evils that follow from the unlimited competition of to-day. Compensation would be paid by the State to the owners of whatever property, industrial or real, which the State would find it necessary to expropriate. The farmer would be left in undisturbed possession of his land, though, in order to enable the State to wrestle with the problem of providing proper housing for the workers, and

proper sanitary and artistic arrangements for the cities and large towns, urban land would pass into State control. By abandoning State socialism for this system the author meets one objection commonly urged against socialism; that it would give the government a power destructive of individual liberty. This criticism he admits has ample foundation as against all schemes of State socialism in which the State in order to carry out the endless tasks of universal production and distribution would be obliged to create an immense army of officials, and unduly interfere in the affairs of every individual by assigning tasks and controlling the hours and form of labor. But this, he argues, would not occur in the present plan. Another objection which is handled, not without plausibility, is the common one that the corruption which exists at present in our government, national and local, demonstrates the unwisdom of placing at its disposal an immensely wider field than is open to it to-day for exploitation by personal greed.

Enough has been said to indicate that the writer of this work is to be classed with the school of Mr. Spargo and Mr. Kirkup and not with that of which Mr. Belford Bax is a prophet, nor with that of the coöperative commonwealth or the New Economy of Mr. Gronlund. The book will well repay perusal by all interested in the question. Its character emphasizes the truth that, owing to the modifications which socialistic ideas have undergone in many quarters, a great deal of the arguments hitherto relied upon by the opponents of the movement fail to reach the position upon which many of the more thoughtful socialists stand to-day.

JAMES J. FOX.

MISCELLANEOUS.

The following is text of the Sermon delivered by Rev. Dr. Healy on the Feast of St. Paul:

"And coming He preached peace to you that were afar off, and peace to them that were nigh. For by Him we have access both in one spirit to the Father. Now, therefore, you are no more strangers and foreigners; but you are fellow-citizens with the saints, and the domestics of God, built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ Himself being the chief corner-stone, in whom all the building, being framed together, groweth up into an holy temple in the Lord."—*Eph. ii. 17-21.*

A notable feature in the life and works of St. Paul is his intense patriotism and his pride of race. He gloried in the fact that he was a Jew, he referred with exultation to the city of his birth, and by word and deed showed himself conscious of the privileges implied in Roman citizenship. He was a Jew, and was proud of it. "They are Hebrews," he says, "so am I. They are Israelites so am I. They are the seed of Abraham: so am I." (*2 Cor. xi, 22*). Nor was it sufficient that he was a Jew: he prided himself because he belonged to the most favored tribe of Jews. He was of the stock of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew of the Hebrews. (*Phil. iii, 5*.) Furthermore, he will not have it forgotten that he belonged to the sect among the Jews who had clung most tenaciously to the rites and traditions of their fathers. He was a Pharisee of the Pharisees. (*Acts, xxiii, 6*). And because none knew better than he the history and the mission of his people there was reason for his exultation. They were Israelites "to whom belonged the adoption as of children, and the glory, and the testament, and the giving of the law, and the service of God and the promises, whose are the fathers, and of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things." (*Rom. ix, v. 5*.)

But, Jew as he was and proud of his lineage, he was also proud of the city in which he was born. "I am a Jew," he says, "of Tarsus in Cilicia, a citizen of no mean city." (*Acts xxi, 39*.) Here, too, he had reason to rejoice. The fame of his birthplace as

a centre of learning, and its commercial importance justified his harmless vanity. Pride of race, however, and civic allegiance were not so strong in Paul's soul as to make him unmindful of the fact that he belonged to a wider confederation, that he was a Roman citizen, that he possessed the privilege of fellowship in the great Empire which extended from Mesopotamia to the Pillars of Hercules. Nor, when occasion arose, was he slow to assert the rights that inhered in that dignity. "They have beaten us publicly, uncondemned," he says in Phillippi, "men that are Romans, and have cast us into prison and now they cast us out privately." (*Acts* xvi, 39.) Again in Jerusalem, when stretched on the rack, he whispered to the Centurion: "Is it lawful for you to scourge a man that is a Roman and uncondemned? (*Acts* xxii, 25), and the magic of the words *civis Romanus* stayed the executioner's lash. Finally, through the potency of the formula, "I appeal to Cæsar" (*Acts* xxv, 11), the charge for which he had been detained in prison two years was placed beyond the jurisdiction of any petty court or magistrate and referred to the great tribunal of Cæsar himself, and Paul went in person to Rome.

Thus was St. Paul willing to take advantage of those rights and immunities. He knew it was an insult to the great commonwealth to degrade a Roman, to make him suffer unjustly, a crime; and to that extent did he value those merely adventitious aids in enhancing the dignity of the common nature of mankind. Is it not permissible to see in the conduct of St. Paul, this boasting of his race and his city, and taking advantage of his political affiliations, the feeling that the dignities he enjoyed were merely adumbrations of the greater honors of which he was the apostle, and the nobler citizenship to be obtained through union with the true believers in that larger confederation of which he speaks to the Ephesians, "where there would be no more strangers and foreigners, but fellow citizens with the saints and the domestics of God." (*Eph.* ii, 19.)

The attitude which St. Paul thus took is not without significance as illustrating to some extent his views regarding the effect which belief in the new faith should have in determining the stand the convert should take towards old lines of distinction and former political or social connections. These statements and incidents in the career of the apostle occur at different times in his life; they were made in various circumstances, and may thus

be regarded as forming part of the settled policy which he had adopted towards the social environment into which his apostolic labors carried him and as being indissolubly associated with the general character of his Christian mission. He, above and beyond his colleagues, deserved the title, apostle of the Gentiles, and on him more than on any of the others rested the burden of defining for the neophyte Christians how they should comport themselves towards the established political and social order.

It is true that St. Paul's mission, like that of his Divine Master, was not primarily for the social regeneration of men, but for their spiritual redemption. Social conditions change, but the problem of attaining salvation is eternally the same, and the road thither never varies. This is what gives the gospel its perennial vitality. Each age has its own special needs and to each the gospel supplies an answer so clear and cogent as to make it appear that the teaching of Jesus was delivered for just such contingencies. It was so when paganism was driven out of its entrenchments in Greek Philosophy in the great Trinitarian and Christological struggle; it was so when the order and culture of the old civilization seemed threatened with extinction in the wave of heathen barbarism and anarchy which opened the middle ages. Religious and social chaos were averted by the mighty force of truth and unity in the religion of Christ.

The present, like the past, has its own peculiar problem. The rejection of authority and the assertion of individual judgment in matters of religion in the 16th century led to the rejection of authority in matters political and the demand for political equality. Since then the field of contention has been widened. Political equality has not resulted in the equal distribution of material advantages and privations, and the way to the attainment of equality, economic as well as political, it is asserted, is through the destruction of the existing social order. The anarchist and the individualist see the desired result in the removal of the restraints imposed by the prevailing social conditions, the collectivist and communist still further extending social control. To many in both camps religion makes no appeal. The lack of personal responsibility in the anarchist finds its counterpart in the economic necessity of the philosophic socialist.

The exigencies of this propaganda have at times turned the minds of men in both parties to seek in the Life and Words of

Christ arguments to support their respective systems. His teachings and His life have been so construed that He stands forth in their pages, if not the founder, at least the advocate and exemplar, of their theories. In the words of a blasphemous Frenchman, "He was *le bon sans culotte*," to others He was a demagogue and an anarchist. It is said of Him that He had no idea of civil government; that it appeared to Him an abuse, pure and simple. His conception of the world was socialist, with a Galilean coloring. "His dream was a vast social revolution in which rank should be levelled and all authority brought low." Another writer says: "There is not one of our great moral institutions which the New Testament does not ignore or condemn. The rights of property are denied or suspected: the ties of family are broken: there is no longer any nation or patriotism. The morality of the primitive Christians is homeless, sexless and nationless." In the same manner numerous phrases have been coined to express the social import of the gospel. We find one man saying: Poverty was an indispensable condition for gaining admission to the kingdom of Heaven, and another who declares that: "an industrial democracy would be the social actualization of Christianity. It is the logic of the Sermon on the Mount."

In view of the wide circulation of such views and hundreds of others like them, it may not be amiss to consider what position St. Paul took regarding some of the questions which are thus stated so persistently. Though it is true that St. Paul does not give any systematic exposition of Christianity as a social scheme, it would be an injustice to him to say that he did not realize that certain conditions of life were wholly out of keeping with the Christian ideal of perfection. He was the first to proclaim the message of salvation of Christian liberty and fraternal love in communities where family ties were practically annulled, where the great mass of the people felt directly or indirectly the evils of the slave-system, and in which there was no bond of unity except that imposed from without. Hence, though St. Paul had no desire to interfere in the secular affairs of his time, or to antagonise any class, or to advocate the claims of any special form of society, it was incumbent on him as the apostle of the Gentiles to leave nothing undone toward promoting the success of his special mission and to instruct his converts as to their duties towards the social organism on which he was laying the founda-

tions of the future great fabric of Christianity. On him rested the obligation of determining for all time who were to be admitted to the Christian fold and who, because of their condition, their calling, or their crimes, were to be excluded.

Though he was as one born out of due time, and though he was the least of the apostles, he labored more abundantly than all the rest (1 *Cor.* xv, 10), he was instructed by Christ Himself and thus he may reasonably be considered to have been in a position to judge of the propriety or impropriety of regarding certain states and conditions of life as being incompatible with the requirements of the gospel. Hence, while we may not expect to find in St. Paul's writings a detailed enunciation of the principles of social science, we may reasonably hope to find evidence which will be convincing as to whether Our Lord's teaching was disruptive of social order or whether it was productive of such union among men as can be described as communistic, or socialist.

Turning then to what may be called the social science in the writings of St. Paul, if such a phrase is permissible, and taking his ideas regarding the constitution of society, ideas which are presupposed rather than expressed, we find that the fundamental predicate, the ultimate unit of society to his mind was the individual composed of a body and soul. By reason of this duality there are two spheres of human activity, the physical and spiritual, and through the proper exercise of the faculties of his higher nature man is capable of working out for himself a destiny that transcends material conditions. This doctrine of freedom and responsibility underlies the entire scheme of life taught by St. Paul and at times finds explicit expression. Writing to the Romans (vii, 23) he says: "But I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind and captivating me in the law of sin that is in my members." Further on in the same epistle (viii, 3) not only the principle but its results are enunciated. "For, if you live according to the flesh, you shall die, but, if, by the spirit, you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live." Man is, then, master of his own destiny. He has the faculty of willing and choosing and by reason of this endowment he is placed above the predestination of the sociologist as well as the predestination of the theologian.

Paul next viewed society as a great confederation of humanity joined together by a common faith in Christ. This thought is

fundamental in all his teaching regarding human relations. In his epistle to the Corinthians (xii, 12) he says: For in one spirit were we all baptised into one body, whether Jew or Gentile, whether bond or free. There are many members but one body. The same thought finds expression in his epistle to the Romans (xii, 5. 6). "For as in one body we have many members, but all members have not the same office, so we being many are one body in Christ, and everyone members of another." The close fellowship implied in this great union did not exclude ties of nationality nor of race. Paul himself was not less a Christian because he was born a Jew nor because he was a Roman citizen. The bond, the coherent principle, in this confederacy, was stronger than that of race or class or state, it came from the natural human instinct of association sanctified by faith and Christian love. "Be ye therefore," says Paul, "followers of Christ and walk in love as Christ also hath loved us." (*Eph.* v, 1, 2.)

That nothing of a communistic or socialistic character was associated in the mind of St. Paul with the great brotherhood of mankind rendering and accepting mutual service, is clear from his many references to differences of gifts and differences of ministry. In fact the very equality which he preached, the equality of a spiritual destiny, had its root in inequality. "For I mean not that others should be eased and you burdened, but by an equality. In this present time let your abundance supply their want, that their abundance may supply your want, that there may be an equality."

Coming down to more practical things and dealing with the administrative affairs of society, we find St. Paul teaching that not only is civil authority necessary but that it derives its power from God. Resistance to it means contravention of divine law, and obedience an obligation imposed by conscience. "For there is no power," he says, "but from God, and those that are, are ordained of God. And they that resist purchase to themselves damnation. . . . Wherefore be subject of necessity, not only for wrath but also for conscience sake. For therefore also you pay tribute. For they are ministers of God serving unto this purpose. Render therefore to all men their dues. Tribute to whom tribute is due: custom to whom custom: fear to whom fear, honor to whom honor." (*Rom.* xiii, 1 seq.)

The same feeling of the necessity of authority and subordination which governed his conception of civil government ruled the mind

of St. Paul in regard to other states of life. He inculcated the necessity of obedience in the family (*Col. III, 18-25*) and above all, recognizing the existence of different classes in society, he urged mutual forbearance and kindness as the means of promoting harmony and success. "Servants," he says, "be obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear and trembling in the simplicity of your heart as to Christ. Not serving to the eye as it were pleasing men, but as servants of Christ doing the will of God from the heart. . . . And you masters do the same things to them, forbearing threatenings, knowing that the Lord both of them and you is in heaven, and there is no respect of persons with him." (*Col. III, 20 seq.*)

As the inequality of station implied in the position of master and servant arises from unequal distribution of property and wealth, we find that St. Paul, accepting the fact, accepted also the cause. In the first place, not only does he not raise any objection to the holding of private property as being inconsistent with Christianity, but he states that its acquisition is part of the duty of those on whom others are dependent. "For neither," he says, "ought the children to lay up for the parents but the parents for the children." (*2 Cor. XII, 14.*) In addition to being legitimate he regards the possession of wealth as desirable inasmuch as it affords the means and opportunity to practice certain virtues. "Therefore," he says to the Galatians (*VI, 10*) speaking of charity and good works, "while we have time, let us work good to all men but especially to those who are of the household of the faith." In fact he exhorts men (*Eph. IV, 28*) to lay up more than is necessary for their own needs in order to be of service to others.

The fact that there were not many wise according to the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble (*1 Cor. I, 26*) proves that the Christian Church was mostly recruited from among the poor and the lowly, but the presence of even a few who were wise or mighty or noble shows that the new faith had not levelled all distinctions. There were rich men in the Church even in the time of St. Paul, yet they are never ordered to renounce their possessions on pain of exclusion from the community. St. Paul does not suggest to Philemon that he should cease to be a slave owner. He sends back to him the runaway Onesimus but he exhorts the master to receive not as a servant but instead of a servant a most dear brother (*Philem. I, 16.*) He writes to Timothy (*1 Tim. VI, 18*)

to "charge the rich of this world not to be high-minded, nor to trust in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God." He exhorts them "to do good, to be rich in good works, to give easily to communicate to others. (1 *Tim.* vi, 18.)

Though none was more insistent than St. Paul in his declarations regarding the necessity of almsgiving and the claims which the poor have on their more fortunate brethren he was far from identifying poverty with holiness. For his own part he says he will be a charge to no one. "For you remember, brethren," he says to the Thessalonians, (ii, 9) "our labor and toil, working night and day lest we should be chargeable to any of you."

The sturdy spirit of independence which led him to work at his rough trade rather than accept the bounty of others does not deprive St. Paul of the credit of having laid in the large missionary field where he labored the foundations of the systematic almsgiving and charity which were so characteristic of the early Church. He admits the existence of an indigent class who are dependent on the charity of others, and he himself made many collections for needy churches among those who were more fortunate (*Gal.* ii, 10, 1 *Cor.* xvi, 1., 2 *Cor.* viii, 4, ix, 1, *Rom.* xv, 25, *Acts* xi, 19, xxiv, 17). He constantly asserts, however, in every case that the offerings are voluntary and to be made from interior promptings of charity rather than from any external title inherent in the needy or the community. (1 *Cor.* xvi, 2.) Though everyone who was able was bound to give, the reward was proportioned not to the measure but to the motive of the gift. And finally, as showing that charity, not justice, was the basis of almsgiving, we have his famous phrases, or Hymn of Charity as it has been called. (1 *Cor.* xiii, 1-3.) "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. And if I should have prophecy and should know all mysteries and all knowledge, and if I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And if I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing."

Turning to another sphere of human relations, we find the same clearness and force in the manner in which St. Paul asserts the unity and sanctity of marriage as the basis of sound social ideals. Except when faith is endangered he will not permit divorce even from an unbeliever (1 *Cor.* vii, 12). He taught the

virtues of kindness, justice and freedom which, spreading outward and upward, led to the extinction of the institution of slavery.

Thus, though St. Paul did not profess to be a teacher of social or economic science, we find enough in his writings to enable us to draw in rough outline at least the scheme of social organisation existent or potential which to his mind would not conflict with the acceptance of the Gospel. To him, men without abandoning the ties of family, of race, or of nationality, but with racial pride and animosity removed from their hearts, were to be united in fraternal fellowship in one large Christian federation. Society was to be transformed into something truly catholic, rising above, but not obliterating, other distinctions. Men were to be mindful of their duty to the Creator and thus would the true nature and aims of government be understood and exemplified and thus would the mutual duties and obligations of ruler and subject be defined and observed. With one heart and one soul each should have his place in this spiritual commonwealth, and each, performing the duties of his state and calling, would serve all through a service of love to his maker.

There is true individualism here, because nowhere are the rights and obligations of the individual so fully asserted. But this individualism is not anarchy: because in freeing men from attachment to earthly things the way was opened to closer union with God and to communion with their fellows. Nor was the communion which St. Paul preached communism, unless it be the communism "which raises the social connection of human beings from the sphere of convention to that of moral obligation, the socialism which rests not upon a conflict of interests, but upon the consciousness of spiritual unity and a common goal." With a mind at once prophetic and apostolic, the great apostle of the Gentiles saw new forms of society and a new concept of humanity arising from the seeds sown by Christ and the preachers of the Gospels; he saw the causes of dissension and hatred vanish and he conjured up the vision of the time when, in the light of faith, and through the influence of charity, there would be neither Jew nor Greek, neither bond or free, neither male nor female, but all one in Christ. (*Gal. III, 28.*)

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

A. O. H. Scholarships. Mr. John Joseph Phillips of New York City has been appointed to the Hibernian Scholarship recently founded by the Ancient Order of Hibernians in New York County. The Hibernian Scholarships continue to increase in number. The other A. O. H. students at the University are Charles Patrick McDonnell of Florence, Massachusetts; Christian James McWilliams of Brooklyn, New York; and James Enright Woods of New London, Connecticut. In the near future, A. O. H. scholars are expected from Illinois, Indiana, and Montana. Quite recently the Hibernians of the District of Columbia founded a Scholarship at the University. One of the conditions of these scholarships is regular instruction in the language, literature, history, and antiquities of Ireland. Eventually the A. O. H. scholars at the University will form the nucleus of the student body pursuing the courses of the Gaelic Chair founded in 1894 by the Ancient Order of Hibernians at the Omaha convention. The present occupant of the Chair is Dr. John Joseph Dunn, one of the most eminent of the younger generation of Celtologists.

Lecture on Temperance. Among the conditions of the Chair of Psychology, founded at the opening of the University by the Catholic Total Abstinence Society of America, is the delivery of lectures on subjects connected with the life and work of Father Matthew, the great Irish Apostle of Temperance. This year the first of these lectures was given at the University on January 5th by the Very Reverend Alexander P. Doyle, C. S. P., on "The Catholic Church and The Prohibition Movement." The second lecture was given on January 26th by Rev. Peter O'Callaghan, C. S. P., of St. Mary's Church, Chicago, on "The Power of Example in Temperance Reform."

Illustrated Lecture. One of the most interesting public lectures of the year was delivered January 12th on "The Ruined Cities of Asia Minor," by Dr. David M. Robinson of Johns Hopkins University. The lecture was illustrated with views taken by the lecturer himself on the occasion of an archæological expedition into the heart of Asia Minor.

Donations. The University has recently received the sum of Five Thousand Dollars from the estate of Mrs. Ann Yarnall of Philadelphia. The will of Mrs. Yarnall was made in 1886 and this bequest was probably one of the first made by individual Catholics for the support and development of the University.

Registration. The registered students at the University number this year about three hundred and sixty. Of these, one hundred and sixty are lay students and come mostly from our leading Catholic Colleges and High Schools. The ecclesiastical students number two hundred, of whom one hundred and forty-two are novices of the several religious orders whose colleges adjoin the University. The other fifty-eight are secular ecclesiastics, forty-three of whom are residents in Divinity Hall and fifteen in the Apostolic Mission House. Of the religious ecclesiastics, the Dominicans number thirty-seven, the Holy Cross Fathers thirty-one, the Paulists twenty-seven, the Marists twenty-two, the Franciscans nineteen, and the Sulpicians four. Thirty states are represented in the University, also the following foreign countries:—British West Indies, Canada, Germany, Ireland, England, Cuba, France, Russia, Hungary, and the Philippines.

Lecture on Engineering. On Friday, February 3rd, Mr. Benjamin T. Allen, Chief Engineer, Harrisburg Foundry and Machine Works, gave an illustrated lecture in Assembly Room, McMahon Hall, on "The Development of the High Speed Corliss Engine." This lecture was largely attended, both by the students of the Mechanical Engineering Department of the

University and by mechanical engineers from the city of Washington, and proved highly interesting and instructive to all.

Contest in Elocution. On the evening of January 25, 1911, the Junior Class held its Contest in Elocution in the Assembly Room of McMahon Hall. Of the seven contestants, Messrs. Bernard A. Kummer and Frederick C. Dietz were awarded the first and second prize, respectively. The Judges were Doctors Turner, McCarthy and Lennox.

NECROLOGY.

MOST REVEREND PATRICK JOHN RYAN, D. D.

The death of Archbishop Ryan of Philadelphia has deprived the University of one of its most zealous and enlightened Directors, a true friend, wise in council and untiring in active coöperation in everything that promoted the cause of higher education. Patrick John Ryan was born at Thurles, Tipperary, February 26, 1831. He made his early studies at home and in a private school in Dublin. Entering Carlow College at the age of sixteen, he continued his study of the classics and completed his philosophical and theological course in 1852. After having been ordained sub-deacon he came to this country and was appointed Professor of English Literature in the Theological Seminary at St. Louis. In 1853 he was ordained priest and appointed to the Church of the Annunciation, St. Louis. In 1860 he was transferred to the Cathedral. During the Civil War he was Chaplain of the military prison and hospital. In 1872 he was appointed Auxiliary Bishop of St. Louis, where he remained until 1883, when he was appointed Archbishop of Philadelphia. During the seventeen years of his administration, that important province made wonderful progress both in material and in spiritual prosperity. The Archbishop was known throughout the English speaking world as an orator of exceptional ability and effectiveness. Religion, Education, Charity and the public welfare were his favorite subjects, and the cause of humanity as well as the interests of the Church always found in him a ready and able champion. His death at his residence in Philadelphia, February 11, 1911, threw the whole Church in America into mourning, and called forth expressions of esteem and veneration from many distinguished men outside the fold. May he rest in Peace.

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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

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THE CORONATION OATH OF THE BRITISH SOVEREIGN.¹

Those may be counted almost on the fingers of one hand who remember to have seen the once famous monument in the populous metropolis of the far-reaching British Empire, which Pope, the Catholic poet, spoke of with scorn in his "The Man of Ross:"

"Where London's column pointing to the sky,
Like a tall bully lifts its head and lies."

Thus ran its inscription: "This pillar was set up in perpetual remembrance of that most dreadful burning of this Protestant city, begun and carried on by the teaching and malice of the Popish faction, in the beginning of September, 1666, in order to the carrying out of their horrid plot for the extirpating the Protestant religion and old English liberty and the introduction of popery and slavery." Men grew ashamed of the brazen lie, and it was erased in 1831. Most Englishmen, except a prejudiced and fanatical minority, have long ago, too, grown to be ashamed of another wanton insult to the twelve millions of Catholics scattered throughout the British Empire,

¹ What is commonly called the "Coronation Oath" is a form of solemn "Declaration" which, according to the enactment of the Bill of Rights (1689), should be made by every British sovereign either at the coronation or at the first assembly of Parliament after the accession, "whichever shall first happen," as the Bill of Rights expresses it.—(EDITOR).

which had its origin in the same panic, caused by the lies and murderous perjuries of the infamous Titus Oates—an insult not to Catholics only and the supreme head of the Catholic Church, but also to our revered king; and moreover a standing record, quite foreign to the present broad-minded common-sense of the nation as a whole, of a time now generally recognized as a very discreditable period of our history. This from an earthly point of view; but, what is far worse, a permanent blasphemy against God's most wonderful dispensation of love in the institution of the Holy Eucharist, and an insult to His Virgin Mother and the Court of Heaven. We refer of course, to the "Royal Declaration," required of every sovereign amidst the pageantry and solemn tradition of ceremonial on the commencement of each new reign. But public opinion moves slowly, and not until the year of grace 1910 did it become sufficiently positive and united to force those most responsible for legislation into action to erase what Cardinal Wiseman long ago spoke of as "an act of national apostasy," and a former Prime Minister as "a stain upon the statute book of the realm."

In days of greater toleration and increased enlightenment we are apt to forget, and are glad to forget, the narrow-mindedness and persecution of a former age. But this forgetfulness frequently carries with it a want of appreciation of greater liberty, and too soon we forget to give a full measure of praise to those who have borne the burden and the heat of the struggle. It may then be of some interest and value to gather together, in retrospect, from the mass of ephemeral literature published during the years of the conflict a brief account of the origin of the oath, the leading facts in the history of its change and the motives which influenced the contending parties.

The Bill of Rights of 1689 (1 William and Mary, S2, c2.) enacted that "Every sovereign shall on the first day of the first meeting of the first Parliament after coming to the Crown, on the throne in the House of Peers, in the presence of the Lords and Commons, or at the coronation (whichever shall first happen) make, subscribe and audibly repeat the Declaration made in 30 King Charles II [1678] entitled 'an Act for the

more effectual preserving of the King's person and government by disabling papists from sitting in either House of Parliament.' ”

The Declaration ran as follows:

“I, A. B. do solemnly and sincerely in the presence of God profess, testify and declare that I do believe that in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper there is not any Transubstantiation of the Elements of Bread and Wine into the Body and Blood of Christ at or after the consecration thereof by any person whatever. And that the Invocation or Adoration of the Virgin Mary, or any other saint, and the sacrifice of the Mass, as they are now used in the Church of Rome, are superstitious and idolatrous. And I do solemnly, in the presence of God, testify and declare that I do make this Declaration and every part thereof in the plain and ordinary sense of the words read unto me as they are commonly understood by English Protestants, without any evasion, equivocation or Mental Reservation whatever, and without any dispensation already granted to me by the Pope, or any other authority or person whatever, or without any hope of any such dispensation from any person or authority whatever, or without thinking that I am or can be acquitted before God or man, or absolved of this declaration or any part thereof, although the Pope, or any other person or persons, or power whatsoever, should dispense or cancel the same, or declare that it was null and void from the beginning.”

This oath was part of that fearful system of persecution which ground down and crushed out the liberty and energy of our loyal Catholic ancestors. It is too well known to be repeated here how the legislators of the country found by experience in the reign of Elizabeth that actual infliction of death aroused a life-giving enthusiasm among Catholics and a keen sympathy among the beholders of the suffering of the martyrs, even though they shared not their belief, or had in their weakness conformed under pressure to the requirements of the State religion. And therefore these wicked, though wise, counsellors for the most part ceased to make use of the executioner's block and the foul dungeon, or to employ the rack, the thumb-screw or other instruments of torture to turn the misguided papists from the error of their way. They provided instead the penal system of quiet oppression, the £20 fine a lunar month, for non-attendance at the established church, the great reward for information which should lead to the apprehension of a priest, the punishments for hearing mass or receiving the sacraments or for

harboring a priest, and the hundred other well-known means for curtailing the liberty, despoiling the property and endangering the lives of those who were staunch to their Catholic principles. The folly of James II's policy led to the enactment of more stringent laws, and besides the inability of Catholics to hold rank in the army, to follow any liberal profession, still less, to sit in Parliament, Catholics could not, under William of Orange, inherit land, which went to their nearest kin who was a Protestant, and after 1700 they could not purchase landed property. At no time was intolerance more at its height than when Titus Oates, in 1678, fanned evil prejudices into a flame by his infamous perjuries; and it would be incredible how one who was known to be so utterly unprincipled should have been believed on evidence quite uncorroborated, had it not been thought that there was some possibility of the banished James reasserting his claims to the throne with the aid of Louis XIV.

This oath was in force from 1678 till the Bill for Catholic Emancipation was passed in 1829, and had to be taken by all office-holders under the Crown, and by all members of either House of Parliament. By the Act of 1829 all were released from this necessity except the sovereign, the Lords Chancellors of England and Ireland and a few others; and in 1867 all were released save the sovereign. When the oath was taken by Queen Victoria in 1837 a vigorous protest was made by Dr. Lingard, the historian, who spoke of it as owing its origin to the perjuries of an impostor and the delusion of a nation; but as her reign drew on to sixty years and prejudice gradually dissolved before more liberal tendencies, the majority of Englishmen, a new generation, had almost forgotten its existence. It is true that as the Queen grew to a ripe old age, provident men, such as the late Cardinal Vaughan, Archbishop of Westminster, saw what would again in a short time be required. He frequently spoke of it at public gatherings, and three years before the Queen's death, he approached a cabinet minister, only to be met with a stolid determination on the part of the government to take no active part in the matter. But neither he nor Catholic peers realized on the accession of Edward VII in 1901 that it would be

too late to alter it until the chancellor met their demand by the reply that Parliament alone could alter or abolish the Declaration, and the statutory law required (so it was then thought) that the Declaration should be made before any legislation could be made by Parliament in the next reign. Foiled in this attempt, the Cardinal issued a pastoral letter on February 25 ordering a day of general Communion and Exposition of the Blessed Sacrament in reparation. From that time the struggle, though keener at one time than at another, never ceased until the bill was passed for the abolition of anything denunciatory and offensive, and received the Royal Approval by Commission on August 3, 1910.

The story of the struggle, initiated in the House of Peers by Lord Braye, and continued in the years 1901-1905, is admirably told in the recently published *Life of Herbert Vaughan*.²

Briefly: the negative attitude of the Government; the failure of a Joint Commission of both Houses; a select Commission of the House of Lords, consisting of eight Peers, all non-Catholics, who did not consult Catholic wishes. The result of what should have been the mature deliberations of picked men was to omit the offensive words "superstitious" and "idolatrous" and substitute for them "are contrary to the Protestant religion," and to change the long rigmarole, so insulting alike to Pope and King, to the words "unreservedly." Certainly polite and restrained words were used, but better far, surely, was the old formula in all its nakedness, claiming an indulgence because it was born of an age long past, of prejudice, intolerance and hatred, than thus to have a deliberate re-affirmation in the enlightened twentieth century of the anti-Catholic spirit of the seventeenth. There were, too, other objections: was it effective for its purpose? Mr. Snead-Cox tells us how Cardinal Vaughan laughed loud when he read their Lordship's weighty decision, that the sovereign should solemnly and sincerely profess, testify and declare that the Invocation or Adoration of the saints and the Sacrifice of the Mass were contrary to the Protestant religion.

² B. J. G. Snead-Cox, London, 1910.

"Why, Pope Leo," he exclaimed, "would be delighted to make that statement every morning before breakfast." Further, it was undesirable that the sovereign should misrepresent the doctrine of Catholics by speaking of the Adoration of Our Lady and the Saints, or select for public and solemn denial the most sacred truths of the Catholic creed. All their amendments which tinkered with the words, proved unsatisfactory to one or other party within the Established Church, and the whole matter fell through. Lord Salisbury shifted the whole blame of the failure onto the shoulders of the Catholics, and was followed by the *London Times* of the following day, which considered itself voicing the common opinion when it said: "The law of this country excludes Roman Catholics from the succession to the throne, and the royal declaration is the touchstone necessary to determine whether any given candidate is a Roman Catholic or not. The Roman Catholics want to abolish the legal and regular means of deciding whether the natural heir to the throne, is or is not, disqualified, knowing that if they succeeded in this they would go far to render the law nugatory. Since they have not been able to get what they really want, they no longer profess to value what they pretend to want."

Nothing came of further attempts on the part of Catholics in the House of Parliament to introduce legislation. A bill was brought before Parliament in 1905 but was abandoned owing to the general election. Afterwards the fight concerning the Education Question, in which Catholics and the members of the Church of England stood side by side, made it inopportune to bring forward a matter which would introduce controversial bitterness. But Catholics prayed and spoke and wrote until at length on the death of the late King Edward VII it was seen that times were ripe for the change, and in the session of the last Parliament the second reading of a bill which provided for redress was passed by a majority in the House of Commons, and Mr. Asquith, the liberal Prime Minister, was not out of sympathy with his hearers when he said in the debate on the measure that "the time has come to put an end to this Declaration."

In earlier years very forcible opinions had been expressed both at home and in the colonies. Lord Salisbury, though failing to have a positive policy, had described the oath as a "stain upon the Statute book." Mr. Balfour, the then conservative Prime Minister, had declared its language "very unfortunate." Mr. Redmond, with a touch of Celtic humor, had publicly asserted that he and the Irish would oppose the settlement of the Civil lists and a continuance of his Majesty's salary. Mr. Costigan in the Canadian Parliament had said it was useless as the fifth wheel of a coach. Sir Wilfred Laurier, the Premier, had declared that he would give the motion for its abolition his whole-hearted support. The Parliament of Canada, supported by the two millions and a quarter of Catholics in the Dominion, on March, 1901, had passed with an overwhelming vote the following resolution: "That such a Declaration is most offensive to the dearest convictions of all Roman Catholics. That the staunch loyalty of his Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects in Canada, comprising forty-three per cent. of the entire population of the Dominion, and throughout the British possessions, should not be rewarded by their being chosen alone amongst the believers of all creeds, and branded as idolators by the sovereign. That in the opinion of this House, the Declaration referred to in the above Act of Settlement should be amended by eliminating therefrom all expressions which are especially offensive to the religious belief of any subject of the British Crown." From Malta, too, came strong expressions. "England owes to us this tardy act of justice"; from the Mauritius and the lay Catholics of Ceylon, and from British India in which the Catholic people of Mangalore reminded the Government that in 1858 Queen Victoria had assured all of her subjects in India that they should never be "molested or disquieted by reason of their religious faith." And Australia with its millions or more of Catholics urged that, as three-fourths of the Australian contingent then serving in the South African campaign were Catholics, it could not be 'prudent, honorable or wise to repay their heroism and patriotism with wanton insult.' This was, they said, an outrage against common sense, no less than religion, and an

infringement of the religious equality to which they were entitled by the Constitution of the Commonwealth and which they cherished as their birthright. It was also well-known that King George had said at Laval: "The Catholic Church has amply fulfilled its obligation, not only to teach reverence for law and order, but to instill a sentiment of loyalty and devotion into the minds of those to whom it ministers." In 1910, the protests from Canada and Australia were repeated with emphasis, and the offices in Downing Street were bombarded with letters of resolutions from very various quarters, such as that of the Catholic Union of Great Britain and a large meeting of London and Provincial Unitarian ministers, who urged the 'necessity of modifying the Royal Declaration so as not to wound the feelings of our Roman Catholic fellow subjects'; and a similar resolution was forwarded by the Northern Association of Baptist Churches. The Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury wished the oath to denounce nothing at all, and Lord Halifax, representing the High Church party of the Establishment, urged in the *Times* its complete abolition. Violent language, he said, was used against any change, but the same sort of language had been used against the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829; it passed, and no one was any the worse. Cardinal Logue on May 26, 1910, wrote that the Declaration 'seems to treat the ruler of a great Empire as if he was a slippery trickster, who would endeavor by equivocation or a secret arrangement with the Pope to mislead his subjects and tamper with the sanctity of an oath. The Oath as it stands is far from complimentary to either the King or the Pope.'

The result of all was that the Prime Minister courageously stood up to the convictions he had already frequently expressed, and began the legislation of the new reign by the introduction of a bill for the amendment of the oath. A positive declaration should take the place of the old denunciation of the Sacred Truths held by Catholics. The first formula proposed, by which the sovereign professed himself a member of the Protestant Reformed Church as by law Established in England, was said by many 'to bristle with false theology, bad history and worse taste.' Let that be as it may; the exact wording, provided it

was a positive profession of faith instead of a denunciation, did not concern Catholics. It was a domestic concern to be settled between the nice distinctions of belief into which the all-comprehensive Established Church is divided. The words met with objections from many quarters, by those Anglicans who did not consider the Church of England a 'Protestant body' nor 'by law Established,' and by non-Conformists who thought the words implied a stigma upon themselves and objected to the Church of England being singled out as the Protestant Church. Another amendment, proposing that there should be inserted a repudiation of any claim by any other power which touched the sovereignty of the King, was disposed of amidst laughter by Mr. Healy pointing out that if this amendment was carried '*Defensor Fidei*' would have to be removed from the coins of the realm.

At length the Third Reading of the Bill was passed in the House of Commons with a majority of 193, met with little opposition from the Lords and received the royal assent by Commission on August 3. By the "Accession Declaration Act of 1910" future sovereigns will thus make their profession of faith:

"I, A. B., do solemnly and sincerely in the presence of God profess, testify and declare that I am a faithful Protestant; that I will, according to the true intent of the enactments which secure the Protestant Succession to the Throne of my realm, uphold and maintain the said enactments to the best of my power."

Catholics are satisfied. They would, indeed, wish before God like St. Paul, that sovereigns and all their fellow-subjects were "like as I am in little and in great, except these bands." They would wish their sovereign free, as is his lowliest subject, and unshackled by religious tests, but England is still a Protestant country and it is too much to hope that though some future sovereign may have atheistic or agnostic tendencies, he should be a Papist and yet be allowed the sceptre of the Empire.

Looking back, it seems difficult to realize that such a painful reflection on the intelligence of a civilized and enlightened community should have remained law so long, and that any struggle should have been necessary to abrogate it. Such a

declaration was first of all, wholly ineffective. It was, as Mr. Asquith had long ago declared, "one of the flimsiest and most unnecessary safeguards for the Protestant succession"; for the Protestant succession to the throne is secured not by this declaration but by the express provisions of the Bill of Rights, and the Act of Settlement (1700) which, though it invited the line of Hanover, who were foreigners, to England and could neither speak nor understand the English tongue but were ardent Protestants, yet provided 'that every person who is or shall be reconciled, or shall hold communion with the See or Church of Rome, or shall profess the Popish religion or shall marry a Papist, shall be excluded and be forever incapable to inherit, possess or enjoy the crown or government of the realm and Ireland and the dominions thereunto belonging.' Those statutes go on to provide that in every such case the people of these realms are absolved from their allegiance, and the Crown and the government are to pass to the next heirs, as though the offending sovereign were naturally dead. The Act of Settlement further enacts that 'whoever shall come to the possession of the Crown of England shall join in communion with the Church of England as by Law established.' With these drastic Enactments on the Statute book, the oath was surely neither necessary nor effective. But it was sufficient to give pain and offense. In the first place, of the numerous religious doctrines of sects which may be counted by the score, held by subjects of his majesty which he as Supreme Head of the Church of England was bound to disbelieve, certain characteristics and cherished beliefs of the Catholic Church were alone singled out and branded with condemnation. These articles of faith which dealt only with religious mysteries and had no bearing on allegiance or public order, were treated as so odious and so wicked as to deserve and require an exceptional denunciation. Between man and man in private life such treatment would deserve condemnation, how much more in the case of the sovereign, publicly and audibly in the presence of the chief men of the realm, many of whom were loyal Catholics, on the most solemn occasion of his life and reign, when men of all classes were eager to tender to him the homage of their dutiful allegiance.

The coarse and violent language no doubt aggravated the offence, but the substance of the complaint of Catholics was that a state function should be made the occasion of an official condemnation of a religion authorized by law. In the next place, the Declaration falsely ascribed to Catholics tenets which they did not hold and which are peculiarly hateful to our fellow-countrymen. It suggested that equivocation and mental reservation were resorted to more by Catholics than other people; that Catholics believed in some dispensing power that can justify a man perjuring himself. It asserted that invocation of the Saints as used in the Catholic Church was equivalent to divine adoration and therefore idolatrous. All ludicrously untrue. Catholics had indeed a right to demand whether the outrage upon their faith was only the unhappy survival of forgotten quarrels belonging to a time when it might be said that there still lived "Popish Pretenders" to the crown, or stood to-day as representing the deliberate will of our living legislators. Happily the result may be taken, despite the noisy opposition of a small minority, to answer the question on the part of the nation as a whole. Our respected sovereign King George V when he is crowned next June, will not therefore be required to undergo the ordeal, so distasteful to his father, or solemnly denouncing as idolatrous and superstitious the loyal Catholic peers who will stand round to give him their homage, nor those countless numbers of Catholics who throughout the vast possessions of the Empire make up a large percentage of Civil officials or of the army or navy or serve elsewhere as true patriotic subjects.

Yet there are misgivings on the part of non-Catholics. Two special articles in the *London Times* in June, whilst praising the tolerance of the age and recognizing that the popular errors concerning Catholics of 1829 have been belied by succeeding events and that no one doubts the capacity and loyalty of Catholics, yet dwelt much upon the fundamental difference between the Catholic Church and the various religious communities which divide Christendom. The main cause of the Declaration was there asserted to be, not 'an historical puzzle'

as Fr. Bridgett, O. P., had called it, but 'two irreconcilable conceptions of life and the basis of society and the State. Rome represents authority, Protestantism liberty.' That 'It is the Mass that matters' is recognized by many, and these articles asserted that 'Transubstantiation and the Mass were premises on which the medieval schoolmen built up the whole priestcraft.' However offensively expressed, these thoughts contain a good deal of truth when stated in a proper way. Our fellow-countrymen view with serious apprehension the steady and rapid growth of High Churchism within the Establishment, and the constant stream of converts to Catholicism. In 1689 there was no doubt as to the religion of this country, and in 1829 the Church of England was solidly Protestant. Now the most influential in it repudiate this epithet and frequently teach the doctrines denounced in the oath, and many advocate corporate reunion with Rome. No longer can the Catholics of England be scornfully designated 'the Italian mission.' They are seen to be a powerful influence in the land, and the unified system of theological principles taught to the poorest child is a marked contrast to the flux of variable opinions which issue from the non-Catholic pulpit. Some light on the growth of the Church may be gained from the following statistics quoted by Archbishop Bourne at the National Congress in 1910. In 1850 on the re-establishment of the Catholic hierarchy in England the number of priests in England and Wales was 788, now it is 3,687; the number of churches was 587, now it is 1,760; the schools numbered 99 with 11,000 children attending, now they number 1,064 with 330,000 children attending. Many indeed are the evil and irreligious forces at work in the country, but we confidently trust that, in God's own time, the leaven of Catholic principles will restore the glorious traditions of an age long past when England was known as 'The Island of Saints' and 'Mary's dowry.'

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ARISTOTLE AS A PSYCHOLOGIST AND A METAPHYSICIAN.

Two questions of philosophy will always be of profound interest not only to the technical student of the science, but to every thinking person, namely, What is the soul? and How is the real world constituted? The first of these is the problem of psychology; the second is the problem of metaphysics. They have always interested mankind, ever since men began to reflect on their own thoughts. What is the soul? Is it a shadow, or is it a substance, and if it is a substance, is it different in kind from the body or only a more subtle sort of matter; is it a spirit or only a body; is it immortal, or does it too die when death claims the body for its own? And then, when we have answered these questions in one way or another, it is natural to reach out into the wider problem of the universe, its origin, its cause, its nature, and, more especially its constituents in the order of reality. In both these lines of inquiry Aristotle was, if not a pioneer, at least a systematizer and an original investigator to such an extent that he is said to be the founder both of psychology and of metaphysics.

Before Aristotle's time there were, it need hardly be said, men who thought seriously about the soul and its nature. He, however, was the first, so far as we know, to write a special work on the soul, and to organize into a system his views on the subject, so that, while there were, undoubtedly, among his predecessors some who composed treatises on questions of psychology, he was the first to write a book treating of all the problems of the science, and consequently, his work *On the Soul* is the first comprehensive treatise on the subject. There, he surveys the whole ground, reviews the opinions of those who went before him, discusses the nature of the soul in general, of the human soul in particular, and describes in succession the various functions and activities of the soul.

And here, at the very outset of our study, let us remove a possible source of misunderstanding. If I were to speak to you of horses and dogs having souls, some of you, I am sure, would be mildly surprised, or would, perhaps, think that I was an ardent, or somewhat over-zealous, member of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. If I were to go farther still, and speak of the soul of the rose or the oak tree, you would certainly be convinced that I was using words figuratively, and taking advantage, for the moment, of the license accorded to poets and imaginative writers. And if I were to ask you why you objected to the word soul in the case of animals and plants, you would, no doubt, answer, "Because animals and plants cannot think." In other words, you take for granted that soul and mind are the same, that the soul is the principle of thought, and that where there is no thought, at least where, as in the case of plants, there is no consciousness, there should be no mention of a soul. This is the too wide-spread misunderstanding, which is traceable to Descartes, the sixteenth century philosopher, who is regarded as the founder of modern philosophy. For him, the soul is the principle of thought, and soul and mind are synonymous. For the whole pre-Cartesian world, for the schoolmen, especially, and for Aristotle, their master, the soul has a wider meaning. It is the principle, not only of thought, but of every other vital activity as well. The soul is the principle of life, and since plants and animals have life, it is perfectly correct to speak of plant souls and animal souls. What is peculiar to man is not the possession of a soul, but the possession of a soul that is immaterial and spiritual. Intellectual thought and spiritual aspiration form a barrier between us and the rest of the universe; but life, which we share with all living things, is a bond between us and all other of creatures, or, at least, between us and the greater part of the world of nature around us. A saint, like Saint Francis, loves flowers and animals because they are his sisters and his brothers, being children of Our Common Father; but any man, be he sinner or saint, may feel, if he is sensitive enough, the bond

that binds us in the natural order to all living things. We must, then, adopt this wider idea of the soul if we are to understand what Aristotle has to say on the subject. We must adopt what I may call the biological, as opposed to the psychological, definition of the soul.

This notion, however, was not attained by the human mind at once. The soul-idea ran its course through mythology, popular misconception and imperfect scientific analysis, before Aristotle came and precised it for us in this way. Primitive man explained the activity of our waking moments by imagining that there is something within us which leaves us temporarily during sleep and departs permanently from us at the moment of death. This something the savage called a soul, a shadow, a phantom or a ghost. Through the influence of religious sentiment this notion was developed in several ways. For instance, stress was laid on the superiority of the soul to the body; consciousness of sin was imputed to the soul, though the blame for most sins was usually assigned to the body; life after death was ascribed to the soul, and transmigration, or the return of the soul in other bodies, was taught as a means or retribution for past offences. At this point philosophy took up the task. But not at the beginning of philosophic speculation. The first philosophers of Greece were interested almost exclusively in the origin of the universe, and had no notion of the soul except that which they borrowed from popular belief or from the prevalent religion. Later on, the distinction between the different kinds of knowledge, especially between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge, forced on the philosophers the consideration of the soul as a something superior to the body and yet somehow related to the body. There were materialists in those days, who, as usual, offered a facile solution that easily satisfied the superficial mind. They said: the soul is but a more refined kind of matter; the particles that compose it are round and smooth; these particles move without friction; hence thought, which is a function of the soul, is more perfect than sense knowledge, which is a function of the body; thought is not superior to sense knowl-

edge in kind, but only in degree. This solution could not commend itself to the more spiritually minded. Anaxagoras, for instance, could not for a moment admit that mind, as he calls it, is material; its activities, he said, show it to be superior to matter. Above all, Plato could not accept the materialistic view. For him, the spiritual is more real than the material; the soul is more necessary to the body than the body to the soul; spirit is not derived from matter, but matter from spirit. And so these spiritualistically minded philosophers conceived the soul to be a substance of a different kind from the body, indwelling in the body "like the sailor in a ship," says Plato, moving the body, being itself self-moved. Aristotle, reviewing these opinions, as he does in the first Book of his treatise *On the Soul*, calls attention at once to their inadequacy. The materialists, he thinks, do less than justice to the soul when they define it as a more subtle kind of matter; they overlook the immaterial activities of the soul, which cannot be explained by material causes. On the other hand, the ultra-spiritualists seem to him to exaggerate the distinction between the body and the soul when they make the soul to be an independent substance indwelling in the body and in contact with it in a merely accidental manner. He, therefore, puts forward his own definition of the soul as the principle of all the vital activities of the body. In this view, the soul is not a material substance; it is not a substance independent of the body; it forms one substance with the body, so that the union of the two is vital, intrinsic and substantial.

It is worth while to spend some effort in trying to realize what this definition means. All psychology sways between the two extremes of materialism and spiritualism of the exaggerated type. There are two terms in the problem: soul and body. Materialism, in effect, does away with one of these terms by reducing the soul to some condition or state of the body or by saying practically that the soul is a part of the body, for instance, the brain or the nervous system. Exaggerated spiritualism does away with the other term by minimising the importance of the body, regarding it ethically as

the prison house of the soul, or metaphysically as an illusion or error of the mind, or as a thought of the soul, or in some other way refining it, so to speak, out of existence: so that, in this view man, the human being, is essentially, the soul, and the body need not be taken into account. Man is a body, and nothing more, says the materialist. Man is a soul, and his body is a regrettable, but somehow persistent, intruder into the problem, says the spiritualist; and the intruder had best be ignored. Between these two extreme views of the problem of body and soul there is a multitude of opinions tending either towards crude materialism at the one end or towards the boldest idealism at the other. No matter where you stand on the question, you stand somewhere between these two points, materialism and ultra-spiritualism. Where, then, does Aristotle stand? He seems to me to stand at the only point, if I may say so, that is equidistant from the absurdity of either extreme. His position is logical and sane. He agrees with common sense; and, so far, I think, all the advance that empirical and experimental psychology have made in our day tends but to confirm his followers in the conviction that he is right. He holds that the body is real and that the soul also is real. At the same time, he maintains that they are in no way separate substances. They are two real principles of the one substance, man. The body is the passive principle, the soul is the active principle of all vital functions. The body does not contain the soul in the same way as the casket contains the jewel or the chemical test tube some highly volatile gas. The body is not transfused or interpenetrated by the soul, in the same way as the air in a room may be permeated by some subtle perfume, or the atmosphere in some day in June may be shot through and through by the rays of the sun. "Containing," "being permeated, transfused or interpenetrated": these are all inadequate to express the union of soul and body; for the union is vital and substantial. If I say that man viewed in one light is body, and viewed in another light, is soul, I have used an expression that is nearer the truth than any other that has been used so far. We commonly say it is the soul that

thinks, it is the body that walks. Aristotle would say the soul is the active and the body, in a sense, the passive principle of thought; and he would say with equal accuracy the soul is the active and the body is the passive principle of locomotion. The unreflecting mind, the popular mind, always falls into the habit of assigning some of our activities to the soul and others to the body. To the soul we assign what is immaterial, spiritual and aesthetic; it is the soul that sees beauty in a picture or a landscape. It is the body, we say, that moves from place to place, that digests food and transforms vital energy into muscular action when we work. But Aristotle would assign all these activities to both body and soul. In reality, it is the individual human being who does any of these things; in each case the body is the passive principle and the soul is the active principle. The same is true of our ascription of qualities. Piety, patriotism, charity, justice are said to be qualities of the soul. Health, strength of muscle, complexion of body are said to be physical qualities. But, the Aristotelian would say, these, too are qualities of soul; for, in so far as they are vital, the soul has a share in them.

If, now, we investigate the phenomena of life in plants, animals and human beings, we shall find that there are different kinds of vital functions. In plants the whole cycle is completed in the processes of nutrition, growth and reproduction. In animals, at least, in the higher animals, there are added locomotion and sensation. In man there is added still another class, the processes included under the general title "rational thought." The human soul, therefore, differs from the souls of lower animals and of plants by the fact that it is the principle of thought as well as the principle of all the lower functions. And this brings us to the consideration of intellect, mind or reason, as we call it, which is not a part of the soul, but a function, or rather a faculty, or power, of the human soul. The study of the intellectual powers of the soul leads, naturally, to a discussion of knowledge, which I hope, will throw further light on the nature of the soul and its relation

It is a principle of method with Aristotle that "In every department of nature we must first ascertain the facts and, after that, state the causes." Now, the first facts in relation to knowledge are these. All our knowledge begins with sense-knowledge. The intellect has no innate ideas: we do not come into this life "trailing clouds of glory," except in the sense that we bring with us a God-given and God-like power of acquiring ideas. At the beginning, the mind, says Aristotle, is like a blank page on which nothing is written. The page is perfectly blank: it is not even a palimpsest on which are characters at first indiscernible, to be later brought to light by a power of recollection. That was Plato's doctrine. Aristotle holds that all our knowledge is acquired, acquired through the senses. The senses are the doors and windows of the soul. Only through them can knowledge come to us. A man who is born blind can acquire knowledge by means of his other senses, wisdom being, in Milton's pathetic phrase, "from one entrance quite shut out." But, if a man had no senses at all, if he were deprived of hearing, smell, taste and touch, as well as of sight, he should, if he could live at all, be compelled to pass his life without any knowledge of anything. The mind cannot evolve a single idea out of itself, without working on the materials supplied by the senses. "There is nothing in the Intellect," say the Aristotelians, "that was not first in the senses." The first series of facts, then, that we observe in regard to the intellect leads to the conclusion that it depends essentially on the senses. If, now, we turn to examine and compare the kind of knowledge that we get through the senses alone, and that which the intellect elaborates from sense-knowledge, we shall find that, while the intellect depends on the senses, intellectual knowledge is generically different from, and superior to, sense-knowledge. Through the senses we get impressions, as of color, of sound, of sweetness, etc. By means of the senses we combine, or rather unite, these impressions into what we nowadays called percepts; such, for instance, is my percept of the table here before me, made up from impressions of color, shape, hardness, etc. We are still within the region

of sense. At this point, intellect takes up the work, and from the data of the senses, that is from impressions and percepts, it extracts, or abstracts, general ideas or concepts. It is clear, says Aristotle, that while a percept and a concept may represent the same thing, they represent it differently. The percept is a sense-image, representing only material things, and representing them in a singular and contingent manner; it represents *this* table, *that* chair, the red book before me on my desk. The concept, or idea is an intellectual image; it may represent an immaterial thing such as justice, and it always represents universally for instance, *a* chair, *a* table, *a* book. Moreover, the content of a percept is contingent: the table that is round may be made square, the chair that is standing on its feet may be tilted, the red book may be rebound in black, and the percept will have to change its content if it is to remain true. But the content of an idea is necessary. A triangle is always a figure of three sides, nothing more, nothing less. A chair is an article of furniture of a certain kind; its definition does not change, and the idea represents the definition. It is evident, then, that an intellectual image, which we call an idea, is different in kind from a sense-image which is a mere impression, or percept. The idea is universal and necessary; the sense image is particular and contingent. Therefore, Aristotle concludes, intellectual knowledge is superior to sense-knowledge. In these two words, then, *dependence* and *superiority*, we may sum up his doctrine on this point. By teaching that intellect is superior to sense, he avoids the doctrine of sensism; by holding that intellect depends on the senses, he avoids the other extreme, innatism. Sensism is only materialism applied to psychology, and innatism is merely an inference from the ultra-spiritualistic doctrine of the soul. Here, then, we have the same problem over again that we had when dealing with the relation between soul and body, and here, as in the other case, Aristotle avoids the inconvenience of both extreme doctrines by striving to hold a middle course between them.

Since the intellect, in the acquisition of ideas, attains the

necessary and the universal, it must be immaterial. Here, however, we are face to face with the greatest problem of interpretation that is to be met with in the study of Aristotle. We cannot avoid discussing it, because it had momentous consequences in the subsequent career of Aristotelianism, and because, even at the present day, it divides the interpreters of Aristotle into two opposing camps. The intellect in the act of extracting ideas from the data of sense—let us once for all designate it as the Active Intellect—must, we have said, be immaterial. But where and what, is this power which creates (in the large sense of the word) the material of our higher mental life? Is it a faculty of the individual soul, like memory, or imagination, or the sense of sight, or the power of judging or reasoning? Or is it something outside the individual, common to all men, coming into contact with the individual soul for a moment and then deserting it until there is once more occasion for its intervention? Or is it God Himself, or some Divine Influence that thus dominates our intellectual life? It may be admitted at once that all these interpretations have been held, that some of them are still held, and that there are passages in the work *On the Soul* which apparently justify, now one, now another, interpretation. The great Arabian commentators, of whom we shall have more to say, later, held that the Active Intellect is one for all men and separate from the individual soul. Hence, they inferred, the individual soul is not necessarily immortal; at least, it cannot be proved to be immortal, because the only title it could have to immortality, its power to create universal ideas, does not really belong to it at all. On the contrary, all the schoolmen held that the Active Intellect is to be understood as a faculty of the individual soul; they held this to be the meaning of Aristotle's words and they repudiated the Arabian interpretation, not only because it jeopardized individual immortality, but because it seemed to them to misrepresent Aristotle. The study of the text does not help us much; for, unfortunately, the text is corrupt or doubtful just where we should expect to find it most decisive. This much, however, is clear, the inter-

pretation of the schoolmen is more in harmony with the general spirit of Aristotelianism. There was nothing of the mystic in Aristotle. Whatever mysticism was later associated with his philosophy is due to the commentators, who interpreted to suit their own mystic tendency the very passages we are just now considering. The question is mentioned at this point chiefly because the doctrines already described lead up to it. In the paper on Aristotle and the Medieval Church it will come up again for discussion.

We are now prepared to consider the question did Aristotle teach that the soul is immortal? Yes and No. If the Active Intellect is part of the individual soul, or rather a power or faculty of it, since it is immaterial, it and, therefore, the soul to which it belongs, must be immortal. If, on the other hand, the Active Intellect is something outside us and above us, holding communion with us from time to time, but not indwelling in us, there is nothing in the individual soul to entitle it to exemption from death. On this most important point, one of the most momentous is the whole range of philosophical inquiry, Aristotle must be judged far inferior to Plato. Socrates was personally convinced of the soul's immortality, but so far as we know, he left us no formal proof of it. Plato was equally convinced that the rational part of the soul is immortal, and he left us a series of proofs which, if they are not rigorously valid, at least contribute by their eloquence, their earnestness, and their sublime beauty, to increase our conviction that we are immortal. Aristotle, no doubt, believed as firmly as Socrates and Plato; we may even go so far as to say that his proof of the immortality of the Active Intellect is more cogent than all Plato's arguments. Yet, owing to the obscurity of the passages in which he sets forth his doctrine, it was possible, as we shall see later, for commentators to maintain that he denied the soul's immortality. Even the great scholastic admirers of Aristotle found him unsatisfactory on this point.

Before passing on to the study of Aristotle's great work on *Metaphysics*, it will, I think, be profitable for us to pause here a moment and take up a question which is partly psychol-

ogical and partly metaphysical, the question of the value of knowledge, which, as some of you, no doubt are aware, is *the* problem of philosophy at the present moment. Those of us who have not studied philosophy have, I dare say, never raised the question at all, even in our own minds. We have taken for granted that our thoughts represent things as they really are in a world outside us and independent of us. That is the view of common sense. But a philosopher, if he cared to upset our faith in the verdict of common sense could easily do so. He would begin by calling our attention to what he considers an evident fact of observation, namely, that our sense impressions have in them no reference to anything outside our own mind. We see whiteness; but whiteness is a sensation, and does not exist except in our senses. We taste sweetness; but sweetness exists only in the organ of taste. And so on. The piece of sugar that we imagine to exist on the table before us reduces itself to a sensation of whiteness, a sensation of sweetness, etc., all of which exist only in our own consciousness. The piece of sugar, therefore, exists only in our mind. It is, in this analysis, a thought, not a thing at all. Similarly, everything else in the so-called external world is only a thought; there are, strictly speaking no things, no reality outside the mind. Nothing exists except thoughts, or ideas—this is the doctrine of idealism in philosophy. And it is not, as some may, perhaps, think, a puzzle to test beginners in philosophy, a kind of *pons asinorum*, or a trick of logic like that by which a person will undertake to prove to us that every cat has ten tails. It is a serious question, discussed quite seriously by learned professors of philosophy; and the conclusion is gravely and, I may add, courageously, admitted, that in spite of common sense, the so-called external world does not really exist. Every reader of J. M. Barrie has enjoyed the passage in *An Edinburgh Eleven*, where he describes the effect that was produced on him by the lectures of Alexander Campbell Fraser; how he returned to his lodgings mystified and perplexed, and for hours sat with bent head meditating on the possibly negative answer to the question “Do I exist, *properly so called?*” The

question of philosophy today is: Does anything *exist properly so called*; is it not all an illusion, or at least, "such stuff as dreams are made of?" Common sense says that things do exist, properly so called; this table exists, you exist, I exist, the statue of Liberty in New York harbor exists. At one time, it is true, that statue was only a thought in the mind of the artist, Bartholdi. But, says common sense, it exists now as a reality, and if you doubt it, go down and see it, draw close to it, touch it and realize that it exists. Yes, says the idealist philosopher—who is in many seats of learning at the present day—yes, you think it exists, because you have certain impressions of color, and muscular sensations and sensations of touch. But these, when you analyse them, are only states of consciousness. Therefore all you are warranted in saying is "I have a complex state of consciousness which I call the Statue of Liberty." On such questions Aristotle is on the side of common sense. The question was up for discussion in a different form in his day, but in a form essentially the same as that of the present day problem. It all turns on a simple fact of observation. As often happens in philosophy, an apparently trivial difference at an early stage of the argument leads to tremendously different consequences later on. We are told that down in Mississippi, when the river is at danger point, the enemy of some planter, wishing to ruin a whole plantation, will steal to the levee at night and try to cause it to collapse. Sometimes, they say, where the levee is already weakened by the action of the current, an opening made with the point of a fishing pole is sufficient to let in a tiny thread of water, which, working gradually larger, will soon cause the levee to collapse and end by inundating the country for hundreds of miles. Something like that happens occasionally in philosophy. Common sense says the world outside us exists independently of our thoughts; idealism says that all that vast world, the sun, the moon, the stars, the earth with its mountains and oceans and rivers and streams, its forests and deserts, its busy, thriving cities, its farreaching stretches of prosperous farmland, its millions of plants and animals and

men—that all this exists only in our minds. The tiny aperture that admits this flood of differences is, as I said, a matter apparently easy to decide. The idealist says what I perceive is whiteness or sweetness or some other sensation. The common sense philosopher says No, what I perceive is a something-white-distinct-from-myself, a something-sweet-distinct-from-myself. In other words, common sense philosophy says that the distinction between self and not-self, between thoughts and things is not of our own making, but is forced upon us by our experience in the very simplest processes of knowledge. And so the whole question is thrown back on observation. We have to try and catch ourselves in the act of knowing, and observe what takes place. I do not think that practical people, if left to themselves, will be seriously disturbed by the thought that, possibly, the external world does not exist. If, however, one reads even an essay on philosophy nowadays, one cannot help learning that there is such a problem, and I should feel that justice had not been done to Aristotle if we had failed to register his verdict on the side of common sense.

The same saneness, if I may so call it, which saved Aristotle from running counter to common sense in his theory of knowledge, characterises what he has to say in his *Metaphysics* about the constitution of reality. Someone, indeed, has defined metaphysics as organized common sense; someone else has said that it is an unusually obstinate effort to think accurately. And if the science so described is the bugbear of many, it is largely because of the vagaries of the idealists about whom we have just been talking. In this paper we cannot hope to do more than give a general notion of what Aristotle means by metaphysics and describe very briefly some of his most important metaphysical doctrines. The word metaphysics needs to be defined. There is hardly another word in the English language that is so often misused. Any philosophy that is abstruse or unintelligible is sure to be labelled metaphysics. It was, I suppose, in reference to some such philosophy that metaphysics was defined "Looking in a dark room for a black hat that isn't there." Then we have "metaphysical healing," and

it is not at all uncommon to see at a country fair a gaudily painted canvas announcing that "Madame So-and-So, *Professor of Metaphysics*, will read one's fortune and foretell one's future: one palm fifty cents, both palms one dollar." It is, indeed, necessary to define metaphysics, and I believe we can have no better instructor in this matter than Aristotle, who founded the science.

Aristotle defines science in general as knowledge of things in their causes. The difference between scientific knowledge and knowledge that is not scientific is not a difference in accuracy, nor a difference in usefulness. Knowledge that is not scientific may be accurate; it may also be useful: it may even be more accurate and more useful than scientific knowledge. The trapper or the hunter or the loafer who happens to have one pursuit and that the gentle art of angling, may know a country district perfectly. He may know its every nook and corner, he may know where every rock and stream and hill is located, he may know the height and depth of each; he may know where the wood is thickest, what kind of trees grow there, and what kind of grass; but he cannot tell *why* the rock is there, *why* the hill is such a height, *why* pines grow in one place and oaks in another, *why* the bank is mossy, and the river bed filled with shining pebbles. The professor of geology and botany in the neighboring high school knows the same district, and he can give a reason, or assign the cause for all the facts which the other cannot explain. The hunter or fisherman has knowledge which is not scientific, but it is none the less accurate and useful. Indeed, if a body of troops were to be led through the district, I have no doubt the commander would rather have the hunter than the professor as a guide. Scientific knowledge, then, is knowledge which assigns a reason or cause. If I know that the rails of a street car track are longer in summer than in winter, I know a fact. If I knew that the difference in length is due to heat, I assign a cause, and my knowledge begins to be scientific.

Starting, then with this general notion of science, Aristotle proceeds towards his definition of metaphysics in the follow-

ing manner. All sciences seek causes. The physicist is interested only in those things which possess color, heat or other form of motion; and the causes which he seeks belong to that order of reality. The mathematician does not care whether the object of his study has physical qualities or not: color does not interest him, nor heat, nor any other mode of motion: he is interested in things that have quantity, and the causes which he assigns belong to the order of quantity. The metaphysician is directly interested, neither in physical qualities nor in quantity; he studies even such things as God and the human soul, which have neither quantity nor color. He is interested in reality; and the causes which he assigns are of the order of reality in general, transcending both the physical and the mathematical. If we consider the scope of the metaphysician's inquiry, we shall find that he is interested in everything. He claims the whole world of reality for his domain. The physicist must confine himself to his own realm; with the immaterial and the spiritual he has nothing to do, as a scientist. The mathematician must restrict his enquiry and his conclusions to the realm of things possessing quantity; the immaterial and spiritual are outside his province too. The metaphysician knows no such restrictions. He roams up and down the universe, physical, mathematical and spiritual; so long as a thing is real in any order whatever, it belongs to his science. But, it does not follow from this that metaphysics is merely an encyclopedic summary of the other sciences; it does not follow that the metaphysician is the man who carries in his one intellect all the knowledge that the other scientists acquire. His point of view is different. Like the traveller who, at the highest point of the mountain range, gains a wider view, but at the same time a unitary view, including all that can be seen from each of the lower peaks, so the metaphysician looks out on all reality and sees that portion of it which the physicist sees or the mathematician sees, but he sees it from a higher point. Metaphysics, then is the most universal of the sciences, because it comprehends all reality in its survey. It is the highest in its point of view, because it seeks, not the

proximate causes, as the others do, but the highest and most general causes; thus it culminates, as Aristotle remarked, in the consideration of God the First and most Universal of all causes.

To admit this definition of metaphysics was, to Aristotle's way of thinking, to admit that metaphysics is the most important of all the sciences. Indeed, he puts forward the explicit claim that metaphysics is the hegemonic, or ruling, science. It is, he says, at the foundation of all the other sciences, and is at the same time, the culmination of them all. The comparison is, perhaps, a bit bewildering. How can metaphysics be at once the foundation and the coping-stone of the edifice of knowledge? Let us vary the metaphor, and we shall be nearer the truth, perhaps, if we regard metaphysics as a territory surrounding, and including the territories of all the other sciences. Any path which we take in physics, biology, chemistry, or mathematics, whichever way we follow it, will lead back to metaphysics or forward to metaphysics, unless indeed, we meet, as we often do in scientific works, a sign "Danger! this road leads to metaphysics!" The presuppositions of physics are justified in metaphysics, and every physical problem, if pursued far enough, leads us to the consideration of the ultimate nature of matter, motion, force, etc., which is a metaphysical problem. To Aristotle it seemed utterly absurd that anyone should try to dispense with metaphysics in a scheme of scientific knowledge. Truth, he said, is one; the mind of the learner is one; therefore there ought to be in a scheme of knowledge one science which would give unity, cohesiveness and articulation to the whole body of facts, laws and principles acquired by science. Aristotle, it seems to me, was right. From the point of view of education, his contention is correct that there must be a unifying, co-ordinating and organizing science, if the other sciences are to be saved from one-sided progress, unbalanced development and specialization to the point of fragmentation. The sciences, as we call them, need metaphysics as much as metaphysics needs them. For the truly cultured mind, metaphysics is a necessity. It is

needed if there is to be order and not chaos in the contents of the mind. The demand for it is natural, and to forbid the study of metaphysics as unscientific is to set up a "No Trespass" sign in a thoroughfare where all have a perfect right to travel. Metaphysics has lent the shelter of its name to many of the aberrations of the human mind: that, however, is no reason why it should be deprived of its legitimate rights.

Passing over now, the whole body of metaphysical doctrine, in which Aristotle analysed our notions of Being, Substance, Quantity, and so forth, we come to the doctrine in which, according to him, all metaphysical speculation culminates—the doctrine regarding the existence and nature of God. Socrates had already introduced the argument from design. He had formulated the principle that "Whatever exists for a useful purpose must be the work of intelligence," and had referred in a general way to the evidences of useful purpose found in nature. Aristotle, with his wider knowledge of natural science and his keener insight into the meaning of natural phenomena, supplied additional evidence of purposiveness, and added strength to the argument from that side. He did more, however; he added a new argument furnished by his analysis of the nature of motion. Motion, he says, ordinarily implies a mover and a thing moved. If my hand moves a cane and the cane moves a stone that lies in my path, the cane is a mover, the stone is the thing moved, and again my hand is a mover and the cane is the thing moved. Here we have a series, the stone, the cane, the hand. In such a series, says Aristotle, we must, if we go back far enough, come to the first in the series which, while it moves the next in the series, and so moves all the others, is itself unmoved. All nature is such a series. Therefore, there must be somewhere the First Mover, Itself Unmoved. In the work on *Physics*, where this question is discussed, Aristotle appears to identify the First Mover with the First Heaven. His meaning is that each of the heavenly bodies, the earth, the moon, the planets, the sun, is moved by the heavenly sphere above it, until we come to the last of the visible spheres, the sphere of the fixed stars. That, too, is moved

by what is above it, namely, the First Heaven; but in a very curious way. A planet, let us say, is moved by the sun, in as much as the sun gives it a kind of physical impulse, pushing it, or driving it along its course—Aristotle has no inkling of movement by physical attraction. But when we come to the First Heaven, *that* moves, not by imparting an impulse, but by attracting (in a metaphorical sense) the next sphere towards it. The First Heaven is beautiful, it is good, it is desirable; and the sphere next beneath it is endowed with intelligence. Just as the noble-minded man is drawn towards a friend in whom he sees nobility of character and moral grandeur, just as the mind is drawn towards lofty ideals, so the lower sphere turns to the First Heaven, observes its desirability, and is drawn towards it in admiration and love. This is the love, of which Dante speaks,

“Which moves the sun and all the other stars.”

A curious idea this, according to modern notions, yet full of poetic possibilities. There is a survival of it in Milton's way of speaking about the heavenly bodies.

The notion that God, the First Cause, is the First Heaven in the physical order is superseded in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* by the doctrine that the First Cause is Intelligence. The life of God is thought. He dwells in endless contemplation. Everywhere Aristotle places theory above practice, and so here he places contemplation above action. Supreme reality is thought. The highest perfection of all is the eternal thought in which the life of God consists. If, now, you ask What is the object of God's thought? Aristotle answers: God Himself. He is the Thought of Thought, the Intelligence of Intelligence. Like some powerful Oriental monarch, he shuts himself up in the majesty and splendor of His Own Thought, and it would degrade Him unutterably to mingle with mundane affairs or even to have anything inferior to Himself occupy His thought for an instant. The shortcomings of this idea of God strike us at once. To our Christian way of thinking, God is Love and Life, as well as Thought. He thinks of us and loves us.

And not only does He think of us and love us; but He thinks of and loves the lowliest of His creatures. To our way of thinking, God's greatness is not diminished, but enhanced by the doctrine of Providence, His glory is not dimmed, but shines out more resplendently in the care and thought with which He envelopes, as with a mantle, the whole universe of his creatures. The denial of Providence, and the exclusion of volition and love from the idea of God—these are the greatest blemishes in Aristotle's treatment of this important metaphysical question.

These defects were not corrected, but were rather emphasized by those who, during the last centuries of the pre-Christian era and the first few hundred years after Christ, undertook to expound the metaphysics of Aristotle. The aloofness of God from the world; the notion that it would degrade Him to think about, and much more so, to interfere with, the trivial things that make up our lives here below; the belief that matter is somehow opposed to God, and the source of all moral evil as well as of physical pain and suffering—these are the fundamental tenets of the Neo-Platonists, as they are called, into whose hands the teaching of Aristotle passed, and by whom it was expounded during all those centuries. We shall see in a later study how these influences perverted the genuine meaning of Aristotle's metaphysics, so that the Aristotle who came into contact with medieval Christianity in the thirteenth century of our era was very different from the Aristotle who placed the doctrine concerning God as the coping-stone to his philosophical edifice towards the end of the fourth century before Christ.

WILLIAM TURNER.

THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF MONASTICISM.

A peculiar feature in the writings of many of those who at the present time pride themselves on originality of ideas and progress in thought is the frequent appeal to history for substantiation of their views. The new receives its value from being old. Even historic civilizations are condemned at times as being at variance with the customs of prehistoric man. Thus while the more radical advocates of a social upheaval are careful to place religion, and especially the Catholic religion, among the institutions which will suffer extinction in the proposed revolution, we find them at times appealing to some forms of social organisation which came into being under Christian influences as models for a new social scheme. Socialists of the Marxian school find no place for religion in their philosophy of the future. They eliminate the supernatural and with it of course all forms of worship and devotion. Nevertheless they do not hesitate to assert that Christianity is socialistic in origin and essence, and they save themselves from the apparent incongruity of testing the validity of their claims by something they wish to reject, through the general principle that all the great factors in life originate in and are conditioned by economic causes. The more moderate socialists, who find nothing incompatible between their theories and a belief in religion, attempt to strengthen their cause by asserting that the tenets they represent exhibit fully the spirit of the gospel and its interpretation in the lives of the first followers of Christ and the teachings of the early Church.¹ Condemnation of usury and avarice, the praise of poverty and denunciation of

¹ Nitti, "Catholic Socialism," Eng. Trans., p. 64. "We are bound to admit that Christianity was a vast economic revolution more than anything else. The first Christians did not seek to acquire wealth; like Christ they sought to annihilate it. Like their Great Master, they had no conception of civil government; the religious idea so dominated them as to destroy all differences of nationality or social condition."

riches, wherever they are found, are taken to mean that the early Christian teachers were opposed on principle to the doctrine of private property. Monasticism in particular is triumphantly stated to be an obvious expression of the inherent opposition of Christianity to a capitalistic régime and a convincing proof that in essence the gospel is communistic.

As a general rule non-Catholic writers exhibit very little sympathy or appreciation for the monastic movement. If they do not entirely reject Christianity they show their disapproval of monasticism by tracing its origin to sources other than the gospel. Hatch finds that the tendency to monasticism came mainly from the Greek philosophical schools. "It was indeed," he says, "known as philosophy. It was most akin to Cynicism, with which it had sometimes already been confused, and its badges were the badges of Cynicism, the rough blanket and the unshorn hair. To wear the blanket and let the hair grow was to profess divine philosophy, the higher life of self-discipline and sanctity."² Others consider Monasticism to be the result of "the universal predominance of the Manichean doctrine of the inherent evil of matter"³ or find its source in Buddhism⁴ in the worship of the Egyptian deity Serapis,⁵ in the teachings of the Neo-Platonists⁶ or set it down as being a revolt against the secularisation of the Church, which led the ascetically-minded to fly "not from the world, but from the world within the Church."⁷ It has remained, however, for the socialists to exalt primitive monasticism as a protest against Capitalism and to have taken it bodily into the socialist camp, not only as a precious memorial left by the early Church of an effort to realize the blessings of a communistic dispensation, but as a standing proof of the feasibility of collectivist administration.

¹ "The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church," *Hibbert Lectures*, 1888, p. 166.

² Milman, *The History of Christianity*, Bk. III, chap. XI.

³ Hilgenfeld, *Zeitschrift f. wissenschaftl. Theologie*, 1878, p. 148.

⁴ Weingarten, "Der Ursprung des Mönchtums im nachoonstantinischen Zeitalter," *Zeitsch. f. Kirchengeschichte*, 1877. Art. "Mönchtum" in the *Realencyclopädie f. protest. Theologie und Kirche*.

⁵ Keim, *Aus dem Urchristentum*, p. 215 seq.

⁶ Harnack, *Monasticism, Its Ideals and Its History*, Eng. Trans., p. 22.

It is a poor philosophy which will not cover all the facts and phenomena in its field. The place of Monasticism in the general scheme of human events as defined by the upholders of the economic philosophy of history has been most lucidly and most fully set forth by Kautsky, whose views may be taken as the latest if not the final judgment of his school,⁸ and for whom apparently historic reality has no significance.

Assuming in accordance with the general principles of the Marxian Philosophy of History that the Christian religion had an economic basis, Kautsky asserts that in essence it is communistic, that it originated as a movement for social reform among the slaves and the proletariat, that it gradually abandoned its communistic character, and, through the patronage of the Emperors, attained power as a state church, becoming in the process the support of the capitalistic class. Its triumph was not a victory for the proletariat, but for the grasping and exploiting clergy: it acquired influence not as a reform power, but as a conservative force, as a new prop for exploitation and oppression. It ceased to be a foe to the poverty of the masses and the increasing wealth of the few and turned from its original purpose to become the mainstay of what it arose to destroy.⁹

This transformation, it is asserted, was not accomplished without protest and opposition. The social conditions which had produced the early Christian democratic communism, continued unabated and even became more oppressive as the Empire weakened and declined. In the Church the abandonment of social reform and the alliance with the state produced a reaction. New democratic and communistic sects sprang into existence, as for example the Circumcellions who in the time of Constantine gave force and point to the struggle against the State and the State-Church by organizing themselves into robber-bands to make war on wealth and class. They even fought against the imperial troops, but the soldiers and the Catholic clergy crushed the rebellion.

⁸ *Der Ursprung des Christentums*. Stuttgart, 1910, p. 481 seq.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 441 seq., 496. This is a summary not a translation of Kautsky's opinions.

Christianity was the State-Church,—the tool of Despotism and Exploitation. It possessed enormous power and resources, and it might well seem that all aspirations for communism had been stifled. That such a result was not attained was due to the fact that the Church, up to the time of its recognition by the state, was confined to the great cities. Only in them could it maintain itself in the period of persecution. When opposition ceased nothing stood in the way of its spread to the country districts, and in these new centres of life the old communistic spirit revived. Precisely at the period when Christianity was tolerated by the rulers of the Empire, monasteries commenced to flourish in Egypt and spread thence to other parts of the Empire. In this way Christianity manifested its natural tendency, and gave proof of the pressing need for social regeneration along communistic lines. Neither the civil nor the ecclesiastical rulers opposed this development. To them it was a distinct gain if the communistic agitators transferred themselves and their doctrines from the cities to the desert, where they were allowed to grow their cabbages in peace.

These communistic settlements were animated by religious enthusiasm: but the real cause of their success is traceable to the economic conditions of the times. Thus through monasticism, the communistic spirit of Christianity received new life and vigor in a form and direction that had no semblance of heretical opposition to the ruling ecclesiastical bureaucracy. The very aloofness and distinction of these new communities were their undoing. The monks became an aristocracy apart from and above the rest of society, which in course of time they ruled and exploited.¹⁰

This summary of the opinions of one of the leading representatives of philosophic socialism, the editor of the "*Neue Zeit*" regarding the character and origin of monasticism, is all the more interesting as it places a follower of Marx in the curious and paradoxical position of defending a movement that was essentially ascetical, and accepting primitive Monasticism not only as the true expression of Christian life, but as a form

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 481 seq.

of social organisation which resulted directly from economic causes. A favorable verdict from such a quarter is undoubtedly very flattering to the memory of the founders of the early monastic communities: but in view of the determinism of Marxian economists and the rigor of economic laws, it may seriously be doubted whether the propaganda of the "Neue Zeit" will be successful unless its editor can offer as the fruit of communism something more attractive to the natural man than the fasts and rags of the early monks.

The assumptions and assertions in Kautsky's estimate of the origin and nature of Christian monasticism may be reduced to three: 1st. that monasticism came into existence as a direct result of the peace between the Church and state in the beginning of the fourth century, or, in other words, of the *entente cordiale* between the ecclesiastical bureaucracy and the ruling capitalistic class; 2nd. that monasticism was an economic movement; 3rd. that it was collectivist in nature and purpose. It is one of the faults of the defenders of the materialistic interpretation of history that they do not seek for their philosophy in facts and phenomena. In the present case the cause of communism cannot derive much advantage from the growth of the monastic movement, for it can be shown: 1st. that in essence monasticism was thoroughly independent of local or political conditions and that its rise in the Christian Church contemporaneously with the cessation of persecution was largely a mere coincidence; 2nd. the reasons leading to its development show no influence of economic causes, nor of any desire on the part of its founders for social changes; 3rd. in essence and origin it was individualistic and only through a gradual evolution did it attain a collectivist character.

In regard to the first assertion, namely that the monastic movement at the beginning of the fourth century resulted from the change in the legal status of the Christians, there are two points that deserve consideration. Kautsky lays great stress on the fact that Christianity during the period of persecution was confined to the towns and cities.¹¹ It is true that in the begin-

¹¹ "Bis zu ihren staatlichen Anerkennung war die verbreitung des Christ-

ning, from causes directly connected with the exigencies of mission preaching and the persistence of superstition in small and remote communities, the gospel found a readier acceptance in the great centres of population than in remote localities; but long before the time of the edict of Milan it had penetrated to the country districts in most parts of the Empire. In his summary of the results of the missionary activity of the Christians in the first three centuries Harnack expresses the conclusion that: "Christianity had already pushed far into the country districts throughout a large number of the provinces, as we know definitely with regard to the majority of the provinces in Asia Minor, no less than as regards Armenia, Syria, Egypt, Palestine and Northern Africa (with its country towns). Wherever we possess sources bearing on the inner history of the churches in a given province, we light upon a series of small places, otherwise unknown, with Christian inhabitants, or villages which either contain Christians or are themselves entirely Christian. . . . All this shows how deeply Christianity had penetrated the country districts in a number of provinces during the course of the third century, while at the same time it warns us to multiply considerably, the number of such places as we happen to know of, if we want to get any idea of the extent to which Christianity had diffused itself locally."¹²

If primitive Christianity was a socialistic reform movement, which required only a free field for the manifestation of its true nature, it seems strange that there is no trace of communism in the Church of Bithynia-Pontus in the second century, when the faithful were still unspoiled by contact with wealth and power, and when, on the testimony of the imperial governor of the province, the gospel had found a footing in the lowlands and among all classes in the population.¹³ During the third century especially, had the need for legal authorisation

lichen Gemeindelebens im wesentlichen auf die grossen Städte beschränkt gewesen. Nur dort konnte es sich in den Zeiten der Verfolgungen behaupten." *Ibid.*, p. 483.

¹² *Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries*. Eng. Trans., vol. II, p. 327.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

been necessary for the organization of monastic settlements there is no reason for thinking that such would not have been forthcoming. The Church enjoyed long periods of unbroken peace. The Emperor Alexander Severus admitted its right to possess property,¹⁴ and even though the churches and cemeteries were afterwards expropriated by Valerian, a later ruler, Aurelian in the famous case of Paul of Samosata,¹⁵ laid down a principle under which the monks might have remained in undisturbed possession of their huts or monasteries, if communistic cravings had drawn any of them together.

A second feature of Kautsky's estimate of the rise of monasticism is that he looks on it as a somewhat isolated phenomenon, a movement held in abeyance by the "world in the Church," which awoke to new life under the magic of state toleration by which it was permitted to revive and recuperate in country places.¹⁶ How far this is from being correct will be clear from a consideration of the nature and antecedents of primitive monasticism.

Monasticism has been defined as Social Asceticism. In its peculiarly Christian form it is distinguished by the observance of the three practices of Poverty, Chastity and Obedience. Poverty means renunciation of private property: Chastity including cloistral solitude and celibacy, abstinence from worldly intercourse; and Obedience the surrender of will to a superior.¹⁷ Hence Monasticism and Asceticism are inseparable and as a consequence the origin of Monasticism is to be found in the ascetical movement of which it is the culmination. All the forms of ascetical activity may be found in the monastic life. They differ from the latter only in as far as the initiative of

¹⁴ Lampridius, *Vita Severi*, c. 49.

¹⁵ Eusebius, *His. Eccles.*, Bk. vii, chap. 30.

¹⁶ "Dieser erwachte sofort wieder zu neuem Leben in christlicher Form, sobald die Möglichkeit offenen kommunistischer Organisation auf dem flachen Lande gegeben war. Ein Zeichen, welches starkem Bedürfnis entsprach. Genau um dieselbe Zeit, in der das Christentum staatlich anerkannt wird, im Anfang des vierten Jahrhunderts, entstehen die ersten Klöster in Ägypten, daneben bald andere in den verschiedensten Teilen des Reiches folgen." P. 484.

¹⁷ Zückler, *Askese und Mönchtum*, p. 9 seq.

the individual ascetic is made subject to prescribed regulations, through the observance of a rule which gives scope and opportunity for the exercise of the virtue of obedience. As in the life of the individual ascetic there is progress from the observance of one counsel of perfection to another, and from the less rigorous to the more rigorous practice of the same counsel, so in the history of asceticism there was progress from the individual strivings of many seekers after perfection to the united action of many finding in corporate activity a life of fraternal love and service in which the social as well as the individual virtues might find expression and out of which might arise a social condition in which there should be no distinction of precept and counsel. When the latter stage was reached asceticism became monasticism.

It is futile, therefore, to attempt to separate monasticism from the ascetical movement out of which it grew, or to refer its origin to external causes, when the elements entering into its composition were already to hand and needed only to be united and coordinated. These elements existed in the Christian Church from the beginning. The highest ideal of perfection was the life of Christ. None, it is true, might hope to equal that perfect model; but there were other standards, over and above the mere requirements of the law, that lay within the reach of all. The gospel, in holding up those standards, defined in outline at least the main features of the ascetical life. Thus poverty, renunciation, fasting, vigilance, mortification, chastity, virginity, prayer and meditation are all inculcated as means to the attainment of perfection. The manner and measure of these practices were not defined, nor was it made incumbent on the faithful to accept them all. Nevertheless, even from the earliest times there were some Christians, notwithstanding the fact that the great mass of the faithful were drawn from the poorer classes, who abandoned all their earthly possessions in order to practise evangelical poverty, and to be better able to serve God. Speaking of the time of Trajan, Eusebius says: "Most of the disciples of that time, animated by the divine word with a more ardent love for philosophy (*i. e.*, an ascetic manner of life) had already fulfilled the command of the

Saviour, and had distributed their goods to the needy. Then starting out upon long journeys, they performed the office of evangelists, being filled with the desire to preach Christ to those who had not yet heard the word of faith, and to deliver to them the divine gospels."¹⁸ The same thought is found in Hermas, who says the rich must abandon their wealth in order that like stones that are hewed and rounded they may be fit for the Tower of the Kingdom. And yet ascetically-minded as he was, Hermas did not consider that renunciation of private property was necessarily connected with the idea of the Kingdom of God. "The Lord," he says, "ordered their riches to be cut down, not to be taken away forever, that they might be able to do some good with what was left them."¹⁹ Not only men but even women long before the rise of monasticism gave up all they possessed in order to live in voluntary poverty. "As Porphyry puts it angrily (*Macar., Magnes* III, 5): "Not in the far past, but only yesterday, Christians read Matt. XIX, 21, to prominent women, and persuaded them to share all their possessions and goods among the poor, to reduce themselves to beggary, to ask charity, and thus to sink from independence into unseemly pauperism, reducing themselves from their former good position to a woebegone condition, and being finally obliged to knock at the doors of those who were better off."²⁰ History has preserved the names of some of those who undertook the practice of voluntary poverty: Cyprian, who sold his estates and distributed the proceeds among the poor,²¹ Origen who disposed of his collection of valuable old books, and confined himself to four oboli a day,²² and Gregory Thaumaturgus who got rid of all his possessions the better to practice the true Christian life.²³ In none of these cases nor in any of the references to poverty in the writings of the early Christians is there any indication that social reform was the motive for this renunciation of private property.

¹⁸ *His. Ecc.*, III, 37.

¹⁹ *Pastor. Similitude*, IX, 30.

²⁰ See Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity*, vol. II, p. 74.

²¹ Pontius, *Vita Cypriani*, 2.

²² Eusebius, *His. Eccl.*, VI, 3.

²³ Gregory of Nyssa, *Vita Greg. Thaum.*, ch. 29.

The strongest evidence, however, of the deep impression made on the early Church by the ascetic idea is found in the attitude taken by large numbers of Christians towards sexual relations. Virginity and chastity were considered to be the summit and crown of ascetic holiness. On this species of mortification the apostles and the apostolic Church set the seal of approval.²⁴ To be a virgin was "to bear the whole yoke of the Lord and to be perfect."²⁵ So highly esteemed was the condition of the chaste and continent that as early as the beginning of the second century, admonitions were addressed to them not to be puffed up by their exceptional position and their triumph over rebellious flesh. "Let him that is pure in the flesh not grow proud of it and boast," says Clement of Rome, "knowing that it was another who bestowed on him the gift of continence."²⁶ It was a source of pride to the Christians, that so many among them could lead such austere lives. Justin Martyr boasted that he knew men and women of every race who had practised this form of self-denial from infancy, and who had remained pure during sixty or seventy years.²⁷ The love for celibacy took deep root in the Church, and in order to live in closer union with God, Christian men and women remained unmarried all their lives.²⁸ "Some of us," says Tertullian, "beat away from them entirely the power of sensual sin, by a virgin continence, still boys in this respect when they are old."²⁹ Even the pagans, struck by the widespread practice of virginity among the Christians, could not refrain from encomiums on the religion which had produced such heroic self-denial. The unemotional physician Galen says of them: "For their contempt of death is patent to us all, as is their abstinence from the use of the sexual organs, by a certain impulse of modesty. For they in-

²⁴ 1 Cor., VII, 1 seq. Acts, XXI, 9.

²⁵ Didache, VI, 2. On this passage of the Didache, see Zöckler, *loc. cit.*, p. 157.

²⁶ Ep. to Corinthians, chap. xxxviii; see also Ignatius, *Ep. to Polycarp*, chap. v.

²⁷ *Apol.*, chap. xv.

²⁸ Athenagoras, *Legatio*, chap. xxxiii. Minucius Felix, *Octavius*, chap. xxxi.

²⁹ *Apology*, chap. ix.

clude men and women, who refrain from cohabiting all through their lives, and they also number individuals who in ruling and controlling themselves, and in their keen pursuit of virtue, have attained a pitch not inferior to that of real philosophers." ³⁰ Contact with the world and the increasing number of converts from all walks of life in the third century intensified the ascetical strivings of the Christians and increased the number of those who devoted themselves to lives of continence. Treatises were written in praise of virginity.³¹ It was lauded as the distinctively Christian virtue,³² the apex and the consummation of all the virtues.³³ Celibacy was said to be the most perfect course in life and those who practised it were called the true priests of God.³⁴

Though the virgins in the early church did not withdraw from the ordinary intercourse of life, the idea was borne in on them that it was necessary to cut themselves off from contact with the grossness of the world.³⁵ In fact so strong was this feeling that the ascetics were considered to form a class apart from the rest of the community. A special place was assigned to them in the churches.³⁶ Because they were ascetics they were enumerated with the bishops, priests and deacons as forming a class apart from the rest of the faithful.³⁷ The importance of this distinction cannot be too strongly insisted on as showing that a separation had already taken place between the ascetics and the other members of the Christian communities.

The separation was made complete when some Christian ascetics withdrew entirely from the haunts of men and took up their abode in the deserts or other out of the way places in order to lead a more thorough life of renunciation. Who the

³⁰ *De Sententiis Politiae Platonicae*, extant in Arabic. Hist. Anteislam. Abulfedae. Cf. Harnack, *Mission and Expansion*, p. 213.

³¹ Cyprian, *De Habitu Virginum*. Methodius, *Convivium Decem Virginum*.

³² Methodius, *Ibid.*, I, 5.

³³ Lactantius, *Divine Institutes*, VI, 23.

³⁴ Eusebius, *Demonstratio Evangelica*, I, 8-9.

³⁵ Tertullian, *De Virg. Vel.*, III. Cyprian, *Ep.*, 62.

³⁶ Tertullian, *Liber de Exhortatione Castit.*, XI.

³⁷ Hippolytus, *Fragmenta in Proverbia*. Origen, *In Num. Hom.*, II, 1.

first hermits were and at what precise date the eremitical life first manifested itself in the Christian church it is impossible to decide. It is certain, however, that when Anthony, the best known of these recluses, commenced his anchoritic life he was able to seek guidance and counsel from others who had preceded him. The chronology of the life of St. Anthony is the best and surest guide to the order of development in this stage of monastic growth.³⁸ The generally accepted opinion is that St. Anthony was born about A. D. 250, at Coma, near Heracleopolis in Middle Egypt. His parents, who were wealthy Christians, died when he was about eighteen, and six months afterwards Anthony, because of the impression which some words he had heard in church made upon him, resolved to rid himself of all his possessions and turn to a life of poverty and solitude.³⁹ After spending some time in the neighborhood of his native village visiting and receiving instruction from the recluses who dwelt round about, he decided to seek a more isolated place to carry on his struggle for perfection.

The first retreat he selected was a tomb which he changed afterwards for a ruined tower. Here he shut himself in and for twenty years carried on the struggle against the flesh and the devil. The fame of his austerities however, attracted many others to his retreat, and before the twenty years of his retirement had passed, hundreds had settled around him eager to profit by his example and to emulate his virtues. For these Anthony was a father and a model. Their rule of life was to imitate his, and thus without any effort on his part he was placed in the position of guiding a community of ascetics. While it would not be accurate to designate this ascetical colony as a monastery, still it contained the germ of the idea which was afterwards put into effect in other parts of Egypt. Other eremitical settlements modelled upon that which had grown up around the cell of Anthony soon sprang up in other places. They were composed of men who were not hampered in their self-denial and austerities by subjection to a superior, and who were free to go or stay as they chose. This was not monasticism

³⁸ See Butler, *Lausiac, History of Palladius*, vol. 1, p. 215 seq.

³⁹ *Life of St. Anthony*, by Athanasius.

strictly so-called, but in yielding to the community idea without absolutely surrendering the life of the solitary, a distinctive step in advance was made towards the next and final stage, with its rules and its vow of obedience.

This stage was reached through the efforts of Pachomius, a younger contemporary of Anthony, who about the year A. D. 305 or 306,⁴⁰ after being released from military service, and being desirous of learning the wisdom of the ascetics, betook himself to a colony of hermits, where he placed himself under the direction of an old man named Palaemon. After many years' experience of rigorous discipline under his master, he left and about A. D. 322, took up his residence at Tabennisi with the distinct purpose of organizing the ascetical life on different lines. He collected around him a band of disciples and drew up a set of rules for their guidance. The cells of the monks were situated close together; they had a common treasury; their daily actions were made to conform to the same discipline and routine, and they were compelled to render obedience to the head of the community. Thus under the influence of Pachomius and as a direct result of the organization of the hermit colonies, the eremitical life was changed to the monastic. It is not necessary to speculate on the reasons which led Pachomius to introduce this sweeping transformation. The assertion that he found the ideal in the lives of the devotees of Serapis has perience of rigorous discipline under his master, he left and, much more natural supposition to say, that the spirit of organization and subordination was derived from his experience in the army. The wisdom of his action was shown by the rapidity with which monastic establishments founded on his rule were established. Each monastery had its own abbot and the general affairs of the order were regulated at an annual meeting or general chapter of the order, thus showing a perfection of monastic organization which was not reached elsewhere until centuries later. Convents for women were established as well as for men, and in the short lifetime of Pacho-

⁴⁰ Zöckler, *Askese und Mönchtum*, p. 194. Ladeuze, *Étude sur le cénobitisme pachomien pendant le ixe siècle et la 1re moitié du xe*. P. 150 seq.

mius—he died in 345—nine monasteries containing more than three thousand monks and nuns came into existence. The rule of Pachomius, in the form in which it has come down to us, contains regulations covering the different phases of monastic and conventual life. It is not reasonable to suppose that the form of the rule which Pachomius finally determined on was that which he drew up at first. Many of its prescriptions and canons were undoubtedly the result of experience, and monastic discipline as it was developed under his hands reflected credit on his prudence and his moderation. In addition to making the three standards of conventual life, poverty, chastity, and obedience, the foundation of the monastic state, he legislated for the ordinary affairs of the daily life of monks, food, clothing, hours of prayer and work, and left a constitution providing not only for the management but the perpetuation of the society.

There were thus two forms of monastic life in Egypt, the conventual life of the monks of Pachomius and the semi-eremitical or Antonian. The latter was the form which by the end of the fourth century prevailed throughout lower Egypt from Lycopolis to the Mediterranean. The most famous of these semi-eremitical colonies were in the deserts of Nitria and Scete, where as Palladius⁴¹ informs us, there were as many as five thousand monks. These Antonian monks differed from the followers of Pachomius inasmuch as they were not bound to the observance of any rule. It was optional with them to live in complete solitude or dwell in the same cell as others. They owed obedience to no one, and each was left to his own devices in finding means of ascetical practice and perfection.

From Egypt the monastic movement spread to the rest of Christendom.⁴² It was carried to Mesopotamia by Mar-Awgin, and by St. Hilarion to Syria from where it went to Armenia. St. Basil introduced it into Asia Minor, and St. Martin and Cassian to Gaul. Through the influence and activity of St.

⁴¹ *Historia Lausiaca*, chap. 29.

⁴² See Willis Bond, on "Celtic Monasticism" in *The Celtic Church in Wales*.

Athanasius and St. Jerome it received a foothold in Italy, and finally, in the rule of St. Benedict, all the various streams of monastic effort were crystallized and adapted to suit the needs of the Western World.

This summary of the antecedents and the rise of monasticism shows that it was not an isolated historical phenomenon. It traced its growth, not to an extinct spirit of communism in Christianity, but was on the contrary the clear result and logical culmination of an unbroken line of ascetical effort going back to the very foundation of the Christian religion. If it appeared first in remote districts and country places, it was not because these were just brought into contact with the Christian religion, but for the prosaic reason, that they afforded the solitude which the city dweller could not find at home, and because they were the natural field for the display of that spirit of retirement which is inseparable from ascetical practices.

It is equally erroneous to assert that the cessation of persecution in the Roman Empire and the consequent change in the legal status of the Christians was the direct cause of the rise of monasticism. Anthony, as we have seen, during his twenty years of retirement between 270 and 290 A. D. had collected around him a band of disciples who had formed a semi-eremital colony of monks at least twenty years before the publication of the edict of Milan. It is true that the spread of monasticism was undoubtedly conditioned by the hostile attitude of the state, and that before the final capitulation it would have been impossible to establish monasteries in the Roman dominions in defiance of the authorities; but the removal of a prohibition which retarded the full manifestation of the monastic tendency, can scarcely be regarded as the sole contributing factor in its origin. The spread of monasticism to other portions of the Empire after the time of persecution was not due to any latent spirit of communism in the Christian doctrines, but very largely because the tendency to self-denial had found a sufficient outlet in the burden of almost constant social and political repression. Living under the sword is not conducive to seeking other methods of mortification. With the removal of

the fear of death, the self-sacrifice which had become ingrained in the Christian character found another means of expression and turned naturally to a system whose constituent factors of poverty and obedience were already familiar. Why this ascetic principle reached its culmination in Egypt it would be difficult to say. Doubtless it was largely, if not solely, through the personal influence of one man.

To see in monasticism a revolt against the "world in the church" or primarily as a revolt of any kind is hardly a fair statement of the case. The neglect of this world was merely a consequence of an earnest effort to realize fully the life of the soul. It is a travesty of history to seek in the retirement of the monks and hermits from the general life of the time any desire of revolt or any spirit of protest against the church or its constitution. It is sufficient to mention the men whose names come most readily to mind when considering the history of the church in the fourth and fifth centuries to show that those who were most active in administering ecclesiastical affairs, Athanasius, Basil, Gregory, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, were also the leaders in the monastic movement, as Tertullian, Cyprian, Origen and Gregory had been in promoting the cause of asceticism in the time of persecution. Far from being regarded as a dissident element, the monks were called on to aid in the repression of error, as when Basil established a monastic community in Cappadocia to check the encroachments of Arianism. In fact, so strong was the feeling that Sozomen⁴³ attributed the downfall of the Eunomian and Apollinarist heresies to the fact that the monks opposed them; "for the people admired the monks who manifested their virtue by works, and believed that they held right opinions."

And as there was no revolt against the Church, there is no evidence of the influence of economic causes in bringing about the monastic movement. As generally understood, economic action of a collectivist character leads men to make a joint effort to improve the conditions of their physical life, to provide themselves with shorter hours of work and larger remuneration for

⁴³ *His. Eccl.*, vi, 27.

their labor, to secure the comforts and a reasonable amount of the luxuries of life. Under the pressure of a common effort for the common good each one should be made to contribute something to the general welfare, and none should be excluded from the accruing benefits, and as a consequence there should be no restriction on the legitimate exercise of the natural instincts. If "economics" means anything at the present time, it refers simply and solely to physical life and the means of subsistence. Monasticism, on the contrary, placed physical life and material things in the background; it did not concern itself with work except as a means to spiritual perfection, and to provide the bare necessities of life; it avoided ease as a detriment to virtue; it reduced the conditions of physical life to a minimum and carefully shunned comfort and luxury. The very nature of the institution shows that it could not have arisen from any purpose of reforming society. It was not intended to appeal to men at large, nor to produce any equalization of social condition. The institution of the novitiate, that means of sifting and selecting, shows its exclusive character, and none but those who proved acceptable, after a period of trial and probation were admitted to the benefits of monastic communism. Any scheme of economic reform containing such a provision would be regarded as an attempt at brigandage.

The fundamental difference, however, between monasticism and economic communism, one which really precludes any adequate comparison, is found in the fact that monasticism was based on celibacy. With the exclusion of sex and family relations society is reduced to very simple elements, in fact, there is no society in the sense of the civil society with whose affairs economists busy themselves.

Whatever may be thought of the communistic character of monasticism as an existing institution its achievements and its development show clearly that in essence and purpose it was essentially individualistic. It was founded on the distinctive note of Christianity that every man is directly responsible to his Creator; in fact so deeply rooted was this idea that asceticism may be regarded as the progressive expression of personal ac-

countability. When in order to gain salvation, men undertook to observe the evangelical counsels they thereby cut themselves off to a greater or less extent from the common life around them, and when this separation had reached the stage shown in the lives of the hermits and the solitaries, individualism had reached its zenith. Monasticism was an attempt to provide a norm for individual effort in ascetical practice, by offering at once scope for the practice of the social virtues and acting as a check on the extravagances to which unguided effort might lead. The individualistic character of the ascetical life was not lost however, by being turned into monastic coöperation. "The dominating principle that pervaded Egyptian monachism in all its manifestations—whether the purely eremitical, the semi-eremitical of Nitra, or the cenobitical," says Dom Butler, "was a spirit of strongly marked individualism. Each worked for his personal advance in virtue; each strove to do his utmost in all kinds of ascetical exercises and austerities—in prolonging his fasts, his prayers, his silence. The favorite name used to describe any of the prominent monks was 'great athlete,' and they were athletes, and filled with the spirit of the modern athlete. They loved to 'make a record' in austerities, and to contend with one another in mortifications; and they would freely boast of their spiritual achievements."⁴⁵ The inherent individualism of monasticism was strikingly illustrated after its introduction into the East. The tendency shown in Egypt to go from the eremitical to the monastic was reversed, and the cenobitical was made in many cases merely the preliminary to greater austerities in the solitary state.

Monasticism cannot therefore be looked on as communistic either in source or history. It was not an expression of the dissatisfaction of the proletariat with their economic surroundings, nor was it in any sense of the word a communistic effort to apply the teachings of the Gospel to social relations. It was based on the Gospel, and reached its final stage as a means of promoting a closer union of the soul with God by emancipation from worldly cares and prepossessions.

⁴⁵Lausiac, *History of Palladius*, vol. I, p. 237.

Of the later history and further development of monasticism it is not necessary to speak. Its influence on the spread of civilization and on the economic development in lands brought under the sway of the Christian religion was due to the spirit of faith which animated its votaries, and a desire for the attainment of perfection in the love and service of others. Monastic settlements were humanizing centres from which rough barbarians frequently learned the first lessons of order and government. The laborious lives of the monks gave an impetus to industry and regular occupation. With the hope of no reward except in a life to come, the monks cleared the forests, drained the swamps, reclaimed barren land, built roads and bridges, and laid the foundation of permanent institutions and prosperity by teaching the ignorant and half-savage peoples among whom they lived the principles of agriculture and mechanical pursuits. The monasteries were the refuge of the poor and the wanderer. The resources which they held were administered in the relief of the needy. Hospitals were built, schools were established, and in regions of ignorance and darkness the first glimmerings of art and science and refinement which illuminated the lives of the untutored children of the soil or the forest were those which came from the monasteries.

Not less noteworthy was the service of the monks in preserving the literary treasures of the old civilizations. Their libraries, their scriptoria and their industry are the link which connect the civilization of the present with that of the remote past. They wrote the history of their time, they protested against its vices, and they found in the ideals which they chose to follow the light to guide them in darkness. All these labors were, however, but secondary to the main purpose of their career as monks. The practice of religion, not social reform was their object.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

WAGES AND THE RIGHT TO A LIVELIHOOD.¹

This book from the pen of a Catholic, who is also a theologian and a moralist, is naturally of special significance to Catholic students of the social question. It deserves, however, the attention of all, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, who are interested in the history of economic doctrines, particularly the economic doctrines of the theologians. Often condemned in the name of Science, the economic opinions of the Schoolmen are now found to embody some of the most general and the deepest impulses of our time. We were certainly not prepared to see these medieval doctrines come into close contact with modern life and suggest solutions almost identical with the remedies offered by men who have little regard for theological systems. Dr. Ryan is exceptionally qualified to bring out this truth effectively. He is not only a theologian. He possesses also a thorough economic training, has an exact conception of contemporary industrial life, and shows a distinctively American genius for practical solutions. Not content with a forcible restatement of the scholastic teaching, nor with the adaptation of it to present needs, he subjects it to the test of scientific criticism, and strives to illustrate and define its basis in the light of philosophy and political economy. The outcome of his efforts is a solid and comprehensive solution of a problem which has been much discussed among Socialists, and which has left its impress on the social evolution of the entire nineteenth century, namely, the problem of a right to a livelihood.

¹ This paper was condensed by Dr. Brocard from his preface to the French version of Dr. Ryan's "Living Wage." Dr. Brocard is professor of Political Economy at the University of Nancy. The Preface contains a scholarly analysis of the subject, laying special emphasis upon the historical basis and continuity of the Catholic teaching on the ethics of wages.

The translation of the present article was made by Rev. Paul Perigord, of the St. Paul Seminary.

It is under this clearly defined aspect that Dr. Ryan discusses the theory of a living wage. He continues, after Leo XIII and many French Catholic social thinkers, the teaching of the medieval theologians. Anton Menger maintains in "The Right to the Full Product of Labor" that the doctrine of the right to a livelihood originated with the Socialists and Communists, but it was undoubtedly proclaimed several centuries earlier by the Schoolmen. The idea of a right to a living is the central point of their ethico-economic doctrine. Upon the necessity and duty of safeguarding this right, the theologians, following St. Thomas, have based all economic doctrines, especially that of private property. For them private ownership is a social function as well as a right,—or rather a right which is justified by its function—differing widely from that absolute and exclusive right which the individualistic school has borrowed from the Roman Jurists. "Need," writes Dr. Ryan, faithfully interpreting the theologians, "is the end to which all other titles are but means, and to which, consequently, all others must give way, even that of the private proprietor." It is, of course, extreme need that is in question here; for the theologians, holding that wealth was desirable only in so far as it was necessary for the realization of our supernatural end, did not concern themselves with any other kind. Within these limits, however, their teaching is very rigorous. They maintain that the private owner may not oppose his proprietary right to the right springing from extreme need, that a hungry man has the right to sustain his life from the goods of his neighbor. They declare with Aristotle and St. Thomas that if the right of property is individual its use must be communal. In the last analysis their thought clearly is that society is bound to provide the individual, in return for a normal measure of activity, with the conditions of living in accordance with his station. In their opinion the regime of private property is justified because of its fitness to obtain this result. Did it fail to fulfill this purpose private ownership would forfeit the very basis of its legitimacy. "The Fathers of the Church," says Dr. Ryan, "and the theologians of the Middle Ages unanimously taught that every human being

has a natural right to a share of this world's goods for his sustenance. They looked upon this as a natural right, independent of all human laws, conventions and institutions, and superior to them all." It does not follow, however, that these theologians were the precursors of Socialism. Some of their ideas are also held by the Socialists, but they do not necessarily lead to the Socialist system. Among these is the idea of the right to a livelihood.

Upon this idea the theologians built their doctrine of wages; but they gave it a special application to the peculiar social conditions of their time. Their doctrine of wages was but a particular application of their theory of exchange. Labor was not as yet subject to the fluctuations of supply and demand, and the number of hired workers was small relatively to the number of independent producers: consequently the theologians directed their attention to the problem of justice with reference to the exchange of goods. The fair price of goods was determined by the concept of equivalence, that is, it was realized when the selling price equaled the cost of production as determined by the social estimate. In the cost of production was included the remuneration of the laborers, which was itself to be determined by the social estimate of the amount required to enable them to live in accordance with their position or status. Thus the theory of wages became identified with the theory of just price.

In the place of the social estimate as a determinant of fair prices, the nineteenth century put supply and demand and applied this measure to labor as well as to merchandise. The result was that the idea of equivalence as a criterion of justice disappeared, the interplay of supply and demand was elevated to the rank of an inviolable economic law, and wages became deplorably mean and insufficient.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the misery of the working classes had provoked a new school of economic thought, holding theories very similar to, if not identical with, the doctrines of the medieval theologians. The movement, Christian at its inception, fell after 1870 under the control

of avowed opponents of Christianity. It criticised vigorously and sometimes excessively the theories of the individualistic school, denied the fatal and inevitable character of economic laws, especially the law of wages, exposed the abuse and evils of free competition, and insisted that the human will and legislation had a great part to play in social evolution. Its practical aim was the betterment of the condition of the working class: according to some of its followers, in the present industrial regime; according to others, under a regime of Socialism. It asserted not merely the right to the full product of labor, but the right to a livelihood.

A little later there arose a school of Catholic theologians and economists that, especially after the favorable pronouncements of Leo XIII, displayed a considerable measure of activity. Though representing a great variety of opinions, its members are of one mind in their sympathy for the working class. They are unanimous in asserting with the theologians, with the socialists, and with the interventionists of every kind, the rights of the laborer against society; and they have attempted to construct a Catholic doctrine of wages, by adapting the theological tradition to the data of modern science. The criticism of individualism made by the Socialist, interventionist, and the historical schools provided the Catholic thinkers with many negative elements which they have utilized to good purpose, particularly in refuting the assumed fatal and inviolable character of economic laws. On its constructive side their undertaking was more difficult, nor was it at first brilliantly carried out. As Professor Ely said in presenting Dr. Ryan's book to the American public, "enlightenment has not kept pace with good intention. The plain man of whom we hear so much has a feeling that our teachers and preachers are vague and indefinite. Is there, after all, such thing as a Christian doctrine of wages?" Even in Europe where the attempts to deduce from the teachings of the Church such a doctrine have been more frequent, who will say that complete success has been achieved? The European Catholic writers have appealed by turns or simultaneously to the concept of the right to a livelihood, and to the idea of

equivalence in exchanges, forgetting that the latter is becoming more and more unintelligible, and that in certain cases it conflicts with the former. What is to be said when the utility furnished by the employer to the employee in the form of wages is equivalent to that received from the latter in the form of labor, and yet is insufficient for his sustenance? This question never confronted the medieval theologians because, in their theory, the selling price of goods was to be determined by the needs of the producer, such needs as are implied in a becoming livelihood. Today, however, prices influence wages as truly as wages affect prices. On the other hand, how are we to deal with the case in which the wages that are the equivalent of the service exceed the amount necessary for the sustenance of the laborer? May the employer retain the surplus? Finally, what is the irreducible minimum for a decent livelihood?

On none of these points have Catholics been clear or unanimous. One of the great merits of Dr. Ryan's book is that it discusses them all, and attempts to give clear solutions. His conclusions may be contested, but his method is precise, and incontestably scientific. He decides the conflict between the principle of the right to a livelihood and the principle of equivalence in favor of the former. Not that he denies the necessity of a certain relation between labor and wages, nor the justice of a higher wage for more productive labor: but the concept of of equivalence, which he subjects to penetrating criticism, seems to him in our time to be incapable of precise determination. It can even be interpreted in such a way as to justify the exploitation of the victims of the sweat-shop. Hence our author concentrates his attention, after the method of the theologians and Leo XIII, on the right to a livelihood.

His first care is to establish clearly the principle, in order later on to draw therefrom with inflexible logic the consequences which it can and should bring about in present society. At the basis of his teaching we find the fundamental and far-reaching idea which individualism and the philosophers of the eighteenth century borrowed from Christianity, or rediscovered, and which afterwards was adopted in varying degrees

by the makers of the French Revolution, the Socialists, and defenders of democracy generally. It is the idea that human personality has an intrinsic value, from which it derives the right to be treated, in the words of Kant, not as a means, but as an end. According to Dr. Ryan, this principle is the anchor of salvation both for the individual and for society. He denies that the essential rights of the individual are based upon the social good. Not that there is any contradiction between individual and social interest: on the contrary, they are identical in the long run; but they must not be confused, nor must the social welfare be so emphasized that the weak minority will be oppressed by the strong majority, or all the individuals be sacrificed to the god of the State. The author points out the dangers of the theories of Hegel and Burke, to which he might have added those of Comte. Consequently he approaches the position of the eighteenth century philosophers and the individualists, in as much as he maintains that man has natural rights which the State must hold sacred; but he differs from them in that he does not share their idea of complete equality, nor look for the realization of individual rights through the abolition of social restraint and a return to the "state of nature." He requires that society should safeguard the rights of the individual, and maintains that these rights are equal in substance, but not in extension. Society owes to the least of its members a minimum of advantages; it may accord more than this to some individuals. Among the rights that society may not withhold from any of its members is the right to a livelihood. This right, according to Dr. Ryan, is based upon the duty of the individual to preserve his life and develop his personality by means of the goods of the earth. Now, since these goods become appropriated under the direction of society, it is the duty of the latter so to legislate that all individuals may through their labor obtain a decent livelihood. In this Dr. Ryan is a faithful disciple of Leo XIII.

What is to be understood by a decent livelihood? It includes, says the author, those goods which will not only secure the laborer against starvation, but permit him to exercise his facul-

ties and develop his personality. It means, moreover, those things which are necessary for the support of a wife and children; for marriage is man's normal condition, and with some exceptions, necessary for his proper self-development, as well as for the very existence of society. Hence the minimum wage of the laborer ought to provide food that will be sufficient in quantity, quality, and variety, decent clothing, sanitary housing, some cultivation of the mental and moral faculties, and protection against sickness, accident, and old age,—all of these to be understood of the wife as well as of the husband and of the children until they become self-supporting. The amount of wage needed to assure all these benefits will vary with time and place, but the author thinks it cannot be less than six hundred dollars in the cities of America.

This might lead us to a pessimistic conclusion; for in every country of the civilized world, wages fall considerably below this minimum. Is it possible to raise them to this figure? While it is well to affirm the right to a decent livelihood and to define its meaning, we must ask ourselves whether the natural resources, the technical and psychological elements of production and the financial condition of industry will permit this abstract right to be converted into concrete reality. On this point Dr. Ryan does not entertain the slightest doubt; and he justifies his position by emphasizing the productive power of modern industry, by showing that the possible supply of goods is now greatly restricted by an insufficient demand, and that higher wages would mean not only a greater demand for products, but a greater efficiency in the producer.

Among the means suggested by the author to better the conditions of the laborer the first is, to assert firmly and explicitly the moral obligation of capitalist, business man, and laborer, and to make clear the fact that these are frequently ignored. From his principle of the right to a decent livelihood, he deduces with incontestible logic the conclusion that the right to a living wage takes precedence of the right of the capitalist to receive interest. The business man, or active director of industry, may take from the product sufficient to meet the essen-

tial needs of himself and family, but his secondary and accidental needs must not be preferred to the primary and vital needs of his employees.

This thesis will undoubtedly startle many readers; but, as Professor Ely remarks, Cardinal Manning startled the English-speaking world some years ago when he declared that the right to subsistence was prior to the rights of property. Yet as we have seen above, this is no new truth, but merely one that was allowed to fall into oblivion. Had the world obeyed this and other moral intuitions regarding wealth we should not be less rich, and we should certainly be far happier. So completely have we ignored them that we are disturbed when we are reminded of their existence. Nevertheless, Dr. Ryan believes that these moral conceptions have not lost their efficacy. "If," he declares, "clergymen would give as much attention to preaching and expounding the duty of paying a living wage as they do to the explanation of other duties that are no more important, and if they would use all the power of their ecclesiastical position to deprive the recalcitrant employers of the Church privileges that are ordinarily denied to persistently disobedient members; and if public speakers and writers who discuss questions of industrial justice would, in concrete terms, hold up to public denunciation those employers who can pay a living wage and will not,—the results would constitute an ample refutation of the libelous assertion that employers cannot be got to act justly by moral suasion. They have never been made to feel a fraction of its power."

But it would be utopian to rely exclusively on moral instruction and public opinion for a betterment of wage conditions. Hence the author advocates the intervention of the State. He does not demand that the State should control production, for Socialism does not seem to him either necessary or desirable; but he protests against that pernicious doctrine of the eighteenth century which maintains that a minimum State activity will lead to the maximum of industrial liberty. Legal liberty is not sufficient, since it merely insures the free play

of economic forces and these are in no wise more legitimate than physical forces. Dr. Ryan compares those who for selfish ends oppose State intervention to the burglar who objects to the activity of the policeman. Only by proper regulation is it possible to secure real industrial liberty. He therefore, advocates legislation for the protection of the working class, particularly, with regard to their right to a decent livelihood, and urges that all countries follow the example of Australia and New Zealand in the enactment of laws prescribing a minimum wage. Nor does he forget to remind the laborers that they, as well as the employers, have duties with respect to the wage question.

We can now readily see the place which Dr. Ryan occupies in the movement of contemporary economic thought. He is among those Catholic social students who adhere firmly to the program of State intervention; but he is above all a moralist who takes his principles seriously and is unwilling that they should remain a dead letter. His own work affords clear proof that ethics and economics may go hand in hand to their mutual advantage.

The application of the fundamental principle that he advocates is fraught with tremendous difficulties. Yet he confidently hopes that specialists and legislators will be able to solve them. He has ably discharged his own task of describing and justifying the ethical ideal. The co-existence in our society of insufficient wages and over production of goods constitutes, both from the economic and moral viewpoints, a monstrous contradiction which cannot be permitted to continue. If modern production, with its immense resources, cannot provide the laboring class with the means of decent existence, then, let us admit that our civilization is bankrupt. On the other hand, if it be true, as we are assured by Mr. Charles Gide, that Christian social principles exert a real influence upon a much larger number of persons than do those of Fourier, Saint-Simon, and Proudhon, we ought to be grateful to Dr. Ryan for having, in the name of Christian ethics, called our attention to the present deplorable

conditions, and to the translator for making that message known to the people of France. In any case it is not most comforting to hear from every quarter, and above the clamor of party and doctrinal conflicts, those words which were first uttered by the theologians, which were taken up and repeated by the Socialists, and which to-day are on every lip: "Man has the right to live by his labor."

LUCIEN BROCARD.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Pascal, sa vie religieuse et son apologie du christianisme, par H. Petitot. Paris, Beauchesne et cie, 1911. 8vo, 427 pp.

Was Pascal an immanentist? The immanentists are not satisfied with metaphysical and historical proofs. They base their faith solely on the religious sense. Pascal set aside the metaphysical proofs for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. Still he was not an absolute immanentist, for in his demonstration of the truth of Christianity, he attributed great importance to the positive historic proofs, to miracles and prophecies. Nor did he attach to the proof from inner religious experience a universal validity. He recognized the futility of using it against infidels. He never pushed the principle so far as to make it the sole guide of life. He also recognized the principle of external authority in religion, namely the teaching Church. Pascal was the creator of the restricted method of immanence. He traced its main outlines and principal arguments with so sure a hand that little was needed in after times to give it completeness.

Such is the main point which Father Petitot brings out in this highly interesting volume. He leads up to it by a careful and sympathetic study of Pascal's religious life, which he finds in the main truly Catholic and saintly, not compromised by his Jansenism, which in him was rather theoretic. He refutes the statements made by some authors that in his ascetic life at Port Royal, Pascal was sad, morose, and depressed by the constant fear of eternal torment. On the contrary, his severe austerity was tempered with a quiet, unostentatious Christian joy. He restrained to a large extent outward expressions of affection for his relatives, but at the same time loved them with genuine tenderness of heart. Whether Pascal died in formal schism or not, he thinks is difficult, perhaps, impossible to determine. He depicts his death as that of a devout, saintly Christian, preparing for the end with heroic calmness and resignation to the will of God.

The genuine admiration and sympathy which the author shows for Pascal do not blind him to his faulty views and to the defects of his apologetic argumentation, all of which come up for just

criticism. It is undoubtedly an erudite volume of great merit, and will win a place of honor among the numerous works that have been written on Blaise Pascal.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi chrétienne, sous la direction
A. d'Ales. Fascicule V, Église-Évangiles. Paris, Beauchesne
et cie, 1910.

As each new part of the Apologetic Dictionary appears, it gives evidence that the high standard of scholarship aimed at in the beginning is being successfully maintained. It was a happy thought of the learned editor to put aside topics of minor importance and thus leave room for a more complete treatment of weighty questions. Many articles in this dictionary are thus rather of the nature of comprehensive, though condensed, treatises. Among the more noteworthy contributions in this fifth fascicle are the well-arranged and, in the main, very satisfactory treatise on the Church, by the Abbé Yves de la Brière, comprising forty pages; the up-to-date article on Egypt, in which the learned author, Father A. Mallon, S. J., gives us the latest results of the researches of Egyptian archeologists; the interesting historic survey of Episcopal Elections in France from the Gallo-Roman period to the fourteenth century, by the Abbe G. Mollat; the erudite and instructive article on Epigraphy, to which the author, Father L. Jalabert, devotes twenty-four pages; the still longer article on slavery, by Paul Allard, who gives a masterly historic treatment of slavery and serfdom from pre-Christian to modern times; the solid and scholarly article on the Eucharist by the Abbé J. Lebreton, comprising nineteen pages, in which the recent theories of rationalists are subjected to learned criticism; the careful study of the Eucharistic Epiclesis, by Father Salaville. These and a few other articles make this fascicle one of great value and interest for students of theology.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

The Process of Abstraction: An Experimental Study. Thomas Verner Moore. Berkeley, 1910.

The introspective method of establishing the difference between thought and imagery, idea and sensation has been in vogue since the days of Greek philosophy. Another witness now comes to its support. Experimental study, after unsuccessful attempts to show that the imagery present in consciousness exhausts the content of the latter, is now veering about to the old introspective conclusion, coming to its aid with apparatus, criticism, and that painstaking minuteness of inquiry which stamps the man of science. An example of this delicate and careful weighing of evidence, with a wary eye all the while to the possible presence of a prejudicial grain of dust in the balance, is furnished in the dispassionate and convincing piece of research into the process of abstraction as revealed in the adult mind, undertaken by Doctor Moore, of our Faculty of Philosophy, and published under the auspices of the University of California, where the experiments were originally conducted.

After reviewing critically the literature of the problem, and indicating the method of research, which is that of allowing geometrical figures to stand for a group of qualities, the author describes his experiments, catalogues the results, and outlines the interpretation to which the facts unmistakably point. There are two main results of this experimental analysis. The first is the fact that thought without imagery exists, even in the test case of visible objects, where, if anywhere, we should naturally expect to find visual imagery present and highly developed, if it played the leading rôle assigned to it by a large school of modern psychologists. The existence of imageless thoughts must therefore be acknowledged as an established mental fact, and one's idea of a physical object be regarded as something more than a mere mental picture of the same. So far from being essential to perception, the formation of a reproducible mental image represents a later stage altogether.

The establishment of this fact by experiment is important, but what is disestablished by it is more important still. Those psychologists who confidently proclaim that thought simply cannot go on without images, and that there must be some carelessness of observation on the part of the experimenter who says it can, will find the

ground completely cut from under their cherished prejudgments. And dare one hope that the philosophers—*durum genus*—will see the utter falseness of approaching the problem of knowledge ever and always from the representative side? This way madness lies, and the great transcendental X of Kant. Much, if not all of the ills philosophy is heir to spring from false approaches to problems, like that of knowledge, and would disappear in a change of avenues.

The second fact brought out by this experimental analysis is the part played by universal ideas, when we are perceiving individual objects. Perception, says the author, as a process of assimilating the data of sense-experience to their appropriate mental categories. He understands by this latter term none of the formalistic terrors of Kant's terminology, much less any doctrine of innate mental forms. The initial stage of abstraction, which is the process of perception, he finds to be one of assimilating the sensation to previously formed mental categories. These categories and their function in perception are facts. Their origin is another matter. The most general of all the mental categories—'something'—starts the process of knowing in the child. As time wears on, this vague awareness of 'something happening' develops into an awareness that something of a more particular nature has happened, and so further and still further mental categories are formed and developed. The acquired results of past experience thus become the categories into which future experience is received, and the exclusive mental origin, which Kant claimed for these categories, is seen to be without warrant in fact, or utility in psychology.

In thus showing by experimental analysis that the 'concept' is essentially distinct from imagery and feeling, and that, so far from being faint second-impressions of the latter, 'concepts' are really the high lights of unconsciousness, bright and definite even when all else is dim, the author has rewritten an old chapter of scholastic philosophy fraught with significance for modern thought. It strikes the reviewer that in many cases descriptive psychology is guilty of gross neglect in passing over the non-sensorial contents of consciousness, as if these were pale and featureless. The worship of mental images amounts nowadays to a superstition. The reviewer hopes that this study will have a large circle of readers. It exemplifies the Leonine counsel: *vetera novis augere et perficere*.

The author has another study which might prove of interest to many: "the influence of temperature and the electric current on the sensibility of the skin." In this study the author investigates from a new point of view the relation between the stimulus and the sensation, coming to the conclusion that the tactual sensibility of the skin is a function of the degree of dissociation in the tissues.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

La sainté Trinité. Lectures théologiques. L. Berthé. Paris. Bloud, 1911. Pp. 218.

In this volume we have an admirable collection of texts from all the great Christian writers, on the august mystery of the Trinity. The place of honor is occupied by Saint Thomas. Upon the pages of the Angel of the Schools are concentrated the rays of light emanating from the minds of fathers, school-men, and modern Christian thinkers. The result is a clear, full, and stirring presentation, one that rouses the religious emotions, and floods the intellect with an unction of nobility. The collective testimony, massed upon each point treated, has a literary effect also. The reader feels all Christian humanity behind him when he reads the great utterances in which truly great men expressed the common faith. Priests and seminarians will find in this volume a very useful addition to the tract on the Trinity. The treatment is such that difficult notions are made easy, and presented in a form calculated to attract by its graces rather than to repel by the technicalities of speech. There is warmth as well as clearness of thought in every page, and the Catholic doctrine is made to stand out prominently. The whole volume reminds one of a reasoned prayer, and fittingly ends in the prayers addressed by Saint Hilary and Saint Augustine to God One and Triune.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

Les origines de la th'ologie moderne. I. La Renaissance de l'Antiquité chrétienne (1450-1521), par l'abbé A. Humbert. "Bibliothèque Théologique" series. Paris. Lecoffre, 1911. Pp. 358.

The first volume on the beginnings of modern theology is so exceedingly well done that the author should feel highly encouraged to bring the subject matter to completion in the companion volume which he has in mind. It is a long time since such a direct, critical, and appreciative study of sources has fallen into the reviewer's hands. Modern theology was born of a dislike for scholasticism. It tried, so to speak, to execute a flanking movement around scholasticism, to the position in the rear occupied, or supposed to be occupied by the fathers and the primitive Christian tradition. The result of this attempted return to Christian antiquity, without taking the laws of history into account, was the irreparable loss of all the development which mediaeval theology represented and brought to the fore. The theology of the schoolmen had a broad, informing spirit; it distinguished aspects, but it did not allow its distinctions to amount to separations, and so it was saved from the fallacy of actually separating what in reality belonged together. Not so modern theology, which plunged headlong into separatism, and has remained there ever since. The author takes up successively for treatment the prevailing dislike for mediaeval theological ideas; the efforts of humanism in Italy, England, France, and Germany to make a new synthesis of Catholic doctrine; the beginnings of the reform theories and their one-sided development; and finally the transformations which the ideas of the Gospel and their interpretation by the Fathers underwent at the hands of the so-called restorers. All these subjects are treated directly according to the sources; copious quotations abound at every turn, making it easy to fix the successive points of development which characterized the progress of the doctrines of reform. The religious revolution of the sixteenth century may here be studied in its rise with great profit by all. The volume is one which commends itself not only to professed theologians, but to those interested in religious history generally. We have long needed a work which would show convincingly that modern theology, as distinct from scholastic, is separatist and exclusivist in character. This want is now admirably filled.

A few instances of the treatment. In the chapter on the traditional directions of Christian thought, the author brilliantly shows that on the eve of the reformation there were three great lines of thought—the ecclesiastical, the scholastic, and the mys-

tical. The distinction of these three imposed on all minds a doctrinal equilibrium. A Saint Bonaventure, a Saint Thomas, a Gerson saw no impossibility in reconciling these three tendencies embedded in the traditional doctrine on the character and the authority of Scripture in matters of faith. All three lines of thought co-existed in the same mind without incommoding or excluding one another. It was Erasmus and his disciples who dissolved this triple alliance of tendencies, substituting mutually exclusive fragments for the integral whole, and making separate elements out of what should have been merely distinguished, and left to enjoy that "unity in difference" which is the characteristic of all organic life. Is not this the quintessence of the art of presentation? Protestantism has always sought a "retrospective paternity" for its doctrines, finding it here and there in the letter, but seeking in vain that separatistic spirit which alone would make its paternity true.

In the chapter on precursors, the author traces the rise of sentimentalism, and legalism, and the consequent eclipsing of the intellectual side of faith, the necessary reaction from which was the strengthening of the sense of the authority of the Church and her teaching magistracy, among Catholic theologians. The chapter on humanism—that veritable invasion of the Christian world by pagan ideas—is finely done. Here it was that Ockam's axiom of simplicity entered into the heart of the system of Protestantism, to play its destructive role from the transcendental X of Kant to the pragmatism of our day. In the part devoted to the *Philosophia Christi*, the author traces the invasion of the juristic and social spirit, which was to end finally in the apotheosis of piety, charity, and the doing of good to one's neighbor. Erasmianism destroyed that very past to which it so clamorously insisted on returning. The chapter on the theology of Wittenberg shows how the opposition to Aristotle had become general, and how the visible and invisible worlds were set over against each other in the violent opposition of nature and grace. The sole authority of the Scriptures was affirmed, and an attempt made to construct a theology from its pages. But in this attempt, Protestantism fell into glaring contradiction with its own fundamental principles. It forgot that not all was divine, if the elaboration of the Scriptures into a theology was a piece of human labor. To rid itself of this incon-

sistency, Protestantism proposed another—that, namely, of identifying the Gospel with a particular interpretation of it. Politics completed the separation which humanism had begun.

One lays down this volume with a sense of favors received. The clear, at times epigrammatic style, fixes the landmarks as one goes along. There is much in these pages to be pondered by the teacher, and the missionary to non-Catholics, and to be read with profit by any man in his study. We hope to see the second volume soon. It will be welcome, doubly so, on account of the favorable impression which the first is sure to create.

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

Histoire du Bréviaire Romain par Pierre Batiffol. Troisième édition refondue. Paris, 1911.

The Abbé Duchesne's *Les origines du culte Chrétien* reinaugurated the study of the Church's formalities of worship along the historical lines laid down by the great masters of liturgical science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Written in the same spirit as the works of these scholars, it gave a fresh impetus to research in a department of study which has long been neglected. It confined itself largely, however, to the consideration of the liturgy proper, and gave comparatively small attention to the Church's psalmody. It was this absence of an adequate treatment of the sources of the Breviary which stirred up the Abbé Batiffol, as he tells us, to write his *Histoire du Bréviaire* on the same general lines as those founded by Duchesne. In the present third edition of the *Histoire*, the author has recast a good part of the original work, corrected details here and there, and instead of mere references has given extended quotations from the authors whom he cites in support of his positions. He has printed three interesting documents not found in the previous editions. One, the *Rubricae Novae* of the Breviary of the time of Nicholas III, which he reprints from Mercati's *Appunti*; another, a letter of Marini, one of the congregation appointed by Pius IV, for the revision of the breviary; and the third, certain *Capita Precipua* for a revision proposed in the time of Clement VIII.

The publication of the first edition of this work in 1893 drew forth a number of books and articles on the breviary from various authors, the most notable of which was Dom Bäumer's *Geschichte des Breviers* in 1895. A French translation of this work was issued in 1905. Bäumer took Batiffol to task for his departure from the traditional theory which gave Saint Gregory the Great the honor of having codified the Roman office. In this third edition Batiffol has given careful consideration to Bäumer's arguments. He still, however, stands by the thesis which he put forward in his first edition, maintaining that the Divine Office of the Roman Church originally consisted only of the office of the vigil, that is *Matin* with *Lauds*, and that was not until the seventh or eighth century that the other hours were finally taken over from the monks and made an integral part of the Roman office.

WILLIAM I. MCGARVEY.

A Roman Diary and other Documents relating to the Papal Inquiry into English Ordinations, MDCCCXCVI, by T. A. Lacey. Longmans, 1910.

This is a record, written from an Anglican point of view, of events in Rome during the spring of 1896 when the question of the validity of the orders of the Church of England was under consideration by the special commission appointed by Leo XIII. The author and the Rev. F. W. Puller were the two Anglican theologians who went to Rome at this time in order to afford Mgr. Gasparri and the Abbé Duchesne (the two members of the commission who were supposed to be more or less favorably disposed towards the Anglican side of the question) such information as they might need during the discussion. The Diary then kept by the Rev. Mr. Lacey is here "printed just as it was written, for it is produced as evidence." It "is intended to show what was done, what was said, and what was thought, to indicate even by its silence what was not done." It will be understood, however, that Mr. Lacey's record is only that of an observer from the outside. Of what went on within the Commission, he, of course, had no knowledge whatever beyond the little which came to him from the incidental reports of individuals. And Mgr.

Moyes, one of the members of the Commission, has pointed out, in recent numbers of *The Tablet*, that in several particulars Mr. Lacey's impressions with regard to the attitude of individuals and the action of the Commission were altogether mistaken. In addition to his diary Mr. Lacey has reproduced certain documents not heretofore accessible which will be welcomed by the student. There is the *De Re Anglicana*, which was an unpublished pamphlet prepared by the Anglicans for the private information of the Cardinals as to the present state of the Church of England. It was of course a rather one-sided representation of conditions from the High Church standpoint. On this account it was sharply criticised by another privately printed pamphlet prepared by Mgr. Gasquet and Mgr. Moyes, and entitled *Risposta all' Oposcolo*. This too will be found reprinted in the present volume. Mr. Lacey has also included the letter of Pope Leo XIII acknowledging the receipt of the answer of the two Anglican archbishops to the Bull *Apostolicae Curae*. There is at the end of the volume a fairly complete bibliography of the whole controversy.

It is clear from what Mr. Lacey tells us that the judgment of the *Apostolicae Curae* was one altogether unexpected by the Anglicans. They had for some reason assured themselves that there would be no absolute condemnation of their orders; that, at the most, the Pope would not go further than to declare the orders doubtful. So confident were they of this, that Mr. Lacey and his friends did not hesitate to give it out "that an entirely adverse decision is impossible." "We honestly believe this to be true" (p. 55). When therefore the Holy See judged the orders to be altogether null and void, the disappointment of the Anglicans can scarcely be imagined. To their disappointment succeeded indignation at what in their vexation they construed to be a heartless decision of Rome dictated by worldly-wise policy, and they immediately poured forth from the press a stream of articles and pamphlets in criticism and denunciation of the papal bull. They professed themselves unmoved by the arguments of the Pope, and only all the more confirmed in their belief in the entire validity and legitimacy of their orders. Such was then apparently the only effect of the papal decision upon those identified with the High Church Movement. But, looking back now after the lapse of fifteen years, and comparing the present status of the so-called Catholic party in the Episcopal Church with what it

was before the formal condemnation of Anglican orders, who will say that the decision has not profoundly affected the whole life and activity of that party? Certainly one thing is patent to every observer, the High Church Movement is no longer the aggressive force that it was. In 1895 it was at the height of its success. It had overcome the opposition which for years had been arrayed against it, and its principles had obtained a recognized place in the Episcopal Church everywhere. It had gained one point of vantage after another, and was already boasting that it was only a question of a short time when it would dominate the whole Anglican communion, and place it in such a position that its Catholicism would be in theory and practice as unmistakable as that of Rome itself. Then came the informal advances towards the Holy See in that memorable year of 1896, of which Mr. Lacey's diary tells us something. For the first time Rome took cognizance of the existence of this movement, and listened sympathetically to all that high churchmen had to say. The Holy Father would have welcomed proof of their claim to possess a valid priesthood. But after a patient and thorough investigation the proof was not forthcoming. So Rome issued her judgment. From that day until the present the history of the High Church Movement has been one of steady decline. A paralysis gradually came over the hearts and hands of those who were identified with it, and the advantages they had gained were lost one by one. Now the high churchmen are but a handful, without hearers, without any vision as to the future, and no longer reckoned as a vital force in Anglicanism. At the same time the Episcopal Church is everywhere identifying herself more and more with the other Protestant bodies, and thus demonstrating the truth of the conclusions of the bull *Apostolicae Curae*. The movement originated in 1832 by John Keble was unquestionably a great movement, and was carried on by great men. God had a purpose in permitting it to rise and progress, and that purpose was accomplished by the many souls it brought back into the unity of the Church. But when it no longer served that purpose, and there was the danger of its galvanizing Anglicanism as a body into the semblance of Catholic life, and so constituting it a rival to the Catholic Church in the eyes of those who might be seeking for the ark of safety, God in His providence moved the Holy See to pronounce judgment. Since then the High Church

Movement has steadily melted away. In a few years it will be but a memory in the past. Again *Roma locuta est, causa finita est*.

WILLIAM I. MCGARVEY.

Mysticism: Its True Nature and Value. By A. B. Sharpe, M. A. St. Louis, Mo., B. Herder, 1910. Pp. xi + 233. Price \$1.35.

A scientific account of the theory of mysticism which obtains in the Catholic Church will be certain to impress non-Catholics and come to them as a surprise. To those especially, who imagine that they have found in the late Professor James' *Varieties of Religious Experience* the last word on the subject, Father Sharpe's account of the matter will be, to say the least, unexpected. All students of this important phase of religious experience will recognize the truth of the statement that "the mystic," as Professor Royce says, "is the only thorough-going empiricist." The counterpart of this truth, however, namely, that the mystic is totally unable to account for the certitude with which he holds that his experience is real, brings the student face to face with the essential element in the Catholic theory of mysticism. It is an element which comes naturally to the Catholic mind, but, just as naturally, is always overlooked by the non-Catholic. The element referred to is the fact that the experience of the mystic is supernatural. At the same time, the state of mind of the mystic is not what is known to psychologists as abnormal in the sense of being pathological. "Mystics," writes Father Sharpe, "have always been remarkable for sanity and placidity, even when invalids; the neurotic temperament which belongs to pathological states of consciousness is conspicuously rare, even if not entirely absent among them" (p. 36). Indeed, a certain sanity of mental condition is one of the tests of orthodox mysticism. Conformity to the teaching of the Church is another, as the author points out in his chapter on heretical mystics. Not the least valuable portion of the volume before us is that in which the writings and doctrines of Pseudo-Dionysius are treated with much detail. The author of the treatise *On Mystical Theology* exerted a profound and enduring influence on all Catholic writers on

mysticism. Father Sharpe's book is a valuable contribution to a subject which is little understood by many who have much to say about it.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Other World. By Harold B. Shephard, M. A. London, A. C. Fifield, 1910. Pp. 59. Price, 25 cents.

This little book appeals, as the author himself says, "neither to religion nor to philosophy, but to observation." Its contention is that we cannot understand such common things as "the tree, the spider, death, virtue, the night-sky" except on the supposition that, besides this world, the world of the senses, there is an "other world" that cannot be seen nor heard, nor touched; that cannot be weighed nor measured; that does not lie within the three dimensions; which is unknowable to the senses, and is known only by consciousness or by reasoning. The other-world is not a Platonic World of Ideas, nor a religious far-off heaven of rest and reward. It is the immaterial in the material world, the idealistic explanation of the real which surrounds us. The book, in fact, is a plea for the introduction of mind as an explanation of matter. It is original merely in the manner of its argument, and remarkable chiefly for the freshness with which it discusses a problem which is as old as philosophy itself. Its incidental discussion of pantheism is not without merit. "The immanence of God is a fashionable religious phrase. If they mean that His imaginations (*sic*) live in all lovely things, well and good. But, they say, can anything be outside of God? Pray God, much indeed. The shadow lives in the midst of a shining deep; but no darkness ever came out of light" (p. 56). The quotation will serve as a sample of the author's unconventional manner of dealing with the technicalities of philosophy.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Modern Biology and the Theory of Evolution. By Erich Wasmann, S. J. Translated by A. M. Buchanan, M. A. St. Louis, Herder, 1910. Pp. xxxii + 539. Price, \$4.50.

Catholics who are at a loss to know what a profound student

of biology and a competent critic of modern evolutionists thinks of the general theory of evolution and its relation to orthodoxy will find in this volume from the pen of the well-known Jesuit scientist the information they are seeking. The Christian apologist will do well to heed the warning "If Christianity is not to succumb to the attacks of monism based on natural philosophy, it must determine on bold action in the offensive; it must seize the enemies' arsenal, and, by accepting without reserve whatever is right in the theory of evolution, it will turn the opponents' weapons against themselves. In such proceedings caution is always advisable" (p. 278). The section entitled "Philosophical and Scientific Limitations of the Theory of Evolution" puts this principle into practice. We make no "concessions" to evolution, says Father Wasmann. Our philosophy bids us postulate the existence of an all-wise, all-powerful, personal Creator as the first cause, extraneous to the world, of the whole cosmos and the laws of its evolution. It teaches us that, to account for the origin of the first organisms, we must accept some special action, direct or indirect, on the part of the Creator, on matter. All the efforts of monism to set aside the first of these postulates are fruitless. As to the second, science by showing the absolute incompatibility of spontaneous generation with the laws of life as we know them, comes to the aid of Christian philosophy. Science, biological science, inclines us to make the further supposition that, since sensitive life is so superior to vegetative life, there was, in all probability, a distinction between plants and animals from the beginning, although this is not an unalterable philosophical postulate, like the first and second. The fourth postulate is one which like the first, is imposed on us inevitably by our knowledge, scientific and philosophical, of the nature of man. It is that "we can account for the existence of man only by assuming some special action on the part of the Creator. No evolution theory is capable of bridging the gulf between mind and matter, which, our experience teaches us, really exists." Having assigned these philosophical limits to the evolution-theory, Father Wasmann considers that the question of the extent of evolution within these limits is to be determined by the study of biological science. Here he meets the evolutionists on their own ground. The theistic interpretation of evolution, always supposing the above-mentioned limits, he set forth in his

famous lecture at Innsbruck in 1909: "A God who could create a living world capable of evolution is immeasurably greater and higher in His wisdom and power than a God who could only set all living creatures in the world, as fixed, unalterable automata. The greatest intellects of the middle ages and of antiquity, such as St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine, perceived and expressed this truth" (p. 488).

Father Wasmann's book is not confined to a discussion of these questions, momentous as they are. It furnishes a good deal of information about the history of biology in ancient and modern times, and, as those who have followed his scientific career might have expected, brings forward a vast amount of curious and valuable information concerning the morphogeny of ants. The translation, made from the third German edition, is well done, and, on the whole, free from the faults of style which it is so difficult to avoid in rendering technical German phraseology into acceptable English.

WILLIAM TURNER.

MISCELLANEOUS.

The Economic Significance of Socialism.

A Synopsis of a Lecture delivered in McMahon Hall, March 2, 1911, by Frank O'Hara, Ph. D.

Economically speaking, modern socialism means collectivism. It means that the social group shall take charge of the material instruments of production, i. e., of capital and land, and carry on the production of wealth in the interest of the whole group. Compensation may or may not be made to present owners of capital. The idea of the confiscation of property is not essential to socialism. The distribution of wealth among the workers is to be made according to some more perfect principle than the present rough and ready one of competition. There is a strong feeling among socialists that the whole produce of labor ought to belong to the laborer. Some socialists, however, look forward to the time when human nature will be so perfected that the principle "to each according to his needs" may be applied practically.

Socialists may be roughly classified as utopian and scientific. Utopian socialism is a socialism of the imagination, a building up of ideal plans which overlook the stern realities of life. The utopian socialists live in the clouds. Scientific socialism—the socialism of Rodbertus and Lasselle and Marx and Engels—has renounced the use of the imagination and has come down to the material earth to dwell. Utopian socialism has been conservative. Scientific socialism is essentially critical. It is a criticism of the present industrial order and of orthodox political economy.

Scientific socialism as represented by Carl Marx emphasizes two main ideas: first, the labor theory of value, and second, the evolution of capital and the increasing misery of the masses leading inevitably to socialism.

Labor alone, says Marx, is productive of value. Land merely supplies the material to which labor gives value and capital is simply a stored-up form of labor. All value is due to labor alone. Capital is, indeed, necessary in production, says Marx, but it adds value to the product only in the degree in which it is itself the

product of labor. For example, an ax or a plane which it has cost one day's labor value to produce will, when it has been worn out, have added one day's labor value to the commodity which it was employed to produce. It will not have added one day's labor value and something else which might be considered interest. Similarly land does not add any value to its product, since land itself is not produced by labor. After a lengthy investigation of the subject Marx feels that he can account for the value of any article by a summing up of the value of the labor necessary for its production.

But if the whole of the value of an article is due to the labor which it contains, Marx would like to know how it happens that the owner of capital can get for it, not merely the labor value which it contains, but interest in addition. The capitalist, let us say, loans something which has cost a hundred dollars labor value. At the end of a year he gets back a hundred dollars of labor value and four or five dollars in addition. And how does it happen that the landlord can get a rent for the use of his land in spite of the fact that all of the value of the product of the land is due to labor?

Marx explains the origin of the two shares, interest and rent, in this way: the wage-earner is able to create more value by his daily labor than is required for his sustenance. By working for twelve hours he is able to create, let us say, three dollars' labor value. Six hours' labor is sufficient to support him in the standard of living of his class. The capitalist who is in possession of the material means of labor buys the wage earner's labor power. He pays for twelve hours, or one day of it, not the three dollars which it produces but one dollar and fifty cents which will allow the laborer to live according to his accepted standard of life. Out of the other dollar and fifty cents, which Marx calls surplus value, interest and rent are paid. In other words the origin of interest and rent is to be found in the robbery of the surplus value of the wage earner's labor which is made possible by the private ownership of capital and land.

Marx establishes the coming of the social revolution by an appeal to history and prophecy. He asks us to go back with him to the period following the overthrow of slavery and serfdom. At that time each peasant owned his own means of labor, that is, his own capital. There was little division of labor and the

conditions of life were primitive. At a certain stage of development this society brings forth the material means of its own dissolution. . . . New forces and new passions spring up in the bosom of society but the old social organism fetters them and keeps them down. Finally, the tension becomes too strong and the old organism is annihilated. The capital which was formerly individualized and scattered among the workers is now united. The pigmy property of the many becomes the huge capital of the few. The great mass of the people have been expropriated from the soil, from the means of subsistence and from the means of labor. The oppression and degradation and exploitation of the masses becomes greater and greater, but the numbers of the working class grow and its discipline is constantly improved. Centralization of capital and socialization of labor continue until they reach a point where the revolution is inevitable. The expropriators are expropriated. Class antagonism will then cease, because there will be only one class.

Scientific socialism brings two main charges against the existing economic order: first, that production is carried on in an inefficient manner as compared with what we may expect under socialism and secondly, that the prevailing method of distribution by which the social income is divided into wages, interest, rent and profits is in the highest degree unjust. Such is the indictment against things as they are. But when the Marxist is asked what substitution he proposes to make, he will answer that he has done enough when he has shown that the present economic order is unjust and that it contains principles which must inevitably lead to its overthrow. Society can be depended upon, he would say, to produce an improved system of production and distribution when the present one is overthrown.

The scientific socialist refuses to give a detailed picture of socialism in operation, and so we must have recourse to the utopian. In a volume which has appeared recently a socialist of this class has outlined a very definite plan. He has organized a holding company under the laws of Arizona with the purpose of consolidating all of the industries of the world. This company, known as World Corporation, is issuing shares of stock at the par value of a dollar each. With the money received for its stock and with the stock itself it intends to buy up one by one all of the great industries, just as the United States Steel Cor-

poration bought up the stock of its subsidiary companies. In the course of time World Corporation hopes to own the steel trust, the oil trust, the tobacco trust, the sugar trust, and all of the other trusts together with the industries that have not yet reached the stage of trustification. As soon as World Corporation gets control of all the industries in all of the countries of the world it will undertake to retire its stock. As fast as it accumulates its surplus it will buy up outstanding shares of its own stock and will cancel such shares as fast as they are bought up. When all of the shares of World Corporation have been bought up and cancelled, socialism will have arrived. World Corporation will no longer have shareholders to receive dividends, and hence it will no longer be necessary to pay rent and interest and profits out of the social product. Of all the wealth that is produced a certain percentage will be set aside to keep social capital in repair; the rest, in so far as it is not used for public purposes, will go as wages. As the United States Steel Corporation or the Standard Oil Company now pay its managers high wages to get efficient results, so World Corporation will seek out the best administrative talent and will pay it well in order to get the benefit of its efficiency. The board of directors of World Corporation will be elected by the nations of the world. To the objection that a system where all men must work for one corporation is slavery, this utopian answers that it is true that if you have no money you must work under the World Corporation plan, but he contends that that is true now. But at any time under the new plan, if the laborer becomes dissatisfied with his work or his manager he may seek a new position. The wage scheme will be arranged on much the same plan as at present. The managers of the various industries will, from time to time, issue a schedule of the wages they are paying. If more laborers enter a particular industry than are needed, the managers of this industry will know that the wages which they offer are too high, comparatively, and they will lower them. In other industries where too few laborers apply for work, wages will have to be raised to attract them. In the course of time it might be possible so to adjust wages in the different industries that little change would be necessary. Under the new plan no man would be deprived of his capital goods against his will. Each would be offered a fair price for his capital and if he did not choose

to sell he might keep it. He could not be permitted, however, to lend it at interest.

World Corporation is, of course, only one of a great many utopian schemes; but it is probably as strong a socialistic position as any and will serve as well as any to illustrate the principles of socialism. An adequate refutation of socialism cannot be presented here for lack of space; a few objections, however, may be briefly treated.

In the first place, agriculture cannot be carried on in the manner contemplated by World Corporation or any similar socialistic scheme. Extremely large scale production in agriculture is economically impossible. On account of the frequent changing from one occupation to another it is impossible for a foreman on a farm to oversee the work of a number of laborers in the way in which it can be done in a factory with its regularity of tasks. Take the case of a farmer who is engaged with half a dozen hired men in making hay. On a few minutes' notice a rain storm blows up, suspending hay making for the rest of the day. The farmer who must find work for his men as soon as the rain is over, sends two or three of them to cultivate corn, one or two to mend fence and the others to split wood. Now if the responsible overseer had instead of half a dozen men, a hundred or a thousand, it is easy to imagine that great waste of time would result in assigning them to new tasks. Agriculture is the weakest spot in socialism. This is indeed beginning to be realized by many collectivists, some of whom have given up hope of bringing agriculture under the sway of socialism. But socialism with the socialization of agriculture left out is no longer socialism, for the reason that values would continue to be regulated competitively.

A second objection has to do with capitalistic monopolies. The socialists claim that there is a natural and universal tendency towards monopoly in industry. This has by no means been established. There are of course industries in which there is a natural tendency towards monopoly. The railway business is an example of this kind. As you continue to add to the number of tons transported you decrease the cost per ton of transportation. There is a natural tendency here towards trustification. The greater the volume of business, the more economical will be the production. There are other industries in which small scale production is more economical than large scale production. And,

finally, there are industries in which large scale production is economical up to a certain point but as the enterprises become still vaster and more bulky their management becomes involved in red tape and a lessened efficiency results which is not overcome by further economies in the technical process of production. When industries of this kind are trustified, the impulse comes, not from the demand for more economical production, but from an artificial demand such as that of the stock market. Promoters and underwriters are anxious to secure profits, and innocent investors who know absolutely nothing about the relative merits of trusts and mere large scale production are willing to risk their money in any enterprise where large profits are prophesied. In any line of business where independent capital can enter and compete with the trust and make profits and compel the trust to buy up the new enterprise, it is certain there is no natural demand for monopoly. There may be an economic demand for large scale production, but as long as competition is possible there is no economic demand for socialism, while there may be strong economic reasons against it. In the case of real monopolies on the other hand it is not necessary to adopt socialism to secure all of the economies. The United States believes, for example, that it can control the railway business through a regulation of rates. If, however, this should be found impossible, public ownership of railways and of the few other real monopolies would not mean socialism.

A further argument against the practicability of socialism has to do with the opposition it would experience if it ever comes into operation. No human institution can stand out against a general and continued attack from all sides. Socialism is no exception to this rule. We are all constantly finding fault with some institution or other. When we travel we are likely to think that the fare is excessive; when we pay our gas bills it seems to us that the meter is defective; when we buy woolen clothing we are suspicious as to the presence of the wool; when we compare our incomes with those of persons with whom we associate we feel that we are unjustly discriminated against. In all of these cases there is little that we can do but grumble. But if the Government or World Corporation or any socialistic institution owned the railways and the gas plants and the clothing stores and all other businesses, and were the sole employer of all of us,

all of the grumblers, and that would mean by far the larger part of the population, would be able to concentrate their hostility upon a very definite objection. Even if socialism were a very respectable institution it would not be able to live under such an attack.

St. Thomas of Aquin.

At the High Mass celebrated in McMahon Hall on March 7 in honor of St. Thomas, Patron of the Faculty of Philosophy, the sermon was preached by Reverend Doctor Turner. The speaker said in part :

"The wise man will seek out the wisdom of all the ancients, and will be occupied in the prophets. He will keep the sayings of renowned men and will enter withal into the subtleties of parables. . . . Many shall praise his wisdom, and it shall never be forgotten. The memory of him shall not depart away, and his name shall be in request from generation to generation."—*Ecclesiasticus*, xxxix, 1-13.

In studying the revealed mysteries of religion, in commemorating the lives of the saints and appreciating the work which they accomplished, we are in danger of attending only to the supernatural, and of overlooking the important part which nature, unadorned, often unregenerate, nature, plays in the dealings of God with men. Yet, we ought to see God in the Natural as well as in the Supernatural; one order is truly the work of Divine Wisdom as the other; both orders are but imperfect glimpses of Him, partial, onesided, surface-presentations of the one Divine Idea—they are, when we consider it, a manifestation; the distinction between them does not appear but on the application of a relative test, the capacity of our created nature. Besides, what God reveals we must believe, but unless we assume a close relation, an intimate union, between the world of truth above us and the truths which are attainable by our natural mental powers, a science of the supernatural is impossible. Thus it is that grace presupposes natural virtue, and the science of things divine is intimately allied with the science of nature.

God, in His infinite love, has safeguarded and with unbounded patience renewed and enriched the treasure of His divine revelation. Having once spoken to the human mind in supernatural revelation,

He took pains to preserve among men the truths which He revealed. The history of the Old Testament and of the New Dispensation is the story of God's jealous care that man should know the truth and of man's perverse proneness to error. From the earliest times the struggle has gone on, until one would have thought that even a God of infinite patience could no longer endure man's obstinate hatred of the light, and still God watched, and still He watches over the truths which He revealed.

Such being God's care that men should know and love the truth that is above them, what shall we say of His care for truth of the natural order? Saul, by express command of Jehovah Himself, was anointed at the hands of a prophet; Augustus attained the throne by ambition, corruption and civil strife. Think you that the Roman Empire was therefore less an object of solicitude to the ruler of the destinies of man than the establishment of a kingdom in Judea? Think you that the rise and fall of nations, the growth of industry, the development of the arts, changes which transform whole peoples, inventions which revolutionize the conditions of life, are not a part, and an important part, of the plan of Divine Providence? We have the Bible, and we are grateful for the lessons which it teaches; we reverence its authority because it is God's own book. Nay, it is but one of His books; the other is the great open book of Nature, whose laws proclaim in capital type the existence, the power, the wisdom, the justice, the goodness of the Creator. Inspired? Yes, though in a different sense, and more than inspired, because written by the very hand of God Himself. Shall we then say that when the leaves of that book of nature are turned, and some new chapter of its contents is read to us by a Plato, an Aristotle or a Newton, that He "who enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world" hath not so ordained?

There is a divine purpose running through the ages, and blending, as in the individual, so in the universe of nature and of human nature, the Natural and Supernatural. There are in some churches and places of Europe some rare old tapestries which men with infinite skill and patience have wrought from many-colored threads into designs of exquisite beauty. But, to him who is blind to some of the colors employed, such works of art must appear to be nothing but incomprehensible medlies. In like manner, he cannot hope to realize the perfect beauty of God's

Providence who fails to see the Natural interwoven with the Supernatural in the intellectual destinies of man.

Thus it was that, while the chosen people of God, heedless of the prophet, deaf to every appeal of supernatural truth, was continuing to earn for itself the epithet "stiffnecked," there was springing up among the sons of Japhet a nation destined to exert influence on the world in the era that was then being prepared. Greece, the land of the physical ideal, the home of poetry, the birthplace of science, the cradle of philosophy, seems to have been set aside from the beginning to play a sublime part in the history of ideas. Stains there are, and great ones, in the character of even the most perfect of her sages. Still as we turn to Greece from the recollection of her pagan contemporaries we feel like one who leaves the fetid air of the marshland for the pure clear atmosphere of the windswept shore of the Mediterranean. When Christ came, and taught, the days of Greece's intellectual supremacy were passing away; Plato and Aristotle had founded no enduring school; their disciples had already begun to pervert the doctrines of the masters. Nevertheless, as Rome was the political, so Greece was still the intellectual mistress of the world, when the new dispensation was vouchsafed. And, as the Jews, when they went forth from the bondage of Egypt, took with them the gold and precious ornaments belonging to their oppressors, so, says St. Augustine, did Christianity come out from paganism bringing with her the riches of the best of pagan thought.

It is in the light of these principles that I would invite you this morning to look at the work accomplished by St. Thomas. I would call your attention especially to the truth, now so generally acknowledged, that the life of humanity is continuous, that the work which was pre-eminently our saint's was not his exclusively. It is God's design that the Natural and the Supernatural should blend in one harmonious system of thought. The Fathers, from Justin onward, took up this idea. The Apologists contributed to its realization. St. Augustine strove for it with the zeal of a St. Paul and the sublimity of a Plato. Albert, the many-gifted, untiring predecessor and teacher of St. Thomas, worked for it throughout his long career. But, in comprehensiveness of view, in thoroughness of method, and completeness of result, St. Thomas outshone all his predecessors in this line. I might, on this, his feast day, recall the events of his early life, and show how, in

common with other servants of God, he was tried by suffering and temptation. I might dwell on his wonderful humility, his still more marvelous patience, his love of solitude and study, his talent for prayer and meditation on spiritual truth. But I prefer to note the traits which were peculiar to him. While yet a mere child playing in the solemn cloisters of Monte Cassino, he would awe the pious Benedictine monks by his precocious questions concerning the nature of God. In Naples he distinguished himself by the zeal with which he pursued the study of philosophy under the guidance of Pietro d'Hibernia. A captive for conscience sake in the mountain fortress of San Giovanni, he delighted in the study of him whom he loved to call the philosopher. Later, over rough ways, through steep, untravelled mountain passes, he journeyed into distant Germany, where, under the direction of the great Albert, he first studied and then assumed the office of teacher. At Cologne, at Paris, at Rome, and elsewhere, he taught and preached. Wherever he taught, pupils flocked from every nation in Europe to hear him. Wherever he preached, the word of God, falling from his lips, wrought wonders. All this time, he prayed and wrote, until at the early age of forty-seven he laid down his pen and whispered with dying breath his exposition of the song of mystic love, leaving unfinished his masterpiece of theology, the most perfect exposition of Christian doctrine. He preached and taught; he prayed and wrote. Such was his life. It was not what one would call an eventful life, unless we say that it was a life in which ideas were events. The predilection which he is said to have shown for Greek philosophy in his youth lasted to the end of his days. Others had explained and expounded Christian truths in the language and in the mould of Greek thought. He was the first to conceive and execute successfully a complete synthesis of Christian revelation on the principles of the Greek masters. He was the first in the medieval times to present a system of theology "clad in a panoply that is proof against the blow of the heretic and the thrust of the unbeliever."

But that was not all that he accomplished. They do less than justice to St. Thomas who see in his writings merely a refutation of the errors of his time. It is true that in his day a new spirit Aristotelianism was threatening the foundations of faith, that the Rationalists of Paris, in sympathy with the heretics of

Languedoc, if not actually in league with them, were using the name and reputation of Aristotle against the authority of the Church; it is true that St. Thomas, throwing himself boldly into the intellectual strife, wrenched the sword from the grasp of the Church's opponents and used it against them. But this is not the whole truth. In the work of St. Thomas one may see not merely a measure of defense, not simply the arrest of a counter movement, but a positive phase of thought, a natural, long looked for step in the direction of intellectual progress, a true evolution, a growth from the less perfect to the more perfect. The Patristic Age had chosen Plato as the philosopher whose principles best accorded with Christianity. The dreamer, the poet, the idealist was a powerful ally in the struggle against the sordid, material views of a world steeped in pagan luxury and weakened by self-indulgence. When all the institutions of paganism were going to ruin, undermined by the vices of over-civilization, it was natural to turn to a thinker who pointed ever to a better, a truer, a more beautiful world above us. St. Augustine and his Platonism suited the decadent Latin civilization of the fifth century. But, since that time the face of Europe had been changed, and a new spirit had entered into Latin civilization. The Celt and the Teuton had come into the Christian commonwealth; a race of vigorous, inquisitive, constructive Christians had sprung up and were now demanding a synthesis of Christian thought on lines less idealistic and more scientific, less fanciful and more solid, less in the spirit of other worldliness and more in the spirit of this worldliness. The Europe of the thirteenth century found more in Aristotle than in Plato. Plato's conceptions were grand, sublime, uplifting; Aristotle's were solid, far-reaching and scientifically accurate. Each had his defects, and each had his claim to supremacy. St. Thomas saw the defects of both, and, with a confidence born of humility, viewing both systems from the higher plane of Christian philosophy, he evolved from materials furnished by them a system of natural truth which, while it is in perfect harmony with Christian revelation, is, apart altogether from revelation, the crowning and consummation of the best efforts of human thought. It is true that St. Thomas is an Aristotelian in the same sense in which St. Augustine is a Platonist. But what an improvement on the cold, calm, unsympathetic Stagyrte. The

philosophy of Aristotle stands forth noble and majestic, like the Parthenon which crowned the hill over-looking the groves where he taught; but, like the great temple of Minerva, it is severe in its strict conformity to principle, uninviting, unconsoling. Thomas presents a system of thought, rich, almost exuberant, in its chastened spiritual imaginativeness, from every detail of which the mind is led inevitably to something beyond and above us, like the grand old Gothic pile which now stands on the Rhine's bank in the city where he first sat at the feet of Albert. If St. Augustine is the Plato of Christianity, St. Thomas is its Aristotle, but an Aristotle, christianized, transformed, transfused with Christian feeling, almost, one might say, an Aristotle transfigured.

Such is the work of St. Thomas. I have said that that work is not his exclusively, that the life of humanity is continuous, that there is an onward movement, if not always true progress, in human thought. The problem which confronted St. Thomas belongs not to any one age nor to any one period of history; it affects the intellectual destinies of Christians in every age and in every clime. In its general terms it is always the same—Reason and Revelation, Science and Faith, Philosophy and Theology—but in details it is always assuming new phases. The task which St. Thomas undertook is for ever renewing itself, and must be solved by each generation of Christians as it presents itself to them. How, and in what terms does it confront us? A careful study of the modern world of thought will reveal, I think, a curious condition of affairs. Science, where it has kept within its own sphere, has made marvelous progress; it has achieved wonderful results, and every new fact which it reveals, every new secret which it has wrested from nature is to the reverent minded but a new manifestation of the Author of all things. With science within those limits no Christian will quarrel. It is different with the philosophy of the modern era. Judged by its general aim the philosophy of the day has simply failed in its mission. Its last word, its final solution of every problem, is a flippant despair of knowing anything. On the great problems: What is the soul? Whence is it? Whither does it go? on the nature and origin of the universe, on the nature and value of knowledge, the last message of modern thought is "We know not." Years of speculation, of research, of laborious investigation, have resulted in this anti-climax. We have had criticism, analysis,

destruction, but where has there been a successful attempt at construction? There are many hands ready to tear down, but as soon as one is stretched out to lay brick on brick or stone on stone, the cry of the Agnostic is heard: "Beware, the foundation is not secure." Great minds, as great perhaps, as Plato's or Aristotle's, have wrestled with the problem of life; their earnestness is worthy of praise; their analysis calls for our admiration at their skill; but the mind of man imperatively demands a system, not the *disjecta membra* of a system; its need is a synthesis of truth, not a collection of facts. What, then can the Christian philosopher do but turn elsewhere for assistance, and elsewhere, I believe, St. Thomas would have turned did he live today. The light that science has thrown on the problems of life he would have accepted with gladness; but, in the science of sciences, in the final synthesis of knowledge, he would have taken the stand which he took more than six hundred years ago. He would have raised experience to the rank of a guiding principle, but, not stopping at the surface, he would have passed beyond experience from effect to cause, from appearance to reality, from the phenomenon to the law of substance. The use of the telescope and the microscope, the precision of laboratory methods have brought to light facts which would have changed many details and reversed opinions on many points of natural science, but the conception of the soul, of its nature, operations and immortality, the dualistic conception of the universe as a combination of the actual and the potential—all these would have remained the cardinal principles of his system of thought. But these principles, you may object, are the common heritage of all Christians. They are, or some of them, at least, are; but to whom, under God, do we owe them? Without explanation they could never have survived, and to whom but to St. Thomas do we own that explanation?

I am conscious that I have led you into thoughts but indirectly connected with the feast which we are gathered here to celebrate. Yet, how can we honor the great Doctor of the Church, the Prince of Christian philosophers, better than by speaking of his work? His work was his life; his intellectual labors are hardly distinguishable from his practice of piety. The order of St. Dominic has given to the Church many a saint and many a scholar. But never a more scholarly saint nor a more saintly scholar than St. Thomas of Aquin. And if, as all Catholics believe, the spirits of the heroic dead hover round the scenes of their labor as

tutetary saints, and continue by a spiritual presence to promote the work which interested them in life—if the Princes of the Apostles are special patrons of the city on the seven hills, and Peter and Paul still watch on the banks of the Tiber with keys and sword; if the gentle Francis still breathes the spirit of simple piety on the peaceful plains of Umbria, and still tames many a wolfish heart in the castled towns of Tuscany; if the other Francis still seconds the efforts of our missionaries in the Far East and sustains them in their heroic task; then, surely, in this institution of learning, founded by the authority which he so strenuously upheld, devoted to sacred truth which he so ardently loved, here where his spirit is in the heart and his name often on the lips of every teacher of sacred science, here where our only justification of the task we are engaged in is the idea which inspired him, here the great, calm, majestic soul of St. Thomas is surely present as a benediction and an inspiration. May it always be so. May the day never come when his authority will be set aside, his guidance neglected, his example ignored, his doctrines held in less esteem than they are now. On the contrary, as this institution grows in numbers and in influence and in usefulness, may the blessing of his patronage grow more fruitful, the inspiration of his example more potent, and the authority of his teaching more helpful; so that here, in this university, the prophecy may be fulfilled: "The memory of him shall not depart away, and his name shall be in request from generation to generation."

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY SUMMER SCHOOL.

The Catholic University of America has issued a handsome prospectus of the Summer School for Teaching Sisters and Laywomen, which it will conduct from the third of July until the seventh of August of this year. This booklet has been sent to every parochial school and academy taught by sisters in the United States and to as many Catholic laywomen interested in education as the university has been able to reach by mail. The prospectus is profusely illustrated and contains a spirited description of the university and the City of Washington. Copies will be sent on request to all who desire further information concerning the summer school.

When the first announcement of the summer school went out to the hierarchy, one of the most scholarly bishops of America wrote to Monsignor Shahan: "I am heartily in sympathy with the movement. Much will depend on the character of the course itself—that is, are these studies to be regular classes in definite branches of study, say of mathematics, physics, chemistry, English literature and the like, just as in college? Lectures are good enough in a way, but what is needed is close and constant study, regular recitations and teaching. Another item of importance is the cost, the price of tuition and of board and lodging. These are vital to our poor communities." The prospectus answers these questions most satisfactorily.

The trustees of the university have authorized a normal institute for teaching sisters (which laywomen may also attend) in the immediate vicinity of the university under its direction. The summer school is, in fact, the first step taken towards the realization of this project. Work done in the summer school will count towards the degrees that will later be granted by the Normal Institute, on the basis of one full course at the summer school equalling two hours a week for half a year in the institute. With few exceptions the courses of the summer school demand five hours class-room work each week of the five that the summer school is in session. Laboratory courses call for twice as much time. Registration commences Saturday, July first. Examinations will be held Saturday, August 5. The other Saturdays will be devoted to excursions to the many points of natural beauty and

historical interest in which the near neighborhood of Washington abounds.

The courses of instruction announced at present are as follows: Logic, Professor Turner; Problems in the Philosophy of the Mind, Professor Pace; Educational Psychology, Professor Moore; History of Education, Professor Pace, Professor Turner, Professor McCormick; High School Methods of Teaching Algebra, Professor Landry; of History, Professor McCarthy; of English, Professor Hemelt; Primary Methods of Education, Training the Backward Child, Teaching the Subjects in a Modern School Curriculum, Miss Maguire, supervising principal of the Western Grammar School, Philadelphia; the Principles of Education, a series of lectures by the celebrated authority, Dr. Thomas Edward Shields, of the university faculty; Physical Defects of Children, with living subjects on exhibition, Dr. Francis A. Schneider, M. D.; English Literature and Theme Writing, Professor Hemelt; two courses in French, Professor Teillard; two in German, and one in Spanish, Professor Furger; courses in Latin and Greek as demanded; General Church History and American Constitutional History, Professor McCarthy; General Biology and the Structure and Physiology of Plants, Professor Parker; Chemistry, General and Qualitative Analysis, Professor Wagner; Physics, lectures, experiments, problems, and reading, Instructor Crook; Astronomy, lectures and practical work, Professor Doolittle; Algebra, Geometry and Plane Trigonometry, Professor Landry; Art, freehand drawing and outdoor sketching, Professor Murphy; Music, art of singing, vocal training of school children, Gregorian chant, harmony, counterpoint and musical composition, Professor Gabert; Library Science, history, works of reference, systems of classifications, cataloguing practical work and visits to Washington libraries.

The City of Washington is itself a great school, presenting educational advantages of the richest and most varied character. The general Government spends eight millions annually in scientific research and several private institutions aggregate possibly a million more. The Government has thus brought to the city an unparalleled force of scientists. Their laboratoires are by act of Congress accessible to students of educational institutions situated in the District, while their influence and assistance are generously at the disposal of the student investigators. Museums, libraries, art galleries, public monuments and the like make Washington unique among American cities as the best equipped

home of study along all educational lines. The summer school will be careful to give its students the greatest possible benefit of the advantages afforded by the city, including lectures at the summer school by distinguished men, thus bringing the students into personal contact with the National Government.

The fifteen buildings making up the university group and comprising the affiliated colleges, offer in themselves rare opportunities for the improvement of class-room workers. Laboratories, museums, libraries, art collections, the entire expensive outfit of the university environment, will be at the command of the students and will be explained by university instructors. Halls on the campus will be conducted as summer school convents, where the sisters will be cared for handsomely at the rate of one dollar per day, ample preparations having been perfected to attend to all their needs and make the sojourn delightful.

Laywomen may board on the same terms in private families in the town of Brookland adjoining the university, and also in the city at hotels which have made special rates varying from \$4.25 a week to \$10.00 a day. Special railway rates have been promised providing those expecting to attend will write promptly to the registrar of the university and thus enable him to make advantageous contracts with the various passenger associations. The summer school fees will be \$10.00 for one course, \$20.00 for more than one, and, in laboratory courses, \$5.00 extra. There is no registration fee or charge for public lectures.

This announcement marks an epoch in the history of Catholic education in America. The teaching sisters of the country, fully abreast of the times, have attended, whenever possible, the summer schools conducted by secular universities. Now the Catholic University of America, easily the peer of any other American university in its teaching capacity, opens its doors to the Catholic teachers with a fully organized pedagogical school which will insure the most congenial surroundings, the truest proportions of curriculum and the inspiring atmosphere of Catholic scholarship, to those teachers whose life is one long act of devotion to the Faith. The good results to be expected from this departure are incalculable. Every Catholic should do all in his power to make this first session of the summer school popular, so that the developments to follow, the foundation of the Normal Institute and the permanent service of the university to the women teachers of America, can be made sure for all time.

"GIBBONS MEMORIAL HALL."

The committee in charge of the proposed Cardinal Gibbons Memorial Hall of the Catholic University, Washington, reports rapid and satisfactory progress. The circular printed below has been sent to every Catholic priest in the United States, and from all quarters a generous response is coming in. Bishop Corrigan is daily in receipt of numerous letters from every State in the Union, containing generous donations, and expressing the deep respect and affection in which Cardinal Gibbons is universally held. Many members of the hierarchy have already contributed very generously, and it is expected that eventually most of the Catholic clergy will have done their full share in the creation of this noble educational monument. The educational feature of the Memorial Hall, and its permanent character appeal strongly to all, likewise its location at the National Capital, where it will be forever visible to visitors from all parts, and will keep alive most efficiently the memory of the great American cardinal to whom religion and country are so much indebted.

A similar circular is now being widely distributed among the Catholic laity throughout the United States and it is certain that a very generous response will come from their ranks. Though a very staunch churchman, the Cardinal is often known as "the layman's Cardinal," not only because of his affable and urbane manner, but also because he has always advocated the religious and patriotic interests of the laity and on countless occasions has acted as their spokesman and champion. Many non-Catholics have already signified their desire to contribute to the Gibbons Memorial Hall, in recognition of the important services rendered by the Cardinal to American democracy, of which he has always been a fearless and enthusiastic exponent. There is probably no community in the United States where he is not deeply respected by all classes for his advocacy of the great essentials of our national life. In both of the great political parties he counts many warm friends and admirers, who rejoice that a fitting memorial will soon be erected to him at the National Capital.

Archbishop Keane of Dubuque writes:

"My whole heart goes out in response to your appeal for the Cardinal Gibbons Memorial Hall in the Catholic University of America. Our Cardinal and our University are the two objects that stand highest, and deservedly so, in the hearts of American Catholics. Success, fullest and most generous success, to this admirable project for linking them together in a monumental structure at the University."

Coadjutor-Bishop Grimes of Syracuse writes:

"I feel as you do that the occasion will be embraced by the clergy and the laity of the country to express their esteem and affection for this remarkable man who is the idol of the American people and the champion at all times of the doctrines of our Church."

Father Railliere, the oldest priest in New Mexico and parish priest of Tome for fifty-three years, born in the same year as the Cardinal, sends his contribution with interesting reminiscences of the days when the Cardinal was the youngest bishop at the Vatican Council, the "boy bishop" as one of the old cardinals was wont affectionately to call him.

Justice McDonough of Fall River, Mass., writes

"I enclose my mite for a few bricks or stones for the Cardinal Gibbons Hall. Cardinal Gibbons is the pride of the Catholic Church in the United States, and while we cherish him living, we should do all we can to revere and perpetuate his memory when God, in His own good time, shall have called him to Himself.

One of the legion of the Cardinal's admirers.

This delightful letter brought the very first contribution to the fund the day after it was first announced in the Baltimore papers.

The Memorial Hall will be erected on the finest site of the University grounds, and when completed will be a notable addition to the numerous fine buildings that now form the chief attraction of the Brookland suburb. While plans have not been definitely accepted, a noble Tudor Gothic building is contemplated, to provide comfortable residence for one hundred and fifty collegiate

and graduate students. The University has just finished a large central heat, light and power plant, so that ample provision is now made for heating and lighting at the least possible expense the present plant and all future buildings that go up on the campus. In this way the entire space of the new hall will be devoted to educational uses. Externally and internally it will meet all the demands made on such an edifice by modern architectural progress. For this purpose a careful study has been made of all the best features of such residence buildings at Princeton, Yale, Columbia and elsewhere, with a view of embodying them in the new edifice. The Memorial Hall will be eventually ornamented with a statue of the Cardinal and his official coat of arms will be sculptured over the entrance.

Among the Catholic fraternal societies the Ancient Order of Hibernians and their Ladies' Auxiliary have already signified officially their intention to make a notable contribution to the new Memorial Hall. Eventually, the University grounds will be encircled by a series of similar residence halls whose architectural unity and symmetry will give the great institution the appearance of an American Oxford.

The following is the text of the circular sent out by the Committee:

DEAR FRIEND:

The Golden Jubilee or fiftieth anniversary of the ordination of Cardinal Gibbons to the priesthood occurs this year, also the twenty-fifth anniversary of his elevation to the august senate of the Apostolic See. His countless friends and admirers believe that these events should not go unrecognized, and desire to enroll your good-will and your personal co-operation in offering to our eminent fellow-citizen a tribute worthy of his high office and of the place he has so long filled in the life of our nation.

It is proposed to erect on the ground of the Catholic University a CARDINAL GIBBONS MEMORIAL HALL of residence for lay students, a noble edifice that shall forever bear his name, and while rendering the most useful service to a rapidly growing school, shall remind all who come after us that we appreciated fully and in his own day the unique influence of Cardinal Gibbons in our national life. It is known that he cares for no other recognition, but is willing that the many friends, both in and out

of the Church, who in his long career as a minister of Jesus Christ and an American citizen have profited by his discourses, his writings, or his example, should unite to erect an edifice that shall stand before the youth of our country for the highest education, the purest religion, and the most exalted patriotism.

Since its opening in 1889 the chief interest of Cardinal Gibbons has been the Catholic University of America. He was the leader in its foundation, and is now its head and governor. In his mind, as in that of the American Catholic hierarchy whom he represents, this great school, the official work of our hierarchy and our people, is destined to render the highest services to the Catholic Church in the United States, not only in the defence and illustration of religious truth, but also as a public monumental witness to the immemorial love of learning that characterizes our Catholic people and their patriotic devotion to the moral and social welfare of our country.

It may be truly said that in respect of the teachings and spirit of Catholicism, the loyalty of Catholics to this glorious republic, and the perfect sympathy between our American democracy and the Catholic Church, Cardinal Gibbons has been for fifty years a foremost educator of the American people. He has dispelled immemorial prejudice, has destroyed in no small measure the roots of fear and suspicion, and has freed the American people from many anti-Catholic delusions that held them in mental bondage. On the other hand he has inspired by word and example his Catholic fellow-citizens to lives of the highest virtue, and has never failed, in season and out of season, to impress upon them the majesty of the American State and its rights to our utmost love and devotion.

When Cardinal Gibbons began his priestly career there were scarcely three thousand priests in the vast territory of the United States, and the Catholic layman had almost to apologize for being a member of the ancient faith, whereas now there are over sixteen thousand priests, and the wisest statesmen admit that the Catholic Church is the nation's chief bulwark against the many evil forces that are threatening the peace, if not the existence, of the world's greatest republic.

In this happy development of Catholicism Cardinal Gibbons has had a large and important rôle. While never failing to emphasize the great substantial truths of religion and their endless

service to the common welfare, he has devoted his best thought and endeavor, by ceaseless preaching of the Word of God, by personal instruction and by books of unparalleled success, to making known the beauty, the power, and the charm of our immemorial Catholicism, its visible roots in the Gospel and in human nature, its beneficent career in the history of mankind, its sun-like vigor in creating and sustaining new and useful institutions.

For fifty years he has moved with unbroken success as an official exponent of Catholicism and has earned at all times not only the love and respect of his own fellow-citizens, both in and out of the Church, but also the commendation of the highest authority in the Church itself. As a priest of God he has lived in this half century a blameless and edifying life, has daily brought to the Catholic people all the divine consoling ministrations of their religion, has preached without ceasing and in its simple purity the saving Gospel of Christ, and in the fulfillment of this ministry has won the love and admiration, not only of his Catholic fellow-citizens, but of a multitude of other right-minded men. As a citizen he stands second to none for constant and active devotion to the principles and the spirit of American democracy. He has never tired of inculcating on all the duty of patriotism not only in eloquent and forcible language, but by his own example, in many acts of public service, in spirited defence and ardent praise of our American commonwealth, and in timely warning of the dangers that beset our path when we abandon the teachings and the example of the founders of the nation. As a man, his plain unassuming manner, his frugal habits and simple life, his industry, self-restraint and regularity, offer to all, and especially to our American youth, a model that cannot be too highly commended amid the acknowledged excesses of our civilization. His love of the lowly and oppressed, and his readiness to defend their cause, have won world-wide recognition, likewise his steady insistence on equity and fair play in all the economic and social relations of our American life.

As a bishop he has administered with paternal mildness the parent see of our American Catholic hierarchy and has maintained and confirmed its glorious Catholic traditions of religion and patriotism that began with Archbishop Carroll, and it is hoped will never suffer an eclipse. His house has been ever hospitably open to his Episcopal brethren from every quarter of the world,

and with equal generosity his good offices have been always at their disposal. It is under Cardinal Gibbons that took place the most striking events of our Catholic public life in the latter quarter of the nineteenth century, the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, the First Centenary of the foundation of our hierarchy, the first Catholic Congress, the foundation at Washington of the Catholic University and the establishment of the Apostolic Delegation. In countless ways he has co-operated with the hierarchy of the United States for the welfare of religion, and by his prudence and experience, as well as by his insight and sympathy, has rendered to all his brethren of the episcopate, individually and collectively, services whose number and importance the Holy Spirit alone could reveal. Meanwhile he has consecrated to their great tasks one quarter of the American hierarchy, and has ordained about two thousand priests, nor has this exhausted his devotion to the Catholic clergy, for he had found time in his busy life to write for them one of the most beautiful books on the priestly life.

As a Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church, besides earning the love and approbation of two of the most remarkable successors of St. Peter, he has represented with equal dignity and success the general interests of our American Catholicism, and on all occasions has so borne himself as to leave room only for praise. It was, indeed, easy for him to continue always affable, gentle, and approachable; to remain unchanged in priestly life and spirit; to retain his modest and toilsome habit of life, but it gave to all, both Catholic and non-Catholic, particular pleasure when it was seen that the leader of the American Catholic hierarchy always spoke and acted with becoming tact, with judicious acumen, with a broad discriminating sense of principles and circumstances, with Catholic frankness, but also with patriotic ardor, while no one could mistake his charitable anxiety not to wound unnecessarily the feelings of our non-Catholic fellow-citizens, so well and widely known to him in the fifty years of his priestly ministrations.

In his eloquent discourse "The Church and the Age," Archbishop Ireland rightly says that "the work of Cardinal Gibbons forms an epoch in the history of the Church in America. He has made known, as no one before him did, the Church to the people of America. * * * Through his action the scales have fallen from the eyes of non-Catholics and prejudices have vanished." Recently, on his death-bed, Archbishop Ryan said to

the Cardinal, "I am now, as I ever have been, profoundly convinced that you are the instrument of Providence for the promotion of every good thing for our Church and our Country." And a prominent writer only echoes the conclusions of these distinguished prelates, when he says that "Cardinal Gibbons has been heard on every question of morals, public policy, or political economy that has agitated the nation since he became the head of the American Catholic hierarchy, and has always said the right thing at the right time."

Such a life calls for no small or transitory memorial, circumscribed by narrow limits. It is believed that the American people will desire to see preserved for all time the memory and the honor of the good Cardinal in the Capital of the Nation, and in such a way that his personality shall forever continue among us a religious, educational, and patriotic force.

If the subscriptions are numerous and generous enough, the trustees of the University will proceed quickly to the erection of the new Cardinal Gibbons Hall, so that it may be practically finished on October 30, when the Cardinal will celebrate solemnly the two anniversaries of his ordination to the priesthood and his elevation to the Cardinalate.

Your voluntary contribution is respectfully solicited. Any sum, however small, will be thankfully received and will be duly recorded in a great album always accessible to visitors. The names of those who contribute five hundred dollars or more will be inscribed on suitable tablets in the vestibule of the new Hall, while members of the University, professors and students, will never cease to remember gratefully and to pray for the generous donors.

All checks should be made payable to RT. REV. OWEN B. CORRIGAN, D. D., TREASURER, 1611 Baker Street, Baltimore, Md., and all correspondence should be addressed to VERY REV. GEORGE A. DOUGHERTY, D. D., Vice-Rector, Catholic University, Washington, D. C.

Very respectfully yours in Xto,

OWEN B. CORRIGAN, *Bishop of Macra.*

President of the Committee and Treasurer.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Gift of Plowden's Commentaries. By the generosity of the late Mrs. Michael Jenkins a very rare law book has been added to the University Library. This is the Commentaries on the Common Law of England, by Sir Edward Plowden, a prominent judge in the reign of Queen Elizabeth. The work is a classic in its kind. It is written mostly in the old Norman French of the English law-courts, though some cases are in Latin or English.

The edition is one of the earliest, and the title page reads: "1571. Les Commentaries, ou les Reportes de Edmund Plowden un apprentice de le comen Ley, de dyvers cases esteantes matters en ley, et de les Argumentes sur yceux, en les temps des Raygues le Roye Edwarde de Size, le Roigne Mary, le Roy et Roigne Phillipp et Mary, et le Roigne Elizabeth. In Ædibus Richardi Tottelli, Octobris 24. Cum privilegio."

Annual Retreat. The Annual Retreat for the students of theology began on Ash Wednesday, March 1, and ended on Sunday, March 5. The exercises were conducted by Reverend John J. Wynne, S. J.

Feast of St. Thomas. On March 7, the Feast of St. Thomas, patronal feast of the Faculty of Philosophy, was celebrated at MacMahon Hall. The celebrant of High Mass was Very Reverend Richard S. Cartwright, C. S. P., President of the Paulist House of Studies. The preacher was the Reverend William Turner, S. T. D.

Lectures by Reverend Dr. Fox. Reverend Dr. Fox, Associate Professor of Ethics, is delivering a course of lectures at the Catholic Club, New York, under the auspices of the

Catholic Summer School of America. The following are the dates and subjects:

March 3—The Socialistic Movement and Socialism.

March 10—The Bible and Socialism.

March 17—Socialistic Aims and Constructive Schemes.

March 24—The Fundamental Errors of the Socialist Philosophy.

March 31—The Right of Ownership.

April 7—The Attitude of the Catholic Church toward the Socialist Movement.

Lectures by Reverend Drs. Shields and Pace. The Reverend Doctors Shields and Pace, of the Faculty of Philosophy, are giving a course of lectures at Worcester, Mass., under the auspices of the Catholic Women's League. The dates and subjects are:

March 6—The Church and the Teacher (Dr. Shields).

March 21—The Church and the Child (Dr. Shields).

April 28—The Church and the Citizen (Dr. Pace).

May 4—The Church and the Scientist (Dr. Pace).

The University Symposium. The first number of the *University Symposium* appeared in February. The editors, who were selected from the student body, intend publishing three issues during the remainder of the scholastic year. Beginning with next October, they intend to publish a number each month of the scholastic year, at the annual subscription price of two dollars. The price for the three numbers published this year is fifty cents.

The *Bulletin* hails with joy this latest evidence of literary and academic activity among the lay students of the University, and wishes the *University Symposium* many years of success and prosperity.

NECROLOGY.

MRS. MARY ISABELLA PLOWDEN JENKINS.

The University extends to its respected treasurer, Mr. Michael Jenkins, Esq., sincere sympathy for the loss of his beloved wife, Mrs. Mary Isabella Plowden Jenkins, who departed this life at Baltimore, March 5, fortified by the rites of Holy Church.

Mrs. Jenkins was at all times a devoted friend of the University, and a notable benefactress. More than once, and in various ways, she came to its assistance, and from its foundation never failed to follow with lively interest its growth. She was among the prominent members of the Cathedral parish, and during her long life was a most generous supporter of all its works and charities, being particularly devoted to his Eminence, Cardinal Gibbons, and ready at all times to second his efforts for the welfare of our holy religion. It may be said without exaggeration that her Catholic generosity came to her not unnaturally, for she was a lineal descendant of Sir Edmund Plowden, a renowned English judge in the time of Queen Elizabeth, and who remained to the end loyal to the old religion.

The last words Mrs. Jenkins wrote were on the fly leaf of a very rare early edition of this illustrious lawyer's "Commentaries" that she presented to the University Library.

While she lived, her modest and unassuming nature made it impossible to learn all the good she did without ceasing, but it could not escape the recording angel, and surely won for her a speedy entrance into life eternal. R. I. P.

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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Communil*, c. 6.

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ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS, THEORY OF STATE, THEORY OF ART.

In the last two articles we have been considering that portion of philosophy which Aristotle calls theoretical, because, he says, it is a matter of speculative knowledge, and has no immediate relation to action. Physics belongs to theoretical philosophy, and so do psychology and metaphysics. Philosophy ceases to be theoretical when it begins to have relation to action. Now, human action, according to Aristotle, is twofold; there is that kind of action which has relation to ethical, or moral, ends, which we call conduct; and there is that kind of action which has relation to the production of artistic effects, and which we call artistic creative action. The three divisions therefore, or the three parts, of philosophy, as Aristotle calls them, are *theoretical*, which has no immediate relation to action, *practical*, which takes up the study of human conduct, including ethics and politics, and *creative* or *poetical*, philosophy, which takes up the study of the creative faculty, including poetry, rhetoric and art in general. It is clear, therefore, that when we bring together as the subject of this paper, Ethics and Politics and Art, we are treating conjointly two parts of philosophy, namely the practical and poetical.

Practical philosophy, then, takes up the study of human conduct both individual and aggregate, in relation to happiness. That happiness is the aim, conscious or unconscious, of all our

actions seemed self-evident to Aristotle as it did to all the Greeks who thought about the subject at all. In their view, happiness and excellence are the same, since the word happiness means merely wellbeing of soul or spirit. That a man *could* consciously aim at unhappiness seemed to them impossible, and that he *should* make misery his deliberate purpose never occurred to them, as it does so frequently to modern thinkers, of the pessimistic school. The Greeks were young; they belong to the youth of the race; and the youthful are always optimistic by temperament. It is only in the old age of the race, as in the old age of the individual, that happiness sometimes seems to have gone out of reach, and the notion occurs that perhaps we are not obliged to be happy, but rather, to be miserable. At any rate, Aristotle belongs to the optimists. He starts with the assumption that happiness is the aim of human action. But, how is happiness to be attained? Socrates had made some progress in the discussion of this problem. He called attention to two kinds of happiness. There is, he said, one kind of happiness which arises from fortune, or chance, the happiness that is given us by inheritance, by environment, by opportunity, by a happy combination of circumstances. This is happiness which we do not earn, and, as it comes to us without any effort of ours, it may be lost to us without any fault of ours; it may desert us as capriciously as it formerly sought us unaccountably. It is, of its nature, ephemeral, uncertain, and we never have, so to speak, a flawless title to it. On the other hand, there is happiness which we do not inherit but acquire; which comes, not as a gift of the gods but as a reward of our own efforts; the bread which we earn in the sweat of our brow, the wages which we wrest from a master that is hard to please, fruit that we glean from a hard, unproductive soil; in a word, happiness that is our own in the strict sense of the word, because we owe it to no one but ourselves. To this happiness, if we once acquire it, we have a clear title, and an unshakable one. Once it is ours, it is ours forever: no reverse of fortune can deprive us of it, no accident or untoward event can diminish it or detract

from it. If now, we wish, as all men do, to attain happiness, and to remain in that state, the obvious moral, says Socrates, is to rely as little as possible on the happiness which is evanescent by nature, and build our hope exclusively on that kind of happiness which cannot fail us. Socrates went farther. He taught that virtue is the one indispensable means of attaining true happiness, and counseled moderation in all things as a condition of a virtuous life. Plato, though the aim of all his philosophy was ethical, did comparatively little towards clarifying our ideas of virtue and happiness. He defined virtue as a kind of harmony, or health, of the soul, and distinguished the four kinds of virtue which have since been called the cardinal virtues, wisdom, fortitude, temperance and justice. His influence, as was said in a previous article, was inspirational rather than illuminative; he incited to virtue by showing how lovely virtue is and how sordid are the things that prevent its attainment. He did not analyse it as a psychologist, nor did he bring to bear on his description of it much knowledge of nature or of human nature. That was left for Aristotle to do.

Aristotle's analysis of happiness is scientific. By this is meant that he bases his examination of the question on principles which he applies elsewhere to the study of natural phenomena. He assumes that the excellence of man is happiness. In his philosophy of nature he discovers that the excellence of anything consists in the realization of the purpose for which it exists. The purpose for which the flower exists is to grow, blossom, and reproduce itself in a certain definite way. If it does this, it is a good flower. The animal, also, has its functions to perform; if it performs them well, it is a good animal. Again, in the products of art, the same holds true. A watch is an instrument for telling the time: if it serves its purpose well, it is a good watch. True, when we come to man we are using the term good in the moral sense; this however, does not make any difference. A good man is a man who attains the purpose for which he exists. And, as in the case of the flower, the animal and the watch, the purpose is the realization

of some form of activity. Now, the form of activity peculiar to man is the exercise of reason. Therefore, in the perfect performance of the reasoning faculty man's excellence, and consequently, his happiness, will consist. If this seems at first sight a rather far-fetched idea of virtue and happiness, we have only to look at its application in order to realize that, after all, it is eminently practical, and as sane a guide of conduct as any that philosophy unaided has offered. What strength and rugged grandeur is to the oak tree, what fragrance and delicacy of tint is to the rose, what grace and swiftness is to the antelope, what keenness of scent and fidelity to instinct is to the hunting dog,—the crowning excellence of nature in each case—reason is to man. According to the standard of human nature, that person is most perfect, has attained the highest excellence, and is, therefore, most happy, who has acquired the greatest perfection of reason. Aristotle, however, knew human nature too well to be content with this academic view, if I may so call it, of virtue. He was not the man to overlook the tremendous importance of the irrational forces in human character and in human life. He was quick to see that, while reason is our chief distinction, it is not our only characteristic, nor is it the mainspring of all our actions. We have feelings, passions, emotions, in a word, "affections," as he calls them, and these are a very important part of our nature. There never yet was a human being so bloodless as to be incapable of anger or zeal or indignation. There never was a man in whom there was not some remnant of an irrational impulse to fight; and as to woman, Aristotle was not so blind as to overlook her claim to be occasionally unreasonable, though he was not modern enough or tactful enough to call it "sweet unreason." In short, a human being whom the definition "Being endowed with reason" would adequately describe, would be a monstrosity. A man or a woman whose mental life would be one interminable series of acts of reason never existed and fortunately never will exist. The power of reason, therefore, must be considered in relation to the rest of man's mental life, especially in relation to the affec-

tions and to all kinds of irrational tendencies. The soul is no Crusoe's uninhabited island in which reason is unquestioned "monarch of all it surveys." If such a condition existed, it might, like the shipwrecked mariner's condition, be properly referred to as a "horrible state." Reason is, or should be, monarch. But its way is not undisputed. Its subjects are the passions and the other irrational impulses which murmur at the authority of reason, and at times revolt against that authority. Moral virtue consists in the perfection by which reason maintains its control, and keeps the irrational impulses within bounds, neither allowing them undue liberty, like some lax or inefficient ruler, nor, like a tyrant, reducing them to complete and ruthless subjection. Moral virtue consists in the maintenance of the golden mean between two extremes, each of which is irrational. Thus, courage is a moral virtue in which reason maintains the golden mean between cowardice and reckless daring. He who refuses to face danger when he ought to face it is a coward: he lacks the full measure of courage when he yields to an unreasoning impulse of fear. He who rushes into danger when there is no occasion to do so is foolhardy, and fails by excess, as the coward fails by defect: he yields to contempt of danger which is as unreasonable as the coward's exaggerated fear of danger. Courage, therefore, is a condition in which reason dominates both these irrational impulses and maintains the golden mean between them. Again, take the virtue of generosity. He who fails to give when he should give is stingy, and sins by defect. He who gives without stint and indiscriminately, is lavish, and sins by excess. The truly generous person gives, or refrains from giving, according to the norm or standard set, in each case, by the verdict of reason. I do not say that these definitions are above criticism; on the contrary, I think that Christian ideals of conduct have modified some of these for the better. I am simply expounding Aristotle's notion of virtue, for which I merely claim that it is sane, human and scientific. Before leaving this question of moral virtue I must call your attention to one other point. Aristotle included in his system of morals

many "virtues" which we no longer consider to belong to morals at all, but look upon rather as matters of good breeding or good manners. For instance, among the virtues he reckons affability. This, he says, is the golden mean between boorishness and obsequiousness. We catch his meaning readily. The boorish person is lacking in the graces and charms of social intercourse; the obsequious person is guilty of excess in those matters. But how can we determine where either excess or defect ends and where true affability begins? Aristotle says, by reason. We are inclined to think that it is a matter of innate tact, or the unwritten code of one's environment, or home influence, or example, or education. Besides, we do not consider affability to be a moral virtue at all. Although here, I think, we err. For affability, if it be not a virtue, may be made so to speak, the matter of a virtue, when it is inspired by a distinctly moral principle, such as Christian charity. A man may be naturally affable, he may acquire affability by the influence of home or school, or he may have it thrust upon him by the requirements of his position in life and the office which he holds. It rests with himself to transform it into a moral virtue by giving it a moral motive.

Virtue, then, is the perfection of reason. So far, we have studied the moral virtues, which consist in that perfection by which reason, holding the lower impulses in control, outlines in each case, and impels to a course of action that avoids irrational excess and irrational defect. Considered in itself, however, reason is capable of perfection without relation to the irrational part of our nature. Perfections of this kind are called by Aristotle intellectual, as distinct from the others which are moral. The first and most obvious intellectual perfection of reason is scientific knowledge; "Happy he who knows the causes of things," sang the Latin poet. Knowledge is not only power, but perfection of soul, and is, therefore, according to Aristotle's definition, a means of happiness. Aristotle is too optimistic, too youthful, too Greek, in fact, to see the other side of the problem, or to fall in with the mood of him who declares that "he who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow."

He has not learned, as we have, to distinguish knowledge which is useful, knowledge which is useless, and knowledge which is harmful to the soul. All knowledge, he believes, is good, and therefore, he puts scientific knowledge among the intellectual virtues. Next to scientific knowledge, or on the same plane with it, he places Art, the knowledge of truth in the production of works of art, and Prudence, the knowledge of what one ought to do in the conduct of life, or, as we should say, a knowledge of human nature. Above these he places Intelligence, or the knowledge of first principles, which we should call the faculty of judging axiomatic truths, and highest of all he places Wisdom, which is philosophy, and knowledge of the highest, or ultimate, truths. If reason is the crowning glory of man, wisdom is the crowning glory of reason. It is preëminently the virtue of mature minds: Aristotle would echo the thought of Tennyson, "Knowledge comes but wisdom lingers." It belongs, he holds, to youth to be inquisitive, and so attain scientific knowledge; it belongs to the later years of life to attain the wisdom by which one meditates on general principles and grasps the abstract truth of things, as it belongs to old age to attain the prudence by which one judges in matters of conduct.

Comparing the intellectual with the moral virtues, Aristotle enunciates a doctrine which, until we consider it carefully, seems to us to be a very dangerous doctrine indeed. He places the intellectual virtues above the moral. And so, he seems to say, it is better to have a knowledge of chemistry or biology than it is to be truthful; it is better to be a philosopher than to be honest; it is better to have a knowledge of art or of human nature than to keep the commandments of God and obey the law of the land. It is true, Aristotle places the intellectual virtues above the moral: at the same time, he is guilty of no such moral anarchy as this. On the contrary, he looks upon the moral virtues as a prerequisite to the attainment of the intellectual virtues. Unless a man be truthful and honest and clean of life, he cannot, says Aristotle, attain those perfections of mind in which intellectual virtue consists.

In one sense he is right, and the innocence, if I may so call it, of his view of the matter is not so very childlike. But in a sense too, he is wrong. The world now knows that it is possible for a man to attain the very highest perfection of mind in the theoretical order without possessing even the most elementary virtue in the moral order. And yet, Aristotle's "innocence" is justified in the ideal order, at least. For moral depravity is a blot on perfection of intellect, and it is still true that the reward of a clean heart is a fuller vision of God.

Before leaving the subject of Ethics, let me call your attention to two minor points, which are deserving of mention here on account of the treatment they receive in the Aristotelian work, *Nicomachean Ethics*. I mean Aristotle's description of the Magnanimous Man and his dissertation on Friendship. Both from the literary and from the ethical point of view, the passages in which these occur are among the finest in all Aristotelian literature. The portrait of the magnanimous man is a masterpiece. It is said to have been suggested, in part at least, by Aristotle's distinguished pupil, Alexander. I like better to think that it is suggested, perhaps unconsciously, by Aristotle's own moral character. Severely simple, yet, at the same time, not without a certain grand generosity in the use of superlatives, indeed, resembling in its style the great-minded man, the passage¹ is, I believe, a true description of the soul of the great philosopher himself. The first trait of the great-minded man is a proper, or, as we say, a just, appreciation of his own worth and dignity: he cannot be great who has a mean opinion of himself. The great-minded man places honor above every other external good: yet even in that he will preserve the golden mean. As regards his personal accomplishments, he must, above all things, have virtue, and of every virtue he shall have the heroic degree. From this height of virtue he will look down upon every dignity and distinction, and, in a certain way, on virtue itself, so that he will consider himself superior to all of them, and will pursue nothing, not even virtue, immoderately. Poverty has

¹ *Eth. Nic.*, IV, Cap. 3, n. 2 ff.

no terror for him, and riches no danger: for, if he is wealthy, his opportunities for showing his true greatness are thereby increased, and he is equal to his opportunities. He disdains what is petty, even in the matter of personal danger: great risks for a great cause entice him onward: the trivial dangers which occupy so much of the attention of the small-minded, do not even engage his attention. The only shame he knows is that of being the beneficiary of the goodness of others: therefore, he always gives more than he receives. He affects a certain elegant indolence, not as a mere mannerism, but as a part of his character; for he "does very little" says Aristotle, meaning that he does not engage in an enterprise unless it is in the heroic scale and worthy of renown. He leaves the trivial things of life to the trivial minded. He is candid, though not to the point of brusqueness; for he fears not to tell the truth and always does so, except, says Aristotle, when he adopts the common practice of speaking ironically. Finally, the great-minded man reveals his superiority even in his speech and gesture: too serious to occupy himself with what is not worthy of him, he avoids the gossip of the hour; his words are few; his utterance is deliberate, and even his gestures show that he is above all nervous haste. "Such," he concludes, "is the magnanimous man."

The disquisition on friendship is conducted with the same loftiness of thought and rigorous simplicity of style. Aristotle does not believe in the sentiment contained in the saying which he quotes "When the gods favor you, what need of friends?" No happiness, he says, is complete without friends to share it and to enable us to enjoy it. Those who have all that the heart desires do not really possess it, for they do not enjoy it, unless they have friends. The afflicted need friends, for comfort and support; the young, for advice; the aged for assistance, and the mature man for united action. Friendship is not an institution; it is a law of nature. But there are various kinds of friendship, some based on profit, some on the pleasure people find in one another's company: the best friendship is that which is based neither on profit nor pleasure, but

on virtue and esteem. In friendship of that kind there must be equality. Perfect friends *are* equal; when one is superior to the other in station, in talent, in wealth, there may still be a friendship of the secondary sort (not perfect), if they meet on an equal plane and treat each other as equals. The details of quarreling among friends, the causes of quarrels and the remedies for them are full of interest, and show, among other things, how little human nature has changed since Aristotle's day. We must pass them over however, and call attention once more to Aristotle's repeated saying that man is intended by nature for the society of his fellow-men. If he is to live at all, he must have friends of some kind. Thus the discussion of friendship brings us to the next division of Aristotle's philosophy, his theory of the State.

There is really no transition from Ethics to Politics in Aristotle's philosophy. Both are integral parts of his system of practical philosophy. The aim of that philosophy is to show us how happiness is to be attained: Ethics treats of individual, Politics of social, well-being. That is the only difference between them. Ethical well-being culminates in the enjoyment of friendship; friendship expands, so to speak, into political organization. For, as friendship is a law of nature; so some sort of social organization is natural to man. As Aristotle somewhat quaintly expresses it, "Man is a political animal." His meaning is that, as some animals lead solitary lives, while others live in herds, or flocks, or droves or swarms, are, in a word, gregarious, man belongs to the latter class. It is possible, indeed, though difficult, for the individual human being to obtain the necessities of physical existence without the aid of his fellowmen—a man may procure his own food, make his own clothes and defend himself single-handed against wild beasts—but for his mental, and, above all, for his moral well-being, he requires the society of his fellowmen and education, which is possible only in an organized condition of society. Aristotle is, therefore, opposed to the notion afterwards put forward by the Epicureans and defended in modern times by Jean Jacques Rousseau, that the natural state of man is

unsocial, and that society is a voluntary institution founded on a so-called social contract. Observe that Aristotle does not exclude the utilitarian motive: he does not deny that man may have been, and is, dependent on his fellowmen for his material well-being, and have had that motive as a secondary incentive to form a social organization. But he insists, and rightly, it seems to me, that the primary impulse to organize was not the deliberate consideration of expediency, but an inclination that is deep-seated and intrinsic in human nature. It is the desire of happiness and not the need of food, clothing and defence, that is at the basis of social organization. Therefore, continues Aristotle, that aim of the state is ethical and not merely economical. When the State has brought about conditions favorable to the material well-being of its subjects, when every citizen is protected in his property rights, well clothed and well fed, the mission of the State is by no means fulfilled. There is still the establishment of virtue, the promotion of happiness, the attainment of mental and moral well-being to be considered. We must remember that this was before the advent of Christianity, when religion, among the Greeks especially, had little to do with morality and happiness in this life, and left the social order practically unaffected. Aristotle, in fact, throws on the State the burden which later political philosophers shift to the shoulders of religion. Some shift it completely, and reduce the mission of the State to a purely economic responsibility, others, more properly, divide the burden, and maintain that it is the duty both of Church and State to secure, each in its own sphere, the supremacy of morality and, therefore, of human happiness.

Such being the mission of the State, according to Aristotle, namely the establishment and maintenance of happiness by means of knowledge and virtue, it is not difficult to outline the constitution of the perfect State. Here, however, Aristotle places himself at once in a category apart from those who, before his time and since, have drawn up a scheme of ideal government. They proceeded on abstract principles, convinced that what ought to work out for the best would work out

for the best—a dangerous assumption when one in dealing with human nature in the aggregate. Plato, for instance, argued that, because there are three parts of the human soul, the rational, the irascible and the appetitive, (or reason, courage, and desire) so there ought to be three orders in the perfect State, the Rulers, whose characteristic virtue is wisdom, the Soldiers, whose peculiar perfection is courage, and the Producers, who should cultivate in a special way the virtue of industry. Aristotle avoids all such theoretical procedure. He goes at once to the facts, as far as they are ascertainable. He studies the constitutions of the Greek states as he finds them, and tries to sift out of the mass of evidence before him the institutions and laws which have proved practically useful. His method here, as in his *Ethics*, is eminently scientific. We may find fault with his conclusions, we may even judge that he was in many respects hampered by his prejudices and by the limitations of his knowledge, but we cannot fail to admire the spirit of scientific research in which he conducted his investigation.

The conclusion which he reaches is contained in his description of the perfect commonwealth. Here, once more, saneness of judgment is his most striking characteristic. In social well-being, as in individual virtue, there must be a golden mean. If he were carried away, as a less cautious theorist might have been, by his grand principle that the chief aim of the State is ethical, he might have decided that the perfect commonwealth is that which maintains a standard of political rights identical with that of moral right. The constitution of such a State would resemble the Blue Laws of some of the New England colonies. Aristotle is too well-balanced to entertain so one-sided a view. In the perfect State there must, he says, be room for freedom and wealth and healthy pleasures as well as for virtue. This combination, he finds, is best secured in a form of government which is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy. He reaches this conclusion after he has discussed three possible forms of government, monarchy, or the rule of one, oligarchy, or the rule of a few, and democracy, or the

rule of the many. He discusses each of these in turn, and finds that each has its advantages, as well as its disadvantages. Theoretically speaking, a monarchy would be best. If the ruler were ideally perfect, placing justice and right before every other consideration, and if the subjects were equally perfect, preferring virtue to everything, even to wealth and liberty, then, there would be an evident advantage, he thinks, in the centralization of authority in the person of one sovereign. He quotes Homer to the effect

“The rule of many is not good : let one man be king.”

But, he sees at once that there are many practical difficulties. The ruler is not always perfect: he may prefer self-interest, his own glory, the advantages of his house, to the good of his subjects. He will almost inevitably desire to make his rule hereditary in his family, and what guarantee have we that it will not pass into the hands of an unworthy heir, to the ruin of the whole people? When the people stand so low as to be incapable of taking any share in the government, or when the individual stands so high that the people naturally revere him and obey him as their ruler, then, and then alone, is the rule of one man the best for the welfare of the commonwealth. Next, he considers the oligarchy, or aristocracy, which is the rule of the few, or of the best. This he considers to be superior to the monarchy; because it excludes the hereditary principle and divides the responsibility of government. That one man may be demoralized by unlimited power and become tyrannical, is, he thinks, quite probable; but that several rulers should all at once lose their sense of responsibility is far from likely, and so long as there are some who remain faithful to their ideals, these will act as a check on the others. The danger of an oligarchy is this: the more progress a nation makes, the larger is the number of those who are capable of sharing in the government, and who become discontented if they are excluded from it. A thorough democracy, on the other hand, while it makes provision for this demand, has not the unity and cohesiveness which are necessary for the successful

performance of the business of government. Therefore, he concludes, that government is best which combines with the aristocratic form a certain measure of democracy, so that all the people shall share to some extent the authority in the state. Throughout the whole discussion there runs one great principle, eminently sane and practical, namely: That form of government is best which best suits the character and attainments of the people to be governed. We can hardly improve on that principle. With all our experience gleaned from subsequent history, with our knowledge of revolutions and their causes, with our wider knowledge of human nature both in the individual and in the aggregate, we can but repeat what Aristotle taught, and no matter how devoted we ourselves are to the ideal of popular freedom, we must acknowledge that other forms of government are the best, elsewhere, because they best suit the character of the people. Assuming for once the rôle of the prophet, Aristotle, looking forward to the progress of education and the spread of enlightenment, foretells that the trend of political change will be in the direction of greater popular freedom. Not at once, nor universally, was this outlook to be justified. In the Athens where he taught and where, perhaps, he wrote his work *On Politics*, there was to come first the tyranny of the Macedonian, then that of the Roman, then a succession of tyrannies of various kinds, and it was not until our own day that Greece was able to realize in a constitutional monarchy the form of government in which the people were to have more than a nominal share. While Aristotle was teaching these doctrines in the shaded walks near the gymnasium of Apollo, Demosthenes was in the popular assembly striving by his sublime eloquence to awaken in his fellow-citizens the dormant sentiment of patriotism. But the time had not come. And, aside from the purpose of Divine Providence, which Aristotle did not reckon with, and which even we can only believe in, without trying to understand, the reason of this tardy realization of a relatively perfect form of government was the reason he assigns: the people of Greece were not capable of governing themselves. Aside from

exceptional instances, where, God for inscrutable reasons, permitting, the strong hand of the tyrant holds in check a people fully capable of freedom, the progress of democracy in the true sense of the word has been step by step, coincident with the progress of education and moral enlightenment.

Judging by these general principles, which are sane, enlightened, practical, and surprisingly modern, we should rank Aristotle very high among the great political philosophers. He was not, however, independent of the defects and limitations of his time and of the civilization in which he lived, which, after all, was pagan. This appears especially in the details of his scheme for the perfect State. The utilitarian view of marriage, the doctrine that defective and deformed children should be exposed to perish, the view that some human beings are naturally ordained to slavery, the conviction that neither the barbarians of the North nor the inhabitants of the Orient are capable of freedom, which is a prerogative, apparently, of the Greeks, the principle that man is made for the State and not the State for man—all these show how far Aristotle fell short of the Christian sentiment and conviction in regard to the value of the individual human soul and the inviolability of the rights which man, however defective, possesses as a child of God. The study of this part of his political philosophy emphasizes the profound truth of the remark so often made even by the enemies of Christianity that it was Christ and His teaching that introduced true freedom into the world.

An interesting and important portion of the work *On Politics* is devoted to the attitude which the State should maintain towards Art in general, and towards Rhetoric and Poetry in particular. This brings us to the third division of Aristotle's philosophy, and the last of the topics set down for discussion in this paper. Poetical, or creative, philosophy includes the theory of Art and the discussion of the Beautiful. It is, therefore, practically identical with what we call nowadays Esthetics. To the philosophy of knowledge and reality, and the philosophy of human conduct in the individual and in society, Aristotle adds the philosophy of artistic production.

Here, as in the other two branches, he is so independent and so thoroughly revolutionary that to his many titles as founder of logic, founder of natural science, and so forth, may be added the title Founder of Artistic and Literary Criticism. It is true, there is wanting here that comprehensiveness of treatment which we find in the other departments of philosophy. To the vast subject of literary and artistic criticism Aristotle has contributed only two treatises, the *Rhetoric* and the work *On Poetry*, and even the latter has come down to us in an unfinished state. Yet, what this part of his teaching lacks in comprehensiveness it has made up in the extent of its influence. For, long after the Stagyrte had ceased to be the "Master of those who know," long after he had ceased to be an authority in natural science, metaphysics, psychology, ethics and logic, he continued and still, to an extent continues, to influence the theory of Art and the art of poetic composition. The credit of this influence he should, perhaps, share with another. If Aristotle had not had as materials for his study of poetry the most perfect model of poetic composition, in the Homeric poems, he could not, perhaps, have formulated as he did the theory of that art. Homer, even without Aristotle to reveal the principles of his poetic art, would have continued to charm and inspire the generations that came after him, but, without Aristotle to interpret him, he would have charmed and inspired without enlightening the reflective mind, and without furnishing canons of poetic taste on which the science of criticism is founded. Here, as elsewhere, Aristotle was first in the field, and no small credit is due to him for having thought of reducing artistic production to certain fixed principles.

He begins his discussion of the principles of poetry by remarking that art in general is imitative. Our enjoyment of artistic production arises from the fact that there is in us an instinct of imitation, the exercise of which brings pleasure in every stage of our existence. As children, we indulge one form of this instinct in games and other childlike amusements; as mature men and women, we find an outlet for the same

instinct in artistic production and the contemplation of artistic products. This sentiment has been criticised as unworthy of the high mission of art, as reducing artistic activity to mere pastime. That is to misrepresent what Aristotle means. He wishes to connect the artistic impulse with something fundamental in our nature, without intending to bring art down to the level of the instinct by which a little girl plays at being school-teacher or a boy starts to play Indian after he has seen a performance of the Wild West Show. In the enjoyment which we experience in artistic imitation, he recognizes an instance of the universal desire of knowledge, which is not satisfied, even in art, until art somehow shows forth the inner intelligible essences of things. The imitation, therefore, which is at the root of all artistic production, is not mere copying of what is in nature around us, or in human nature: it is an effort to attain and express the ideal. It has nature for its standard: it "holds the mirror up to nature": but, it has for its ultimate standard what is innermost in nature, and what the unartistic mind fails to see in nature. Goethe says very truly that it needs some insight into Aristotle's general philosophy to understand what he says about the drama. The misunderstanding in regard to his doctrine that art is imitation is due, I think, to a lack of knowledge of his metaphysics. Aristotle's true meaning, as explained by Professor Butcher² is that Art, "resembling nature in a certain instinctive, yet rational, faculty, does not follow the halting course of nature's progress. The artist ignores the intervening steps, the slow processes, by which nature attempts to bridge the space between the potential and the actual. The form which nature has been striving, and perhaps vainly striving, to attain stands forth embodied in a creation of the mind. The ideal has taken concrete shape, the finished product stands before us, nor do we ask how it has come to be what it is. The flaws and failures incident to the natural process are removed, and in a glorified appearance, we discern nature's ideal intention. Fine art, then, is a completion of nature . . . it presents

² *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, London, 1902, p. 157.

to us only an image, but a purified image of nature's original." But while this recognition of the ideal in the product of art is the chief source of pleasure in artistic enjoyment, Aristotle is too keen a psychologist to hold that intellect alone is concerned, and that the only element in artistic enjoyment is intellectual. He expressly teaches that the feelings also, or affections, are concerned, and the effect of art on them is, he says, a kind of purification. This is the doctrine of a very celebrated passage in which Aristotle declares that the aim of tragedy is to purify the emotions of pity and fear. The meaning seems to be that, when we observe on the stage some great action which moves to pity or to fear, the mind is thereby rendered purer by being rid of these emotions, which are in themselves painful and do not minister to, but rather hinder, the performance of heroic deeds. The idea of purification is partly physiological and partly religious, being suggested probably both by the practice of medicine and by the custom prevalent in all the mysteries of ridding the soul of sin by some process of ablution or the performance of some penance. The passage, especially what is known as "the pity and fear clause," has given rise to much discussion. I give here the interpretation which seems to me to be most reasonable. It is of perhaps greater importance to note that, while in Greece generally, both before and after Aristotle's time, the aim of art was supposed to be moral instruction, Aristotle assigns to it no other purpose than merely to please. He judges poetry by esthetic and logical standards, taking no direct account of ethical aims and tendencies. Still, he will not allow that poetry should be altogether independent of morality. For, while its aim is pleasure, the pleasure must be sane and wholesome: the theme, especially of tragedy, which he places above all other kinds of poetry, must be noble, and tragedy does not admit the presentation of moral depravity except where truth demands that such a presentation be introduced. Thus, to take a modern instance, Aristotle would have condemned the theme of *Paradise Lost*, because the chief character is Satan, although he

would have allowed the occasional introduction of Satan in episodes of the poem.

Aristotle's doctrine of the three unities in tragedy or epic is almost a commonplace in literary criticism. He held, or is supposed to have held, that the plot should conform to unity of action, unity of time and unity of place. With regard to the unity of action, the requirement, in the large sense, has been admitted by all literary critics. James Russell Lowell, in his *Old English Dramatists* (p. 55) writes: "In a play we not only expect a succession of scenes but that each scene should lead by a logic more or less stringent, if not to the next, at least to something that is to follow, and that all should contribute their fraction of impulse towards the inevitable catastrophe. That is to say, the structure should be organic, with a necessary and harmonious connection and relation of parts, and not merely mechanical, with an arbitrary or haphazard joining of one part with another." This is all that Aristotle requires, a certain organic or logical unity among the incidents of the epic or the scenes of the tragedy. The notion that he insisted also on unity of place and unity of time is founded on a curiously persistent misapprehension. Such misunderstandings die slowly, and, even nowadays, one hears the critic talk glibly of Aristotle's "three unities." The so-called "unity of time," demanding that the action of the piece should take place within a single day, between sunrise and sunset, is merely a clumsy mistranslation. What Aristotle means is that the *performance of the play* should take not more than that period of time. Perhaps some of us who are not enthusiastic Wagnerians, but have been compelled to sit through a five-hour opera, may sympathize with the Aristotelian rule. But, with the Greeks the play was very frequently an all day affair, and no doubt, Aristotle was legislating against authors for whom even the period between sunrise and sunset was not long enough. As to unity of place, Aristotle does not speak of it at all. It is merely a figment in the minds of his critics.

If we turn now from these general principles which are at the basis of all artistic production in general and of poetry

in particular, we shall find that the various arts are differentiated from one another according to the means which they employ in the process of imitation: painting employs color; sculpture, form; music, the voice; poetry, words, and dance, rhythm. We cannot, however, dwell on these details, interesting as they are. The subject will be found treated at length, as it deserves to be, in Saintsbury's *History of Literary Criticism*, especially Chapter III of Volume I, which is devoted to Aristotle, in Butcher's translation of the *Poetics* and in the more recent translation by Bywater.

WILLIAM TURNER.

SPANISH-AMERICAN LITERATURE.

The language known as Spanish, is really Castilian, the triumphant dialect of the Iberian Peninsula which, with the Catalan and the Galicio-Lusitanian, belongs to the Romance family, the offspring of the Latin. It was this language with its Andalusian modifications that the Spaniards brought with them to the New World. Excepting Brazil, and the three Guianas, it is now spoken from the Rio Grande to the extreme southern limits of the continent. It possesses a double literature, of the mother country, and of the American Republics, once colonies of Spain. The literature of Spanish America is a subordinate branch of the Castilian, with characteristics of its own, borrowed from the scenery, the aboriginal population, and the languages of America.

Castilian literature begins in the thirteenth century, its earliest production being verse of a rude character, the *Poema del Cid*. From its obscure and anonymous cradle, it advances step by step through chronicles, ballads, and poems, until it reaches its golden age, the age of the drama, and of the great masterpiece, *Don Quijote*. At this time the influence of the Renaissance was strongly felt, and the Italian style, the *Culto*, predominated, owing its beginning to Boscan, and Garcilaso de La Vega. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the great literary triumvirate of Cervantes, Lope de Vega and Calderon flourished, witnessed the rise of Spanish literature to its highest perfection. This period coincides with the colonization of the New World.

It was quite natural that the literature of the Western hemisphere should be influenced by that of the mother-country but it, also, reacted upon it, furnishing to its history such names as Ercilla y Zuñiga, Ruiz de Alarcon, and Castellanos.

The earliest literature of America was historical and religious, though it was not until 1535 that works were

printed. In fact many writings were not published, until our own day, while not a few manuscripts still remain unprinted, and hidden away in the libraries of Spain and of America. From time to time, one or the other of special interest is drawn from its obscurity by individuals or learned bodies, to speak the language of the past, after centuries of silence.

Leaving such writings as those of Columbus and his son Fernando, besides brief memoirs, out of the question, it may be said that Bartolomé de las Casas is the first historian of America, though his great work, the "*Historia de las Indias*," was not completed until after the first volume of Oviedo's had been printed.

Mexico furnished, in the sixteenth century, the most abundant themes to historians like Motilinia, Sahagun and later Juan de Torquemada, all three members of the Franciscan order. At that early period, the Franciscans and Dominicans were the great writers of America, while the Augustinians distinguished themselves in Mexico by their scientific additions to general knowledge. In point of history, Peru followed Mexico, with writers like Xerez, Cieza de Leon, Zarate, Garcilaso the Inca and many more, to be succeeded by the Jesuit Acosta whose large work on the Indies is monumental. The Jesuits arrived in America in the second half of the sixteenth century; but it was not long before they had become the great educators of Spanish America, establishing colleges everywhere, from Mexico to Chile and the La Plata regions.

As Spanish colonization spread, historical works increased to record events transpiring in New Granada, Venezuela, Chile and La Plata. Among these writings, the history of Bogota by Juan Rodriguez Fresle which was not printed until the nineteenth century, must be regarded as of the highest importance from a literary standpoint, deserving, as it does, an honored place among prose writings of the age.

The religious works of the period were principally catechisms, composed for the instruction of the Indians, often

with the native texts, Aztec, Quechua, Aymará, and so on, together with the Spanish. The first "*Doctrina Cristiana*" was composed by the Dominican Father Pedro de Cordova, in the island of Hispaniola.

The religious, Dominicans, Franciscans, Jesuits, and others also distinguished themselves as linguists and grammarians, accomplishing the difficult task of learning the Indian language by sound and by practice, and composing grammars and vocabularies.

While these studies of a serious character were pursued, those of a lighter vein were not neglected. Though the novel, as such, did not exist until the nineteenth century, history and fiction were mingled in verse. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries produced a number of historic poems. The *Araucana* of Ercilla y Zúñiga, and the *Arauco Domado* of Pedro de Oña relate the heroic struggle for liberty of the Araucanians, while Juan de Castellanos gives us the history of New Granada in verse. At the same time, Eslava was composing his odes in Mexico, and Bernardo de Valbuena was singing the greatness of Mexico. The "Age of Gold" of the latter is a pastoral poem, written in the spirit of the *Galatea* of Cervantes.

At a somewhat later period, in the seventeenth century, flourished in her convent, Juana Inez de la Cruz, the "Nun of Mexico," a woman of no mean talent who, by her poems, lyric and dramatic, acquired great reputation in her day.

In the meantime, the purity of the Castilian muse, both in Spain and in America, had been diminished by the influx of the bombastic style, known as the *Cultisimo*, or, also, Gongorism, from its author Luis de Gongora, a style that sent its influence to our own times.

Toward the end of the seventeenth and the early part of the eighteenth centuries, Spanish literature on both sides of the Atlantic, underwent a period of decline, while, at the advent of the House of Bourbon to the throne of Spain, French influence made itself strongly felt.

At the end of the eighteenth, and the early part of the

nineteenth centuries, there was a great scientific awakening which had its origin in the College of the Holy Rosary at Santa Fé de Bogota, with which the revolution came to interfere.

During this period of strife, when the colonies were struggling for their independence, the pen was, generally, laid aside for the sword, and though literature still breathed, it languished. From the second decade of the century on, however, it received a new impulse, and every field of literature began to be cultivated with the principal literary centres in Mexico, Bogota, and Santiago de Chile, journalism becoming especially pronounced. The most distinguished writers like Mitre and Bello, at one time or another, tried their hand at periodical literature.

Writers in Spanish-America had great difficulties to contend with. Publishers were scarce, libraries few, and the reading public small. Individuals, even today, often publish their own books, while large and important works are patronized by the government. Yet with all these difficulties, Spanish-American literature is most abundant in every department.

From the beginning of the period of independence, every country has had its historians, with Alaman and Bustamante in Mexico, the Amunateguis and Arana in Chile, Lopez in Argentina, Suarez in Ecuador, and a host of others, too numerous to mention. Gonzalez Saurez, archbishop of Quito, the historian of his country, is one of the most prominent literary men in Spanish-America today.

Among writers of the nineteenth century, two great figures tower above the rest, Bartolomé Mitre in the Argentine Republic, and Andres Bello in Chile. Mitre, warrior, journalist, historian, *savant*, has indelibly inscribed his name on the literary history of Argentina. The services rendered to his country as statesman, as military man, and as president of the Republic, are enhanced by his fame as a writer. The house in which he lived and labored, and in which his career was closed, together with his valuable library, is preserved as he left it, forming, as the "Museo Mitre," one of the treasures of the great city on the La Plata.

Andres Bello, a self-made man, was, to my mind, one of the most extraordinary scholars the Western Hemisphere has produced. In point of erudition, I may, perhaps, compare him to Orestes Brownson. There was hardly a field of literature that Bello did not cultivate. He shone as philosopher, jurist, historian, journalist, and poet, while his civil code of Chile has placed him beside the world's legislators. His statue in Santiago de Chile is an abiding testimony to the gratitude of his adopted country, while Venezuela may be proud of having given him birth.

Political economy has furnished a host of writers to Spanish-America, while forensic oratory has not been lacking in worthy representatives. The venerable Abdon Cifuentes, one of the leaders of the conservative party in Chile, is a prominent representative in the field of eloquence. Cifuentes is, also, a professor at the Catholic University of Santiago.

Although, unlike the colonial period, that of independence has been more prolific in lay than in ecclesiastical writers, the latter have not been wanting. Names like those of Aracena, Errazuriz, Eyzaguirre, Lopez, Tolano, and Suarez are prominent in the history of their respective countries, while the pastorals of the late Archbishop Casanova of Santiago de Chile furnish a wealth of material to the ecclesiastical student.

Lyric poetry has been most abundant in Spanish-America, since the close of the revolutionary period; for most writers, some time or another, ascend the heights of Parnassus. Although no great poem, like the *Araucana*, or the *Lima Fundada* of a bygone age has come to mark an epoch, if we except the *Canton à Junin* of Olmedo which has been regarded as one of the best epics in Spanish, some excellent poets are on record. Arboleda in Colombia, Althaus in Peru, Berro in Uruguay, Echeverria in Argentina, Walker Martinez in Chile, Heredia and Milanés in Cuba are some of the many that will be remembered in the history of the literature.

In literary criticism, we find such names as Gutierrez, Rojas, Caicedo, and Garcia Merou, while our debt to

bibliographers cannot be overestimated. Among the latter, two names are especially prominent, those of the late Garcia Icazbalceta in Mexico, and of Toribio Medina in Chile. The former rendered immense service by his *Bibliography of Sixteenth Century Mexico*, and by his publication of inedited works, not the least of his merits being in his biography of Juan de Zumarraga, the first bishop of Mexico, whose memory he has completely vindicated.

José Toribio Medina is, perhaps, the most copious bibliographer of ancient or modern times, his works constituting a veritable library. Medina has his own printing press in his house, and his Spanish-American library is the most complete in existence. It has furnished him the material for the larger volumes in which he has given us the history of typographical activity in America, of the Inquisition, and of other subjects appertaining to this hemisphere.

In literature of a lighter vein, we have to thank Ricardo Palma, the aged custodian of the *Biblioteca Nacional* of Peru, for his valuable collection of old Peruvian legends and traditions that would otherwise have been lost, though the writer's expressions sometimes grate on our Catholic sensibilities.

In spite of French influence, and of the number of French works that have flooded the markets of Spanish-America, novel writing has had its representatives, as well as the drama. Among dramatists who have been successful, Caldéron, de Goristiza, and Galvan in Mexico, Gavito in Cuba, Madrid in Colombia, Carpancho in Peru, and Carlos Walker Martinez in Chile, stand prominent.

Novelists of note, among others, are Balcarce, Goriti, Blest Gana, de Cuellar, Altamirano, Lizardi, Orozco y Berra, and Riva Palacio, besides many more. Among novels of prominence must be mentioned the little love tale, idyllic and pure, of George Isaacs of Colombia, entitled *Maria*, and the *Amalia* of José Marmol of Argentina. The former is probably known all through Spanish-America, while, according to the eminent critic, Ferdinand Wolf, the historical novel *Amalia*,

dealing with the period of the dictatorship of Rosas in Buenos Aires, marks an epoch in the history of Spanish-American letters.

Literature still flourishes with our neighbors to the South, though, in some countries, it seems to have declined with the advance of commercialism. Colombia, one of the least progressive of the South American republics from a material standpoint, is one of the most prolific in writers. However the elements of literature are nowhere lacking, and though often the colonial period is forgotten, there are those who look back with pride to their literary inheritance, and return for their inspiration to past ages. Education is increasing, though not always to the benefit of religion; but educational work in Spanish-America is a subject that cannot be drawn into this paper as, in itself, it might furnish an abundant theme. What I have written should suffice to give an idea of the prodigious literary activity, past and present, of Spanish-America.

CHARLES WARREN CURRIER.

WOMEN WRITERS OF ENGLISH IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY.¹

I.

Anyone who proposes to deal with Women Writers of English in the Fifteenth Century has, in one sense, a comparatively easy task, for the number of such writers known to us is strictly limited and their productions are but few; but if he would place them in their proper setting by showing the conditions prevailing at the time they wrote, he must perforce make a study of an exceedingly disturbed period of English history, and great events and famous names will cross his vision and crowd his page.

When the fifteenth century opened in England Henry IV., the first monarch of the Lancastrian line, was seated somewhat insecurely on the throne and with considerable trepidation wore the crown and wielded the sceptre which, without much ado, he had wrung in 1399 from the nerveless grasp of Richard of Bordeaux. Almost from the outset of his reign Henry was in serious trouble. He was called upon to defend himself from a conspiracy of his nobles; to try, ineffectively, to quell an insurrection in Wales headed by Owen Glendower; to repel an invasion of England by the Scots, whom the Percies of Northumberland defeated for him at Nesbit Moor and Homildon Hill; to put down the revolt of the Percies themselves, which he did at Shrewsbury (1403), where Harry Hotspur fell in one of the most obstinate and bloody battles recorded in English history, and again at Bramham Moor (1408), where the old Earl of Northumberland was defeated and slain; to combat the unrest produced by

¹This article and its continuation, which will appear in the next number of the *Bulletin*, consist, in substance, of a lecture delivered December 15, 1910, in the series of public lectures organized by the administration of the Catholic University of America.

the growing strength of Lollardy; and, generally, from domestic worries and failure of health, as well as from cares of state, to lead a troubled and harassed life. Nor was his reign free from the terrible visitation of the plague or Black Death, as it was called, which on three different occasions in the time of Edward III.—in 1349, 1361, and 1369—had, if we may believe the estimates, reduced the population by at least two-thirds. In 1400 and 1407 the pestilence broke out again, and wrought fearful havoc.

When Henry IV. died, March 20, 1413, he passed on the succession, still in fact in doubt but to all seeming no longer in dispute, to his son, Henry V., Harry of Monmouth, the great warrior king. In order, probably, to distract attention from the unlinical character of his title to the throne and from the troubles engendered by Lollardy, now fast making headway, Henry V. revived the claims of his great-grandfather to the Kingdom of France, and, in pursuance of his alleged rights, covered his name and race and the arms of England with deathless glory on the field of Agincourt (1415). In his next campaign (1417-1419) he stormed town after town in Normandy, his exploits in the ancient duchy culminating in the capture of Rouen after a six months' siege. Thence he marched, with scarcely any opposition, right up to the gates of Paris, and finally extorted the Treaty of Troyes (1420), by which he won the hand of the French princess Catherine, the regency of France during the lifetime of Charles VI., and the succession to its throne on the death of that insane king. The prospect that opened before the youthful conqueror was magnificent indeed; but death extinguished his high hopes of further earthly glory by taking him off, August 31, 1422, in the thirty-fourth year of his age and the tenth of his reign.

His son, born at Windsor, December 6, 1421, was not quite nine months old when, as Henry VI., he succeeded to the throne of England and to his father's claims on the French crown. On the death of Charles VI. at Paris in October, 1422, the infant Henry was proclaimed king of France, but similar proclamation was made on behalf of the Dauphin,

now Charles VII., who, although at that time he was not master of a fourth part of his kingdom, was anointed and crowned with some solemnity in the city of Poitiers. Thereupon there ensued that fierce and long protracted war which was rendered forever memorable by the siege of Orleans (1428-1429) and its heroic defence and relief by Joan of Arc. The fulfilment of Joan's prediction that she would have Charles VII. anointed and crowned in the cathedral church of Rheims did not, however, bring the fighting to an end. The war dragged spasmodically on to beyond the mid-century mark (1453), and resulted in the final loss to England, not only of the whole of Normandy, Anjou, and Maine, but also of that splendid heritage of the Duchy of Guienne and the County of Poitou, including all the western coast of France from the mouth of the Loire to the foot of the Pyrenees, which Eleanor of Aquitaine had brought as dower to Henry II., so that ultimately nothing of what is modern French soil remained to the English except the town of Calais and a strip of marshy land commanded by its batteries.

Turmoil abroad was succeeded by civil war and intestine broils and something approaching anarchy at home. The Wars of the Roses, which had their origin in the usurpation of Henry IV., began with the first battle of St. Alban's in 1455, and lasted, with occasional intermissions, through thirty years, until Richard III. fell, fighting to the end, and lay stark in death on Bosworth Field (1485). His conqueror, the Earl of Richmond, founder of the Tudor dynasty and a Lancastrian by descent, then held sway in England as Henry VII. He was fortunate enough to make successful resistance to two pretenders to the kingship in the persons of Lambert Simnel and Perkin Warbeck, and down to his death, which took place in 1509, he displayed so much craftiness in statesmanship that he held almost supreme power in the country. One of his astute acts was to marry Elizabeth, daughter of the Yorkist Edward IV., and thus their son, Henry VIII., united in his own person the rival strains of blood, and so at last reconciled the red rose of Lancaster with the white rose of York.

War, foreign or domestic, was therefore, almost continuous

throughout the greater part of the century. To the terrors of war, moreover, were added the terrors of an extremely disturbed state of society, in which might was mainly right and the strong hand took and held what it could. Burning and harrying and driving and highway robbery and daylight murder were rife. Great lords with their retainers fought pitched battles on their own account. Riots on slight occasion were common. Behind all there was a seething discontent fermenting in the minds of the common people, and seeking an outlet in such forms as the insurrections which broke out in different parts of the kingdom before the fall of the Duke of Suffolk in 1450, and the formidable rising organized by Jack Cade among the men of Kent in the same year.

The nature of the grievances put forward by these insurrectionists has its own significance. Evidently the common people had advanced a stage since the Peasant Revolt under Wat Tyler in the time of Richard II. In 1381 one of the main demands of the commons was the complete abolition of villeinage: in 1450 nothing was said of villeinage, for its legality was no longer absolute. Instead, Cade and his men took higher constitutional ground. They declaimed against the extravagance of the crown, and demanded immediate redress of the abuses of government; they protested against over-taxation; they claimed the right to choose their own representatives in parliament without let or hindrance from the nobility.

With a larger personal and political liberty the peasantry had also acquired a corresponding increase in the means and comforts of domestic life. The rise in the wages of agricultural laborers which took place between 1388 and 1444 appears to have led even to some extravagance in living and dress, which it was thought necessary to restrain by the enactment of sumptuary laws. For example, it was ordered that no laborer should appear in broadcloth costing more than two shillings a yard; that his hosen, consisting of breeches and stockings in one piece, should not cost more than fourteen pence; and that his wife should no longer wear a silver-ornamented girdle or display her vanity by donning a head-

covering made of cloth value for more than twelve pence per plight. Domestic servants, too, appear to have been fairly comfortably off. We are told that, in the matter of food at all events, they lived well, having one substantial meal a day of flesh or fish, with sundry other meals of milk, butter, cheese, and bread. As for drink, the eminent fifteenth century lawyer, Sir John Fortescue, informs us that in his time the commons of England fared so abundantly that they seldom drank water unless for penance.

While the whole nation was frantic over the loss of Normandy, Maine, and Anjou, and especially of Guienne, the masses of the people do not appear to have been particularly concerned with the result of the Wars of the Roses. Occasionally, indeed, they displayed great enthusiasm, as when they flocked to the standard of Warwick the Kingmaker on his landing from France (1470) to champion the cause of Margaret of Anjou and her son, Prince Edward; but as a rule, if it was not exactly a case of "a plague o' both your houses," their attitude was one of supreme indifference as to whether they were ruled by Lancaster or York. Hence the Wars of the Roses, which decimated the nobility and laid feudalism low, seem to have interfered but little with the ordinary occupations of the bulk of the populace. They tilled and reaped, and bought and sold, just as if a crown were not hanging in the balance. Neither did they forgo their usual amusements, so that, despite many depressing circumstances, the country to a great degree still deserved the name of "Merry England." Mystery and miracle plays afforded at once pleasure and instruction. Exercise with the quarter-staff was almost universal. Running, wrestling, pitching the bar, and spear-throwing, going out of fashion with the upper classes, were ardently taken up by the lower. Tennis—a very different game from the modern one of lawn tennis—bull-baiting, cock-fighting, balloon-ball, club-ball, trap-ball, foot ball, base or bars, hoodman blind, boating, skating, fishing, hunting, hawking, and archery were all pursued with zest by different orders of the people. Medicine and surgery were not much in vogue: there was, for instance, only one

English surgeon at Agincourt, and to him were assigned fifteen unskilful and very unwilling assistants to attend to the wounds of the 1,600 Englishmen who fell on that glorious field. On the other hand, as might be expected from a disturbed state of society, in which questions of title to lands and tenements were continually coming up, law was a lucrative calling and was extensively practised. We shall see in a moment how the writings of which I am to treat centre around some of these amusements and professions.

From this hastily sketched and imperfect picture it might with some show of reason be inferred that, taken all in all, the fifteenth century in England was but little favorable to culture in general and to the growth and development of literature in particular. That is the general opinion concerning it at any rate. In many manuals of literary history it is described as dull and uninteresting, a barren waste as contrasted with the Chaucerian period, which had immediately preceded it, on the one hand, and the Elizabethan period, which was so soon to follow it, on the other. This description, however, like most other sweeping generalizations, has the disadvantage of conveying a really erroneous impression. It is about on a par with the condemnation of the middle ages, because they lie between the glories of classical antiquity and the effulgence of modern times. But all critics are not so prejudiced. A saner and doubtless a juster judgment is beginning to be formulated. Thus Mr. A. R. Waller, in his final words on the fifteenth century, has this to say:—

“It would rather appear that a century, the beginning of which saw the English Mandeville translators at work, and the end of which saw one of those versions printed; a century to which may be credited *The Flower and the Leaf*, the Paston letters, Caxton's prefaces and translations, the immortal Malory, lyrics innumerable, sacred and secular, certain ballads, in the main, as we now know them, *The Nut Brown Maid* (in itself sufficient, in form and music and theme, to ‘make the fortune’ of any century), carols and many of the miracle plays in their present form, can well hold its own in the history of our literature as against the centuries that precede or follow

it. At least it is not deficient either in variety of utterance or in many-sidedness of interest. It is not merely full of the promise that all periods of transition possess, but its actual accomplishment is not to be contemned, and its products are not devoid either of humour or beauty."²

It is not for me on the present occasion to descant at large on the very numerous and undoubtedly important contributions to English literature which the fifteenth century has to show. I am, on the contrary, to confine myself to an infinitesimal portion of the writings of that age—a portion, too, to which it is doubtful how far the term literature in its true signification may with propriety be applied at all. But as all beginnings are important and are deserving of painstaking investigation, so I think the beginning of the writing of English by women is justly entitled to consideration, especially when we bear in mind the range of positive achievement which in the centuries that have since intervened women writers were to attain, and the high position which in our own day they have won for themselves in the republic of letters.

I have always been of opinion that, if we could ever get to know the facts, it would be found that in the middle ages English women wrote much more than we are now aware of. It is almost impossible to conceive that, in the stately homes of England and in convents and nunneries throughout the land, there were not many gentlewomen who burned with devotional enthusiasm or poetic fire, and who managed to deliver through the medium of the pen to their own little world the thoughts of which their souls were pregnant. We know that as early as the first quarter of the thirteenth century the study of religious writers is expressly enjoined upon recluses in the *Ancren Riwele* ("Anchoresses' Rule"); and what more natural than that some of them, inspired by such reading and feeling that they too had a message to convey, should commit to writing the ideas and aspirations that surged through their minds? One of the spiritual descendants of the mystic Richard Rolle of Hampole, namely, Walter Hylton (d. 1396), the August-

² *The Cambridge History of English Literature*, Vol. II., pp. 486-487.

tinian canon of Thurgarton in Nottinghamshire, in his beautiful work, the *Scala Perfectionis* or *The Ladder of Perfection*, lets fall the incidental remark, "this readest thou in every book that teacheth of good living," which has been interpreted to prove the existence in the fourteenth century of many a manuscript containing spiritual reading which has not come down to us at all or has come down only in fragmentary form. Of the writings of that age, so far undiscovered, it needs no great stretch of the imagination to suppose that some were from the hands of women, and if there be any truth in this supposition for the fourteenth century, it would be, inferentially, at least equally true of the fifteenth.

It is at all events now certain that the claim sometimes put forward for Dame Juliana Berners that she is the first of the long line of women writers of English can no longer be sustained, and that that honour, so far as we at present know, appears to belong to another Juliana—Juliana of Norwich. This excellent lady was an anchoress of that ancient city, and according to the account usually received—but now received with some question—she is believed to have lived for at least a century, from 1342 to 1442. Nearly as long a span used to be assigned to Juliana's master in mysticism, Hylton himself, and to Juliana Berners, and such an ascription is by no means inherently improbable. It would go to prove that in the middle ages, as in the early ages of the Christian Church, the religious and especially the contemplative life was a healthy one and conduced to vigorous old age. The work which establishes Juliana of Norwich's priority is entitled *XVI Revelations of Divine Love Shewed to Mother Juliana of Norwich*, 1373. It exists in two manuscripts, one in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, and the other in the British Museum in London. It was first printed by H. Cressy (Dom Serenus Cressy, O. S. B.) in 1670, and was reprinted in 1845. It had, however, escaped general attention, so that Father Dalgairns, writing in 1870, speaks of it as "a hitherto almost unknown work," and in another place he says that it "remained comparatively unknown." Hence it eluded the notice of the compilers of text books, and thus led to the

error to which I have referred. It has since been printed in 1877, 1901, and 1902.

Juliana saw for the first time in 1373 the vision from which she derived her *Revelations*, and she is supposed to have written down her account of it in 1393, so that she falls just outside the century with which we are immediately concerned. Let me, however, say here in passing that hers is a remarkable work. Students of mysticism cannot afford to neglect it, and any one who wishes for further proof of how divine love triumphs over everything has here a splendid illustration.

Proceeding to Dame Juliana Berners, we are at once confronted with many difficulties and doubts. She is by some modern writers considered rather a mythical personage. Usually, however, she is described as the Prioress of Sopwell Nunnery, and is said to have been born towards the end of the fourteenth century at Roding-Berners, in the hundred of Dunmow, and county of Essex, and to have been the daughter of that Sir James Berners who was beheaded on Tower Hill in 1388 as one of the evil counsellors of Richard II.

The family of Berners—the name is spelled variously Barnes, Bernes, Barners, and Berners—was of considerable honour and antiquity. The founder of the house was Hugh Berners, or de Berners, a great Norman of the eleventh century, who held a hide of land in Eversden in the county of Cambridge as certified to by Domesday Book made in the twentieth year of William the Conqueror's reign (1085). Various members of the family rose to eminence. One female line gave to church and state Stephen Langton (c. 1150-1228), cardinal priest of St. Chrysogonus and forty-fourth Archbishop of Canterbury, who played so important a part in obtaining Magna Charta from King John. In literature the family is also splendidly represented, again through the female line, by Sir John Bouchier, Lord Berners. On the execution of Sir James Berners in 1388 his blood was attainted and his Essex estates were confiscated, but there was a partial restoration of the property to his widow in the following year, and the family was restored in blood in 1398. Sir James's son, Sir Richard, created Baron Berners in the reign of Henry

IV., left a daughter and sole heir, Margery Berners, who took for her second husband Sir John Bouchier. He was summoned to Parliament in 1455 as Lord Berners in right of his wife, *jure uxoris*. Their son, Sir Humphrey Bouchier, was slain at the battle of Barnet in 1471, during his father's lifetime, leaving a son, Sir John Bouchier, who in 1474 succeeded his grandfather as Lord Berners, and is known to all lovers of literature as a translator on a grand scale, his most notable work in that line being of course his rendering of the Chronicles of Froissart from the French.

Sopwell nunnery, of which Juliana Berners was prioress, was a dependency of the great abbey of St. Alban's, and was founded as far back as 1140. Two women religiously inclined made themselves a habitation by raddling boughs of trees with wattles and stakes close to Einwood and within the precincts of the Abbey of St. Alban's, and there passed their time in continual acts of devotion, severe abstinence, and strict chastity. Soon Geoffrey de Gorham, sixteenth abbot of St. Alban's, erected them into a cell subordinate to the mother abbey, and directed them to adopt the garment of nuns according to the order of St. Benedict. The nunnery so established had a continuous existence until in the dissolution of the monasteries under Henry VIII. it was confiscated, and the site and buildings were granted to Sir Richard Lee. At present it belongs to the Earl of Verulam. The nuns' fishponds, now overgrown with water lilies, still stand in a part of the grounds. According to received tradition the two pioneer women of the community used to dip their dry bread in the water of an ancient holy well adjoining, and hence the place was called Sopwell.

It is not certain at what date Dame Berners became head of Sopwell nunnery, but we know that one prioress was elected in 1426 and another was superseded on account of old age in 1480, and very probably she came in somewhere between the two, if indeed she was not the superseded one.

The work by virtue of which she is entitled to notice from students of literary history is known as *The Boke of St. Alban's*. Caxton had established the first printing press in England at Westminster in 1476, and speedily found imitators. In 1478

a press was set up at Oxford, in 1480 another was established in London, and in 1479 or 1480 a "sometime schoolmaster of St. Alban's," whose name is unknown, but who is often called "John Insomuch" because two of his productions commenced with that word, started a press there, printing altogether eight books of which we have record. One of these was the volume which goes by the name of *The Boke of St. Alban's*. It contained three treatises, the first on hawking, the second on hunting, and the third on coat-armour or heraldry. The treatise on hunting, which is in rhymed verse, has for colophon: "Explicit [Here ends] Dam Julyans Barnes in her boke of hunting." On the strength of this statement the authorship of the whole book has been assigned to her, but there is really nothing to show whether she did or did not write the other two treatises.

For my own part I see no reason why she could not have been the author or, to speak more correctly perhaps, the compiler of the whole *Boke of St. Alban's*. All three subjects would come well within her purview as the daughter of a noble house, trained up from youth in the accomplishments and indoor and outdoor sports and occupations belonging to her rank in society. Some writers, assuming that the good Juliana practised as a nun what she preached as a writer, have styled her "a second Minerva in her studies and another Diana in her diversions"; others, as already stated, have raised doubt of her authorship and even of her existence. Between the two extremes of opinion the truth probably lies. The colophon I have mentioned, as well as unbroken tradition, would appear to establish satisfactorily the two facts (1) that there was a real Juliana Berners, and (2) that she is responsible at least for the treatise on hunting. Bale in his *Scriptorum Illustrium majoris Britanniae Catalogus*, printed at Basel in 1559, gives a special paragraph to her, enumerates her works, and says that she flourished (*floruit*) in 1460 in the reign of Henry VI. With regard to the other point, it is true indeed that Chaucer represents a Benedictine prioress as riding with some attendant nuns and priests on the celebrated pilgrimage to the shrine of the

"holy blisful martir" at Canterbury, but a pilgrimage, even in Chaucer's conception of it, is a very different thing from a fox-hunt, and there certainly is no need for our supposing that the prioress of Sopwell periodically sallied forth from the seclusion of her nunnery to engage in the sport of hawking or to ride horseback across country in pursuit of fox, or hare, or deer.

The dates indeed are slightly awkward; but let us, by no far-fetched idea, suppose her to have been a mere infant at her father's death; to have been brought up in the way that befitted a young gentlewoman in those days; to have acquired in a convent school or from domestic tutors some book-learning, writing, and drawing, as well as needlework, confectionery, and the rudiments of surgery and physic, for apothecaries and surgeons were, as we have seen, rare at that time; next, when emancipated from the school-room, to have passed some time with relatives in the vicinity of the court and to have taken her own part in field sports, then as now a favorite amusement with ladies of family; to have kept a commonplace book of recipes and notes such as was usual down to comparatively recent times with women who could write; to have found a religious vocation and retired from the world—and we have just the ideal preparation for the composition of such a work as the *Boke of St. Alban's*.

We can picture the good nun sitting down in her leisure time, and, with the benefit and instruction of some kinsman perhaps in view, amusing herself by versifying the rules of hunting, by adding thereto points gained from her own previous experience, and by extending her notes on hawking and heraldry, using in all cases, in conformity with the practice of the time, whatever of previously existing material came to hand. For, whoever wrote the *Boke of St. Alban's*, nothing more can be claimed for it than that it is in great part a translation and compilation. The treatise on heraldry is expressly said to have been translated and compiled at St. Alban's, its principal source in all probability being a work on the same subject written in 1441 by Nicholas Upton, and the major portion

of the treatises on hawking and hunting is derived from the early fourteenth century work, the *Venerie de Twety*.

In opposition to my own theory that Juliana composed the *Boke of St. Alban's* in its entirety as it at first appeared, it is only fair that I should say that some writers, who admit both her existence and her authorship, limit her writing to the treatise on hunting. Others would give her a little more. Thus Joseph Haslewood, who in 1810 produced a fac-simile of the second edition (1496) of the *Boke of St. Alban's*—a scarce work which I had the opportunity of examining in detail in the British Museum in London last August—has gone very carefully into the question of authorship, and he assigns to her a small portion of the treatise on hawking; all the treatise on hunting; a short list of the beasts of the chase; and another short list of Persons, Beasts, Fowls, &c.

In 1496 Jan Wynkyn de Worde, Caxton's successor, reprinted the *Boke of St. Alban's* with the addition of a treatise on fishing. The object of the addition was doubtless to make the work more saleable and therefore more valuable commercially as being a kind of complete "Gentleman's Vade Mecum," for in its later form it gave just the information which a gentleman might be likely to need. Evidently it supplied a want, for it was in great demand. It continued to be very popular throughout the sixteenth century and was frequently reprinted, as, for example, by Gervase Markham in 1595, under the title of *The Gentleman's Academie, or the Booke of St. Alban's*.

A few extracts to show the nature and quality of the work which the prioress of Sopwell composed at least 425 years ago will not come amiss. The first is taken from the treatise on hawking. Observe how severely practical it is. Observe too the varied and irregular character of the spelling:—

"And if yowre hawke be harde pennyd [strongly feathered] she may be drawne to be reclaymed [pulled by a string to be taught to come back]. For all the while that she is tender pennyd she is not habull to be reclaymed. And if she be a Goshawke or Tercell that shall be reclaymed ever fede hym

[sic] with washe mete at the drawyng and at the reclaymyng, bot loke that hit be hooted, and in this manner washe it. Take the meet and go to the water and strike it upp and downe in the water and wringe the waater owte and fede her therwith and [if] she be a brawncher [a hawk just able to leave its nest]. And if it bene an Eyesse [a hawk reared in captivity] thow most wash the meete clenner than ye doo to the brawncher, and with a linne [linen] cloth wipe it and fede hir, &c."

The second extract is from the treatise on coat armour, dealing with the origin of nobility:—

"How Gentilmen shall be knowyn from churlis and how they first began.—Now for to devyde gentilmen from chorlis in haast it shall be preved. Ther was never gentilman nor churle ordeyned by kynde [nature] bot he had fadre and modre. Adam and Eve had nother fadre nor modre, and in the sonnys of Adam and Eve war found bothe gentilman and churle. By the sonnys of Adam and Eve, Seth, Abell and Cayn, devyded was the royall blode fro the ungentill. A brother to sleigh his brother contrary to the law where myght be more ungentelnes? By that did Cayn become a chorle and all his ofspryng after him, by the cursing of God and his owne fadre Adam. And Seth was made a gentilman thorow his fadres and moderis blessing. And of the ofspryng of Seth Noe came a gentilman by kinde and lineage."

The next extract from the same treatise tells the vices which a gentleman must particularly avoid:—

"There be IX vices contrary to gentilmen.—Ther ben IX vices contrari to gentilmen, of the wiche V ben indeterminable and IIII determinable. The V indeterminable ben theys: oon to be full of slowthe in his werris, an other to be full of boost in his manhode, the thride to be full of cowardnes to his enemy, the fourth to be full of lechri in his body, and the fifthe to be full of drynkyng and dronckunli. There be IIII determinable: on is to revoke his own chalange, an other to slay his presoner with his own handis, the thride to voyde from his soueraynes baner in the felde, and the fifthe [sic] to tell his soueraygne fals talys."

A final extract is taken from that part of the treatise which deals with the blasing of arms:—

"Here begynnth the blasynge of armys.—I have shewyd to yow in thys book a-foore how gentilmen began, and how the law of armys was first ordant, and how moni colowris ther be in cootarmuris, and the difference of cootarmuris with mony other thinggis that here needis not to be rehersed. Now I intende to procede of signys in armys and of the blasynge of all armys. Bot for to reherce all the signys that be borne in armys, as Pecok, Pye, Batt, Dragon, Lyon, and Dolfyn, and flowris and leevys, it war to longe a tariyng, ner I can not do hit: ther be so mony. Bot here shall shortli be shewyd to blase all armys if ye entende diligentli to youre rulys. And be cause the cros is the moost worthi signe emong al signys in armys: at the cros I will begynne, in the wich thys nobull and myghtie prince King Arthure hadde grete trust, so that he lefte his armys that he bare of III Dragonys, and over that an other sheelde of III crownys, and toke to his armys a crosse of silver in a feelde of verte [green], and on the right side an ymage of owre blessid lady with hir sone in hir arme. And with that signe of the cros he dyd mony maruelis after, as hit is writyn in the bookis of cronyclis of his dedys.

"Also I have read this sign of the cross to be sende from God to that blessed man Marcuri as Vincencius saith in speculo historiali, of the marvellous death of Julian the apostate emperour, lib. XX he sayth the angel brought unto the foresaid Marcuri all armour necessary with a shield of azure and a cross fleuri with IIJ roses of gold, as here in this, and I found never that ever any arms were sent from heaven but in them was the sign of the cross. Except in the arms of the King of France the which arms certainly was sent by an angel from heaven, that is to say IIJ flowers in manner of swords in a field of azure, as it shews here, the which certain arms were given to the foresaid King of France in sign of everlasting trouble and that he and his successors always with battle and swords should be punished."

There is evidently a quaint interest attaching to some of the

contents of the book, but on the whole one is more fascinated by the mystery surrounding its authorship than by any literary merits it possesses. Like many other didactic works, it is lacking in art. It attracts us not because it is beautiful but simply because it is old.

(To be continued.)

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THE FATHERS ON WEALTH AND PROPERTY.

The publication of the Edict of Milan by Constantine in the early part of the year 313 A. D., which assured to the Christians in the Roman Empire legal toleration and the right freely to practise their religion, marked merely one successful stage in the conflict with heathenism. Political disabilities were removed: but much still remained to be done. Philosophy had to be moulded in order to make of it an adequate medium for the approximate expression of Christian truth and society had to be transformed in order to secure a favorable environment for the expression of Christian life. The spirit of heathenism in law was annulled; but the spirit of heathenism in life and thought was still active and flourishing. All the forces of the decaying pagan life had been drawn together in the Philosophy of the neo-Platonists, and used as a means to combat the advance of Christianity. A more serious menace, however, presented itself when heathenism raised its head within the Christian fold itself in the two great heresies of Arianism and Pelagianism. Both schemes were rooted in the same unchristian ideas of God and law, in the same heathen and mechanical conception of sin, in the same naturalism and rationalism.

In other spheres of life heathenism was still equally vigorous. "It was still an established religion, receiving state support till the time of Gratian, a vast and venerable system. The Emperor was still its official head during life; and even Theodosius was formally placed among the gods at his death. Old Rome was still devoted to her ancient deities, her nobles still recorded their priesthoods and augurships among their proudest honors, and the senate itself still opened every meeting with an offering of incense on the altar of Victory. The public service was largely heathen, from its lowest ranks up to the prefectures of Rome and Constantinople. The army was full of heathens, both Roman and barbarian, though Chris-

tians were not a few even among the paladins of Julian. Education was mostly heathen, turning on heathen classics and taught by heathen rhetoricians, like Themistius, the king of eloquence, or Libanius the honored friend of Basil as well as Julian. Above all society was heathen to an extent we can scarcely realize."¹ More and more as time went on and as their numbers increased, the Christians were brought into contact with this all-pervading heathenism, and graver became the responsibilities which rested on them of defining the scope and application of Christian principles to the hoary social institutions of Rome under the watchful and jealous eyes of their pagan censors. The fact that the Christians were permitted by law to assemble without fear of molestation and that they were allowed to build and own churches had produced no change in the prevailing social or economic outlook. Property was still held by the old titles and was still looked on in the traditional pagan way, and the callous individualism which had found expression in absolute ownership still prevailed. In the eyes of the law no new value had been placed on human life: labor was still held in contempt: and as formerly taxes were imposed and collected with the same sublime disregard for the rights of the taxpayer.

In forming an estimate, therefore, of the attitude taken by the Christians towards wealth and property and the administration of finances, public as well as private, in the period immediately following the era of the persecutions, it will be necessary constantly to bear in mind the circumstances of the time. The evils of an economic character to which they called attention and for which they offered a remedy had not escaped the notice of pagan statesmen and moralists. The enormous concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, the increasing poverty, the avarice of usurers, the devastation and depopulation of large tracts of territory, the cruelty and exactions of taxgatherers had found many opponents from the days of Seneca onwards and had frequently been the object of corrective legislation. The Christians did not concern them-

¹ H. M. Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*, p. 58.

selves directly with economic affairs. Their energies were sufficiently taxed to maintain the purity of their doctrines in face of new heresies, and to provide for the spread and organisation of the Church. Confronted, however, as they were on all sides with the expiring spirit of heathenism, and forced to awaken in the faithful a sense of responsibility towards a social organism which was rapidly becoming Christian, they were compelled, as well by the increasing number of converts, as from the fact that the bishops were coming to be looked on as the "*defensores civitatum*" the natural protectors of the weak and the oppressed—to take a decided stand on matters of social and economic import. Questions of conscience arose regarding the disposition of wealth, the rights of the poor had to be considered and above all it was necessary to safeguard the teachings of the Christian religion against the attacks of the heathens who were asserting that the decay of the Empire and the universal misery were due to the abandonment of the old gods. The enormous difficulties implied in transforming the old Roman state into something approximating a Christian commonwealth cannot be easily defined; but it is significant that just a century after the Church received legal toleration in Rome, St. Augustine commenced his work on "The City of God." The composition of this work, marks another stage in the struggle with paganism. If the earthly city was not already realized, the possibility of its attainment was present to the minds of the Christians, and the pagan accusations which called for the great work in which it was described were the despairing cries of defeat. It is futile to discuss the influence which St. Augustine's work had in helping to bring about the state which he described, but in all subsequent Christian writings we find little which is not moulded by his thought or borrowed directly from him. The last blow to pagan pride was administered when Alaric captured Rome, and even if there were pagans enough left to trouble the Christians by attributing to their religion that calamity, the strength of paganism had vanished, and henceforth, owing to the influence of St. Augustine and the extinction of pagan

institutions, we do not find in the writings of the Christians many expressions which need to be interpreted in the light of the special circumstances which provoked them. These circumstances are frequently lost sight of by some advocates of communism and socialism, who wishing to enlist the Fathers among their advocates, forget the fundamental canons of historical criticism, and take isolated statements in their writings, and with no regard to the occasion which called them forth, make them do service as expressions of principle. Thus we find Nitti asserting that: "The doctrines held by the early Fathers of the Church on the nature of property are perfectly uniform. They almost all admit that wealth is the fruit of usurpation, and, considering the rich man as holding the patrimony of the poor, maintain that riches should only serve to relieve the indigent; to refuse to assist the poor is, consequently, worse than to rob the rich. According to the fathers, all was in common in the beginning: the distinctions *mine* and *thine*, in other words, individual property, came with the spirit of evil."² The same or similar assertions are found in a large number of other writers, some of whom are not partial to the tenets of Socialism, but all of whom are misled by what is looked on as a communistic tone in certain passages of the writings of some of the early fathers.³

Of Communism as now generally understood, it may be asserted, there is not a trace in the writings of the early Christian fathers. They never express themselves as desiring to subvert the established political order and they never assail vested rights. No statement of theirs can be taken to mean that they had in mind some new social scheme and they constantly preach peace and contentment. In fact when they do express themselves on social and political matters, it is to point out remedies for evils which were undermining the state, and had their preaching been generally observed there

² *Catholic Socialism*, p. 66 seq.

³ Laveleye, *Le socialisme contemporain*, p. xvii. Laurent, *Principes du droit civil*, t. vi, p. 119. Bouctot, *Histoire du Communisme et du Socialisme*, p. 8 seq. Adler, *Geschichte des Sozialismus und Kommunismus von Plato bis zur Gegenwart*, p. 76 seq.

can be no doubt but that the old order would have survived the shock of barbarian invasion. If their teaching has been misunderstood it is due either to the subjectivity of a certain school of propagandists who find everywhere confirmation for their opinions, or to the fact that no attention is paid to the times and circumstances in which the fathers lived and to the peculiarly unchristian character which still inhered in many of the laws and institutions in the fourth and fifth centuries. In order to arrive at a just basis for judging some phases of the economic utterances of the fathers it is essential to have a clear conception of some economic features during the two centuries which preceded the fall of the Western Empire.

It is a truism among historians that at no point did Roman imperial administration fail so lamentably as in fiscal matters. Desperate expedients were resorted to at various times to provide for the maintenance of government and to ward off national bankruptcy. Nothing that had previously been attempted was so far-reaching, nor so fatal perhaps, as the measures introduced by Diocletian and Constantine, "by which at the beginning of the fourth century the old municipal curia or senate was metamorphosed into a machine for grinding down the provincial proprietors by a most unmerciful and injudicious system of taxation. The curia of a town consisted of a certain number of the richest landowners who were responsible to the treasury for a definite sum, which it was their business to collect from all the proprietors of the district."⁴

The ruinous effect of this legislation can be readily seen from the fact that at all times, but especially in the fourth and fifth centuries all wealth in the Roman Empire was derived from landed possessions and agricultural pursuits. For purposes of taxation, the slaves and the plebeian class consisting of free artisans, shopkeepers, etc., could not be taken into consideration, and because trade and commerce had languished to such an extent that the merchant class was almost extinct,⁵ the entire fiscal burden fell on the Curiales and the members

⁴ Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire*, vol. I, p. 27.

⁵ Duruy, *Hist. Rom.*, VI, 378. De Coulanges, *L'Inv. Ger.*, 102.

of the senatorial class. The Curiales were the middle class, they were described as the *nervi rei publicae ac viscera civitatum*,⁶ they were admitted to the municipal curia not because as formerly they had filled important magistracies through the election of their fellow-citizens, but because they were land-owners, who owned more than twenty-five jugera. On them devolved all the expenses and responsibility of municipal administration, and, what was more onerous, the responsibility for the collection and payment of the imperial tax assessment in their district. So heavy were these burdens that the declining years of Rome saw no more sorry spectacle than what has been called "the flight of the curiales." By every conceivable device they sought escape from their grinding obligations. They enrolled in the army or the Palatine service or if wealthy they bought admission to the Senatorial order, they degraded themselves to the plebeian class or, what was more deplorable, they surrendered their holdings to some wealthier neighbor and sank practically to the condition of serfs. The imperial authorities sought by means of legislation to stop this depletion of the ranks of the curiales. Admission to the Senatorial class was denied them,⁷ and numerous enactments framed by which their condition was reduced to that of imperial serfs. They were not allowed to absent themselves from their homes, even for the shortest period without the permission of the imperial authorities, they could neither sell nor dispose of their property, they could not take up other occupations, and if they died intestate their estate went to the municipality. The list of their disabilities extended even to denying them the asylum of the Church thus placing them in the category of fugitive slaves and insolvent debtors. Two evil consequences resulted from this depletion of the curial class, the burdens became heavier on those who could not escape, and the amount of land under cultivation constantly decreased, thus adding to the universal misery.

The decay of the middle class composed of the curiales was accompanied by a movement in the opposite direction among

⁶ Majorian, *Nov.*, I.

⁷ *Cod. Theod.*, XII, 1, 183. Theodosius, *Novella*, 8.

the members of the senatorial class whose wealth and prestige were constantly increasing. Though the senators were no longer public functionaries, the title senator being merely a badge of social distinction, membership in the order was so eagerly sought for, no less because of the rank it conferred than for the privileges and exemptions it conveyed, that from the time of Constantine the number of those enjoying senatorial honors had been constantly increasing. The prohibitions of later emperors against the admission of curiales to the senatorial order gave to the latter all the more repulsive features of a caste. They enjoyed a practical monopoly of the higher offices, and because of their wealth and cohesiveness they were in a position to exclude others from the more important posts in the public service. In the utter financial prostration of the later Empire two causes contributed to enhance enormously the wealth of this aristocratic class. In the first place, they were secured through their possession of large estates in various parts of the world against the uncertainty of bad crops and the ruin of excessive taxation, and were thus in a position to constantly increase their holdings at the expense of their less fortunate neighbors. The burden of taxation compelled the small proprietors to borrow money at usurious rates from the *potentes* as they were called, and being unable to meet their obligations, they were dispossessed by means of forced sales or compelled absolutely to surrender their holdings and to be reduced to the unenviable position of *coloni*. In this manner the free middle class was gradually reduced to poverty, and wealth and power passed into the hands of the great landowners. The transfer, however, could not have been effected except through the connivance of the government officials and the utter shamelessness and venality of the provincial authorities. "A volume," says Dill,⁸ "might be written on the subject of

⁸ *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, p. 270. In his chapter on the "Decay of the Middle Class and the Aggrandisement of the Aristocracy," Dill elaborates this phase of the social conditions in Rome from a study of the Theodosian code with a view to showing that moral and economic vice "far more than the violent intrusion of the German invaders produced the collapse of society which is known as the fall of the Empire of the West."

financial corruption in the last century of the Western Empire. When one wanders through the maze of enactments dealing with fiscal oppression, malversation, and evasion, one knows not whether more to pity the weakness of the government, or to wonder at the hardened cupidity and audacity of the classes which were leagued together in plundering both the treasury and the taxpayer."

Through the venality of the official class the wealthy land-owners were enabled systematically to oppress and rob the poor, who, if not deprived of their property, were compelled to bear an unequal and unjust share of taxation. On the other hand the system of pilfering public funds and defrauding the taxpayer, as revealed by the enactments of the Theodosian code, shows a condition and quality of crime which would not have been possible, had not public morality and governmental activity been utterly lacking. "The system of bureaucratic despotism, elaborated finally by Diocletian and Constantine, produced a tragedy in the truest sense, such as history has seldom exhibited; in which, by an inexorable fate, the claims of fancied omnipotence ended in a humiliating paralysis of administration, in which determined effort to remedy social evils only aggravated them till they became unendurable; in which the best intentions of the central power were, generation after generation, mocked and defeated alike by irresistible laws of human nature, and by hopeless perfidy and corruption in the servants of government."⁹

It would be an obvious injustice to cast the responsibility for this condition of widespread suffering on the Emperors and their advisers. The causes which produced it were beyond the reach of legislative remedies and were rooted in the lives and institutions of the people, which were still colored by the spirit of paganism. The causes were moral rather than economic. In the first place the absolute title to property which sufficiently safeguarded the rights of the owners could not arouse them to a sense of their duties and obligations, and

⁹ Dill, *Ibid.*, p. 281.

in the second place the cold and selfish individualism which dominated conduct, excluded all feeling of corporate or humane responsibility.

Though the Christian writers did not directly concern themselves with economic problems, they cannot be denied the credit of having correctly diagnosed the situation, and of having offered remedies adequate to the current needs. They were unsparing in their denunciation of the avarice and corruption of the times and unwearied in their efforts to arouse in their contemporaries a sense of duty and responsibility to others. In one treatise of the period, the "*De Gubernatione Dei*" of Salvian,¹⁰ there is a striking account of the impression produced on the earnest minded Christians by this universal misery. Written with the purpose of showing that the barbarian invasions and the general suffering were no proof that God had abandoned His providential care over men, Salvian points out that the humiliation of the Romans was an evidence of divine government and a punishment for evil-doing. The rich he accuses of murder, oppression and robbery. The dignities of the great mean the robbery of cities; prefects are plunderers. Honors are purchased by a few to be paid for by the spoliation of all; the lowly pay the price of dignities for which they did not bargain. The world is in constant turmoil because a few enjoy honors and authority. The community suffers for the glory of one man. The poor have no greater scourge than the civil power.¹¹ The morals of the rich are worse than those of the slaves.¹² Immunity from punishment makes them murderers.¹³ Their homes are dens of iniquity and immorality.¹⁴ The poor, on the contrary groaned under the burden of excessive taxation and unjust imposts.¹⁵ In cases

¹⁰ Salvian was born near Cologne about the end of the fourth century, and after being ordained to the priesthood he entered the monastery at Lerins. He died about 480 A. D.

¹¹ *De Gubernatione Dei*, iv, 4.

¹² *Ibid.*, iv, n. 6.

¹³ *Ibid.*, iv, 5.

¹⁴ vii, 3. Quis potentum ac divitum non in luto libidinis vixit? quis non se barathro sordidissimae conluvionis inmersit? quis conjugii fidem reddidit?

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, v, 7.

where the Emperors lightened the taxes, the rich enjoyed all the benefits by paying nothing and by compelling the poor to assume the entire responsibility.¹⁶ Widows were in tears, the unprotected were robbed, the orphans were homeless.¹⁷ Many even of the better class fled to the enemy in order to escape this official persecution. They preferred to live free though appearing to be prisoners than in apparent freedom to become slaves.¹⁸ In business affairs deceit and injustice prevailed everywhere.¹⁹ Lying, misrepresentation and perjury were considered to be legitimate provided they were profitable. So widespread were these evils that many Christians were no better than the heathens and barbarians.²⁰ The whole congregation at Rome with the exception of a few was a sink of vice.²¹

To remedy these evils and to restore order to the world, Salvian proposes in the first place that men should learn how to practise justice and uprightness in public as well as private life. The poor should not be made to suffer, and if taxes are remitted or reduced they should be allowed to enjoy the benefits of this concession.²² In the second place he calls attention to the necessity of cultivating a wholesome public spirit, of being zealous for the general welfare, of submerging all desire for personal aggrandisement in zeal for the well-being of the community.²³ The duty of those in authority is to provide for the people at large, to work for the common good, to remember that poor public officials made Rome great, as the rich were its destruction.²⁴

Those results could be attained only through the practice of fraternal charity, by which the individual places himself and his resources at the service of others. No one should shut himself off in selfish isolation. If he has riches and

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, IV, 6; V, 8.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, V, 5.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, V, 6.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, IV, 14.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, IV, 19.

²¹ *Ibid.*, III, 44.

²² *Ibid.*, V, 8. Nam sicut sunt in adgravatione pauperes primi, ita in relevatione postremi.

²³ *Ibid.*, I, 2.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 2.

property he should look on them as gifts from God of which for a brief period he is the steward and administrator.²⁵

Confronted with such economic paralysis and no doubt feeling as keenly on the subject of the miseries of the poor as did Salvian, the fathers could not be insensible to the duty which rested on them of striving to relieve as far as possible the prevailing distress. In common with the framers of the Theodosian Code, whose efforts for social betterment are seen on every page, they could not escape the conviction that the fabric of Roman society was being undermined by the greed and rapacity of the great landowners. To understand fully the attitude they took towards wealth and property, and to bring out in stronger relief their thorough conservativeness, it must be borne in mind that they were witnesses of the process by which the middle or curial class had been destroyed, and that the great fortunes of the aristocracy had been collected under their eyes. The disorganisation of the economic structure and the centralization of wealth in the hands of an inconsiderable minority had been accomplished in a comparatively short period, and consequently the sources of the enormous fortunes of the time and the manner of their acquirement were matters of common knowledge. In addition the fathers did not set themselves up as the exponents of social theories or economic reforms. Their writings were not academic treatises, and their utterances were expressions of opinion to meet definite circumstances. They are never carried away by the idea that social Utopias can arise from economic adjustment. The cause of the trouble and misery lay too deep for cure by statute or sword. The fathers offered the remedy which they found in the Christian religion. They strove to arouse the individual conscience to a sense of duty and morality, to lay the foundations of social order in better and more upright individual lives, and to recall wealth and power to a full realization of their responsibility and limitations, by insisting that no man

²⁵ *Ad ecclesiam*, I, 2. Nos usum tantum earum rerum accepimus, quas tenemus; commodatis enim a Deo facultatibus utimur et quasi precarii possessores sumus. Denique egredientes e mundo isto, velimus nolimus, hic cuncta relinquimus.

should seek self alone, but should serve others by being bound to the community through the exercise of fraternal love.

The primary principle of all patristic teaching of a social or economic character is the doctrine that all men have a common origin and a common destiny: "that whether rich or poor, bond or free, sound or sick, they are all one in the Lord, that they have one Head, Christ, from Whom are all things."²⁶ The nature of all men is the same, and all the affairs of mankind must be regulated according to that fact.²⁷ Human society itself was the work of Divine Providence,²⁸ and the bond of society fraternal love.²⁹ Through divine dispensation men in society are bound to mutual helpfulness and love; the strong should aid the weak, the rich the poor, the powerful those who were oppressed.³⁰ "Thus," says Ambrose, "in accordance with the will of God and the union of nature, we ought to be of mutual help one to the other, and to vie with each other in doing duties, to lay all our advantages as it were before all and to bring help one to the other from a feeling of devotion or of duty, so that the charm of human fellowship may ever grow sweeter amongst us and none be ever recalled from their duty by the fear of danger, but rather account all things, whether good or evil, as their own concern."³¹

Organised in this manner the relations of men with one another would be characterized by Justice and Humanity."³² "For that which holds society together is divided into two parts, Justice and Beneficence, which also is called liberality and kindness. Justice seems the loftier, liberality the more pleasing of the two. The one gives judgment, the other shows goodness."³³ That such a system would not be expected to

²⁶ Greg. Naz., *Orat.* xiv, 8. (Migne, *P. G.*, xxxv, 868.)

²⁷ Greg. Nyss., *De Paup. Am.*, *Orat.* 2. (Migne, *P. G.*, xlv, 489).

²⁸ Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, v, 1.

²⁹ Greg. Naz., *Ibid.*

³⁰ Greg. Naz., *Orat.* xiv, 8. (M. xxxv, 868), xiv, 6. (M. xxxv, 864).

³¹ *De Officiis*, Bk. I, xxviii, 135.

³² Augustine, *Ep.* 153. Migne, *P. L.* xxxiii, 653.

³³ Ambrose, *De Officiis*, Bk. I, xxviii, 130.

lead to absolute equality in all things is clear from the words of Chrysostom, who says: "because equality often leads to strife, God suffered it not to be a democracy, but a monarchy as in the army or the family in order that one might be subject and another rule."³⁴ Difference in station, did not however, destroy the essential equality which came from sharing the same nature.³⁵

The principal question in connection with the teaching of the fathers on society and social topics is: did they advocate Communism or Collectivism in regard to property and wealth, and can their doctrines regarding the duties of men towards their fellows be made to include a belief in an equal division of all the fruits of the earth? On this subject, the starting point for their doctrines is, that men are not the owners but merely the stewards or administrators of their possessions. "We all," says Chrysostom, "have the use, but no man the ownership."³⁶ God gives the riches and man is merely the steward.³⁷ "From God have you received that which you give: what you offer Him is His."³⁸ "To Him, Who is our Father belongs all that we have."³⁹ "Give all to Him, Who gave you all."⁴⁰ Let us think nothing our own, seeing even faith itself is not our own but God's.⁴¹ "Who but God gave you the rains, and the fields, and the arts and food and houses, and republics and friendship and happiness."⁴² "For thou art steward of thine own possessions, not less than he who dispenses the alms of the Church. For even though thou hast received an inheritance from thy father, and hast in this way all thou possessest, even thus all are God's."⁴³

³⁴ I. Cor. Hom. xxxiv, 6.

³⁵ Augustine, Ep. 155, 3. (M. xxxiii, 672). Socii sunt omnes homines: nam si pecuniae ratio socios facit, quanto magis ratio naturae non negotiandi sed nascendi lege communis.

³⁶ Hom. on Statues, II, 18.

³⁷ Greg. Naz. Orat., xvi, 18. (M. xxv, 960).

³⁸ Ambrose, De Nabuthe Jezraelita, xiii, 58. (M. xiv, 748).

³⁹ Greg. Nyss, De Paup. Am., Orat. I, (M. xlv, 465).

⁴⁰ Greg. Naz., Orat. xiv, 22. (M. xxv, 885).

⁴¹ Chrysostom, Hom. xxx, on Acts.

⁴² Greg. Naz., Orat. xiv, 23. (M. xxv, 888).

⁴³ Chrysostom, Hom. on Matt., lxxvii, 4.

By teaching that men were merely trustees the Fathers did not by any means wish to imply that all were trustees in the same sense, nor that all were entitled to an equal share either in possession or enjoyment. Property, like everything else in human affairs was viewed *sub specie aeternitatis* and was valuable or otherwise according to its bearing on man's ultimate destiny. Like everything in the world riches were created by God and were beautiful and pure, for the word of God made nothing useless or impure.⁴⁴ "Riches and gold and silver are not, as some think, the devil's, for the whole world of riches is for the faithful man."⁴⁵ In rejecting this Manichean doctrine of the inherent sinfulness of material things Cyril did not teach that Christians should make money or riches the object of their desires or efforts. "For I neither wish thee," he says, "to be a slave of money, nor to treat as enemies the things which God has given thee for use."⁴⁶ In themselves and from the standpoint of virtue and perfection, riches were not bad, but indifferent.⁴⁷ If Christians found anything in riches to object to, it was because they aroused in men the passions of covetousness and cupidity, and because they were a danger to the soul.⁴⁸

But even though there were dangers to virtue and to salvation implied in the possession of riches, the Christian Fathers did not counsel that they should be abandoned by all. "I have no wish," says Augustine, "to spoil or strip them or leave them empty, I do not bid them to lose their goods."⁴⁹ In fact if the rich did abandon all they had one of the means of perfection would be removed. "If money," says Chrysostom, "was a universal possession and was offered in the same manner to all, the occasion for almsgiving and the opportunity for benevolence would be taken away."⁵⁰ The true Philosophy of

⁴⁴ Athanasius, *Ep. ad Amun.*

⁴⁵ Cyril of Jerusalem, *Cat.* viii, 6.

⁴⁶ *Catech.* viii, 7.

⁴⁷ Basil, *In Ps.* i, 3. (M. xxix, 216). *De Inv.* 5. (M. xxxi, 384).

⁴⁸ Cyr. Alex. *Catech.* xvi, 19.

⁴⁹ *Sermon* lxi, 11.

⁵⁰ Chrysostom, *Hom.* ii, on *Statutes*, no. 18. See Jerome. *In Matt.* v. 42. (M. xxvi, 41). *Divites si semper dederint, semper dare non poterunt.* Ambrose, *Expos. Evan. Luc.* v, 53. (M. xv, 1650). *Paupertas enim media est; possunt et mali et boni esse pauperes.*

Life, according to the Christian standard, was that which counted riches, not according to earthly possessions but according to faith and virtue. "A great thing is a faithful man," says Cyril of Jerusalem, "being richest of all men. For to the faithful man belongs the whole world of wealth, in that he disdains and tramples on it. For they who in appearance are rich, and have many possessions, are poor in soul; since the more they gather, the more they pine with longing, for what is still lacking. But the faithful man, most strange paradox, in poverty is rich; for knowing that we need only food and raiment, and being therewith content, he has trodden riches under foot."⁵¹

In making all things in life subordinate to spiritual advancement and eternal salvation, the Fathers adopted as a determining standard for the value of wealth and riches the uses to which they were applied. From this standpoint, while property had its dangers, it also had undoubted advantages.⁵² "Do thou but use it well," says Cyril of Jerusalem, "and there is no fault to be found with money; but whenever thou hast made a bad use of that which is good, then being unwilling to blame thine own management, thou impiously throwest back the blame on the Creator. A man may even be justified by money. I was hungry and you gave me to eat: that certainly was from money. I was naked and you clothed me: that certainly was by money. And wouldst thou learn that money may become a door of the Kingdom of Heaven, sell, saith He, what thou hast and give to the poor and thou shalt have treasure in Heaven."⁵³ Chrysostom compares riches to beauty in woman, which had been called the greatest snare. The evil he says, is not in the beauty, but in unchaste gazing. "For we should not accuse the objects but ourselves, and our own perversity. . . . In the same way poverty brings innumerable good things into our life, for without poverty riches would be

⁵¹ *Catech.* v, 2. See Greg. Naz., *Orat.* xiv, 28. (M. xxxv, 896).

⁵² Ambrose, *Ex. Evan. Luc.* v, 69. (M. xv, 1654). In pecuniariis copiis multa sunt lenocinia delictorum, pleraque tamen sunt etiam incentiva virtutum.

⁵³ *Catech.* viii, 6.

unprofitable. Hence we should accuse neither the one nor the other of these: for poverty and riches are both alike weapons which will tend to virtue if we are willing." ⁵⁴

The Fathers saw nothing incongruous between the possession of riches and the sincere profession and practice of the Christian religion. "These things, I say," says Ambrose, "not because riches are a sin: the sin is in not distributing them to the poor and in the wrong use of them. For God made nothing evil, but all things good, so that riches too are good, that is if they do not master their owners." ⁵⁵ "His wealth need not stand in the way of the rich man, if he makes a good use of it," says Jerome, "and poverty can be no recommendation to the poor if in the midst of squalor and want, he fails to keep clear of wrongdoing." ⁵⁶ In spite of his asceticism, Jerome goes so far as to say that the wise man who is rich, is in a position to gain greater glory than the man who is merely wise; the latter can teach what is good, but sometimes he is unable to give what is asked of him. ⁵⁷ The same thought constantly occurs in the writings of the Fathers, and without exception they maintain that the possession of wealth is in no way prejudicial to faith, provided such use is made of it as faith dictates. "Use what you have," says Gregory of Nyssa, "but do not abuse it." ⁵⁸ In fact it was perfectly legitimate for the wealthy according to Augustine to enjoy the luxuries suitable to their condition. ⁵⁹

There is no note of inconsistency in the teaching of the

⁵⁴ *Hom. on Statutes*, xv, 10. See Jerome, *In. Is.* LVII, 10. (M. xxv, 554). Non solum divitiae, sed et paupertas probat hominem.

⁵⁵ *Hom.* XIII, I Cor. 8.

⁵⁶ *Ep.* LXXIX, v. (M. xxii, 726) Ambrose. In *Ps.* xxxvi, *Enan.* xxviii. (M. xiv, 981). Non divitiae accusantur, sed divitiae peccatorum.

⁵⁷ In *Eccles.* vi, 12. (M. xxiii, 1064). Majoris est gloriae sapiens cum divitiis, quam tantum sapiens. Alii enim sapientia indigent, alii opibus, et qui sapiens est et non dives, potest quidem docere quod bonum est, sed interdum non potest praestare quod petitur.

⁵⁸ *De Paup. Am., Orat.* i. (M. xlvi, 465).

⁵⁹ Sermon LXI, 12. Ambrose, *Enarr.* xxxii, in *Ps.* xl. (M. xiv, 1082). Fidei non praejudicant opes: si tamen uti opibus noverimus. Cf. *De Officiis*, II, 26, 132. (M. xvi, 138). Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.* iii, 8.

Fathers regarding earthly possessions. Like all the gifts of God they had their uses. They were desirable not in themselves but because they might be made a source of justification. "If riches are a mere means of unrighteousness," says Basil, "woe to the rich man! If they minister to virtue, there is no room for envy, since the common advantages proceeding from them are open to all, unless anyone out of superfluity of wickedness, envies himself his own good things."⁶⁰ To the wicked riches are an impediment, to the good they are an aid;⁶¹ those who know not how to use them are reprobate by the sentence of God Himself.⁶² Provided men were humble and just, there was no difference in the eyes of God between the rich and poor.⁶³ "Let those of you," says Augustine, "who boast of your poverty, beware of pride, lest the humble rich surpass you: beware of impiety, lest the pious rich surpass you: beware of drunkenness lest the sober rich surpass you. Do not glory of your poverty, if they must not glory of their riches."⁶⁴

While the Fathers thus defended the possession and legitimate enjoyment of riches, they were equally firm in their opposition to luxury and extravagance, to the selfish worship of mammon which saw in the possession of wealth only a means to selfish enjoyment.⁶⁵ To spend money foolishly on the collection of works of art, on clothing and fine houses, on silver services, and gold ornaments, in the purchase of slaves and lands, etc., was regarded as sinful and unchristian.⁶⁶ Equally reprehensible was the practice of acquiring wealth by means of oppression and injustice. Basil compares the rich of his time to the voracious fishes who devoured the smaller members of their own species. "We mortals," he says, "do not act otherwise when we oppress our inferiors; what difference is

⁶⁰ *Hom. xi, De Invid.*

⁶¹ Ambrose, *Exp. Ev. Luc. viii, 85.* (M. xv, 1791). *Nam divitiae ut impedimenta improbis, ita in bonis sunt adjumenta virtutis.*

⁶² *Ibid.*, v, 69. (M. xv, 1654).

⁶³ Ambrose, *Enarr. v, in Ps. xlviii.* (M. xiv, 1157).

⁶⁴ *Sermo. lxxxv, 2.* See Greg. Naz., *Orat. xiv, 34.* (M. xxxv, 904).

⁶⁵ Greg. Naz., *Orat. ix, 18.* (M. xxxv, 881).

⁶⁶ Athanasius, *Frag. in Matt.* (M. xxvii, 1371). Basil, *In Divit.*, vii.

there between the fish (who has consumed his fellows) and the man who, impelled by devouring greed, swallows the weak in the folds of his insatiable avarice. We incessantly move the ancient landmarks which our fathers have set, we encroach, we add house to house, field to field to enrich ourselves at the expense of our neighbor."⁶⁷ Property unjustly acquired was a badge of shame to its owner.⁶⁸

Thus on all points concerning property and wealth the Fathers offered a coherent and fully consistent system, based not on economic considerations but on the requirements of the gospel. They made God the possessor, and because men, the trustees, were children of God, they were brethren and entitled through charity to a share in those things which were created for the common benefit of all. More clearly than their pagan neighbors they located the causes of the prevailing social and economic misery, and they did not hesitate to affirm, even in the face of universal ruin, that in the Christian religion was to be found the source of renewed strength and security. "Let those," says Augustine, "who say that the doctrine of Christ is incompatible with the state's well being, give us an army composed of soldiers, such as the doctrine of Christ requires them to be; let them give us such subjects, such husbands and wives, such parents and children, such masters and servants, such kings, such judges—in fine even such taxpayers and taxgatherers, as the Christian religion has taught that men should be, and then let them dare to say that it is adverse to the state's well-being; yea, rather, let them no longer hesitate to confess that this doctrine if it were obeyed, would be the salvation of the commonwealth."⁶⁹

The assumption that the Fathers were advocates of Communism and opposed to the retention of property in the hands of individuals is based on certain texts taken principally from the writings of SS. Basil, Chrysostom, Jerome and Ambrose. The

⁶⁷ Hexaemeron, VII, 4.

⁶⁸ Ambrose, *Exp. Ev. Sec. Luc.* IV, 53. (M. XV, 1628). Greg. Naz., *Orat.* XIV, 34. (M. XXXV, 904.) Jerome, in *Jer.* XVII, II, (M. XXIV, 790). *Ep.* LXXII, 4.

⁶⁹ *Ep.* CXXXVIII, 15.

principal texts used to support this contention are the following. Basil in answer to the question, What wrong do I do, if I keep what is mine, says:

“Tell me then what is thine? Whence did you receive it? Did you bring it into the world with you? As one who takes a seat in a theatre, and would exclude all others claiming as his what belongs to all, so are the the rich, who seize what is common for all, and through prior-possession (*πρόληψιν*) make it their own. If everyone took only what was sufficient for his wants and left to those in need what was over and above, there would be no rich and no poor. Werc you not naked from your mother’s womb? and will you not return naked to the earth? Whence therefore came your present possessions? If you say from Fate you are blasphemous, because you do not acknowledge the Creator nor give thanks to the Giver. But if you say, from God, give a reason why you have received them. Is God so unjust as to have distributed unequally the necessities of life. Why are you rich and another poor? Is it not that you may receive the reward of generosity and faithful stewardship, and that he may be rewarded for patience? You gather all things through your insatiable greed, and think you harm no one although you rob many. . . . Should not he be called a robber who could have clothed others and failed to do so? To the hungry belongs the bread you keep: to the naked the robe you have stored away: to the unshod the shoes which are rotting in your house: to the needy the silver you have buried. Therefore to as many as you could give, you do an injustice.”⁷⁰

From Chrysostom the principal passage is:

“Tell me, then, whence art thou rich? From whom didst thou receive it, and from whom he who trans-

⁷⁰ In *Luc.* xi, 18, 7. (M. xxxi, 276).

mitted it to thee? From his father and his grandfather. But canst thou, ascending through many generations, show the acquisition just? It cannot be. The root and origin of it must have been injustice. Why? Because God in the beginning made not one man rich and another poor. Nor did He afterwards take and show to one treasures of gold, and deny to the other the right of searching for it. But He left the earth free to all alike. Why then, if it is common, have you so many acres of land, while your neighbor has not a portion of it? It was transmitted to me by my father, and by whom to him? By his forefathers. But you must go back and find the original owner. Jacob had wealth, but it was earned as the hire of his labors.

"But I will not urge this argument too closely. Let your riches be justly gained, and without rapine. For you are not responsible for the covetous acts of your father; your wealth may be derived from rapine, but you were not the plunderer. Or granting that he did not obtain it by robbing, that his gold was cast up somewhere out of the earth. What then? Is wealth therefore good? By no means. At the same time it is not bad, if its possessor be not covetous; it is not bad, if it be distributed to the poor, otherwise it is bad, it is ensnaring. . . . why is it, that there is never a dispute about a market place? Is it not because it is common to all? But about a house, and about property, men are always disputing. Things necessary are set before us in common; but even in the least things we do not observe a community. Yet those greater things He hath opened freely to all, that we might thence be instructed to have these inferior things in common."⁷¹

Many passages are quoted from St. Ambrose in support of the

⁷¹ *Hom. I, Tim. XII, 7. (M. LXII, 563, 564). Hom. on Acts, XI. (M. LX, 96).*

view that he favored a communistic form of society. The following are the more striking:

"Nature has poured forth all things for all men for common use. God has ordered all things to be produced, so that there should be food in common to all, and that the earth should be a common possession for all. Nature, therefore, has produced a common right for all, usurpation has made it a private right (*natura igitur jus commune generavit, usurpatio jus fecit privatum*).⁷² The Lord God wished the earth to be the common possession of all, and its fruits to sustain all; but avarice has distributed the rights of possession (*possessionum jura*). It is just therefore if you claim anything as a private possession, that you give something to the poor, and thus not deny sustenance to those to whom you owe a share of your right (*juris tui consortium*).⁷³

You do not give to the poor what is yours, but what is His, (*de suo reddit*). For you have claimed as your own, what was given for the common use of all. The earth belongs to all, not to the rich alone. Those who do not enjoy it are fewer than those who do. Consequently you are paying a debt not bestowing a gratuity.⁷⁴

St. Jerome, despite his extreme asceticism, offers few passages that would give any ground for suspecting him of communism. Answering a certain Hedibia, who wrote to him from Gaul to ask how can perfection be attained and how a widow without many children ought to live. He said:

Since you have few children, make to yourself friends of the mammon of iniquity, that they may receive you into everlasting dwellings. Aptly did He say of iniquity: all riches come from iniquity, and unless one

⁷² *De Officiis*, I, 28, 132. (M. XVI, 62).

⁷³ In *Ps.* 118, *Exp.* VIII, 22. (M. XV, 1303).

⁷⁴ *De Nabuthe*, XII, 53. (M. XIV, 747).

lost another could not find. Hence the common saying seems very true: the rich man is wicked or the son of a wicked man.⁷⁵

There are no other passages in the works of St. Jerome which are worthy of quotation as containing anything like communistic sentiments. He seems to have had a special liking for the phrase he quoted to the widow Hedibia, for it occurs in two other places in his writings, in neither of which does he say from whom it was taken.⁷⁶ Its source is still unknown.⁷⁷

These extracts represent practically all that the Socialistic writers, by careful gleaning of the works of the Fathers, have to offer in support of their views. How small the return is, can be seen from the fact that, in the edition of Migne, the works of Basil fill four quarto volumes (P. G. xxix-xxxii): those of Chrysostom eighteen volumes (xlvi-lxiv): those of Ambrose four volumes (xiv-xvii): those of Jerome nine (xxii-xxx). It need scarcely be said, that, if the Fathers entertained communistic views in regard to wealth and property, their writings would not be so barren of evidence of such opinions. For this reason and especially because of the fragmentary and misleading manner in which the Fathers are sometimes quoted, it seemed advisable to give the passages *in extenso*. A careful study of these extracts fails to reveal any proof that the Fathers favored Communism or Socialism. In the first place the question of private ownership is never raised. What the Fathers refer to is not the title but the use, not ownership, but enjoyment. In Basil the point at issue is merely in regard to superfluities: in Chrysostom that of just acquirement. He finds no fault with property, pro-

⁷⁵ Ep. 120, 1. (M. xxii, 983). *Dives aut iniquus aut iniqui haeres*. Nitti, *Catholic Socialism*, p. 69, quotes St. Jerome as saying opulence is always the result of theft, if not committed by the actual possessor, then by his predecessors. As no reference is given, it is fair to conclude, that Nitti considered his words a fair rendering of the saying quoted by St. Jerome.

⁷⁶ In *Habacuc.* iii, 7. (M. xxv, 1316). In *Jer.* v, 26. (M. xxiv, 719).

⁷⁷ Funk, *Kirchengesch. Abhand. und Untersuch.* iii, 151.

vided it be "justly gained." In fact he might even be accused of laxity, in reassuring those whose property was acquired by plunder, on the ground that they were not the plunderers. Ambrose, it is clear, did not refer to community of possession, but to community of enjoyment of the necessities of life, and Jerome's half-hearted endorsement of a current phrase may pass for rhetorical exaggeration.

In the second place, the statements quoted above refer not to riches and property, in general, but to the possessions of the rich to whom the Fathers addressed themselves. Officially, the bishops were the protectors of the poor, and circumstances were forcing them into the position of *Defensores Civitatum*,⁷⁸ and hence it is not surprising that they should, at times, have been vigorous in their denunciation of the rich whose aggressions had increased the miseries of the poor and pauperised the middle class.

Furthermore, they were fully justified in protesting against the absolute idea of property which then prevailed, and which admitted neither limitations nor responsibility in the owner. The *jus utendi et abutendi* of the pagans could not be maintained in face of the Christian doctrine of fraternal charity. Whether the Fathers viewed the responsibility of the rich towards the poor as one of charity or justice, need not be discussed. They were positive and uncompromising in their attitude that no man should retain what was superfluous, if others were in actual want. This was the only communism of which they were guilty, the communism which entitles all men to a share in the love of their fellows, and through that to a share in the things necessary for life, of which, some, as trustees of the Creator, were the proprietors. In addition the Fathers were devoted to the ascetical idea, and were not always careful to distinguish between what was of precept and what of counsel. Chrysostom himself confesses to this failing. "I know not," he says, "how I have been carried into such a transport in speaking such words as these unto men who think it a great

⁷⁸ Among the duties of the *Defensores* was: *plebem tantum vel Decuriones ab omni improborum insolentia et temeritate tueantur. Cod. Theod. i, 11, 2.*

thing to impart but ever so little of their own. Wherefore let these my words have been spoken to the perfect. But to the more imperfect, this is what we may say, Give of what you have unto the needy." ⁷⁰

Enough has been said regarding the doctrines of the Fathers to show that deductions from their words regarding the duties of property are not valid arguments that they denied its rights. Basil, while he denounces the uncharitable rich can also find words of praise for the wealthy who share their goods with the poor.⁸⁰ Chrysostom assured his hearers in Antioch that wealth is not forbidden, if it be used for that which is necessary.⁸¹ He disposes of the idea of a communistic state, saying: "that we may live securely, the sources of our existence have been made common. On the other hand, to the end that we may have an opportunity of gaining crowns and good report, property has not been made common: in order that by hating covetousness, and following after righteousness, and freely bestowing our goods upon the poor, we may by this method obtain a certain kind of relief for our sins." ⁸² Ambrose asserts that crimes should not be attributed to property, but to those who do not know how to use it:⁸³ and Jerome expresses the belief that: "his wealth need not stand in the way of the rich man, if he makes a good use of it; and poverty can be no recommendation to the poor if in the midst of squalor and want he fails to keep clear of wrong doing."⁸⁴

From the actions as well as the words of the Fathers it is clear that they based their opinions regarding economic relations on the general principle of the innate dignity of human nature. Through this common possession all men were in a certain degree equal, and entitled, in those things necessary for the proper maintenance of life, to a just share of the fruits of

⁷⁰ *I Ep. ad Cor. Hom.* xv, 15.

⁸⁰ *De Inv.* (M. xxxi, 384).

⁸¹ *Hom. on Statutes*, II, 14.

⁸² *Ibid.*, II, 20. See also *Hom. on Matt.* xxi, 1. *Ep. ad Corint. Hom.* xiii, 5.

⁸³ *Ep. Ev. Luc.* viii, 85.

⁸⁴ *Ep.* lxxix, 1.

the earth. The main purpose of human existence was to attain salvation: to this all other considerations were secondary and subordinate. Because they were human, men were viewed as forming one family, united in the strongest bonds of fraternal love, and thus constrained to mutual aid and protection. Compared with the destiny appointed for them in Heaven the best the earth could offer was looked on as worthless. Injustice and rapacity were equally opposed to man's earthly privileges and supernatural end. Worldly possessions were valuable only in proportion as they aided in securing a heavenly reward. This reward came to those who looked on what they owned as a trust, and administered it in the way prescribed by the gospel, thus gaining the intercession of the needy and the approval of Him in Whose name they acted. This relative character of property did not destroy the true idea of ownership, nor did it transfer the title from the individual to the community. The best interests of religion were not to be attained in a communistic or collectivist form of society, but in a social condition which offered opportunities of mutual succor and care, through subordination of offices as well as possessions.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

AN IRISH HOMILY ON THE PASSION: TEXT AND TRANSLATION.

This text, now published and translated for the first time, is found in two manuscripts, that of Rennes, and the Eger-ton 1781, in the British Museum. The ms. kept in the Library of Rennes, Brittany, contains 125 folios dating from three different periods. It begins with the Irish translation of the "*De Contemptu Mundi sive de Miseriis Humanae Conditionis*," composed, says Dottin, to whose article (*Rev. Celt.*, xv, pp. 80 ff.) we are indebted for the larger part of this account of the ms., "by Innocent III., and to be found in Migne, *Pat. Lat.* T. 217, col. 701-746." This identification, given without any proof, is doubtful, to say the least. The ms. contains, besides, homilies on various subjects, among them on the Blessed Virgin, the Passion of Our Lord, His Resurrection and Confession. There are also collections of texts from the Fathers, on Patience, Charity, the Pains of Hell, etc; a version in Irish (published by Whitley Stokes in *Zeitschrift für Celtische Philologie*, II, p. 1 and ff.) of the voyage of Sir John Maundeville, and a treatise entitled, *Teanga Bithnua*, the "Ever-New Tongue," (published by G. Dottin, *Revue Celtique*, xxiv, p. 365 ff.) . The second section consists of a life of St. Colman soon to be published by Kuno Meyer. The third section contains the Dinn-Senchas, a collection of legends in prose and verse on the place-names of Ireland.

Several notes by different hands give us good reason to believe that the ms. was written in Ireland, and about the XIV century. It was in the possession of President de Robien in 1753. At that time it was referred to two learned Benedictines, (Dom Tassin and Dom Toutain), who were unable to make anything of it, but knew that it was written in Irish. They were better informed in this respect than a later compiler, the author of the Catalogue of Manuscripts in the Library of Cambrai, who declared several Irish glosses in

a Latin homily by Alberic, Bishop of Arras, to be remnants of the old tongue of the Gauls. The question naturally arises, as to how this Irish ms. came to be found in the library of the President de Robien which brings up a very interesting and little studied chapter in Irish and Breton history. It was probably brought over by one of the many Irishmen who sought the protection of France during the troubled periods of struggle between the Irish and the English in Ireland. A writer in the *Annales de Bretagne*, vol. ix, pp. 524 ff., M. Paul Parfouru, in an article entitled "Les Irlandais en Bretagne, XVII et XVIII siècles," tells us that the emigration of the Irish into Brittany began in the XVI century. In 1678, an Irish College was founded at Nantes. Some doubt having arisen during the Seven Years War as to whether the Irish dwelling in Brittany were to be considered English citizens, a petition was circulated by the Irish residents of Nantes in which they maintained that they had always been treated in France as French citizens, and that the English were their hereditary enemies. This petition shows us the occupations of these Irish exiles: Sea captains, army officers, physicians, merchants and teachers. The Irish College had then 55 priests and students.

Cooper's Report contains a notice of our ms. Dr. Todd, in the *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*, vol. i, pt. 1, gave the first precise account of it, and Stokes mentions it in an article in *The Academy*. Probably basing his assertion on the title of the Homily, *Passio Christi secundum Bernardum*, Dottin attributed the authorship to St. Bernard, and identified the work with the "*Liber de Passione Christi et doloribus et planctibus matris ejus*," published in Migne, *Pat. Lat.* T. 182, cols. 1133-1142. A comparison of the two texts shows no relation whatever. A search made through all the passages of St. Bernard's writings indexed under the word, "*Passio*," failed to produce any text resembling in the least the one here ascribed to St. Bernard. Possibly some other Bernard may have been confused with the Saint. The author of a "*De Contemptu Mundi*," namely Bernard de Cluny, may have written our Homily. Considerable confusion exists on the identification of

the several Bernards who lived in the XII century. For example, some identify Bernard of Cluny, also called of Morlaix, with Bernard of Pisa who became Pope Eugene IV. It is just possible that this Homily is nothing more than a collection of texts brought together by someone and afterwards ascribed to St. Bernard. At any rate, we are not yet able to settle the question of its authorship.

While the literary value of our text may even be below the average of Irish works of this kind, and its language not always correct, it is here printed in the belief that all the unpublished material of this nature should be edited. No less a scholar than the late Professor Atkinson laid great stress on the utility of such publications as these. From a linguistic point of view, they are very valuable, for they offer the best introduction to the language and literature of Medieval Ireland, and their importance has only recently been recognized by linguists, theologians and church historians. It is much to be hoped that others may be encouraged to take a hand in exploring this little-worked field, and in putting this material at the disposition of scholars. Until all the compositions of this class are examined and studied no final judgment can be passed as to the intrinsic value of this mass of Irish ecclesiastical literature. It may be worth noting that in the popular Gaelic literature of Ireland poems on the Passion are not infrequent. One, containing numerous passages closely resembling some in our Homily, has been published by Mr. P. H. Pearse in the *Claidh-eamh Soluis*, Sept. 24, 1904 (not October, as given by Mr. Pearse, in a reprint and translation of the poem, in *The Irish Review*, March 1911). A somewhat similar poem entitled "The Keening of the Three Marys" will be found in Douglas Hyde's collection "*The Religious Songs of Connacht*," vol. I, p. 130.

The text is printed without change (except for the italics, which represent the filling up of abbreviations) from a photographic copy of the Rennes ms. in the possession of the Catholic University, and the footnotes give the more important variants from the Egerton ms. The translation has been made to keep as close as possible to the original.

TEXT.

(fo 31d) *Pasio Christi secundum Bernardum* .i. mar adeir Bernard
 næm ar-páis Christ .i. fech ana¹-agaid Ísa sa¹-croich césta 7-doge-
 bair² a-tæb³ ar-na-tollad⁴ 7-a-druim ar na-sciúirsad 7-a-cenn ar-na
 tollad (o fhiacclaibh na coiroine 7 a-lamha 7-a-chosa ar na-tollad)⁵ o-na
 clódaib 7-indtóg⁶ 7-athindtóg⁶ an-cuirpD. næmta sin 6 tæb co tæb
 7-6 baithis⁷ co a-bonn 7-ní⁸ faicfir⁸ æn-ní⁸ and acht-crechta 7-galar
 7-adeir Bernard: A-Ísa bennaigti¹⁰ is-milis t-centa¹¹ dona-dæinib
 óir is-mór 7-is-achfaindech do-tidhlaicis¹² tú fein dóib 7-is-trom 7-is-
 gruama¹³ do-césadh trithu tú 7-is-truadh 7-is-ro¹⁴-truadh gruam-
 dacht¹⁴ peine¹⁵ na-croiche duit 7-adeir Bernard: A-duine féch¹⁶
 a-t-menmain¹⁶ cá mé¹⁶ do-dlghfedhtea¹⁷ do-tabairt don-tigerna do-
 fulaing¹⁸ na-dochar-sin¹⁹ do-t-cind²⁰ co-foighidech 7-cuimnidh ant-
 allus fola docuir se de ac-guidhi do-t-cind 7-dortad a-fola in²¹ a-
 dfaidh²²-sin 7-na-haithiside²³ examla (fo 32a) do-fhulsaing²⁴ o-n-
 popul fudaiddhi²⁵ 7-an-coroin spine²⁶ ac-a-hullmugad cuigi 7-briatra
 sgigemla na n-iubul²⁷ ac-a-tabairt cuigi ac-gairm rí-g-de²⁸ 7 ac-cur
 na-croiche ar-a-hancairib .i. na-hinad comnaide docum²⁹ a-césta 7-
 hé³⁰ cengailti do pilér ac-eistecht briatra³¹ na-n-iubul .i.³² ac-a-rád³³
 ris crochaidh crochaidh hé 7-olcus na-n-oilemna do-hullmuighthe dó
 .i. aigeit 7-domblas aóí³⁴ 7-cach³⁵-ní-ele doni'd digbal³⁶ don corp
 áoenna 7-an-tittal mór-clúach do-cuired³⁷ air .i. Ísa naserda³⁸ rí-
 na-n-iubul 7-grandcor ac-a-cur ar a-étach ac-lucht a-césta 7-mórán
 examlacht³⁹ oifici báis ac-an-ullmugad chuici 7-adeir⁴⁰ Adeir⁴⁰ Bernard
 næm curab⁴¹-decair⁴² do-nech druis do-denam fan coroin spine oir
 atat lamhanna fa-tlaimhaib-si⁴³ 7-coroin spine fa-cenn ChristD.co⁴⁴-
 marthanach⁴⁵. Adeir⁴⁶ Bernard næm curab gruama do-foibred⁴⁷ do-
 corp, a-Christ don-tæb amuich 7-curab⁴⁸ truad⁴⁹ domter don-tæb
 astigh ac-a-comcesadh maille riut. 7 adeir Augustin a-lebar na hogh-
 achta fechaid⁵⁰ crechta an césaidh 7-creitidh géiti cro na-heisergi

¹ in-aighi ar Ísa crochda isin. Cf. below, fo 32.

² dogebha.

³ a-tæbh, Eg., in margin, R.

⁴ fuiliugad.

⁵ Eg.

⁶ innto 7 aithinnto.

⁷ baithius.

⁸ faicfer.

¹⁰ ro-maith.

¹¹ h-senta.

¹² tidhliucius.

¹³ gruamdha.

¹⁴ ri-truaighe 7 nis-ro-truaighe gruamdhaht.

¹⁵ pian.

¹⁶ do-suilbh t-inntinne.

TRANSLATION.

The Passion of Christ according to Bernard. Thus says Bernard concerning the Passion of Christ: "Behold Jesus on the cross of suffering, and his side will be found to be pierced, and his back scourged, and his head perforated by the thorns of the crown and his hands and feet pierced by the nails, and the tossing and re-tossing of his sacred body from side to side." And from crown to sole nothing will be visible there but wounds and sores. And Bernard says: "O blessed Jesus, sweet is thy union to man, for freely and abundantly didst Thou bestow Thyself on him, and yet heavily and sadly didst Thou suffer at his hands, and wretched, wretched indeed for Thee was the horror of the suffering on the cross.

And Bernard says: "O man, consider in thy mind how much thou shouldst give to the Lord for having undergone those torments patiently for thy sake, and remember the bloody sweat which came from Him, praying for thee; and his blood that was shed afterwards, and the various insults which He bore at the hands of the Jewish people; and the crown of thorns which was prepared for Him, and the derisive words of the Jews which were hurled at Him hailing Him as King, and the setting up of the cross on its anchors, that is, in its resting place, for his crucifixion; and Him bound to a pillar, listening to the shouts of the Jews, crying out at Him, "Crucify, crucify Him"; and the poorness of the food that was got ready for Him, even vinegar and gall, and everything else that does hurt to the human body; and the

¹⁷ do-dlighfeá do-thobairt.

¹⁸ do-doinib.

¹⁹ haithisi.

²⁰ iubulta.

²¹ na-n-iubul ris.

²² cum.

²³ briatra ndiubulta na n-iubul.

²⁴ se.

²⁵ docuredar.

²⁶ d-examlacht.

²⁷ nach alainn.

²⁸ Omitted in *Eg.*

²⁹ do-foidhre.

³⁰ fech.

³¹ na-dochair-so.

³² ad-diaidh.

³³ do-fulaing se.

³⁴ abine.

³⁵ a-righ dhe.

³⁶ é fen.

^{37,38} Omitted in *Eg.*

³⁹ gach lictubair ele doni dibail.

⁴⁰ nasardha.

⁴¹ sic MS.

⁴² fod-lamhaib-si.

⁴³ oir adeir.

⁴⁴ gur truagh.

7-fechaid an-fuil do-bí g-ar cennach 7-fechaid an-lúach dob-aíl do fagail do-chind na fola¹ 7-smuainidh² so a-meidhD.-tomaís na derci 7-tabraid gradh³ dona-neichib-so⁴ indus corab a-figar⁵ an-ar-craidedaib⁶ mar dobf⁷-sin na-fidair isin croich tar-ar-ceand-si⁸ 7 Adeir Job^{9a} isin vii cabidil nar-pecaig ar-slanaigteoir⁶ ac-techt dar-cennach 7-cur¹-imcuir sé ana-umla fein serui ar-pecaig-ne 7-troma ar-caire⁶ 7-é-fein can caire.⁶ Adeir⁶ Bernard mar-fechaim an-aged¹⁰ Christ sa-croich do-cíter dam cur-caoi-sé 7-fiarfaigim dít a-I'sa ro-milis¹¹ cidh¹² imar-caódis¹³ 7-cur-córa subachus¹⁴ do-denam na-caói o-do-oibrigis sláinti am-bolgan na-talman dona-cinedechaib¹⁴ 7-cur-si'nis ar-pecaidh-ne ris-an crand¹⁵ césta ac-damnad¹⁶ an-diabail 7-ac-slanugad in domain 7¹⁷-aire-sin bud¹⁷ lór do-slanugad in¹⁸-domain do páisi¹⁹ 7 Adeir Béta ar²⁰ Lúcas suiscealach²¹ an-faicenn tú béodacht mi'-trocairech an-popuil iubultaid²² ac-tabairt^{23a} imat²³ bás ndocraid don-tigerna nem-uurchóidech .i.²⁴ ac-a (fo 32b) crochad iter da-gattaide²⁵ 7-ac-cengal a²⁶-lamh 7-a-chos²⁶ don crand césta 7-ac-tabairt²⁷ báis dó²⁷ co-hopann 7-do choimett seisin²⁸ a-spiratt²⁹ sa-croich tamall can bás do-fagail 7-ní-do-grad tsægail³⁰ do³¹-fein. D-sin³² acht do métugud ar-slanti-ne and fein co-martanach.³³ 7 Adeir Jeoronimus cindus fétus nech siubacas do-denam 7³⁴-cin dera do-dortad an-tan smuaines slegh an-doill³⁵ do-oslacud tseib ant-slanaigteora³⁶ 7 Adeir Augustin 7 Gregoir a-moralibus nar-gab dfa on-a-mac diles³⁷ do-bí can-cair can-a-cur tar-cenn ar-caire-ne ós-indaínd dobf³⁸ an³⁹-cair co-mór. 7⁴⁰ Adeir Bernard curab ard do-fulaing Christ a-crochad sa-croich docum⁴⁰ a-faicsina do-cach sán⁴¹ 7-is-ard an-comarc do-rindi sé ac-iarrad fortachta ar⁴²-an-athir⁴³ duinne 7-do-doirt dera imda⁴⁴ mar-eisimplair don duine do-denam aithrigi co-buan marthanach⁴⁵ 7-a⁴⁶ Adeir Bernard do-foillsig Christ a-tseib duit a-duine do⁴⁶ leigen a-ruin riut⁴⁵ 7-da-gradugad mar-do-gradaig se tú 7-do-foillsigud

¹ na-fola-sin.² smuintigh.⁴ a-figur-so-in-bur-craidibh.⁵ dobf si-sin in-a-figur isin croich tar-bur cenn-si.^{9a} The reference to Job is a gross error, surely due to an omission on the part of the copyist who is perhaps quoting from a commentary on Job.⁶ slanacidh.⁷ do.⁸ do-gab se cugi gin gu-roibh cair ann fen.⁹ 7 adeir.¹⁰ ina aiged ar Crist.¹¹ ro-milis ar se.¹² cad far caidhius.¹³ forbailteus.¹⁴ don.cinedhach.¹⁵ croith.¹⁶ damnugad.¹⁷ gurub aire-sin a-tiagerna budh.¹⁸ ar-in.¹⁹ do-chesadh sa a-t-senar.²⁰ Beda.

much celebrated title that was given Him, to wit; "Jesus of Nazareth, King of the Jews"; and the lots that his tormentors cast for his garments; and the many forms of the infliction of death which were prepared for Him." And Saint Bernard says that "it is difficult for one to be guilty of lust when under the crown of thorns, for there are gloves on thy hands and a crown of thorns on the head of Christ forever."

Saint Bernard says that fiercely was thy body assailed, O Christ, from without, and bitterly did it suffer from within, since both ways didst Thou suffer. And Augustine says in his book on Virginity; "Behold the wounds of the Crucifixion, and believe in the spears of blood of the Resurrection, and see the blood that redeemed us, and behold the reward which He was pleased to receive for that blood, and consider the measure wherewith He dispensed charity, and show love for these things, in order that this image may be in our hearts, as that love was manifested on the cross for our sakes."

And Job says in the seventh chapter, that our Saviour did not sin in coming to redeem us, but that He humbled Himself, and bore the bitterness of our sins and the weight of our offenses, although He Himself was blameless. Bernard says: "When I look at Christ on the cross, it seems to me that He weeps, and I ask Thee, O most sweet Jesus, why weepest Thou? It would be more fitting to rejoice than to weep, for Thou hast wrought healing unto the very bowels of the earth for the nations; and Thou didst spread out our sins on the tree of torment, confounding the devil, and

²¹ suisigel.

²² tobairt.

²³ *da* omitted in *Eg.*, *gadethibh.*

²⁴ *basugad.*

²⁵ *spiret.*

²⁶ *Sic, Eg.* The *ms.* of Rennes originally had *dom* which a later hand has corrected to *do*.

²⁷ Omitted in *Eg.*

²⁸ Omitted in *Eg.*

²⁹ *slainicidh.*

³⁰ *dobi si.*

³¹ *cum.*

³² *fortacht* in *athar.*

³³ *cum-a-cuimnich duinne 7-cum-aitrighe do-denum dorer arn isimlaradh.*

³⁴ *Sic, ms.*

³⁵ *iubulta.*

³⁶ *examlacht bais.*

³⁷ *a-chos 7-a-lam.*

³⁸ *si-sin.*

³⁹ *aimsir seagulta.*

⁴⁰ Omitted in *Eg.*

⁴¹ Omitted in *Eg.*

⁴² *dail.*

⁴³ *dilus nech.*

⁴⁴ Omitted in *Eg.*

⁴⁵ *sen duine.*

⁴⁶ *arna-foslugudh do-tobairt fesa ruin duit.*

crechta a-chos¹ 7-a-lam² *ar-in-adbarr cétna*. Adeir Ambrocíus cach³ comrad ata ar-césad Christ curab-gruamda serb⁴ hé⁵ docum⁶ an-duine do-chainéad a-pecad fein⁷ 7-ní-dlegur⁸ sólás corpdo do-beth a-timcill a-leghta 7-Adeir Augustín nach ail le-Día an-popul do-roind acht a-mbeth aici an-a-ænur ós-an-a-ænur⁹ do-cendaig¹⁰ iat 7-adeir fós curab díles do cumniugad páisi Christ dortad der¹¹ 7-craidhi¹² do-nertugad 7-gruaidi do-fluichad 7-corp do-anmfandugad¹³ Adeir Augustín¹⁴ ó-césad¹⁵ Christ do¹⁶ congmail a-t-craidhi¹⁷ co-hindrech¹⁸ cuimnech ní-fuil cair da-troma gabus¹⁹ nert ort²⁰ 7-teithead cach uile peacad uait co-himlán²¹ Adeir Bernard curab²² imda césadh²³ tucad ar crist²⁴ arn-a-sanntugad on-díabal 7-arn-a-brath o-Iúdás 7-ac-fulang cach andlecht ele ar-lar nan Iubul. 7-ní-tabrad freagra orra 7-do-curtaidi césta air 7-do-beired sin solæit 7-do²⁵ beired slainti do-dæinib²⁶ 7-do-hullmuigte easlainte dó-fein²⁷ 7-doní'd²⁸ seanmóir²⁹ 7-ní hestide³⁰ ris 7-do-senmorad an-umla 7-do-beirtaighi freagrata dimsacha air 7-donsthi ithimrad air 7-ni-denadh (fo 32c) ithimradh ar-nech 7-adertaighi ris com-bi'd³¹ diablaidecht aici 7-do³² a-sgrisad andiablaidecht³³ 7-do-bered tidlaicti³⁴ amach 7-do-fuilnged aithisi³⁵ 7-doní'd³⁶ ar-rdamainti³⁷ ar na-lochtaib 7-do-daingniged na-nem-lochta 7 Do³⁸ glacadh hé fa-dered o-júbulaib³⁹ 7-do-claidhedar he mar-do-fetadar 7-do-cengladar hé 7-do-comgabadar do seiledhaib dó 7-do-sciúrsetar⁴⁰ hé⁴¹ 7-do-chomdamnadar hé iter-da⁴² gataigi sa⁴³ croich 7 do-fulaing⁴⁴ roime⁴⁵ sin cach cumgach⁴⁶ da⁴⁷ fuair⁴⁸ a-m-broind amatar 7-in-a-hucht 7-a-maindsér an-asail a-n-éaighib crina ar-na-caithem roime⁴⁹ o-dæinib bochta 7-ar-tethedh leis san-egept⁵⁰ 7-ar-fagail gorta ann-sa-fásach da-chuidechtain 7-ac⁵¹ fagail a-sænta⁵² sa-

¹ a-cosa.² a-lama.³ gac æn.⁴ iad.⁵ da-eisimlarudh don duine a-pecadh fen do-chaineth.⁶ ní do-dlegur.⁷ osa-in-a-ænar.⁸ do-cennaid se.⁹ dera do dortadh.¹⁰ gruaidhi do-fluichad 7-corp d-ainfainniugad 7 craidhi do-nertugad.¹¹ Augustín acso in-alánti .i. cesadh.¹² re.¹³ a-cridhi.¹⁴ co-hinnrech 7-a-suile co-cuimnech .i. ní fuil druis na dimus na-saint na cair ele gabus.¹⁵ isin cridhi a-cometecha cuimne cesta crist 7 co-teithinn gach uile cumachta peacaidh uadha 7.¹⁶ curob.¹⁷ examla ar-in tiagera nemhuurchoidech.¹⁸ dallmhuigh daine cum-slainti.¹⁹ fein, omitted in *Eg*.²⁰ doni.²¹ senmoir 7 dobereth thecusc 7 ni-heisti.²² bi.²³ eisen a-sgrisad na-ndíabal.²⁴ tidhluice.²⁵ aithis.

saving the world; and for this reason thy Passion would be sufficient to heal the world." And Bede says, commenting on the Evangelist Luke: "Dost thou see the pitiless rigor of the Jewish people, inflicting a multitude of horrible deaths on the innocent Lord, even crucifying Him between two thieves, and binding his hands and feet to the tree of torture, and putting Him to death straightway? And yet, He kept his spirit a while on the cross without dying; and not out of love of the world for Himself did He do this, but to increase our healing in it forever."

And Jerome says: "How can one rejoice, and not rather shed tears, when he thinks of the spear of the blind man opening the Saviour's side?" And Augustine says, and Gregory, too, in "Moralibus," that God did not accept satisfaction from His own Son, who was sinless, without first sending Him to suffer because of our sins, since great was our guilt. And Bernard says, that Christ suffered his Crucifixion high on the cross, in order to make Himself visible to every one, and loud was the cry He made, when calling on his Father for help for us; and He shed many tears as an example to man to do lasting, persevering penance. And Bernard says: "Christ laid open his side to thee, O man, to place his affection before thee, that He might be loved as He loves thee; for the same reason He showed the wounds of his feet and hands."

Ambrose says that every discourse concerning the Passion of Christ should be gloomy and sad, to the end that man may mourn his sins; and likewise, that bodily comfort should be absent when reading of it. And Augustine says: "It pleaseth not God to divide the people, but that they should be as one with Him, since it is as one He redeemed them." And he says further, that it is fitting when one is mindful of the Passion of Christ to shed tears, and to strengthen the heart, to wet the cheeks, and to weaken the flesh. Augustine says: "By keeping the suffering of Christ rightly in thy heart, remember, there is no sin, however grievous, that will gain strength over thee, but every sin will leave thee entirely."

²⁷ doni.

²⁸ argaminte.

²⁹ tareisi so uile do-glacadh o-iúbulaib é.

³⁰ docom-sgiursadar.

³¹ Omitted in *Eg.*

³² da, omitted in *Eg.*, gadaigib.

³³ isin croich mar is-mo do fétadar 7 do-fulaing.

³⁴ gach cumgach roime so.

³⁵ Omitted in *Eg.*

³⁶ o-dainibh ele bochta roime.

³⁷ ann-san eighipt.

³⁸ ar.

³⁹ a-senta do-fen ann-sa-tempoll.

tempul¹ ona-docturib² ainmfesach ac-tagra ris 7-hé eólach³ 7-ac-gabail poicci iúdás⁴ asariacht 7-hé ac-a-brath 7-ac-eistecht Petur⁵ ac-a-séna an-aimsir a-cesta 7-ac-fechain⁶ na-coroine spine ac⁷-a-hullmugaud cuigi 7-ac-faicsin⁸ an⁹ matail purpure uime¹⁰ sa pretuir .i. an-inad na-comurle¹¹ aingidi 7-ac-faicsin¹² clódha congmla a-ball¹³ san-inad re-n-aburar¹⁴ clauarie¹⁵ locus 7-an-aidhchib¹⁶ 7-a-láib¹⁷ 7¹⁸. an-anæidendacht 7-an-amacándacht ar-fed a-æisi¹⁹ ac-fulang dochar²⁰ 7²¹ cumgad duinne 6-lá²² a-genemna co-lá²³ a-césta 7²⁴ andliged ar corp-ne aici-sin²⁵ ac-a-fulang an-a-corp-fein. Oir²⁶ dob-imda dochar²⁷ 7-tribloid²⁸ ac Christ ac²⁹ a-fulang tar-ar-cenn-ne³⁰ co-bás na-croiche 7-adeir casidorus cret far æntaighetar na-hiubul bás do-tabairt³¹ don nech do-athbeógaig na-mairb 7-do-olsaie³² na-geimlena³³ do-pecachaib an-domain co-himlan 7-adeir Adeir³⁴ maighisder na-sdaire co³⁵-tairngidis cailgi na-coroine spine fuil chind ant-slánicid³⁶ ar fad a-cind³⁷ 7-a-droma 7³⁸ a-da-tæb³⁹ anúas 7-co-tairngidis ingne⁴⁰ cromad na-sgiursad⁴¹ croicend a-tæib 7-a-droma docum⁴² a-chind indus-cur comlí'nad⁴³ le-chele a-corp⁴⁴ do-braenaib 7-do-brointib fola techtaidti on-a-baithis conuici-a-bondaib 7-adeir (fo 32d) Adeir⁴⁵ Bernard curab mór do-gruamdacht do-fulaing Christ sa-crand césta tar-ar-cenn-ne indus cur-cennaigh⁴⁶ sé gradh⁴⁷ do-fagail uainne co-himar-crach⁴⁸ Adeir Ambrosius nar-fétad an-cined dænna do-chennach acht monbud mó umhla a-cennaig ina dimus a millti ar⁴⁹ tosach ríamh.⁵⁰ 7 Adeir Grigoir mona-fuilnged Christ pian an-mesarda⁵¹ ac-a-césad nach særfeti an-cined doenna 6-na-pianaib⁵² do-tuilledar ac-denam

¹ a-senta do-fen ann-sa-tempoll.

² docturachta.

³ iulmar.

⁴ iudais asariacht.

⁵ Peduir.

⁶ faicsin.

⁷ Omitted in *Eg.*

⁸ 7-in-matail purpair cuige 7-a-gabail na-purpaire uime.

⁹ comairle.

¹⁰ faicsin a-croithi 7 clodha a-ball do congmail.

¹¹ R., abur.

¹² clauaire locus cuigi.

¹³ an-aidhche 7-a-ló.

¹⁴ Omitted in *Eg.*

¹⁵ a-aisi 7-a-samreth 7-an-geimrad ac-fulang gac dochar.

¹⁶ 7-gac cumgaid.

¹⁷ lo.

¹⁸ 7-sæthar 7-docur 7-truaille ar ar-corp ndæna-ne aigi.

¹⁹ 7.

²⁰ triboloide dochraide.

²¹ da-fulang.

²² cenn-ne do-cinelaibh examla báis co-bas.

²³ tobairt.

²⁴ do-sgail.

²⁵ an-geimleth.

²⁶ Sic, ms.

²⁷ com gur tairngidar.

²⁸ in-tiagera.

²⁹ taibh.

³⁰ Omitted in *Eg.*

³¹ Omitted in *Eg.*

³² sgiursadh.

³³ cum.

³⁴ gur-linadar.

Bernard says that many were the sufferings inflicted on Christ in his temptation by the devil, and after his betrayal by Judas, and when enduring every other wrong amongst the Jews. And He gave no answer to them, but torments were inflicted upon Him; and while He brought solace and health to mankind, He procured ill-health for Himself; He preached, but He was not listened to; He taught humility, but received haughty answers; He was calumniated, but He did not calumniate anyone; He was told that He was possessed of devils, whereas He drove out the devils; He bestowed gifts, and bore reproaches; He defended the accused and fortified the innocent. Finally He was seized by the Jews, and they overpowered Him, since they were able to do so, and they tied Him and fastened Him with ropes and they scourged Him, and bound Him between two thieves on the cross.

Before that, He suffered every distress, in the womb of His Mother and on her breast; and in the manger of the ass, clad in old garments that had been worn out by poor men before Him; and her flight into Egypt with Him; and the hunger she endured to accompany Him in the desert; and receiving denials in the temple from the ignorant doctors who were arguing with Him who was full of wisdom; and accepting the kiss of Judas Iscariot, who was betraying him, and giving ear to Peter who was denying Him at the time of His suffering; and looking on the crown of thorns as they were getting it ready for Him; and beholding the mantle of purple that was about Him in the pretorium, that is, in the place of evil counsel; and in the place which is called *Calvariae locus*, looking upon the nails that were to fasten his limbs.

Night and day He experienced inhospitality and ill-treatment during the course of His life, enduring ills and tortures for our sakes from the day of His birth to the day of His Passion, and suffering the unrighteousness of our bodies. For, many were the trials and tribulations which Christ had to suffer for our sakes, even unto death on the cross. And Cassiodorus says: "Why did the Jews unite to inflict death on Him who brought the dead back to life, and loosed the fetters of the sinners of the whole world?"

²⁵ Omitted in *Eg.*

²⁶ *Sic*, *ms.*

²⁷ *cenneth.*

²⁸ *co-dlistinach mor gradhach gradh duthrachtach d-fagbail o-craidhi na daine 7.*

²⁹⁻³¹ Omitted in *Eg.*

³² *mi-dlistinach.*

³³ *pianarbh dlistinacha.*

an¹-pecaig² 7 Adeir fós an³-gein bett beó cuimneochat⁴ mé⁵ ant-
 sæthar fuair *Christ* tar⁶-mo-cend⁷ ac-senmoir 7-an-popul geindtlidhi
 ac-tagra ris 7-ac-dortad⁸ der co-foighidech ac-clai⁹ cumacht¹⁰ an-
 diabail 7-ac denam treigenais 7-uarnaighiti¹¹ 7-farecrais 7-cuim-
 neochat fós¹² an-selegar 7-an-galar¹³ ger¹⁴ fuair tar mo-cenn¹⁵ 7-mí-
 toil talanaighiti na-crecht-so cuice sin¹⁶ 7¹⁷ móran mí-trocaire ele nach-
 eider do-airem.¹⁸

¹ Omitted in *Eg.*

² *pecah.*

³ gibet beó do-cuimneochad.

⁴ dom-chinn.

⁵ ac-fulaing co-foigidech 7 a-dortad a-der aclai.

⁶ cumachta.

⁷ fuiracrús 7 uarnaighiti.

⁸ fós air se seilidha 7-galur.

^{9,10} Omitted in *Eg.*

¹⁰ Omitted in *Eg.*

¹¹ 7 maille so moran.

¹² turem.

And the Master of Sentences says, that the pricks of the crown of thorns drew blood from the head of the Saviour down along his head and his back and his sides; and that the bent nails of the scourges tore the skin away from his side and his back, up to his head; so that his body was all covered with drops and drippings of blood which came oozing from head to foot. And Bernard says that great was the agony Christ endured on the tree of suffering for our sakes, in order that He might purchase our love and possess it in abundance. Ambrose says that the human race could not have been redeemed unless by a humility greater than the pride that first destroyed it. And Gregory says: "If Christ had not borne immoderate suffering during his Passion, the human race could not have been saved from the punishment it deserved for committing sin." And he says further: "So long as I live, I will be mindful of the greatness of the suffering which Christ bore for my sake, while teaching, and the gentiles arguing with Him; and shedding tears patiently when overcoming the power of the devil, and while fasting and praying and watching." And further, "I will remember the spittle, and the severe illness He assumed for my sake; and His unwillingness to be relieved of those tortures; and much other mercilessness that it is not possible to enumerate."

(To be continued in the June number.)

GEORGE W. HOEY.

BOOK REVIEWS.

The Catholic Encyclopaedia. New York, Robert Appleton Company, Vol. VIII.

All doubt as to whether the *Encyclopaedia* would realize the promises made when the work was begun have long since been laid to rest. In fact, the *Encyclopaedia* has already become a necessity to scholars and to men in public life; the wonder is how we managed to get along without a Catholic Encyclopaedia for so long a time. The Church, in English speaking countries especially, has been persistently maligned, her history has been falsified, her doctrines misrepresented and her practices and institutions caricatured. The wellsprings of English literature have been poisoned from the period of the Reformation and while apologists have explained and controversialists have triumphantly answered the calumnies hundreds of times, still even well-meaning men outside the Church knew not where to turn for the truth. Catholic priests and Catholic writers grew tired of explaining the same things over and over; and so multitudes of our young people grew up in our public schools and universities believing all manner of untruths about the Catholic Church. The *Catholic Encyclopaedia*, however, is rendering ignorance of this kind inexcusable for the future.

The volume before us is particularly rich in historical articles dealing with matters that have been persistently misrepresented. The article on Innocent III, from the able pen of Dr. Michael Ott, O.S.B., will be welcomed by all fair-minded historians of the period. The article on the Inquisition tells the whole truth, whether pleasant or unpleasant. The evident candor of the author as well as the documentary evidence submitted in connection with every point under discussion can scarcely fail to bring conviction to the seeker after truth. The article should prove effective in laying the many ghosts that have, during the past few centuries, haunted this subject. Speaking of the suppression of heresy during the first twelve centuries, the author concludes, after submitting his evidence: "Hence, the occasional executions of

heretics during this period must be ascribed partly to the arbitrary action of individual rulers, partly to the fanatic outbreaks of the over-zealous populace, and in no wise to ecclesiastical law or the ecclesiastical authorities." More strenuous means were used at a later date and Father Blotzer does not hesitate to set forth the actual transactions of the inquisition, nor does he seek to shelter the guilty from the blame which is due to them. Catholic students attending non-Catholic colleges and universities will find in such articles as the Inquisition and the Investiture the means of refuting the many offensive assertions which are frequently heard in class-rooms of Medieval history in these institutions. A multitude of readers throughout the English speaking world will naturally turn to the articles on Ireland, Irish Literature, and the Irish in countries other than Ireland. In like manner the article on Italy will be read with eager interest by Catholics throughout the world who have not had time to study its history in formal volumes.

Volume ix, *Laprade-Mass*. The legal profession will naturally be interested in the article Law. The Church was largely instrumental in preserving Roman law and adjusting it to modern needs. But the interest in this article will not be confined to professional readers. There are so many questions of vital importance in which the concept of law plays a leading part that every thoughtful reader will be glad to have at hand in convenient form reliable information concerning the attitude taken by the Church. The scope of the article is shown by its several subdivisions: The Concept of Law, Obligation Imposed by Law. Classification of Laws, constitute the general theme, which is treated by Father Cathrein, S. J. Canon Law embraces the following subdivisions: General Notions and Divisions, Canon Law as a science, Sources of Canon Law, Historical Development of Texts and Collections, Codification, Ecclesiastical Law, The Principal Canonists. This division is from the pen of Dr. Boudinhon of the Institut Catholique, Paris. The influence of the Church on Civil Law, written by Dr. Shaefer, is arranged under the following heads: Slavery, Paternal Authority, Marriage, Wills and Testaments, Property Rights, Contracts, Prescriptions, Legal Procedure, Legislation, Government and Administration of Justice, Sacred Scripture in Legislation. Common Law is treated by the Honorable John W. Willis. The Moral Aspect of Divine

Law, is from the pen of Father Slater, S.J. International Law is dealt with by the Honorable Walter George Smith. Natural Law is treated by Dr. James J. Fox under the following headings: Its Essence, the Contents of the Natural Law, the Qualities of the Natural Law, Our Knowledge of the Natural Law. The final division of the subject, Roman Law, is from the pen of Dr. Joseph Kelly. Catechists will be particularly interested in the Liturgical articles from the pen of Dr. Adrian Fortescue, especially those on Liturgical Books and the Liturgy of the Mass.

Volume x, *Mass-Newman*. The article on the Sacrifice of the Mass by Dr. J. Pohle, presents the subject under the following sub-heads: The Dogmatic Doctrine of the Mass and Practical Questions Concerning the Mass. The clear exposition of the whole subject contained in these pages would go a long way towards removing the ignorant prejudices of many otherwise well-meaning and intelligent non-Catholics. But the article will be used especially by the teachers who would conscientiously prepare themselves for the instruction of our Catholic youth concerning this central act of Catholic worship. The article on the History of Medicine is full of interest not only for the members of the medical profession but for all those who are interested in the attitude of the Church towards the advancement of science and in the splendid work that her distinguished sons have accomplished in this field. The article on Metal Work in the Service of the Church will come as a surprise to many who are in the habit of regarding manual training as a modern innovation. Today, we seek to train the child to use his hands for purely selfish motives, but in the service of the Church, love of God and enthusiasm for the beauty of His house, lent skill to the hand of the toiler, while at the same time the social side of his nature was developed. The present stirring events in Mexico will cause many to turn for information to the able article of Father Grivelli, Professor of General History in the Instituto Cientifico, City of Mexico. The article on Miracle is very timely, since it has become the fashion in our day not only to deny miracles performed by the saints, but to reject even the miracles of the New Testament as antecedently improbable.

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, edited by James Hastings, M. A., D. D., etc. New York, Scribners, 1911. Vol. III. Burial—Confessions, Pp. xvi, 901.

The third volume of this learned and valuable publication maintains the standard of scholarship set by the first and second volumes. It contains articles on anthropological, philological, archaeological and ethnological topics connected with religion, written by the most eminent authorities and brought up to date as far as information and criticism are concerned. Among the articles by Catholic writers are "Charms and Amulets (Vedic)" by Dr. Bolling of the Catholic University of America; "Charms and Amulets (Muhammadian)," by Baion Carra de Vaux; "Coleridge," by Dr. Ryan of St. Bernard's Seminary, Rochester, N. Y.; "Church, Doctrine of (Roman Catholic)," by Father Thurston, S. J. In the discussion of topics which may be said to belong to pure scholarship, and in the articles such as Father Thurston's, in which the Catholic point of view is set forth authoritatively, the Catholic student will find nothing that he can object to. In those questions, however, where scholarship and theological orthodoxy are intermingled, in questions of a "mixed" character, if the expression is permissible, there are many instances in which color is given to facts, and interpretations of facts are introduced in a manner which cannot but be displeasing to Catholic readers. The articles on philosophy, are, on the whole, above criticism. By way of exception, the writer of the article on "Conditional Immortality" disappoints us with the meager statement that "Among the Jews some Rabbis, notably Maimonides, held that the wicked would not live forever." Behind the phrase "some Rabbis" is an interesting episode in the history of Jewish religious thought in medieval times. Turning to the article on "Censorship" we find an interesting account of present-day law and practice on the part of civil authorities—Catholic censorship is to be discussed under the title "Index"—but surely there is a glaring inconsistency between the abrupt condemnation of censorship of books "it is impracticable, it is inadvisable" and the approval of censorship of plays. The reasons adduced for the control of dramatic productions should hold, *a pari*, in the case of books and periodicals. Finally, in the article on "Casuistry"

we find the usual reference to the contrast between the English and the Latin temperament. We should be disappointed if we did not.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Certitude: A Study in Philosophy. By Rev. Aloysius Rother, S. J.
St. Louis, Herder, 1911. Pp. 94.

The preface to this little volume is a model of brevity. It says "The following pages present an exposition of *Certitude* according to the teaching of scholastics, and their purpose is to secure a greater esteem and love for the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas." This contains a promise and a hope. The promise, it seems to us, is fulfilled; the exposition of the scholastic doctrine is clear, accurate, and orderly. We are not so certain about the hope that the volume will secure a greater esteem and love for the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. There is in the author's treatment of this important topic a certain scholastic severity of method that will almost inevitably repel all except the convinced scholastic. What those outside the scholastic ranks need most is training in close, accurate thinking. But what they are most likely to take to is just the opposite kind of literature, the journalistic, the sprightly, the superficially brilliant lecture or popular exposition. One point in the scholastic exposition the author seems to have missed. He would, we think, succeed better in his description of "Moral Certitude in the wider sense" if he referred to the two-fold original meaning of the word "moral." "You are *morally* convinced," he says, perhaps from sad experience, "that in a book of fair proportions, some printing mistakes will be found." And he adds "This quasi-certitude is called 'moral' because actions performed with such mental assurance as it can give us, are justified before the tribunal of conscience." A flippant comment might be that the actions we are inclined to commit after "such mental assurance" has been fully confirmed by an abundant crop of typographical errors would be difficult to justify in conscience. The more serious consideration is that, according to the scholastics, (e. g. Lorenzelli, *Institutiones*, I, 109) the foundation, or motive, of this kind of certitude is "*modus consuetus*

agendi hominum intellectu ac libertate utentium," and has no reference to moral rectitude or "Justification before the tribunal of conscience."

WILLIAM TURNER.

Tennyson: Fifty Poems, 1830-1864, edited by J. H. Lobban, M. A. Cambridge: at the University Press. New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910. Pp. xxxiii, 299. Price 75 cents.

It is always disappointing, except perhaps in an anthology, to be presented with part of the work of any poet whose earthly career has come to an end. One likes to take him all in all, to trace the course of his genius from the first stammerings of his muse to his last firmly-rounded utterance; or, as may well happen, from the early maturity of heart-felt passion or pathos or patriotic fire to the feeble pipings which are the sure mark of senile decay. Nor is this desire for wholeness the effect of merely morbid curiosity: there are valuable literary lessons to be learned from the theory of development in a poet as he proceeds from youth to age. It will be therefore inferred that the selection given in the volume now under review is not regarded as entirely satisfactory. There are, however, in the law of copyright, apparently good and sufficient reasons for the limitations which the editor had to impose on himself; and, this granted, it may be at once said that he has put before us many of the poems which show Tennyson at his best. We have *Oenone* and *The Lotos-Eaters* and *Ulysses*, *A Dream of Fair Women* and *Locksley Hall*, the *Morte d'Arthur* and *The Lady of Shalott*, and with these, several of the pieces which exemplify Tennyson's mastery of melody, his depth of thought, and that prophetic vision which singles him out among the poets of the Victorian age. It is on the whole a notable collection. The *Introduction* is in excellent taste, and not only gives us an account of Tennyson's early life and literary activities, but also furnishes a fine example of what can be done in comparative criticism by a man who knows his subject in its various bearings. The Notes are brief, but illuminative. Some people may ask if Tennyson requires annotation. The answer is obvious: he does indeed. If, for example, a reader who does not possess a liberal education involving a knowledge of ancient

mythology and of biblical history as well as the history of Greece and Rome is set down before the bare text of *A Dream of Fair Women*, how hopelessly will he flounder for the poet's meaning, how utterly lost will he be in the maze of historical references. For such a one the editor of these selections from Tennyson has supplied the information that makes the poem intelligible, and therefore lightens the pleasure that is to be derived from its perusal. And it is so throughout. The volume is handsomely brought out; a special word of praise is due to the clearness of the type.

P. J. LENNOX.

Voices from Erin and Other Poems, by Denis McCarthy; New Edition, revised and enlarged. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1910. Pp. xi, 132. Price, \$1.00 net.

A double devotion, to the land of his birth and to the land of his adoption—that is the note that dominates throughout this book of Mr. McCarthy's poems. All the pent-up longing of the exile from Erin to tread once more the hills and the valleys, to wander by the streams, to hear the birds singing in the hedgerows and the groves of his sireland here finds sweet and melodious expression; nor is there lacking an enthusiastic display of that loyalty to the American flag which it seems to inspire in everyone who dwells beneath its folds. Facile and fluent in the stringing together of rhymes, Mr. McCarthy works delightfully the simpler emotions. He seeks to plumb no depths, to expound no recondite philosophy, to bring his reader through no psychological mazes. He understands his own limitations, and he therefore comes with a message of which there is no mistaking the meaning. His honest and manly heart beats true to faith and fatherland and the sacredness of the home. He is a close observer of nature, too: anyone who ever dwelt in Tipperary cannot fail to appreciate how well the various moods of the wind from Slievenamon are described in the stanzas devoted to the portrayal of its character as it is successively gentle, gracious, wailing, roaring, magic, and lonesome. The prayer that concludes a very beautiful piece is characteristic:

It blows across my mother's grave, wherein when life is gone
 God grant that I may rest beneath the wind from Slieve-na-mon!

An appealing note of pathos underlies such poems as "The Niobe of Nations," "The Hills o' Carrickbeg," and "In the Fields of Ballinderry," which suddenly changes to a martial swell in "The Song of the Bugle" and "The Irish on Parade." Some of the songs sing themselves. What the author says of "The Minor Poet" may appropriately be applied to himself.

He may not wake the mighty chords
 That rouse to fury and to fire,
 He may not voice in wondrous words
 The soul's supreme desire.

but what he does say is sweet and true and tender and straightway reaches the heart. An unpretentious book, this, but one deserving of high commendation.

P. J. LENNOX.

An Anthology of the Poetry of the Age of Shakespeare, chosen and arranged by W. T. Young, M. M. Cambridge: at the University Press; New York: G. P. Putman's Sons. 1910. Pp. ix, 307. Price, 2s.6d., net.

A foreword to this volume tells us that the Cambridge Anthologies are intended for the general reader, not for the professed student of literature. In the preface we are informed that they aim at an adjustment of the claims of literature and literary history—to drive the reader back to the works themselves and to save him from second-hand judgments derived from the critic and the historian. The purpose is laudable and is very well carried out. The volume has eight divisions devoted respectively to lyric poems, descriptive and narrative poems, sonnets, classical poems, historical poems, reflective and moral poems, poetical addresses and satire. There is also a one-page glossary of obsolete or difficult words, with an index of authors and index of first lines. All the great names that fill the spacious times of Queen Elizabeth and her successor are here: Bacon and Shakespeare, Sidney and Spenser, Beaumont and Fletcher, Marlowe and Webster and Ben Jonson, and some fifty others, many of whom, in another

era, would be literary stars of the first magnitude. How copious the extracts are may be inferred from the fact that Shakespeare is represented by forty pieces, Ben Jonson by twenty-one, Sidney by twenty, John Fletcher by nineteen, Drayton by seventeen, and Spenser by sixteen. Southwell finds his place, but has only one piece, "The Burning Babe"—that wonderful allegory of which Ben Jonson said to Drummond of Hawthornden that "if he had written that piece, he would have been content to burn many of his own poems." Southwell is eminently quotable, and room might have been found, for example, for his "Dyer's Phancy turned to a Sinner's Complainte" or his "Thymes goe by Turnes." One loves to come across Drayton's spirited "Ballad of Agincourt," which is but too little known, but which in reality, as Sir Phillip Sidney said of *Chevy Chase*, stirs the heart like the sound of a trumpet. Lyly is well in evidence, as he deserves to be, for his lyrics have a perennial freshness and grace. A place is very properly given to Stevenson's rollicking drinking song, from *Gammer Gurton's Needle*, "I can not eat but little meat," which with its humor and its lilt and swing has served as a model for many a Bacchanalian ditty since. But if one were to note all the good things here provided, it would mean referring to practically every extract in the volume. The collection is a fine one, and seems likely enough to fulfill the wishes of the editors by making the reader wish for more, and so leading him on to a perusal, perhaps even a study, of the works themselves of which so good a sample is here brought forward.

P. J. LENNOX.

World Corporation; by King Camp Gillette; the New England News Company, Boston. Pp. 240.

From the invention and successful exploitation of a safety razor to the conception and organization of a world corporation, is a fairly long leap. In the present volume Mr. Gillette gives us the constitution and by-laws of his new organization (incorporated under the laws of Arizona, with offices in Boston) describes the automatic labor system of the future, and points out the wastes of the system in vogue today. World Corporation is empowered

to own all kinds of property, real, personal, and representative, and to carry on all kinds of industrial and commercial enterprises. Its organizer hopes that ultimately it will not only absorb and control all the economic activities of the world, but, "displace all governments,—tear down the barriers of caste and nationality, and combine in one brotherhood all the people of the earth for a common purpose" (pp. 42-43). Mr. Gillette admits that his expectations sound like the dream of a utopian Socialist, but maintains that his World Corporation will accomplish by tried and scientific methods what Socialism seeks to bring about by revolution. He would merely extend indefinitely the present movement of corporate concentration, until we should have, instead of a few great corporations controlling the leading industries of one nation, one corporation managing all the stable and staple industries of all the nations. And substantially all the individuals in the world would ultimately be shareholders. His expectations seem to be based mainly upon these assumptions: the larger the corporation, the greater is its stability, its economy, its lack of friction; and the smaller is its liability to injury through the dropping out of individuals, and its possibility of control by any clique. Mere size, with the accompanying stability and checks and balances, would prevent managerial autocracy. Many persons will, however, be inclined to question the theory that economy of operation increases indefinitely with the size of a concern, and the prediction that the corporation would be too large to come under the domination of a small number of the shareholders and directors. Size in this matter is relative; undoubtedly the controlling clique would have to be more numerous than in any corporation now in existence. Nevertheless, the project as worked out and presented by Mr. Gillette in these pages is by no means as extravagant as it is apt to seem at first thought, and its author is not a mere dreamer but a hard headed and successful man of business. The book is well worth reading.

JOHN A. RYAN.

La vie internationale; par le Vicomte Combes de Lestrade, correspondant de l'Institut; Victor Lecoffre; Paris; pp. 190.

In this little book we have a brief description of the most important facts and conventions which go to make up the international life of the world. While the author declares at the outset that the analogy between the individual and the nation may easily be overdrawn, he shows throughout the course of the work that the mutual relations and the interdependence of the nations are more numerous and more effective than most of us are apt to think. The book is divided into four chapters: Introduction; International Facts, International Laws, and the International Spirit. It is especially timely in view of the growing tendency toward the discouragement of narrow and militant nationalism, and the establishment of permanent international peace.

JOHN A. RYAN.

MISCELLANEOUS.

On Tuesday evening, April 4, 1911, before the Special Child Study Club, in Washington, D. C., composed of teachers in the public schools, particularly those engaged in the work of ungraded schools and atypical classes, the Reverend Doctor Thomas E. Shields delivered an interesting lecture upon the present-day methods of instruction of children. He criticised the phonic or word method and contended that it had the tendency to fix words in the mind of the child at the expense of thought, drying up thought at the root. He reminded his hearers that the visual and the auditory faculties were the latest in development and were not the sole means of educating the individual, that there was splendid opportunity of reaching the soul through the deeper laid and earlier evolved sense of touch, for instance. He advocated a process of education that would develop real knowledge through the doing of things. He instanced the case of Helen Keller as typical of what may be accomplished in the absence of the senses of sight and hearing. The Doctor was of the opinion that free text books, medical inspection, and free dentistry were unconscious steps towards socialism, a serious invasion of the home, which is already the object of too many disintegrating forces under modern conditions. The Doctor had little sympathy with the study of eugenics, reminding his hearers that the magnificent brute specimens of the race evaporated without leaving an impress, that Divine Providence "fills the hungry with good things, while the rich he sends empty away."

Many of the teachers coincided with the views of the Doctor in regard to the abuses under the phonic or word method and one teacher has observed that ability to read rapidly in the third grade could exist without proper appreciation of the sense embodied in the printed page.

Summer School.—The Catholic University of America.**SCOPE OF THE SCHOOL**

The Summer School has been organized in order to give Catholic teachers an opportunity of profiting by the facilities which are provided in the University, and of obtaining under Catholic auspices whatever may be helpful to them in their work.

The courses here offered include both the professional subjects which are of vital importance to every teacher and the academic subjects which are usually found in the school.

Each subject is treated with a view both to content and to method, and the aim throughout is to base educational theory and practice on Catholic principles.

The schedule of courses as herein announced supersedes all previous announcements. Other courses will be organized if a sufficient number of requests are received in time to permit the necessary arrangements to be made.

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FEES

The fee for each full course is \$10. A fee of \$20 entitles the student to all the courses of the Summer School. An additional fee of \$5 will be charged for each laboratory course.

Room and board will be provided for the Sisters in the Uni-

versity buildings at a uniform rate of \$1 per day. Applications for such accommodation should be made as early as possible.

For further information concerning the Summer School, apply to

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- V. **METHODS OF TEACHING RELIGION.** Historical outline of the subject, Christ's manner of teaching; the principles applied by the Church; recent developments of method. Edward A. Pace.
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XIII. GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY. The methods of Psychology; current theories regarding the nature and development of mind; their influence on educational problems. Edward A. Pace.

XIV. LOGIC. The analysis of mental processes from the point of view of clearness, consistency and validity; examination of arguments; rules of reasoning; the estimation of evidence; logic of the sciences. Text-book. *Lessons in Logic*, Turner. William Turner.

Sciences

XV. ALGEBRA. Review of elementary algebra; selected topics from advanced algebra. Students will be consulted in the choice of topics. Aubrey Edward Landry.

XVI. GEOMETRY. Drill in the solution of originals; solid geometry. Aubrey Edward Landry.

XVII. ASTRONOMY. General and practical astronomy; work in the observatory. Alfred Doolittle.

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XIX. CHEMISTRY. General laws and doctrines of chemistry; connection between facts and principles; physical principles in chemical operations; laboratory work includes the preparation from ores and other crude materials of a number of chemical compounds. One hour lecture and two hours laboratory work daily. Ignatius Albert Wagner.

XX. GENERAL BIOLOGY. The study of selected types ranging from unicellular forms to vertebrates and flowering

plants; collecting, rearing and preserving material for class use; life history, habitat, economic value, and systematic position of types studied. One hour lecture and two hours laboratory work daily. John Bernard Parker.

Languages

literature from the arrival of the Saxons in Brittany to the present day (five lectures). A "masterpiece course" (twenty lectures). All lectures will be designed to meet the needs of the classroom. Francis Joseph Hemelt.

XXII. ENGLISH—II. THEME WRITING. The principles of

XXI. ENGLISH—I. LITERATURE. Continuity of English rhetoric and the forms of discourse; the fundamentals of English Composition; short themes weekly; one longer essay; private criticism and correction. Francis Joseph Hemelt.

XXIII. LATIN—I. For beginners. The matter of this course will be arranged to meet the needs of the applicants.

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XXV. FRENCH—I. French sounds; elements of grammar; drill in verbs; translation of French into English and English into French; reading of modern prose. Xavier Teillard.

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XXVII. GERMAN—I. Schweitzer's *Deutsches Lesebuch für ältere Anfänger*. Development of a practical understanding of the fundamental principles of the language; reading of easy narrative prose from current writers with conversational and written exercises. Francis J. Furger.

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- XXXI. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY. The Constitution of the United States; municipal, town, and county systems; the problems of the classroom and progressive methods of instruction. Text-book, *Civil Government in the United States*, McCarthy. Charles Hallan McCarthy.

Art

- XXXII. SPECIAL INSTRUCTION IN FREE-HAND DRAWING. Drawing of simple geometrical solids, representation of form in line, light, and shade; the theory of composition; classroom exercises supplemented by outdoor sketching. Frederick Vernon Murphy.

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- XXXIV. HISTORY OF PRINTING. Great printing centers and printers. Study of standard works of reference, such as the general and special encyclopedias, dictionaries, annuals and indexes to periodicals, ready reference manuals, etc. A study of the trade and national bibliography of the United States, England, France, etc. Principal schemes of classification. Codes of cataloguing rules. Various forms of catalogues and their objects. Charging systems, accession methods, book buying. Joseph Schneider.

SCHEDULE OF COURSES

Class days are Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. All courses are given daily unless otherwise noted.

A. M.	Course
8	VI. Primary Methods. III. History of Education—II. XIV. Logic. XXIX. Spanish.
	I. Principles of Education. XXV. French—I. XXVII. German—I. XXXIV. Library Science.
	XIII. General Psychology. XXVI. French—II.
10	XXVIII. German—II. XVII. Astronomy.
	II. History of Education—I. XXXIII. Music.
11	XV. Algebra. XXI. English—I. Literature. XXIII. Latin—I.
	V. Methods of Teaching Religion.
12	XVI. Geometry. XXII. English—II. Theme Writing. XXIV. Latin—II.
P. M.	IV. Psychology of Education. XXX. Church History.
3	XX. General Biology. XIX. Chemistry. XVIII. Physics.

- XXI. American History.
- XX. General Biology, Laboratory.
- 4 XIX. Chemistry, Laboratory.
- XVIII. Physics, Laboratory.
- XXXII. Drawing.
- VIII. Backward Child.

- VII. Physical Defects of Children.
- XXXII. Drawing.
- 5 IX. Methods of Study—Monday.
- X. Methods of Teaching History—Tuesday.
- XI. Methods of Teaching Algebra and Geometry—
Thursday.
- XII. Methods of Teaching English — Wednesday and
Friday.
- XX. Biology, Laboratory.
- XIX. Chemistry, Laboratory.
- XVIII. Physics, Laboratory.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Recent Bequests. The Catholic University has been generously remembered by three well known Catholics of Brooklyn, N. Y. Upon the settlement of the estate of Mr. Martin Kavanagh, of which the University was the residuary legatee, the sum of \$10,082.59 was received. Mrs. Francis A. O'Mahony, widow of John O'Mahony, bequeathed the sum of \$5,000 for the founding of another Brooklyn scholarship, and Mrs. Ellen Haggerty left in her will the sum of \$1,000.

Gift to the Library. Among the most precious of the volumes kept in the department of biblical science in the Library is a recent gift of Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan, entitled *The Golden Latin Gospels*. It is an edition with facsimiles and critical notes of a manuscript now in Mr. Morgan's Library and formerly known as King Henry the VIIIth's Gospels.

Monsignor Russell. Reverend William T. Russell, D. D., Rector of St. Patrick's Church, Washington, and President of the Alumni Association, has recently been advised by the Holy See of his elevation to the rank of Domestic Prelate. The BULLETIN joins Monsignor Russell's host of friends in offering him its most heartfelt congratulations on this well merited distinction.

Cardinal Gibbons Memorial Hall. The report of the Committee in charge of the Cardinal Gibbons Memorial Fund is most satisfactory. The contributions already received warrant the authorities of the University in proceeding without delay to the erection of the Hall. The style chosen is a magnificent example of Tudor-Gothic of gray stone, with a large central tower. The building is designed to accommodate two hundred students.

The Summer School. The number of prospective students of the Catholic University Summer school, as represented by the

percentage already registered, is likely to exceed all expectations. The latest report from the Registrar's office is that more than a hundred Sisters have already placed their names on the register. A circular containing a list of subjects and a schedule of the courses, with a complete *horarium*, has been prepared and is now being mailed to those who are interested in the work of the school.

Lecture at Trinity College. Miss Agnes Repplier's lecture on "The Mission of Humor," at O'Connor Hall, Trinity College, was highly appreciated by the students and professors of the University who had the pleasure of hearing it. The author of "Compromises" and "Convent Days," counts among her friends many of the subscribers of the BULLETIN, all of whom rejoice at the distinction conferred on her by the presentation of the *Laetare* medal for 1911.

The Symposium. The April number of *The University Symposium* contains, in addition to poems, essays and sketches that are very readable, a number of personal items both from within the University and from among the Alumni that will be read with a great deal of interest. The section headed "Athletics" tells the tale of recent successful achievements, and will be welcomed by former students, clerical as well as lay.

The St. John Chrysostom Society. The St. John Chrysostom Society has been recently established at the University. The officers of the society are: Honorary president, His Eminence James Cardinal Gibbons; acting president, Rt. Rev. Monsignor Shahan, S. T. D.; vice-president, Very Rev. Henry Hyvernatt, S. T. D.; treasurer, Rev. A. A. Vaschalde, C. S. B., Ph. D.; secretary, Rev. Sigourney W. Fay. On Monday, March 27th, a regular meeting of the society was held, in which proposed programs and policies were discussed, and several committees appointed. The work of the society is first, to publish a list of available liturgical books containing the original texts; secondly, to present in pamphlet form an accurate translation of the liturgical documents of the first six centuries, together with

copious commentaries and notes ; and, finally, to edit the liturgical texts now in use in the various churches. The committees appointed are the following :

Committee to Ascertain What Liturgical Texts are Available for Publication : Rev. A. A. Vaschlade, C. S. B., Ph. D. ; Rev. Thomas K. Reilly, O. P. ; Mr. Andrew Shipman.

Committee on Liturgical Texts of the First Six Centuries : Rev. Sigourney Fay, Rev. John Delanay, C. S. C., Ph. D.

Committee on Publication : Very Rev. Henry Hyvernatt, S. T. D. ; Rev. Sigourney Fay, Mr. Andrew Shipman.

Since it is the object of the society to satisfy a need long experienced by liturgical students, it is hoped that the endeavors of the society will meet with cordial co-operation and support.

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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

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IS THE STATE A DIVINE INSTITUTION?

A celebrated critic in a celebrated criticism has taken a poor poet severely to task for having, in one of his poems, observed that the deity was present at some of the events related in it—a proposition, says the critic, which might be safely predicated of any event that ever happened or ever will happen. In a similar strain some friends have commented upon the title of this present lecture, *Is the State a Divine Institution?* Why they have said, in a sense it is a divine institution; for is not God the author of everything? In the language of philosophy, all being is derived from the Infinite, all secondary causes depend for their existence from the First Cause; or, to state the same truth in the more homely, but not less precise, words of the Gospel, by Him are made all things that are made, and without Him was made nothing that has been made. Of course, in this sense, the State is of divine origin; and so is everything else from the solar system to the suffragette movement. But you surely do not propose to inflict upon an innocent audience a disquisition of an hour's length on a platitude.

Those who made these remarks—and they were very intelligent persons, quite familiar with Washington political life—did not seem to entertain for a moment the supposition that the State could have any other claim to a divine origin than the one above referred to. Yet the purpose of this paper is

certainly not the idle one of raising the barren ontological question which cannot be answered in the negative without denying the infinity of God. The question means, is the political State a contrivance of the human mind and will, just like, for example, a railroad company, but on a larger scale; or is its existence ordained in a special manner by God, so that it stands, in the moral world, on quite a different plane from any association or organization created by human ingenuity and co-operation? In other words, is the State to be considered as purely a product of human reason and volition established by men to promote their welfare, which they are perfectly free to institute or not to institute just as it pleases them; or is it, on the contrary, provided for and ordained in the Providential scheme of things to be—we are speaking of men in general—a necessary means for man to rightly develop his nature and realize his destiny? This is the query which this paper proposes to answer by stating the authoritative Catholic doctrine bearing on the subject.

As an initial step it may be well to define in what sense the word State is here accepted. We have a very large number of definitions of the term; for students and masters in political science, when they take account of all the details involved in the idea, and all the actual varieties of the thing which the idea represents, find, as is usual in a problem of this kind, a great deal of difficulty in formulating a definition which shall conform to the rules of logic by being applicable to all the individual things of the class defined and to none outside of that class.

In our present case, however, we need not insist on absolute scientific precision with regard to the meaning of the term. We shall use it to signify an organized civil society, politically independent of any other such organization, and exercising supreme authority in temporal affairs over the members of the society. We speak of civil society as distinct from the State, but this distinction is rather mental than actual. In the concrete they are not distinct; they both embrace the same aggregate of persons or groups of persons, but when we speak

of the aggregate as the society, we think of it apart from the power or authority which serves to organize it into a sovereign political unity. When, on the other hand, we think of the same aggregate, the people, as permeated, organized and controlled by that supreme authority which binds the otherwise loosely associated groups into one compact whole, we call it the State. If a collection of families were living together, united by mutual relationships, common pursuits and interests, but under the authority of no individual or body of individuals, that collection would be the inchoate or partially developed society; when there should arise in such a collection of families some controlling authority, exercising a compulsory directive power over the individuals and groups of the society, and itself subject to no other power of a similar kind, then the society would have developed into a State.

Now on surveying mankind today from China to Peru, we observe that everywhere men are grouped into states; and history, with its sister sciences, tells us that the same has been the case as far as we can pursue the traces of man into the dark backward and abysm of time. Among some tribes of degraded savages, indeed, the characteristics of social and political life present themselves only in an extremely imperfect and rudimentary form; but the germ at least is there in a condition of development corresponding to the general mental and moral development that prevails in the tribe. Now we face the question, whence are we to trace the origin of this universally spread institution of human life, what has given rise to the State?

The question thus stated must be disintegrated into two, one of which addresses itself to the historian, the other to the moralist or jurist. To trace historically the origin of the State the student's work would be to collect the data that history, archæology and ethnology provide relative to the manner in which states actually came to exist; to supplement this data by judicious inference based upon them and upon the known tendencies, needs and activities of human nature, and the external conditions in which man's lot is cast. History can

inform us accurately concerning the origin of many states, our own Republic, for example; but apart from the revelation contained in the Bible, it can tell us but little regarding how or when the State, in its rudimentary form first sprung up as an institution of human life. Nevertheless the research and reflection of a host of earnest workers, who do not always agree in detail among themselves, permit us to hold with sufficient certitude that the actual origin of the State has been, roughly speaking, as follows:—A number of families living in proximity, in some cases associated with each other by ties of blood were brought into mutual relationship by their respective wants, and powers to supply the wants of one another. They entered into relations of exchange or barter; they introduced a division of labor. They began the work of organization by acknowledging as authoritative some principles of justice and other moral rules, they devised some system of defense against outside enemies; and against members of their own community who disregarded the rights of others and the feelings or prejudices of the society. In the course of time a body of customs was evolved and accepted as being obligatory guides of conduct. To prevent the dissension and violence that would constantly occur if every quarrel were to be fought out and settled by the parties concerned some individuals were acknowledged arbiters or judges whose decisions were enforced by the consensus of the community or by physical compulsion. Some persons too, were chosen either by suffrage or the force of circumstances to be the leaders in military defense. And, usually, some method was fixed upon to determine who, on the death of the holders of these offices, should succeed to the power. When these developments had been taken the society found itself to be a State.

Our present enquiry, however, is only indirectly interested in historical origins. Its purport is of a different character. The problem which it pursues lies not in the order of facts, but in the order of rights. It is philosophic, rational, or, if you prefer the term, jural. It is a problem dealing primarily not with *is* but with *ought*. What we want to know is whence

is derived the right in virtue of which those individuals, or collections of individuals who exercise authority on the part of the State, can justly lay obligations on the independent wills of the members of the community. In all that belongs to the essentials of our nature, in all the rights intrinsically inherent to personality all men are equal, and no individuals or group of individuals possess as originating in and belonging to themselves the moral power of imposing any limitation or constriction on the will of any other person. How then are we to account for the legitimacy and moral validity of political authority in virtue of which these individuals in whom it is justly vested have the undoubted right to make laws to bind their associates in the community, and by various means involving physical constraint enforce compliance with the laws and punish infractions of them?

Various theories have been proposed to account for the legitimacy of this power. Students of the subject usually begin with a study of the ideas of Plato and Aristotle. The limitations of our time save you from having any review, however short, of the *Republic* or of the *Politics* inflicted upon you. Nor shall we examine any modern theories any further than an inspection of their character will enable us more thoroughly to grasp the import of our own doctrine.

These theories, besides, are too numerous to permit us to review them individually. But the principal ones closely related in virtue of common descent, and from which they have inherited a common feature. The distinctive character of them is that they rest the authority of the State upon a purely human basis. They might take as their motto the expression which Laplace is said to have used when Napoleon observed that the astronomer in his great work on the heavens had made no reference to the Creator: we have no need of that hypothesis. The origin of political powers, according to this school of thought is some kind of a contract or compact which the original members of a community entered into for the purpose of establishing a civic society or State. Their theories taken together as a class are conveniently called the contract theories.

The leading advocates of them were the Englishman Thomas Hobbes and the Frenchman Jean Jacques Rousseau. These philosophers are the parents, acknowledged or unacknowledged, of subsequent writers who while disregarding the views of Hobbes or Rousseau as a whole, nevertheless assume as axiomatic the leading principle of these doctrines which is that the political authority arises solely from the consent of the people; and that the original liberty of the individual cannot become subject to civic authority except through his own act.

The English philosopher starts from the assumption that the original and truly natural condition of man was one in which every individual was absolutely independent, and unrestrained by any social or moral relations with his fellows. It was a condition of warfare in which every man's hand was against every other man. Force and brutality reigned uncontrolled by any moral or jural restriction. Obviously, this plan of life, however strenuous it might be, was not the one best adapted to permit the individual to obtain the maximum of enjoyment of the desirable things which lay in his path. So, for their common benefit the individuals agreed to surrender their liberty and power to a certain extent at least, in order that some common authority might emerge strong enough to coerce all and establish a condition of peace and order under which each one should reap a larger measure of well-being than was possible for him in the original condition of warfare. The jural foundation of the State, then, according to Hobbes, is "a covenant of every man with every man in such manner as if every man should say to every man 'I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man or to this assembly of men, on this condition that thou give up thy right to him and authorize all his actions in like manner.' This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a commonwealth." This, he continues, is the generation of Leviathan, his symbolic name for the State.¹ "In him," Hobbes proceeds, "consisteth the essence of the commonwealth, which, to define it, is one person of whose acts a great

¹ *Leviathan*, Morley ed., p. 84.

multitude, by mutual authority one with another have made themselves every one the author, to this end (that) he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defense."

Like Hobbes, Rousseau assumes that man's natural state was one of solitary independence and absolute liberty; but, in contrast with Hobbes' primeval ruffian, Rousseau's man was an idyllic creature, endowed with every charm and every goodness. Society, Rousseau held, is an artificial state introduced subsequent to the original natural state of solitary existence. Whereas Hobbes declares that when the people individually surrender their liberty, the alienation is complete and irrevocable, Rousseau's teaching is that they never can possibly abjure their liberty and independence. They enter into a contract to constitute a State authority. But the object of this contract is "to form an association which shall defend and protect with the public force the person and property of each associate, and by means of which each, uniting with all, shall obey, however only himself, and remain as free as before." In this manner is created what Rousseau calls the *general will*. "Thus is produced a moral collective body, which derives from this act its unity, its common personality, its life, its will. To conceive the existence of an entity corresponding to "the general will" is a difficult feat for the intellect, or even for the imagination. It is not at all what we ordinarily mean by the general will, which is a general consensus of the wills of all the persons who make up the people, or of a majority of them. There is, Rousseau tells us, quite a difference between the will of all and the general will, for the will of all is the sum of particular wills. In accepting the general will he declares the individual continues to enjoy full liberty. Because when a proposed law is submitted to the people they are not asked "whether they approve of the proposition or reject it, but whether it is conformed to the general will which is theirs. When therefore the opinion contrary to mine prevails, this proves nothing but that I have made a mistake, and that what I thought to be the general will was not such. If my

opinion had prevailed I should have done something other than I had wished to do; it is then I should not have been free." The general will of Rousseau, at once the will of each individual and yet not his will, a will not identical with the consensus of wills, a will belonging to no person, but existing, if one may say so, *in vacuo*, is, as Woolsey has caustically characterized it, a fine illustration of the absurd in impractical abstractions.

Against the contractual theories criticism has launched many unanswerable arguments; one being that no such universal compact or contract as they postulate ever did or ever could have been entered into among men. Another is that the social condition is not unnatural to man; on the contrary, that it shows itself as a normal development of his nature without which he cannot attain to his destined perfection. Furthermore the conception that the rights of the State are composed of the personal rights which the individuals relinquish is obviously false. The individual does not surrender his personal rights in becoming a member of an organized society. It is true that his liberty is subjected to more restrictions that would exist for him if he were living after the fashion of Robinson Crusoe, but he does not surrender any class of rights. The first duty of the State is to protect him in the peaceable enjoyment of his rights. Besides, the State has rights which never belonged to the individual at all; as, for instance, the right to inflict capital punishment.

Another unanswerable charge against these theories is that they fail to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem which they have been invented to solve: why and how can we be lawfully bound by the will of another?

Assuming that a contract such as Hobbes or Rousseau has described was ever entered into, it would have bound those and those only who were parties to it, it would have no force whatever to bind succeeding generations. One of the supporters of the contract idea, Thomas Jefferson, by logically deducing the absurd consequences contained in it, unintentionally revealed its weakness. He said that, as a political contract of

this kind could bind only the individuals who were originally parties to it, and as the life of a generation is about thirty years, every constitution and law expires at the end of thirty years. Subsequently he reduced the period by one-half, thereby as one of his critics has observed reducing the life of almost every political constitution to a span shorter than that of a horse.

Though the contract theories have been as a whole abandoned they have left as a legacy to our contemporay political constructive thinkers the idea of the general will.

Perceiving clearly that the State's authority, if it can justly lay obligations on the wills of the citizens, must derive from some other will that is on a higher plane and superior to the individual will, political theorists of today, nevertheless, refuse to raise their eyes to the only authority which exists with a native right to bind our free personalities. So they labor over the hopeless task of constructing some transcendental will residing in the body-politic distinct from, and superior to, the wills of the citizens and to the sum of those wills meeting in a general consent, or in the consent of the majority. They might just as well contend that, distinct from the sum of the digestive apparatus possessed by each citizen, the people as a body have also a transcendental stomach which belongs to no one in particular and yet is the property of each.

The foregoing considerations have placed in evidence two principles, one of which is common to our own doctrine and the antagonistic theories that we have glanced at. This one is that to vindicate the claim made by political authority, and acknowledged by all but anarchists, to have a just power to lay binding obligations on those ruled by it, it must derive its power from a source jurally superior to those wills which it assumes to control. The second principle which is set in relief by the failure of the contractual theories to solve the problem is that to discover the true origin of the State we must revert to God, the only source of all authority over the free creature whom He has endowed with liberty.

The Catholic doctrine has been succinctly stated in the

plainest of language, many years ago by Paul of Tarsus writing to some citizens of the greatest State that the world has ever seen. "Let every soul," he wrote to his disciples in Rome, "be subject to the higher powers, for there is no power but from God, and those that are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God." Continuing to speak of the political ruler he calls him God's minister to whom all are to be subject, not only through fear but also for conscience sake; and that, he adds, is the reason why men are to pay lawful taxes to the proper officials; "because they are the ministers of God serving to that end."

Those familiar with the ambitious motives and methods that prevail extensively in political life may be inclined to believe that to ascribe any sacred character to State authority is highly incongruous. Many good people no doubt who would not think of challenging any apostolic teaching would treat it as an irreverent joke if a tax collector or the custom-house inspector at the New York docks were to claim that in discharging his duties he was acting with authority derived from on high. The policeman is a figure which, however dignified, is, even in the religious mind, but remotely associated with the Kingdom of Heaven. The belief that the ruler rules by the authority of God and right divine may in the opinion of a great number be left at this stage of the world's history to the moth-eaten theologian and the Emperor of Germany.

When properly understood, however, the doctrine that the authority of the State is derived in a special manner from the supreme source of all right, justice and authority cannot but appear eminently reasonable to any one who believes in God at all; that is to say, not merely in an impersonal First Cause, or absolute groundwork of all existence, but in God as the author of the moral law, the fount of righteousness, the ultimate ground of justice as of truth, who, in creating man destined this creature to an end and traced out for him a law by which his activities should be governed in order to achieve his perfection and attain that end.

As a preliminary step towards reaching the true significance of the doctrine that we must look upon supreme political authority as derived or descended from the Almighty, let us first glance briefly at some conceptions which are not to be confounded with it. In the first place it is not identical with the theory known as the divine right of kings. This theory is that the sovereign receives his authority to rule directly from God by some mysterious method of communication. Having thus received it from on high, the sovereign as distinct from the community, is the sole possessor of the power, or, if you like, he can truly affirm, as Louis XIV said of himself, *L'état c'est moi*. The people and their ruler are two entirely distinct parts of the social body. Responsible only to God from whom he received it, the sovereign cannot forfeit his rights by misgovernment nor diminish them by any concessions to the people. If under stress of adversity he is obliged to make any contract of this kind he is not bound by it and may repudiate it when he has been delivered from his difficulties. This theory was advocated widely during the Seventeenth Century by Protestant theologians subservient to princes who were ambitious to exercise paramount authority over religious affairs in their dominions, and by Catholics supporting their kings who endeavored to restrict and supervise the existence of papal authority in their kingdoms. The civil power has never been communicated in this manner to any political ruler outside the case of the Jewish theory recorded in the Scripture. Again, in the supernatural order we have the example of another form of divine communication made directly to the recipient, but not without the previous intervention of human agency. This is the case of the Pope who receives immediately from God the powers of Peter, but not until the cardinalitial conclave determines by a majority of votes who is to be the successor of Peter. Political power is imparted in no supernatural or preternatural manner. Nor is it conveyed through the operation of physical causes and laws and facts, as is the case with parental authority which by the very fact of birth arises independent

of the human will. Political power is not communicated to any person or body of persons until the explicit or implicit consent of the people or some combination of circumstances equivalent to such a rational consent designates those to whom the power shall be entrusted. In what sense then is the State, and especially the authority which organizes the otherwise loosely associated elements of the society into a harmonious and stable unity, and, having organized it, direct it to realize its end, of divine origin.

Let us go down to the root of the matter. We sometimes say that a certain law is unjust though it has been enacted in a perfectly legal manner. Now to say so is to imply that above and independent of civil or human law there exists for us some standard of justice by which we may try these laws and approve or condemn them accordingly; that superior to the laws of the State there is some law which the State is bound to observe under penalty of acting unrighteously and thereby vitiating its claim to our obedience. Our legal system itself acknowledges by the existence of our courts of equity that there is a law of natural justice authoritative enough to over-ride any statutory enactment when the latter works out to unfair conclusions in some particular case. There is then some transcendent law superior to and independent of State authority and human legislation. You may say perhaps, "Certainly,, but this law is nothing else but the judgment of our reason. If we say that some human law is unjust and if we are asked why we say so we immediately proceed to point out considerations that warrant us in calling it unreasonable." True, the supreme law is the law of our reason rightly exercised. But it is that and at the same time something immeasurably higher and more venerable. Human reason is not its original fount nor the source of its validity. Reason—our reason—recognizes it, acknowledges its authority and interprets it—not always truthfully—in order to apply it to the direction of our lives. The great thinkers of the Pagan world, no less explicitly than the Christian philosopher, have borne witness to the existence and the transcendent

majesty of the higher law. It is proclaimed in one of the noblest passages of Greek poetry. When Antigone, in violation of King Creon's express decree, pays the honors of sepulture to the corpse of her disgraced brother, Creon upbraids her with having defied his edict. She replies:

" Nowise from Zeus, methought, this edict came,
Nor justice that abides among the gods
In Hades who ordained these laws for men.
Nor did I deem thine edicts of such force
That they, a mortal's bidding, should o'er ride
Unwritten laws, eternal in the heavens. .
Not of to-day or yesterday are these ;
They live from everlasting, and from whence
They sprang none knoweth. " (Sophocles, *Antigone*.)

The consensus of classic philosophers on the existence of the supreme law has been gathered by Cicero, who says: " This then, as it appears to me has been the decision of the wisest philosophers—that law was neither a thing contrived by the genius of man, nor established by and decree of the people, but a certain eternal principle which governs the entire universe, wisely commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong. Therefore they call that aboriginal and supreme law, the mind of God, enjoining or forbidding each separate thing in accordance with reason." This witness of the ancient world is repeated and confirmed by the world of today wherever prejudice or false philosophy has not made thought subservient to the Positivism which refuses to acknowledge a God who is the moral ruler of the universe. The greatest master of political wisdom who has used the English language says: " We are all born in subjection, all born equally, high and low, governors and governed, in subjection to one great imitable pre-existent law, prior to all our devices and all our contrivances, paramount to all our ideas and all our sensations, antecedent to our very existence, by which we are knit and connected in the eternal frame of the universe out of which we cannot stir. This great law does not arise from our conventions and compacts; on the contrary, it gives to our compacts all the force they have."

Let us now turn from these somewhat vague descriptions to the precise thought of Catholic philosophy. When God by an act of His will gave existence to the universe He had conceived everything in order and harmony. He destined all things to an end, and that they might attain their ends He prescribed a course which each according to its kind should follow in its rise, development and progress towards its perfection or final goal. This course or law He fixed for things when He constituted their respective natures, just as the clock-maker determines by the character of the mechanism which he puts into a clock which he constructs, whether it shall strike the quarters and half-hours or only the hours, or not strike at all. The universe, however, contains two widely different classes of beings; it is divided into the moral world and the non-moral world, the world of free will and the world of creatures which do not possess the power of controlling their actions. The first of these two worlds comprises man. The second, everything else in the visible universe except man. The characteristic which marks man as a being of a different and incomparably higher order than those of the sub-human and merely material realms is that his possession of intelligence and free will renders him the master of his actions, the arbiter of his conduct. In accordance with this radical difference between the human and the non-human is a difference in the manner in which the mandates of the eternal are issued to these two kinds of creatures. In the merely physical world the course of all beings is traced for them in terms of "you must;" to man the form of the divine mandate is "you ought." The physical universe is bound in the iron chain of cause and effect; man is bound to shape his conduct in harmony with the divine plan and the eternal law by the bond of duty or moral obligation. The everlasting law of Sophocles, of Cicero and of Burke has been defined by St. Augustine as the Eternal Reason and Will of God, ordaining that the order which He has established be respected and forbidding its violation. This Eternal Law is no separate distinct being such as the Stoics imagined it to be; on the other hand, it is

no mere abstraction; for it is one aspect of God Himself, the ground and exemplar of all truth, order and justice.

But, one may say, if this transcendent law is the divine nature, how can we reach a knowledge of its tenor or contents? *Who by searching can find out God?* The means are provided; a copy of the Law, so far as it bears upon our lives exists in the very constitution of our own nature and of the things which form the world in which we live, move, and have our being.

The interpreter of this text is our own reason with which God has endowed us to be the guide of our own life. So that what we call the law of reason, the natural law or the moral law is a temporal copy of the law which is from everlasting. Live according to your natural nature, observe the order prescribed by God, obey your conscience, are various formulæ of one import epitomizing the commands of that law which the Creator has imposed on the human will. From that law every just human law draws its vigor, and every just human authority must derive its warrant from that same source. God alone possesses at first hand the right to impose obligation on the free wills of men. No human beings or aggregation of human beings can of their own authority impose their dictates on any other person; because every other person is their equal and is jurally independent of them by the constitution of our common nature.

In order, then, to learn what is the course of life prescribed in the Eternal Law two concurrent methods are to be followed. One is directly to inspect our own nature in its entirety under all its various aspects, according to its essential constitution; in all its manifold relations, with its higher and lower elements, spiritual and material; with its distinction of sex, and its need for society as an indispensable means to its normal development. The knowledge gained from this method will be controlled, and false inferences may be corrected by studying how some of the race in the past have interpreted or misinterpreted the demands of our moral nature, and frequently, through prejudice, ignorance, erroneous re-

ligious notions, and the influence of passion have reached false conceptions of what the moral law prescribes, and formed false codes of morality in consequence. Thus by introspection, observation and reflection on experience, reason is able to interpret that living volume in which the Divine Language has written His *Thou Shalt* and *Thou Shalt Not* for the human race in accordance with that Eternal Law of order which is the expression of His own nature.

One of the clearly expressed ordinances of this law is that, in order suitably to develop his powers and capacities to their normal perfection, man shall enter into social relations with his fellow-men; not merely into those social relations which constitute the family and arise in consequence of physical laws, but also into that broader though less intimate form of association known as civil society. That in the teeth of the evidence to the contrary offered by psychology, history, and ethnology any philosophers should be found to assert that a man is not by nature a social being is but another example of the extravagances to which one may be driven by the exigencies of a favorite theory. Given the conditions necessary—sufficient numbers and physical proximity—civil society will arise by the force of nature in the manner we have already sketched when touching upon the historical origin of states. Now let us listen to Leo XIII, completing the last link in the chain of our argument: "Man's natural instinct moves him to live in civil society, for he cannot, if dwelling apart, provide himself with the necessary requirements of life, nor procure the means of developing his mental and moral faculties; hence it is divinely ordained that he should lead his life, be it family, social, or civil, with his fellow-men, amongst whom alone his several wants can be adequately supplied. But as no society can hold together unless there be a head over all, directing all to strive earnestly for the common good, every civilized community must have a ruling authority, and this authority no less than society itself has its source in nature, and has consequently God for its author. Hence it follows that all public power must proceed from God. For God alone

is the true and supreme Lord of the world. Everything without exception must be subject to Him and must serve Him, so that whoever holds the right to govern, holds it from one sole and single source, namely, God the Sovereign Ruler of all. *There is no power but from God.*" The authority of the State, then, is no mere human contrivance; it is not begotten by the consent of the governed; it is the offspring of "the one great immutable, pre-existent law, prior to all our devices and all our contrivances, . . . antecedent to our very existence by which we are knit and connected in the frame of the universe out of which we cannot stir.

"But," some may say, "must we believe that the Almighty as author of nature has directly constituted every State that exists or ever has existed? Has He instituted the various forms or government, here a republic, there an absolute, elsewhere a constitutional monarchy, an oligarchy or a military despotism?" Or, the objection may be raised as it is to be found in an able work on political science that emanates from a neighboring university: "Grant all that the Divine theory maintains that ultimately all power is from God; that by Him is implanted in the nature of man the need and demand for the State, we get no nearer to knowing why, in any particular case, there should exist in a community a definite set of individuals arrogating to themselves the right of exercise of the divine prerogative of ruling." Granted; this is perfectly true and entirely irrelevant as an objection to the divine theory, as the writer calls our doctrine. It was formulated and answered long before the dawn of political science by St. John Chrysostom. In one of his sermons, on the Pauline text, we read the following passage: "What is that you say, Paul? 'Every ruler is ordained of God.' 'No; I say not such a thing,' replies Paul. 'I am not speaking of particular individual rulers, but of the thing itself. That there should exist a principle of authority, and that some should rule while others obey, so that everything may not be at the mercy of chance and rashness, driving the people hither and thither—this, I say, is provided for by divine wisdom.'" "Hence,"

concludes Chrysostom, "the apostle does not say there is no ruler except from God, but he speaks of the authority itself, saying, there is no power except from God."

In the objection above quoted two distinct matters are confused, one is that of the ultimate origin of the power of ruling, the other is how some person or persons are designated to be the custodians and wielders of that authority. Our theory that all power is from God, will no more, of itself, prove that President Taft, the Legislature and judiciary are the just and lawful possessors of the supreme power today in the United States than the doctrine of apostolic succession would alone, without an appeal to a vast congeries of facts, enable a historian to determine who was the rightful pope in those days when rival claimants contended for the chair of Peter. It simply declares that if President Taft and these bodies who share political power with him have lawfully and constitutionally attained the offices which they fill, then the power which they exercise is from God. Before this hypothetical statement can be turned into a categorical one—the President and the bodies associated with him in the Government of the United States, are the custodians of a divinely given power—we must revert to the Constitution of the United States and the elections of 1908, or subsequent ones, without, of course going behind the returns.

While the State is an institution ordained by God, He does not establish directly any particular State, nor specify what form it shall assume nor who are to be vested with authority to rule. These matters are settled by human convention or the force of circumstances or, as is usually the case, by a conjunction of both of these causes. Pact or convention, on the part of the whole people, or their chosen representatives, may be the means to determine the form of government, and the manner in which the ruler or rulers are to be designated may be fixed by a written document, as is the case in our own country, or by immemorial custom, such as obtained long in many parts of Europe. Conquest, violence, and usurpation have laid the foundation of many a State. But here it may

be well to remark that a power unjustly acquired or established may in the course of time come to be legitimate, that is, when to upset it or disturb it would be injurious to the common welfare of all the people which is the reason for the existence of the State's authority: and the norm by which the State is justified or condemned is whether or not it fulfills the duty of promoting the common weal.

But is not authority derived from the people? Yes, if the statement be understood in the true sense. It is from the people inasmuch as without the people it would not exist at all, and because it is the constituent element which inhering in the whole social body organizes it into a State. It is not from the people in the sense that it depends on the will of the community whether political authority shall exist or not; because, if when a sufficient number of individuals and families living together under certain conditions, whether they are pleased or not, the law of nature demands that they combine in a civil society, and furnishes the authority requisite for organization and direction. That authority is derived from the people is not true if we interpret the proposition in Rousseau's sense, which is that when the State is constituted the ruler receives his authority from the people who nevertheless remain sovereign or supreme, and can, therefore, at any time, at their own good pleasure depose their rulers, disregard a constitution, and even institute a new form of government. Here we may recall the words of Washington: "The basis of our political system is that the people can make and alter their constitution of government. But the Constitution which at any time exists till changed by an authentic act of the whole people is sacredly obligatory on all."

Now we can satisfactorily solve the problem which has proved insoluble to all the theories of contract: How can the acts and conventions of one generation bind subsequent ones who were not parties to the original agreement, by which the State was founded? The answer is simple. Contract is not the sole source of our obligations. Some arise entirely independent of any consent of ours. The obligations of parents,

for example, do not depend on their accepting or consenting to them. Children are, by the law of nature, born subject to parental authority without any consent of their own. In like manner we are born subject to the State to which we belong. For, to borrow the words of Burke, "The author of our being is the author of our place in the order of existence, having disposed and marshalled us by a divine tactic, not according to our will but to His. He has, in and by that disposition virtually subjected us to act the part which belongs to the place assigned to us." "If the social ties and ligaments spun out of these physical relations, which are the elements of the commonwealth, in most cases begin, and always continue independently of our own will, so, without any stipulation on our part, we are bound by that relation called our country which comprehends, (as has been well said) 'all the charities of all.'"

It is, I know, difficult for many persons, who observe the unworthy principles and practices that play a large part in contemporary political life, to give their unreserved assent to the claim that the State is of God. They retort by pointing scornfully to the unlovely figure of the "boss"; to the annual spectacle of the "pork barrel;" and the unsavory heaps of facts that have been accumulated by the muck-raker. They dwell on the unscrupulous methods of intrigue and chicanery which are resorted to by seekers after political place; the bargaining and "log-rolling" by which legislative measures are carried or defeated. They see personal greed or the interest of certain classes prevail over the interests of the people; and observe that some who exercise powerful influence over State affairs, remember only that they have a party and forget that they have a country. But what do these ugly facts prove one way or another, concerning the origin of authority? Nothing whatever. They simply attest that, however exalted its origin may be, authority can be abused and perverted from its true end. But what gift of God may not be, and has not been, abused by men? And, as the old adage has it, the corruption of the highest is the worst.

To set forth with any amplitude the practical consequences flowing from the Catholic doctrine of political power would be matter for another hour's dissertation. Leo XIII has done the work admirably in one of his great Encyclicals, from which we may borrow a pregnant thought or two. Since all authority is from God, he premises, it ought to be used strictly in accordance with divine justice and for the end for which it has been given. Then he says: "In order that justice may be safeguarded in the State let those who administer the affairs of the commonwealth remember that political authority does not exist for the private gain of those who exercise it; that the government of the commonwealth is to be carried on by those to whom it has been entrusted, but for the welfare of the people for which end alone it exists. While the responsibilities of the governing body are placed in its true light, by our doctrine the dignity of those who obey is admirably safe-guarded, because they are taught that in submitting to a just authority they are not bowing their wills merely to the dictation of men like themselves, but to the supreme will of divine majesty itself; and in rendering to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's they are really rendering to God the things that are God's. The conscientious citizen recognizing that the laws have a divine sanction behind them obeys, as St. Paul counsels, not from fear but for conscience sake, and sees the institution of his country clothed with a sacred character which demands from him reverential loyalty and attachment.

There never has been a time in the history of the country when there was more need than there is today of inculcating the truth about the nature of political authority both upon those who exercise it and those who are bound to obey it. If we believe even only the half of the allegations that are daily published in the press and repeated from mouth to mouth, then the people are rapidly losing respect for the laws and the lawmakers; and the lawmakers have, in too many instances lost sight of the reason why this sacred power has been confided to them. The evil is intensified by the fact

that a widespread decay of religious faith, and a vicious way of training the young, in which parental authority is not sufficiently insisted upon, are co-operating to destroy respect for every form of authority. In the present situation no greater service can be rendered to the Republic than can be done by the Catholic Church, if her members are but true to her teaching on the nature of the State, and proclaim it to their fellow-countrymen, both governed and governors, not merely by word but also and especially by example.

JAMES J. FOX.

ARISTOTLE IN RELATION TO MEDIEVAL CHRISTIANITY.

In order to understand the attitude of the medieval Church towards the philosophy of Aristotle, it is necessary to know how that philosophy was modified and transformed in various ways before it came into contact with Christianity. From Athens at the end of the fourth century before Christ, to Paris at the beginning of the thirteenth century of the Christian era there is a long journey both through space and through time. From the days when the Stagyrite himself discoursed on philosophy in the shaded paths where he met his disciples, to the days when Thomas of Aquin expounded him in the convent of St. James, or Siger,

Reading lectures in the Streets of Straw
Did syllogize invidious verities,

the world underwent so many changes, that the old Aristotle would hardly recognize himself in the new. And among these changes I do not reckon now the greatest of them all, which was due to the advent of Christianity; for, as yet, Christianity had modified Aristotle very little, if at all. The changes I refer to are intellectual, political, social, linguistic, literary as well as religious, through which, as through a series of successive transmigrations, the soul of Aristotelianism passed before it appeared on the stormy scenes at the University of Paris in the thirteenth century. During the progress of these transformations Aristotle had acquired various kinds of reputation; he was "a heretic" and "the father of heresies," he was a "pagan atheist," a "pantheist," a "sorcerer," an "uncanny Arabian magician," and in one quaint old woodcut he is represented with a swarthy complexion, a thick black beard, fierce flashing eyes, bushy eyebrows and elaborate folded turban of the typical Moorish teacher. In Rome he was known as a

logician, in Edessa he was understood to be almost a Nestorian, in far off Bagdad he was the great physician, in Cordova he was a philosopher hostile to the Korân, and in Paris in the twelfth century, before the University attained its corporate existence, he was regarded as an advocate of pantheism, materialism and fatalism. No wonder then, that he was at first misunderstood, suspected, proscribed, and not admitted without a struggle to the title of preëminence which he held in Dante's time as "the master of those who know."

The point of departure in this curious succession of changes is, as has been said, Athens at the end of the fourth century B. C. There Aristotle expounded his philosophy until the year before his death, when he retired to his country house at Chalcis and handed over the government of the school to Theophrastus. Theophrastus, was then, the first scholarch, or ruler of the school. He appointed his successor, and so there was a series of scholarchs, whose descent is as well authenticated almost as the pedigrees of kings or emperors, down to the third century of the Christian Era. All this time, the school was at Athens; how long, however, it continued to meet in the shaded walks made sacred by the footsteps of the Founder, it is impossible to determine. One thing is certain, the tradition of Aristotelianism in the school was vigorous at first; the earliest of the scholarchs were men of science, botanists, moralists, historians; but, little by little, the tradition became weaker, the pure stream of doctrine became tainted by the accession of elements and tendencies foreign to its spirit. There was, as we said before, no mysticism in Aristotle. In fact he was a positivist, or if you will, a practicalist, in the large sense of the word. The characteristic note of all his teaching was scientific accuracy and healthy, wholesome naturalness. His philosophy was the last great product of the classic spirit. With the downfall of Greece's freedom and the arrival of the Macedonian and the Roman, came a tendency towards cosmopolitanism, followed by a tendency towards mysticism. It was no longer an honor to be a citizen

of Hellas; therefore, the philosopher sought refuge either in the doctrine of the Stoics that all men belong to the common nationality of human nature or in the doctrine of the mystic that the sentiment of nationality belongs to worldliness and that piety is better than patriotism. Even before Christianity came, philosophy, feeling the inadequacy of its own efforts, turned to Oriental religions for inspiration and assistance: natural phenomena came to be explained, not by the forces of nature, but by the power of demons or spirits, and the practice of magic and divination took the place of the cultivation of virtue and the pursuit of the beautiful. Matter came to be considered the source of all suffering and of all moral evil, and consequently the science of nature took a place subordinate to speculations about the One, the Ineffable, the pantheistic God. This is the movement known as Neo-Platonism, and it influenced, from the beginning of its career the school of Aristotle, so that those who wrote commentaries on his works strove with might and main to read these doctrines and tendencies into his writings. That was the condition of the school of Aristotle at Athens when, in the year A. D. 529, it, together with the other schools of philosophy, was closed by order of the Emperor Justinian. This edict sent the Aristotelian tradition into exile in two directions. At Constantinople a more or less unsteady succession of commentators began, which reached its greatest importance in the ninth century, but exerted, generally speaking, very little influence on the Latin world at any time. The more important line of development leads us from Athens to Asia Minor, whither most of the Athenian teachers went after the edict of banishment. There, especially in Syria and Armenia, important schools were established in the sixth century, which translated the works of Aristotle into Syriac, and explained them in the Neo-Platonic sense. In Persia, too, the philosophers found refuge for a while, and underwent the influence of the mysticism native to that country. There, at Bagdad, in the ninth century, the philosophy of Aristotle first came

into contact with the Arabians. In that century, while Europe was experiencing that wonderful awakening to education and culture which we call the Carolingian revival, the world of Central Asia was being governed by an enlightened line of Caliphs known as the Abassides. Under their protection, learning flourished throughout the Saracen empire of the East; later, it travelled into Northern Africa and Spain, and finally, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, reached the world of Western Europe in the great center of intellectual life, the University of Paris. Thus, as you see, the journey from Athens to Paris was not direct; it was by way of Syria, Persia, Afghanistan, Morocco, and Cordova. And even this is not all. In Spain, the Caliphs, less enlightened or less liberal than their predecessors at Bagdad, persecuted the philosophers, seized their libraries, drove them into exile or put them to death. The Jews, however, were a privileged class, probably because they held the purse strings, and could claim a greater freedom because they controlled the finances of the Caliph's court. Whatever the cause, the fact is that Arabian learning found refuge in the synagogue, and it was through the synagogue, in many cases, that it reached the Christian Church. Consider, then, the succession of linguistic changes through which Aristotle passed. In Syria he was translated into Syriac, in Persia into Persian, thence, (from either Syriac or Persian) into Arabic, from Arabic into Hebrew, from Hebrew into Latin. So that Renan is not in the least exaggerating when he says that the works of Aristotle made their entry into the University of Paris, in a Latin version of a Hebrew version of an Arabic version of a Syriac version of the original Greek!

These linguistic changes are, however, but an index of changes far more profound which the interpretation of Aristotle underwent. Thoughts always take on the color of the mind through which they pass. Even facts have a different shade of meaning according as they are narrated by one kind of historian or by another. The battle of Sedan means one thing to a German, and quite a different thing to a Frenchman.

This is especially true of a system of philosophy, like Aristotle's, which needs elucidation. The Syrians gave it one shade of meaning, the Arabians another, and the Jews did not allow it to pass through the synagogue without the addition of elements distinctly Hebrew. The Syrian was a Christian, but a heretic of the sect of Nestorius; the Arabian was a fatalist, a pantheist, and often a materialist; the Jew was a monotheist, but of the Oriental type, and if he found anything in Aristotle that could be used against the Christian theologian, he was not likely to gloss it over, but rather to emphasize it and accentuate its importance. How profoundly, then, had the meaning and import of Aristotle's words and thoughts been transformed when, about the end of the twelfth century he appeared in this disguise, before the learned world of Christendom at the University of Paris.

Meantime, what had been taking place in the Latin world? There, Aristotle was known only as a logician. Translations of his logical works were current in Latin, some of which, most of which in fact, had been done in the sixth century by Boethius, statesman and scholar, philosopher and martyr for the faith. All the other works, on physics, on psychology, on ethics, metaphysics and politics, were lost to the Latin world. They had not been translated, and, if there were any copies of the Greek text, very few, if any, could read them. The Latin world was Platonist in philosophy. Some, like the stern Tertullian, condemned philosophy of every kind. "What has the Church to do with Aristotle? What is there in common between Christ and Athens, between the Academy and the Church of God?" But, such rigorous narrowness was exceptional. Christian philosophers welcomed Plato as an ally in the contest against paganism. From Justin Martyr in the second century down to St. Augustine in the fifth, they fought the fight for Christian truth with weapons forged in the Academy. There was much in Platonism that appealed to these first Christians: there was its highly spiritual outlook on life, its idealism, its constant effort to uplift, its sweet

persuasive presentation of the reality of the world above us, and its noble disdain for all that is sordid, material, and of the earth earthy. Moreover, the warfare of Christianity was against Platonists or Neo-Platonists, who fought the last fight of Paganism, as did the learned lady Hypatia, of whom we have all read in Kingsley's famous novel. And it was good tactics then, as now, to meet the enemy on his own ground, capture his heaviest guns and use them against him. But, most convincing justification of all, in the mind of the first Christian thinkers was the belief which they openly proclaimed that God had inspired Plato in the natural order as He had inspired Moses in the supernatural order, so that, in the design of Providence, Plato was sent to prepare the world for Christianity. In intellectual matters Plato was the precursor of Christ, as John the Baptist was in matters spiritual. Therefore, while the Christian philosophers esteemed Plato for the truth that he taught, they did less than justice to Aristotle. In the East they suspected him, because he was the favorite author of the Nestorians; in the West they held him in contempt, because, knowing only his logical treatises, they could pay him no higher tribute than to say that he was a sharp-witted dialectician, a framer of subtle arguments, a word juggler and a logic-chopper.

We are all this time preparing for the story of what happened to Aristotle at the University of Paris. And I promise you that the event will be exciting enough, dramatic, indeed tragic. One more digression is necessary in order that the historic setting of the picture be complete. I have said that only the logical works of Aristotle were known to the Latin world, that they alone had been translated, and that the other works in the Greek original were as good as lost during all the long period of predominant Platonism. The Greek schism of the ninth century was accountable for this. There was little communication between the two great divisions of Christian Europe, the Latin with its capital in Rome, and the Greek Church with its center in Constantinople.

And whatever communication there was was not of the friendly kind. The crusades changed all that. Especially the events of the year 1204, when Constantinople was stormed by the Latin crusaders, the city sacked, its treasures of a literary and artistic, as well of a more material kind divided among the conquerors, and carried off to France and Italy. Among these treasures was the text of Aristotle in Greek, which within a decade or two was known at the University of Paris, and translated into Latin. This version however—I would like to call your attention to this point—this version made directly from the Greek did not become known, in fact, was not made, until after the translations from the Arabic or Hebrew had already become a subject of controversy. For convenience sake, the one shall be referred to in future as the *Greek Aristotle*, and the other as the *Arabic Aristotle*.

We have now the historic setting of the introduction of Aristotle to the Latin world of the Middle Ages. It remains to describe the scene in which the event took place. The scene, as was said before, was the University of Paris, the center, then, for some fifteen or twenty years, of the intellectual life of Europe. Paris had been for half a century the city of schools; at the time of which we are speaking, the beginning of the thirteenth century, it was becoming the city of books. It was the chief center of the bookmaking industry: thither every new manuscript found its way to be copied and studied and explained. Thither scholars flocked from every country in Europe; and a picturesque, boisterous, irresponsible crowd they were, lawless in point of fact, and to a certain extent beyond the law, even in theory. Among them were Jews from Spain with curious manuscripts to sell, jostling the returned crusader who offered for a bargain the literary spoils of some Greek palace or monastery. In the throng too were members of the newly founded mendicant orders, Franciscans and Dominicans, as well as clerics from the various dioceses and monks of the older monastic institutions. And, what strikes us as most curious of all, there

are no university buildings. The Sorbonne has not yet been erected as a hospice for poor students. The students live here, there and everywhere; they assemble in the halls of the monastic buildings, or in the squares or in the streets, wherever a teacher sets up his chair. They bring with them bundles of straw on which they sit, a restless, curious, ill-behaved crowd, if we are to judge by some old woodcuts representing such scenes. The organization of the university is not yet fixed. The relations of the Rector to the Chancellor are still a matter of dispute, and the masters, or professors, who have secured their license to teach, have not yet found out the full extent either of their obligations or their privileges. There are, I am sorry to say, constant riots in the streets, in the lecture halls and even in the churches. The authority of the Pope is invoked, the authority of the king is also invoked, and both are in turn set at naught by passion and prejudice and mob violence. In those days, you can well imagine, the life of a student, or even of a professor, was by no means dull. But the turmoil and the contentiousness and the lack of harmony which marked the external life of the student or master was soon to be paralleled by a conflict of ideas, in which both scholar and teacher took part.

At the beginning of the thirteenth century, we may say, Aristotle was held in no higher esteem at Paris than elsewhere in the Latin world. He was known as an acute logician and nothing more. In far-off Toledo, a school of translators were busy with the Arabic text, in Palermo a former student of Paris, the wizard Michel Scot, was engaged in his translations of the Arabic commentaries, so was Gerard of Cremona; and it is said that Robert Greathead, Bishop of Lincoln, was studying the *Ethics* of Aristotle in Greek. But, none of these translations were to reach Paris before 1215 or 1220. The teachers at the University still hold to St. Augustine in theology and to Plato in philosophy. There is William of Auvergne, who is soon to be bishop of Paris; there is the severe and dignified teacher who has come over from England to be first

a pupil and then a master in the Parisian schools, Alexander of Hales, who will surprise the turbulent world of the University when, in 1232, he will lay down his titles and his dignities to become a humble friar of the order of St. Francis. These are Platonists, though Alexander begins to show a tendency to compromise on some points. The general spirit of their teaching is Platonist, and they are by training distrustful of Aristotle. These teachers were in possession when the Arabian Aristotle was introduced. Naturally, therefore, their attitude towards the new thought, if we may so call it, was one of suspicion and hostility. They had no difficulty in pointing out the errors of Aristotelianism. It was plain that the Aristotle who had come in so incongruous a company, surrounded, so to speak, by unbelieving Jews, paynim Saracens and Nestorian Syrians, was out of place in a Christian center of learning. They would have none of him or his fatalism, his pantheism, his denial of individual immortality. But, no student, least of all the medieval student of that period, ever hesitated to make trouble for his teacher. The thirteenth century student did not hesitate; he made up his mind very quickly. He, or a certain number of him, became at once very much interested in the Arabian Aristotle. There were Jews and Saracens at Paris from whom copies of translations could be got, and perhaps a start made in the direction of interpreting the text. At any rate, there appeared among the student body outspoken and ardent, if not intelligent, advocates of Averroism, that is of the kind of Aristotelianism taught by the great Arabian commentator, Averroes. Then, there was trouble in the schools. Discipline being lax, (indeed, I might say, discipline there was none) the question of the schools soon became the question of the streets and the taverns; and fisticuffs and sword-thrusts, rather than arguments, were used in this strange struggle between Platonism and Aristotelianism.

So,—to pursue the Academic phase of the contest—so the affair progressed until Albert the Great appeared on the scene.

To him and to his still more illustrious disciple, St. Thomas, both members of the order of St. Dominic, is due the ultimate triumph of Aristotelian philosophy at the University of Paris, and its subsequent establishment in all the schools of Christendom. They were strong personalities, both of them, the one possessing the thoroughness, the patience, the perseverance of the Teuton, the other eminently endowed with the clearness, the preciseness, the spirit of system characteristic of the Latin mind. And they must have been courageous. Not only in the turbulent quarrelsome multitude of the University, but within the quiet of the cloisters of their own order, they met with opposition. We have a statute of the General Chapter of the order in 1228 which forbids the friars to read the books of the Arabians, and in more than one passage in his works Albert complains of the obstinacy with which some of his confreres refused to sanction the study of Aristotle. We can well understand the strength of the opposition. Platonism seemed to suit piety better than Aristotelianism. It satisfied the demands of the mystic soul. Besides, Platonism came with the sanction of St. Augustine, while Aristotle had none to stand sponsor for him but the Saracen and the Jew. The opposition, if we are to believe Albert, was more zealous than enlightened. But the courage and the patience of these two great men were such that their final success was assured. They took the works of Aristotle as they found them in translations made from the Arabic, separated Moorish comment and interpretation from what they believed to be the original teaching of the Philosopher, and, when the time came, secured through a fellow member of the order of St. Dominic a translation made directly from the Greek text. Thus, they not only robbed the study of Aristotle of whatever danger formerly attended it, but, by bringing out the genuine meaning of the Stagyrte, showed that he was far from being hostile to Christianity. Thus, too, a catastrophe in the intellectual world was averted. For, there can be no doubt that the crisis through which Christian thought then passed was one of the

most momentous in its whole history. I have said, somewhat flippantly, perhaps, that the body of students took sides with the Arabian Aristotle because they liked to make trouble for their masters, who were Platonists. There was, however, a deeper reason. They took to Aristotle because Aristotle suited the spirit of the age; and it was largely for this same reason that the Greek Aristotle finally triumphed. Plato, the heavenly minded, with his firm belief in the reality and eternity of the spiritual, and his noble depreciation of all things physical as unstable and evanescent, Plato the dreamer and idealist, suited admirably well the centuries which witnessed the decay and downfall of the Roman Empire. He suited too the spirit of the centuries that followed, when, amidst the chaos of invasion, devastation and internal strife, there was no refuge for the philosophic mind except within the peaceful walls of the cloister in a life of meditation and prayer. But now a new Europe had sprung up, and a new civilization had arisen from the ashes of what had been Greece and Rome. A race of mingled Teuton, Celtic, and Latin stock had begun a period of constructive activity. Curious, restless, insatiably inquisitive about everything in nature, ready to believe anything, but wanting to know everything, confident of itself and of its future, this new race was more likely to be satisfied with Aristotle than with Plato. It had already learned something of medicine, geography, astronomy and physics from the Arabians, and now it demanded a philosophy that would have less to say about the spiritual essences above us and more about the nature of physical things around us. The age that chose Plato chose well; the age that demanded Aristotle chose wisely, for the needs of the decadent Latin world of the fifth century were very different from the needs of the rejuvenated Latin world of the thirteenth. That is why the Aristotelian party triumphed, though the opposition was as obstinate as it was at first violent, and, indeed, did not entirely disappear throughout the whole Middle Ages.

What, during all this time, was the attitude of the official

Church? She was, it goes without saying, no longer the Church of the catacombs in her relation to public affairs. She was no longer persecuted, no longer barely tolerated, no longer hampered in her public career by the devastation of the barbarian, or the rapacity of the local tyrant. She was entering into a period of great public activity, of unquestioned authority and of unparalleled prestige. When she acted now, it was with all the solemnity of her ritual and all the dread forms of official condemnation. She could not afford to ignore or pass by the scandal at the University of Paris. When avowed advocates of Averroism began publicly to teach in the name and with the authority of the University, she considered it high time to intervene. The first condemnation is that issued by the Provincial Council held in Paris in 1210, which forbids that the works of Aristotle on Natural Philosophy and the commentaries thereon be *read* (that is taught—we still speak of “reading” law) either publicly or privately at Paris. In 1215 Robert of Courçon, papal legate to the University, renewed the prohibition in regard to the books on Natural Philosophy, added also the books on Metaphysics and prescribed all the writings of two well-known pantheists of that day, David of Dinant and Amaury of Benes. To this extent, then, was Aristotle condemned in the first decades of the thirteenth century. Remark that the condemnation bore directly and exclusively on the use of his works as texts in the schools of Paris. We know that at the very time this enactment was in force, the works of Aristotle were being read elsewhere without protest or interference. Where such conditions existed as existed in Paris, the measure was one of elementary prudence. And, the times were troublesome enough elsewhere to warrant stringent regulations at the great seat of learning. In the south of France the Albigensian heresy was still rife; the war of suppression was still being waged, the taking of Carcassonne and the battle of Muret were recent events in 1220. And we have reason to believe that the doctrinal differences at Paris were not without influence

on the popular mind of Languedoc. In the Middle Ages heresy was a crime against the State as well as against the Church, and the civil as well as the ecclesiastical authority took cognizance of it.

The events I have been describing happened at Paris in the first two decades of the thirteenth century. In 1229 an extraordinary event occurred. The University of Paris went on a strike. The immunity of the student body had been infringed on; some students had been punished by the city authorities, whereas the right to punish was vested in the authorities of the University. When the city refused redress, the whole teaching staff of the University suspended their classes, and quit the city. This is known as the Great Dispersion. In 1231 a compromise was reached; the professors returned to Paris and resumed their work. Somehow, this disturbance seems to have benefited the Aristotelians. At any rate, in 1231 a commission was appointed by Pope Gregory IX to revise the works of Aristotle, in which, says the decree, there are many things useful mingled with what is dangerous and harmful. This is the first sign that the Greek Aristotle was beginning to be known and distinguished from the Arabian Aristotle. Whether the three professors assigned to this task ever attained any tangible results we do not know. But, we do know that by 1255 the works of Aristotle appear on the official programme of the University of Paris among the texts prescribed for study. From that time onward Aristotle was in full authority, so to speak, in the Christian Schools. There are, it is true, later condemnations, one, for example, that dates from 1263; but they are directed explicitly against a powerful party of Averroists who, even at the end of the thirteenth century, had considerable influence at the University. Aristotle as distinct from Averroes, indeed, as opposed to Averroes, is henceforth held in honor; he is, in Dante's grand phrase, "the master of those who know;" his books are studied in all the schools, and the fault found with the Church from this time forward, is that her teachers

are too subservient to the authority of Aristotle. Dating from the middle of the thirteenth century, Aristotle is for the Medieval Church what Plato had been for the Church of the first five centuries "the precursor of Christ in things intellectual."

If I have at all succeeded in laying before you the actual conditions that prevailed at Paris in the thirteenth century, if I have made clear to you the difference between the Arabian and the Greek Aristotle, you will, I think, agree with me that the successive phases of the attitude of the official Church were perfectly consistent. Aristotle condemned, Aristotle corrected, Aristotle approved and prescribed—there would, indeed, be inconsistency here if it were question of the same Aristotle. It was not question of the same, but of the two entirely different systems of philosophy. The Aristotle in the Arabian presentation might well wear the turban. He was a pantheist of the materialistic type; he denied the origin of the world by creation; he taught that the individual soul is not immortal; he lent favor to the prevalent heresy which was disturbing State as well as Church. The Aristotle who came to be known through the interpretations of Albert the Great and St. Thomas, and who could speak for himself as soon as the text was freed from its Saracen coloring, was not, indeed, a Christian. He never wore the halo of the saint nor the official cap of a master in a Christian school. But he was recognized as not anti-Christian; and the vast synthetic system which he had built up by unaided reason was found to fit the needs of the time when Plato's mystic idealism was no longer satisfying. The logic of events, the genius of the great Dominican teachers, and what I think I may call the enlightened patience of ecclesiastical authority brought about this change.

But, the triumph of Aristotle, though definite, was not immediate. I have said that the university world at Paris was an unruly one. It was a race of lusty, contentious, fun-loving, fight-loving youths, who treated king and pope with

less respect than they should have shown, since they believed in both. The forbidden always had attractions for them. And so, even after the Christian interpretation of Aristotle had been officially recognized, there were those who still favored the Arabian interpretation. These were now called the Averroists, from Averroes the great Arabian interpreter,

Che il gran commento fà.

Among the teachers of Averroism in Paris at the end of the thirteenth century was Siger of Brabant, who from the vividness of Dante's description of him, is supposed to have been his teacher in philosophy. There was also a certain Boethius the Dacian. Both of these, probably while St. Thomas was still teaching, professed their belief in the Averroistic philosophy: they were, or should now be considered, skeptics; they held that by reason alone we cannot prove the existence of God or the immortality of the soul, and, worst of all, they set up the double standard of truth, maintaining that a principle may be true in theology and false in philosophy, in other words, that one may believe by faith what his reason tells him to be false. They were, or claimed to be, Aristotelians. It was they, and not the theologians of the Church, who made a demigod of Aristotle and took the word of the master in place of arguments from reason. We shall hear more of them later when we come to the period of the renaissance.

What was then, the attitude of the Christian Church towards Aristotle triumphant? It is hardly necessary to say that the doctrines of Aristotle were never made dogmas of the Church. Neither was Aristotle's philosophy made the official philosophy of the Church to the exclusion of all others. Nor was the natural science of Aristotle made a matter, at any time, of Catholic belief. At the same time, the charge of undue subservience to the authority of Aristotle has been made against the great philosophers and theologians of medieval times. Let us look into the matter somewhat closely, and, instead of

relying on prejudiced witnesses, like Francis Bacon or the other writers of the humanistic period—we shall deal with them in the next article—let us go to the medieval masters themselves and judge them by their own professions. We shall admit at once that they held Aristotle in the highest esteem: they referred to him as *the* philosopher; they placed him above Plato and all the other Greeks; they considered his teaching to be the highest expression of human wisdom. Dante reflects their sentiment when he calls him “the master of those who know,” “the master of human reason,” “most worthy of confidence and obedience,” a teacher whose opinions are “divine.” They gave credit where they thought credit was due: where less scrupulous teachers would have claimed originality, they acknowledged freely their indebtedness to the Stagyrte. Nevertheless they set limits to his authority. It was not they, but their Averroistic opponents who gloried in the title “Aristotle’s Ape,” quoted his *ipse dixit* as a clinching argument, and swore, as the saying is, by the words of the master. William of Auvergne at the beginning of the thirteenth century writes “It is right and just to contradict Aristotle wherever he says anything contrary to the truth, and to sustain him in everything in which he seems to be right.”¹ Durandus, at the end of the thirteenth century declares “The science of nature does not consist in knowing what Aristotle and other philosophers believed, but in knowing the truth itself; and when Aristotle wanders from the truth, a knowledge of Aristotle is not science but error.”² The greatest of the scholastics, Albert and Thomas, are clearest in the expression of their relation to Aristotle. Albert writes “Natural science does not consist in narrating the opinions of others but in finding the causes of phenomena;” when he is commenting the works of Aristotle he warns us in words which are an echo of Avicenna: “I am explaining the physics of the Peripatetics more according to their intent and belief than according to what I myself have

¹ *De Anima*, I, i.

² *In I Sent.*, Dist. iv, Q. 5.

gleaned from the study of nature,"³ and "If we believe Aristotle to be human, then we must acknowledge that he could be mistaken just as we ourselves can." And St. Thomas sums up the whole attitude of his school when he says "Truth itself is our authority, and without that no other authority can avail."⁴ "Human authority," he adds, "is the weakest of all arguments."⁵ What is more, these men did not hesitate to contradict Aristotle. They held that he was in error in many points, for instance in his denial of creation, in his denial of providence; they found fault with the obscurity of his doctrine regarding the oneness of the intellect, well aware that the Arabian interpretation had leanings towards pantheism and jeopardized the doctrine of individual immortality; finally they saw in his doctrine of the influence of the heavenly spheres the danger of fatalism, and proclaimed their own belief that the human soul is greater than all the stars and cannot be influenced by them to the exclusion of free will. Thus, on this point, at least, they strove to offset the confirmation which sorcery and magic found in the Aristotelian doctrine. In a word, the great masters of the school were not slavishly subservient to Aristotle: even in the popular estimation they were held to be superior both to Aristotle and to Plato. In a fresco by Francesco Tani, a disciple of Orcagna in the fourteenth century, we see in the centre of a group of philosophers St. Thomas of Aquin, chief of the school, holding open on his breast his *Summa Contra Gentiles*, and on the other side, bowing to him as to a superior, are Aristotle with his *Ethics* and Plato holding open the pages of his *Timaeus*. The picture expresses the popular opinion of the Middle Ages.

There are, no doubt, later representatives of scholasticism who carried their reverence too far. There is the celebrated instance of the monk, who, when the telescope was invented,

³ *In Libros de Physico Auditu*, Lib. viii, Tract. i, Cap. ii.

⁴ Talamo, *L'aristotelismo della Scolastica*, p. 146 n.

⁵ *Sum. Theol. Ia*, i, 8 ad 2um.

would not look through it to see that a certain star was in a certain place, because his Aristotle taught him that it should be somewhere else, and while the telescope might possibly be right, Aristotle could not, by any chance, be wrong. Again, there is the instance of the philosopher who would not study the science of botany by the usual methods of observation and experiment, because, having obtained from Aristotle the definition of a plant, he could deduce the whole science from that definition. I have never seen these instances properly authenticated. But even if they are historical, they represent, not the genuine method of the medieval Aristotelians, but the false notion of method prevalent in the age of degeneration and decay.

I have said that Aristotle met the requirements of medieval civilization better than Plato. I meant, of course, in the purely intellectual, scientific order. There are needs of man's spiritual nature which Aristotle did not, and never could, satisfy. There was in him no element of mysticism. He has his feet firmly planted on the earth beneath him, and his head in an atmosphere free from the clouds of ignorance and superstition, but free also from that golden halo which surrounds the head of the mystic. He will not quit the earth on which he stands so firmly, to venture on a flight into the region of beautiful truths. He loves the clear cold light of the atmosphere of science, and has no hankering after the heavenly aura in which the Platonist sees spiritual essences in a warmtinted light. Therefore, he disappointed the mystics. St. Bonaventure never found in him the inspiration of his *Journey of the Soul of God*, Gerson saw in him the teacher of "those self-dubbed philosophers who, separating religion from their philosophy, ruin both;" and Thomas a Kempis had the Aristotelians in mind when he said, "I had rather feel contrition of heart than know its definition." The mystics did not take kindly to Aristotle. When they did not oppose him, they were, at least, lukewarm towards him. Now, mysticism is an important phase of scholasticism itself.

It certainly played an important part in the life of the medieval Church. When, therefore, the attitude of medieval Christianity towards Aristotle is discussed, that of the mystics should not be overlooked. They were the intellectual descendants of those who opposed the first introduction of Aristotle. They were Platonists by disposition, and preferred the dreamer to the investigator, the poet to the scientist, the spiritually minded founder of the Academy to the too naturalistic head of the peripatetic school.

One more point remains to be discussed. Did the medieval Christians really understand Aristotle? They had much Latin and no Greek; even Albert and Thomas did not know enough Greek to read the original text. How, then, could they reach Aristotle's meaning? The modern philologist, with all his linguistic attainment, with the aid of dictionaries and critical texts and learned footnotes, finds it by no means an easy task to determine the meaning of a passage in Aristotle. How then could schoolmen understand him at all? The fact is that they did; and to my way of thinking, they understood him better than many a modern philologist. In the first place, they had translations made which may be wanting in elegance, which are often defective, owing to the blunders of the translator, but which have the supreme merit of adhering literally to the text. Those translations were made, if I may say so, impartially, with no particular theory of interpretation to uphold. It is sometimes a disadvantage to know too much. This is especially true of those who try to render other people's thoughts. The Greeks used to say that the pedagogue, whose business it was to conduct the children to and from school, should either be a very accomplished slave or a slave who knew nothing at all. Mark the alternative, and the exclusion of the half-learned, the semi-educated, from among the eligible. The same, I think, is true of translators. A translator should know everything, so far as that is possible, about his author, or he should know nothing at all, but merely adhere to the text. The first medieval translators belonged

to the latter class. In the second place, the medieval masters grasped the spirit of Aristotle: they themselves worked in that same spirit of wholesomeness, the spirit of the cathedral builders, the spirit in which the *Divina Commedia* was planned and executed. The modern philologist has lost that spirit. He fishes in the text of Aristotle, like the fisherman of whom Dante speaks

Who fishes for the truth and has no skill.⁵

The secret of the art of finding truth or beauty is not a knowledge of words, but a feeling for the truth and a power to appreciate the beautiful. We all know, no doubt, the case of the professor of English literature in some German or French University, who, quoting from memory a celebrated line in *Macbeth* rendered it "Will you not give the physic to the madman."—"Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased?" What a difference there is in the two sentences, though word for word the meaning to the philologist is, I suppose, the same. To understand Aristotle, a knowledge of Greek is necessary, but more necessary is the mind capable of appreciating the spirit of Aristotle. Such minds, I think the medieval masters had. They belonged to the great constructive age of medieval Christendom, to the century that organized the universities, founded the guilds, and planned the great cathedrals. There were "giants in those days." With none of the intellectual apparatus which we consider indispensable, they synthesized and uplifted the scattered fragments of their own intellectual world; if they were deficient in historic sense, they were strong in abstract science; if they were incapable of appreciating the value of facts, they were thoroughly well able to appreciate principles; if they were ignorant of the history of the philosophers as we know it, they had an insight into systems of philosophy which we do not always possess. They were in many respects like Aristotle himself. That, I think, is

⁵ Par. XIII, 123.

why they understood him. Not that they always caught his meaning in matters of detail. Nevertheless, they always, it seems to me, rang true to the voice of his spirit, a spirit calling to them across the abyss of centuries comparatively empty of great constructive effort. If we had more of that spirit we might, with profit, bring to bear on Aristotle's philosophy our more scientific knowledge of the language in which he wrote. We are more critical than the medieval schoolmen, more introspective; but I doubt whether the greatest among us are as profound as they were. Our scientists are heirs to Aristotle's spirit of investigation and systematisation, but our philosophers do not seem to be able to cultivate profundity except at the cost of sacrificing intelligibility. Those of them who have caught the attention of the present generation either soar into metaphysical heights where they are admired without being understood, or skim along the surface of the greatest problems, and cater to the taste of an age that seems weary of prolonged philosophical effort. The medieval Aristotelians were not deterred by the difficulties that lie in the path of every metaphysician: they were convinced, too that the sources of philosophy are in nature around us and beneath us; for

Wisdom is oftentimes nearer when we stoop
Than when we soar.

WILLIAM TURNER.

WOMEN WRITERS OF ENGLISH IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY.

II

Our attention is next engaged by the very remarkable series of fifteenth century documents known as the *Paston Letters*. Preserved by the family with a care that has laid succeeding generations under the deepest obligation, these letters give us glimpses, that are now satisfying and now tantalizing, into the thoughts and actions of three generations of a fairly prosperous Norfolk house. Their acquaintances, friends, and enemies, their patrons and dependents, and many of the great historical characters of the time live over again for us in these pages and strut their little hour upon the stage for our benefit and, so to say, under our very eyes.

The *Paston Letters* cover the extensive period of 87 years, from 1422 to 1509. First published by John Fenn in 1787, they attracted immediate attention, as they deserved to do, for they shed a vivid light on the manners and customs of the times, occasionally bring us in contact with the larger events which give so dramatic an interest to the contentions between the houses of York and Lancaster, show us the beginning and development of more than one love story, and are everywhere replete with human interest.

The Paston family was settled in the village of Paston, in the county of Norfolk, some twenty miles to the north of the city of Norwich. Like the Bernerses, they claimed to be noble by long descent through "worshipful blood" from the Norman Conquest, alleging that one Wolstand Paston came out of Normandy into England in 1069; but this is a doubtful ancestry, and there are many other points about their family tree also in doubt. However the antiquity and the gentility of the family may stand, we find its representative, one

Clement Paston, living as a plain husbandman towards the close of the fourteenth century. He appears either to have thriven in the world or to have been helped by relatives, for he gave his son William a good education, which enabled him to hold successive offices of dignity and emolument, until he eventually rose to the position of Justice of the Common Pleas.

Judge Paston (1378-1444) married Agnes Berry (d. 1479), daughter and heiress of Sir Edmund Berry of Horlingbury or Horwelbury Hall in Hertfordshire. She brought him estates in Hertfordshire and Suffolk, and he himself made extensive purchases of land in Paston and other parts of Norfolk, including the manor of Gresham bought from Thomas Chaucer a son of the poet. Knowing well the turbulent spirit of the times, the Judge used to say that "whosoever should dwell at Paston should have need to know how to defend himself," and accordingly he placed his sons at the Inns of Court in London to study law, since in a knowledge of the subtelties of the law lay one of the principal helps against violence and spoliation.

William's son, John (d. 1466), was a hard man, and had unceasing quarrels, which were added to when, in 1459, he was greatly enriched by being made executor and heir to his wife's kinsman, Sir John Fastolf, whose reputation as a brave soldier and a patron of literature was equalled by his notorious character for grasping and grinding in matters of money and property. John Paston's enemies, who were numerous and powerful, sought at one time to affix to him the stigma and legal disabilities which attached to a servile ancestry, and were temporarily successful, but, an investigation having been duly made, the king's council declared the family fully cleared of the imputation. The troubles and quarrels in which this great legacy involved the Paston family were not allayed until 1480. Many letters in the collection deal with the lawsuits and disputes engendered by the Fastolf bequest.

John Paston the first was married to Margaret Mauteby

(d. 1484), daughter and heiress of John Mauteby of Mauteby, near Caister, and by her he had five sons and two daughters. On his death in 1466 he was succeeded by his eldest son John, who had been knighted in 1463. Dying unmarried in 1479, this John was in turn succeeded by his next brother, who, strange to say, was also named John (d. 1503).

From John the third, through his marriage with Margery Brews, of Sturton Hall in Norfolk, were descended Clement Paston (1515?-1597), a distinguished naval officer in the time of Henry VIII., and Sir Robert Paston (d. 1683), who was made Earl of Yarmouth by Charles II. His son, William Paston, second Earl of Yarmouth, dissipated the property so dearly won and with such difficulty held, and the family as well as the title became extinct on his death, without surviving issue, in 1732. It was this nobleman that sold the family papers to Le Neve, the antiquary and collector, who had been Rouge-croix pursuivant and Richmond herald and was then Norroy king-of-arms. After Le Neve's death in 1729 they passed into the possession of Thomas Martin, of Palgrave in Suffolk, who married Le Neve's widow. When Martin died in 1771 the papers were purchased by one Worth, an apothecary and chemist, of Diss in Norfolk, from whose executors they were in 1774 bought by Mr. (afterwards Sir John) Fenn, who, as already stated, began their publication in 1787. Other letters and documents have since been discovered, and are incorporated in the edition brought out by James Gairdner in 1904.

The principal correspondents in the beginning are Agnes Paston, John Paston the first, and his wife Margaret; and afterwards their sons, John the second and John the third; but there are also letters from all sorts and conditions of men and women, from King Edward IV. and King Henry VII. down through duke and earl, archbishop and chaplain, to the land steward and the unknown persons who signed their initials or did not sign at all. The main feature under discussion is the worldly welfare of the Pastons, how it may

best be promoted, how dangers thereto may be averted, how interest and influence may be secured. At every turn we meet references to the law, with the processes and details of which every one, gentle and simple, young and old, rich and poor, male and female, shows a surprising familiarity. The letters bristle with technical phrases concerning suits and indentures and mortgages, writs of replevin and distresses for rent, amercements and estreats, and it is quite common to be confronted with a *supersedeas*, or a *certiorari*, or a *scire facias*. Through it all we can clearly trace the endeavours of the family to form a combination of royal favour, local intrigue, and judicious bribery, so as to secure effective protection from the law against those who sought to take away their manor-houses and their lands by scheming or who had actually seized them by armed force.

The correspondence incidentally reveals a state of anarchy in which "great riots, extortions, horrible wrongs, and hurts" are prevalent, in which electors are intimidated, juries are packed and bribed, and gentlemen returning from church or market are set on and beaten by hired desperadoes or dragged from their own fireside to be despatched out of doors. We read of one gang, armed with bows and arrows, spears and bills, jacks and sallets, making a murderous attack on two servants of the bishop of Norwich as they knelt at Mass in the church at Burlingham, and later attempting to break into White Friars at Norwich during evensong to get hold of certain citizens alive or dead. The same band came near killing John Paston at the door of Norwich Cathedral, and on the same day his wife's uncle, Philip Berney, was so badly beaten that he died in a little over a year. It is not therefore surprising to learn that, during a time of excitement, Cardinal Kemp, Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Chancellor of England, felt constrained to charge and command all his servants to be ready with bows and arrows, swords and bucklers, crossbows, and all other habiliments of war such as they could procure and handle, to wait on the safeguard of his person. The

condition of the times is further forcibly illustrated by the account of two sieges which the Pastons, in defence of their property, sustained, not without loss of life, at Gresham (1450) and at Caister (1469), respectively. In the first of these Lord Molynes' men, 1,000 strong, clad in cuirasses and brigandines, attacked Dame Margaret and twelve others with guns, bows and arrows, pans of fire, and scaling ladders, and, after storming the strongly fortified mansion, carried out the stout-hearted defender in ruffled raiment to watch the demolition of her home. In the second case 3,000 of the Duke of Norfolk's men sat down before Caister Castle and took it after a five weeks' siege.

On the wider arena of the nation's battles also the Pastons took their own part. At first they appear to have been in high favour with the house of York, but Edward IV. turned against them and alienated their allegiance, and accordingly we find Sir John Paston and one of his brothers fighting on the side of Henry VI. at the battle of Barnet on Easter Sunday, 1471. They had in consequence considerable trouble to secure from the victorious Edward a pardon under the great seal when, after the fatal field of Tewkesbury, the Lancastrian cause had sunk in apparently irretrievable disaster. John Paston the third rose into great favour with Henry VII., and, true to his Lancastrian leanings, helped the King, at Stoke (1487), to smash Martin Swartz and his German auxiliaries in their vain attempt to set Lambert Simnel on the English throne. Henry was so pleased with the valour displayed by Paston in that stubbornly contested fight that he knighted him on the field.

During all the excitement business is not neglected. The steward lets farms, collects rents, attends markets, sells barley, malt, and timber, and lays in his stock of hay for the winter and of herrings for Lent. The principals are now in Norwich trying to influence elections, now at Framlingham courting favour with the Duke of Norfolk and for that end paying compliments to the Duchess and bribing her waiting-woman

with gifts of jewels, and again in London tapping court influence for the protection of their manorial rights or for the appointment of a friendly sheriff.

Domestic details, too, we have in abundance: requests for girdles and gowns, for kerchiefs and dress materials, for hose and hats, for treacle "of Genoa," for cinnamon and sugar, for dates and raisins "of Coruns" [Corinth], for basins and ewers, for candlesticks and spoons, for trenchers and quince preserves and plasters, for hawks that can fly at game, and for horses that can trot. The diversity of the subjects treated of is what lends interest to the whole correspondence and constitutes one of its principal charms.

Our immediate concern with the *Paston Letters* is with those of them which were written by women. Not counting Amye Bowet, who writes in very passable French, I have found at least twenty-four women correspondents: Agnes Paston; Margaret Paston; Elizabeth Poynings (née Paston), afterwards Dame Elizabeth Browne; Elizabeth Mundeford; Elizabeth Clere; Alice Crane; Eleanor Chamber; Constance Reynforth; Cecily Dawne; Dame Alice Ogard; Dame Elizabeth Brews; Margery Brews, afterwards Lady Paston; Lady Elizabeth Rothenhale; Alice, Lady Fitzhugh; Elizabeth, Countess of Surrey; Margaret, Countess of Richmond, mother of Henry VII.; two Countesses of Oxford; one Duchess of Suffolk; three Duchesses of Norfolk; one Queen of England; and an unknown lady who furnishes a copy of rather dainty verses in rime-royal. Fortunately, we need occupy ourselves with only two or three of these writers.

First in point of time comes Agnes, wife of Judge William Paston. She was a very determined character, obstinate in having her own way, and grimly tenacious of her rights; but in the first extract which I propose to give she appears in a rather amiable light. She and her husband had contracted their eldest son John to Margaret Mauteby, and the young people never saw each other until their marriage had been all arranged. This is how Agnes Paston tells her husband

of the first meeting of the betrothed pair: observe the various feminine touches in the letter:—

AGNES PASTON TO WILLIAM PASTON.

To my worshepefull housbond, W. Paston, be this letter takyn.

Dere housbond, I recomaunde me to yow, &c. Blessyd be God I sende you gode tydynggs of the comyng, and the brynggyn hoom, of the gentylwomman thet ye wetyn of fro Redham, this same nyght, acordyng to poyntmen [*appointment*] that ye made ther for yowr self.

And as for the furste aqweyntaunce be twhen John Paston and the seyde gentylwomman, she made him gentil cher in gentyl wise, and seyde, he was verrayly your son. And so I hope ther shall nede no gret trete be twyxe hym.

The parson of Stocton toold me, yif ye wolle byin her a gowne, here moder wolde yeve ther to a godely furre. The gowne nedyth for to be had; and of colour it wolde be a godely blew, or erlys a bryghte sanguelyn.

I prey yow do byen for me ij pypys of gold [*gold thread on pipes or rolls*]. Your stewes [*fishponds*] do weel.

The Holy Trinite have you in governaunce.

Wretyn at Paston, in hast, the Wednesday next after *Deus qui errantibus* [*the third Sunday after Easter*], for defaute of a good secretaire. Yowres,

AGN. PASTON.

The next extract shows us the same Agnes Paston some eighteen years later as the stern parent, with a keen eye to domestic economy and a desire to discharge her financial obligations promptly when the services stipulated for had been done. Remember that the young man who was to receive corporal punishment had been through Cambridge University and was now a law student at the Inns of Court in London:—

AGNES PASTON.

Errands to London of Agnes Paston, the xxviiij day of Jenure, the yer of Kyng Henry the Sext, xxxvj.

To prey Grenefeld to send me feythfully word, by wrytyn, who [*how*] Clement Paston hath do his dever [*duty*] in lernyng. And if he hathe nought do well, nor wyll nought amend, prey hym that he wyll trewly belascch hym, tyl he wyll amend; and so ded the last mayster, and the best that ever he had, att Caumbrege. And sey Grenefeld that if he wyll take up on him to brynge hym in to good rewyll and lernyng, that I may verily know he doth hys dever, I wyll geve hym X marcs [*a mark = 13 s. 4d.*] for hys labor, for I had lever he wer fayr beryed than lost for defaute.

Item, to se who many gownys Clement hathe; and the that be bar, late hem be reysyd [*that is, have a new nap or pile raised on the bare cloth*]. He hath achort [*a short*] grene gowne and achort musterdevelers gowne [*musterdevelus, a kind of mixed grey woollen cloth*] wer never reysyd; and achort blew gowne that was reysyd, and mad of a syde gowne, whan I was last at London; and a syde russet gowne, furrzyd with bevyr, was mad this tyme ij yer; and a syde murry [*dark red*] gowne was mad this tyme twelmonth.

Item, to do make me vj sponys of viij ounce of troy wyght, well facyond, and dubbyl gylt.

And sey Elizabet Paston that she must use hyr selfe to werke redyly, as other jentylwomen done, and sumwhat to help hyr selfe ther with.

Item, to pay the Lady Pole xxvj s. viij d. for hyr bord.

And if Grenefeld heve do wel hys dever to Clement, or wyll do hys dever, geffe him the nobyll [*a noble = 6 s. 8 d.*]

After these injunctions it will not surprise us greatly to learn that Agnes treated her grown-up daughter Elizabeth very harshly, beating her several times a week, sometimes twice the same day, breaking her head in two or three places,

forbidding her to speak to any one, and upbraiding her so vilely that her sister-in-law was fain to implore her husband to find a match for the luckless maid. The desired result was somehow brought about, for we find that before 1459 Elizabeth married Robert Poynings, and by him became the mother of Sir Edward Poynings, who as Lord Deputy of Ireland caused the enactment (1495) at Drogheda of the celebrated act, called by his name, which had such disastrous effects in Ireland for nearly three centuries until its repeal by Grattan's parliament in 1782. Robert Poynings died in 1461, and subsequently his widow married Sir George Browne of Betchworth in Surrey. She figures in the correspondence as the writer of one letter during her widowhood, in which she displays a fair command of English and a full share of motherly solicitude for the worldly interests of her baby boy.

The case of Elizabeth Paston, with other cases that come under our notice as the documents are unrolled before us, goes to prove that the position of unmarried daughters in those days was no enviable one. They were regarded as sources of worry and trouble, expensive to train up in the proper way by placing them to board with a family of gentle breeding, and a drug on the marriage market unless provided with a goodly dowry. To keep them among their own was scarcely giving them a fair chance to acquire the necessary accomplishments, although the *res angusta domi* sometimes rendered this an inevitable, if unpleasant, method of avoiding outlay, and the problem of finding them husbands became under such conditions more and more complicated.

Parental authority over girls was great and unquestioned. It was so even with regard to grown-up sons. Years after William Paston's death his sons, now of full man's estate, and one of them married, lived with their mother, who treated them like children.

The marriage of John Paston and Margaret Mauteby turned out better than might be expected from the way in which it was arranged. Margaret proved herself a devoted and loyal,

even a heroic, wife, and an anxious, if not exactly a tender, mother. For a long series of years she figures either as the writer or the recipient of letters. Here is a letter which she wrote to her husband, September 28, 1443, some two or three years after their wedlock:—

MARGARET PASTON TO JOHN PASTON.

To my ryght worchepful husbond, John Paston, dwellyng in the Inner Temple at London, in hast.

Ryth worshipful hosbon, I recomande me to yow, desyryng hertely to her of yowr wilfar, thanckyng God of yowr a mendyng of the grete dysese that ye have hade; and I thancke yow for the letter that ye sent me, for be my trowthe my moder and I wer nowth in hertys es [*not in heart's ease*] fro the tyme that we woste [*knew*] of yowr sekenesse, tyl we woste verely of your a mendyng. My moder be hestyd [*vowed*] a nodyr [*another*] ymmage of wax of the weythe of yow to oyer Lady of Walsyngham, and sche sent iiij nobelys [*a noble = 6s. 8d.*] to the iiij Orderys of Frerys at Norweche to prey for yow, and I have be hestyd to gon on pylgreymmays to Walsingham, and to Sent Levenardys [*St. Leonard's shrine at Norwich*] for yow; be my trowth I had never so hevy a sesyn [*season*] as I had from the tyme that I woste of yowr sekenesse tyl I woste of yowr a mendyng, and zyth [*since*] myn hert is in no gret esse [*ease*], ne nowth xal [*shall*] be, tyl I wott that ze [*ye*] ben very hal [*really whole, or well*]. Your fader and myn was dysday sevenyth [*this day se'nnight or week*] at Bekelys for a matyr of the Pryor of Bromholme, and he lay at Gerlyston that nyth [*night*], and was ther tyl it was ix of the cloke [*clock*], and the toder day. And I sentte thedyr for a goune, and my moder seyde that I xulde have dan [*then*], tyl I had be ther a non, and so thei cowde non gete.

My fader [*godfather*] Garneyss sentee me worde that he xulde ben her [*here*] the nexch weke, and my emme [*uncle*]

also, and pleyn hem [*amuse themselves*] her with herr [*their*] hawkys, and thei xulde have me hom with hem; and so God help me, I xal excusse me of myn goyng dedyr [*thither*] yf I may, for I sopose that I xal redelyer have tydyngys from yow herr dan I xulde have ther. I xal sende my modyr a tokyn that sohe toke [*gave*] me, for I sopose the time is cum that I xulde sendeth her, yf I keep the be hest [*promise*] that I have made; I sopose I have tolde yow wat it was. I pray yow hertely that ze [*ye*] will wochesaf [*will vouchsafe*] to sende me a letter as hastely as ze may, yf wryhyn [*writing*] be non dysesse [*trouble*] to yow, and that ye wollen wochesaf to sende me word quowe your sor doth [*how your sore does*]. Yf I mythe have had my wylle, I xulde a seyne yow er dystyme [*have seen you before this*]; I wolde ye wern at hom, yf it wer your ese, and your eor myth ben as wyl lokyth to [*looked after*] her as it tys ther ze ben [*where you are*], now lever dan a goune zow [*I would rather have this than a gown though*] it were of scarlette. I pray yow yf your sor be hol, and so that ze may indur [*endure*] to ryde, wan my fader com to London, that ze wol askyn leve, and com hom wan the hors xul be senthe hom a zeyn [*again*], for I hope ze xulde be kepte as tenderly herr as ze ben at London. I may non leyser have to do wrytyn half a quarter so meche as I xulde sey to yow yf I myth speak with yow. I xall sende yow a nothyr letter as hastely as I may. I thanke yow that ze wolde wochesaffe to remember my gyrdyl, and that ze wolde wryte to me at the tyme, for I sopose that wrytyng was non esse for yow. All myth [*Almighty*] God have yow in his kepyn, and sende yow helth—Wretyn at Oxenede, in ryth grete hast, on Sent Mikyllys Evyn. Yorys,

M. PASTON.

Then follows this postscript:—

My modyr grette yow wel, and sendyth yow Goddys blyssyng and hers; and sche prayeth yow, and I pray yow also, that ye be wel dyetyd of mete and drynke, for that is the grettest helpe that ye may have now to your helthe ward. Your sone faryth wel, blyssyd be God.

The reference to Our Lady of Walsingham in the foregoing letter is only one of many made throughout the correspondence to this shrine, the most famous perhaps in all England, and one of the most ancient, dating, as it did, back to 1061. We find Sir William Yelverton, one of the judges of the King's Bench, ascribing all the good fortune he had met with in the world, and all his escapes from danger and from the malice of his enemies, to Our Lady of Walsingham. Our Lady of Walsingham was particularly resorted to by women in anticipation of the perils of child-bed (Gairdner, Vol. v., letter 804, and Fenn, II., 96, and IV., 444). Erasmus, who visited Walsingham in the reign of Henry VIII., has left in one of his letters a vivid description of the shrine and its surroundings. When King Henry VII., in his efforts to make headway against Lambert Simnel and the Earl of Lincoln, took a leisurely progress through the eastern counties in the spring of 1487 to beat up recruits for his army, he went from Bury St. Edmund's to Norwich and thence made a pilgrimage to Our Lady of Walsingham. After the battle of Stoke, where victory had perched on his banners and his rival was utterly defeated and degraded from being an aspirant to the crown to be a turnspit in the royal kitchen, Henry again repaired to Walsingham to return a solemn thanksgiving, and he hung his colours as an ex-voto offering in front of the image. It is traditional in England that when his son, Henry VIII., was a child he walked barefoot to Walsingham from the neighboring town of Basham, and made an offering of a necklace of great value to the virgin. This fact did not prevent him at a later period from stripping the magnificent shrine of all its treasures at the same time as he dissolved the religious house of which it was the pride and the principal support. In September, 1538, by order of the Lord Cromwell, Henry's confidential adviser, the image of Walsingham with those of Ipswich, Worcester, Welsdon, and many others were all taken away. Those of Walsingham and Ipswich were brought to London "with all the jewels that hung about them," and by Cromwell's order were committed to the flames.

Returning to Margaret Paston, we find her in the following letter, written November 29, 1471, expressing her fears and regrets, her displeasure with the extravagance of her eldest son, her dread of shame, and her mortified pride. Her cry has found an echo in many an anxious mother's heart:—

MARGARET PASTON TO JOHN PASTON.

To John Paston, Esquier [the second son], be this delyverd in hast.

I grete zow welle, and zend yow Goddes blyssyng and myn, letyng zow wete [*know*] that I have a letter from zour brother, wherby I undyrstand that he cannot, ner may, make no porveyans for the C. mark; the wyche causythe me to be rythgh hevvy, and for other thynges that he wrytth to me of that he is in dawnger. For remembering wat we have had befor thys and ho sympplly yt hath be spente and to lytyl profythe to any of us, and now arn in soche casse that non of us may welle helpe other with owte that we schuld do that wer to gret a dysworschip for us to do, owther [*either*] to selle wood or lond or soche stuffe that were necessary for us to have in owr hows; so mot I answer a for God, I wot not how to do for the seyde money, and for other thyngges that I have to do of scharge, and my worshup saved. Yt is a deth to me to thynk up on yt. Me thynkyth be zour brother's wrythyng, that he thynkyth that I am informed be sume that be a bowthe me to do and to sey as I have be for thys, but be my trowthe he demyth a mysse; yt nedyth me not to be informed of no sech thengges. I construe in my owyn mend, and conseyye i now [*enow, enough*] and to myche, and whan I have broken my conseyte to sume that in happe he denythe yt too, they have put me in cownforth more that I kowde have be by any imajynasyon in my owyn conseyythe. He wrythetyth to me also, that he hath spent thys terme xl. li. [*forty pounds*]. Yt is a gret thyng; me thynkyth be good dyscreyson ther mythe myche ther of aben sparyd. Zour fadyr, God blysse hys sowle, hathe had as gret maters to do

as I trowe he hathe had thys terme, and hath not spende halfe the money up on them in so lytyl tyme, and hath do ryth well. At the reverens of God, avyse him zet to be war of hys expences and gydyng that yt be no schame to us alle. Yt is a schame and a thyng that is myche spokyn of in thys contre that zour faders graveston is not mad. For Goddes love, late yt be remembyrd and porveyde for in hast. Ther hathe be mych mor spend in waste than schuld have mad that. Me thynkyth be zour brother that he is wery to wrythe to me and there fore I wyl not akumbyr hym with wrythtyng to hym. Ze may telle hym as I wryth to zow . . .

As for my rowndlet of wyne, I schuld send zow mony there fore, but I dar not put yt in joperte, ther be so many theves stereng. John Lovedayes man was robbyd in to his schyrte as he cam home ward. . . .

God kepe zow and send zow good speede, &c. Wretyn the Fryday, Sen Andrue Ev.

Be zour modyr.

So through the whole gamut of human emotions runs this interesting correspondence. Many a pathetic figure peeps at us out of these fifteenth century pages—Cecily Dawne and Jane Boys and Elizabeth Paston and Constance Reynforth and Margaret of Anjou, and the “goodly young woman,” Margery, daughter of John Paston the first. In particuler the narrative of the sorely tried patience and constancy and the final triumph of Margery Paston can scarcely fail to strike a responsive chord in any sympathetic heart.

From the instance of John Paston himself and Margaret Mauteby it may be inferred that marriages by arrangement of the elders and without reference to the feelings of the contracting parties were the rule, and so they were; but we are given an occasional glimpse of the genuine unbidden feeling of a man for a maid and of a maid for a man. Here, for example, is an extract from a letter of Margaret Paston to her eldest son, Sir John Paston, from which we see that hearts could glow, and that love could be made, in what our age and country

at least regard as the orthodox style. There is something captivating about Jane Walsham's frank avowal of her feelings:—

“Item, I wold ye shuld speke with Wekis, and knowe hys dysposysion to Jane Walsham. She hathe seyde, syn he departyd hens, but [*unless*] she myght have hym, she wold never maryd, hyr hert ys sor set on hym; she told me that he seyde to hyr that ther was no woman in the world he lovyd so welle. I wold not he shuld jape hyr, for she menythe good feythe; and yf he wolle not have hyr, late me wete in hast, and I shall purvey for hyr in other wyse.”

After that it comes on us rather in the nature of a shock to learn that Margaret Paston was not so concerned that her own daughter, Margery, should marry the man of her choice. Two days earlier (November 13, 1463) she had written a letter to her husband from which the extract below is taken; observe how the feelings of the prospective bride and bridegroom are utterly left out of account: one husband would do as well as another:—

“I was at my modder, and wille I was ther, ther cam in on Wrothe, a kynnyngsman of Elysabet Clers, and he seyde your dowter [*saw your daughter*], and preysyd hyr to my moder, and seyde that she was a goodly yong woman; and my moder prayd hym for to gett for hyr on good mariage yf he knewe any; and he seyde he knewe on shuld be of a CCC. mark be yer, the wyche is Sir John Cley son, that is Chamberleyn with my Lady of York, and he ys of age of xviiij yer old. Zyf ye thynk it be for to be spok of, my moder thynkyth that it shuld be get for lesse mony nowe in thys world than it should be her after, owthyr that j. [*one*], or sum other good mariage.”

The suggested union did not take place, and Margery remained on her mother's hands until they bored each other

unutterably. The brothers felt it, too. John Paston the third thus writes to his mother in London, September 14, 1465:—

“I pray yow voyseyt the Rood of Northedor and Seynt Savyour, at Barmonse, amonge whyll ye abyde in London, and lat my sustyr Margery goo with yow to pray to them that sche may have a good hosbond or [ere] she com hom ayen.”

Margery's marriage to another suitor is mooted in a letter from J. Strange to Sir John Paston two or three years later:—

“Ryth worchupful ser, after dewe recomendacion, plesyt zow to understond the cause of my wrytyng ys for a maryage for my Masters Margery, zowr suster. For my nevyewe, John Straunge, wold make her sure of xl. li. [*forty pounds*] joynture and CC. marke [£133. 6. 8] be zer [*year*] of inherytaunce; and yf zee and zour frendes wole agreve [*will agree*] herto, I trost to God that xall take a conclusion to the plesur of God and worchup to both partyes.”

These overtures also came to nothing, and, thus tossed from pillar to post, Margery finally took the matter into her own hands and betrothed herself to their steward, Richard Calle. Thereupon there were fearful wrath and dismay in the Paston family circle. Calle was a good steward and a loyal and faithful servant: he had run the risk of being murdered in the streets of Norwich and of being hanged by process of law for devotion to the cause of the Pastons: but when it came to the question of his wedding a daughter of the house the pride and prejudices of class and caste and of the alleged Norman blood were aroused, and frantic efforts were made to prevent their union from taking place. But Richard and Margery were staunch and true. They stood upon the rights conferred on them by their betrothal, then a most sacred and solemn engagement. There is one letter from Calle to Margery, which is too long to quote, but which proves him to have been a loyal lover and a manly man, well worthy to be mated with the grand-daughter of an English judge, even

if, in addition to that distinction, she could boast of the claims of long descent. When the family found that their efforts were unavailing to thwart the designs of the determined pair, appeal was taken to the bishop of Norwich to show whether or not there had been a betrothal. The bishop, good man, went as far as he conscientiously could in reasoning with Margery, but reasoning was of no avail, and there was of course a point where his authority ceased. It would appear that the contract was proved and confirmed, whereupon the angry mother turned her daughter out of doors and left her to the cold and unwilling charity of a stranger. All obstacles, however, were finally overcome, and the marriage eventually took place in 1469; let us hope that Richard and Margery lived happily ever after. Their union was blessed with at least three sons, and blood proved thicker than water in the long run, for Margaret Paston in her will made on February 4, 1482, handsomely remembered her three grandsons of the name of Calle.

There is one joyous personage who breaks into the correspondence as it nears its close. I refer to Margery Brews, who eventually married John Paston the third and, when he was knighted at Stoke, became Lady Paston. She is an artist in the composition of valentines and knows how to say a coy thing coyly and an arch thing archly. She rises up amid a most serious set of people to appeal to our sense of humour and of fun. She invites us across the ages to laugh with her at her jokes and with a twinkle in our eye to sigh gently with her in her mock sorrows. Her wooing by John Paston begins in a letter which he wrote to her apparently before he had seen her, or at least before he could be said to be acquainted with her. The girl was flattered and interested, and her mother, Dame Elizabeth Brews, was evidently very anxious for the match. She writes to her prospective son-in-law several encouraging letters, meant to give him heart and hope when the usual difficulties about settlements had supervened. She reminds him, oracularly and metaphorically, that

It is but a sympill oke,
That is cut down at the first stroke.

Margery herself is frankly outspoken. She writes to Paston that she is not in good health of body nor of heart and will not be until she hears from him; assures him that, even if he had not half the means he has, she would not forsake him; and declares that, if he will be content with the dowry offered him, she will be the merriest maid on earth. She carries on the campaign vigorously in her family circle, and gives her mother rest neither by day nor by night, crying and clamouring to have the matter brought to an issue. Paston on his side was also very energetic, and the marriage finally took place about the month of August, 1477. After marriage Margery's letters show many traces of her old sprightliness, but they gradually become records of business transacted, wrongs done to property, and public events. She bore several children, and died in 1495, eight years before the husband she loved so well.

From the nature of my subject I have been able to do no more than touch on the fringe of the *Paston Letters*: full justice could not be done to them in the course of one short article. It is not too much to affirm that any one who wishes to be thoroughly conversant with the real history of fifteenth century England must not be content until he has mastered the correspondence and the accompanying documents in all their details. They are history at first hand and in the making, source books for the after time.

On the literary side no extravagant claim can be made for them, although some of the letters are very well written indeed. From the linguistic point of view they are extremely interesting. And those who have been patient enough to read this article through will, I think, agree with me that, if the *Paston Letters* are not themselves literature, they at least provide much of the raw material of which literature is made.

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AN IRISH HOMILY ON THE PASSION: TEXT AND TRANSLATION.

II.

TEXT.

Adeir grigoir an ¹-tan fíarfócair² dim a-tigerna cad-he an-résún nó-an-cúntus do-bér a-fuil an fireoin do-dóirtidh a-talman tar-mo-chenn na³ testaigat grasa uaimsi ac-freagra na-n-aithisi fuair *Christ* co⁴-humal and fein. an-tan do-dóirtad⁵ fuil an-rechta-núaid⁶ ar-an-talmain so. 7⁶-gur-brúidheadar an-cined iúbulta mac dé⁶ fa-cosaib tar⁷ éis a-adlaicti co-mí-trocaireach.⁷ 7-a Adeir grigoir is-truad 7-is-ro-truad dona-doeinib imcras⁸ croch *Christ* 7-nach leanann hí .i. a⁹-coroin coiserca 7-nach⁹ congmann a-riagail mār¹⁰ atat éis grada cacha ceime in-molta 7¹⁰ adeir grigoir ca-fuil in¹¹-att tethmhe na-daingen ac-an-cined dænna acht a-creachtaib *Christ*.¹¹ 7 Adeir ambrocus is¹²-teind leat a-christ ar-creachta-ne¹² 7-ni hiatt do-creachta fein is¹²-teind let¹³ 7¹⁴-ní-he¹⁴ do-bás fein¹⁵ acht ar-n-eslainti¹⁶-ni is¹⁷-teind let¹⁷ oir do-gallraigte tú ar-son ar-peccad-ne. Adeir Augustin ca-fuil ni-is-mó re-congmaíl¹⁸ ar-cuimne na-is-troma¹⁹ re-cairiugad na-mac dé¹⁹ do-faicsin tarrnocht am-bochtacht²⁰ indarbert o-c[u]raid crochti mí-trocairigh²⁰ 7-nach-smuainenn duine a-trocaire (fo 33a) do-techt ar-bochtaib dia²¹ a-comæin na-pían-so.²¹ Adeir ambrosius is-truadh damh-sa troma 7 serui mo-pectaig indus corab-eicen do-*Christ* páis²² do-fulang ar-mo-shon²³ 7²⁴-hé-fein can-peacad and²⁴ 7 Adeir ambrocus curab ar-ar-son-ne do-bo-teind²⁵ le *Christ* cach²⁶ ní da-fuair²⁶ oir-nír-fíetadh²⁷ teindes do-tabairt do and fein do²⁸-reir adhbair²⁸ 7 Adeir Bernard do-cim *Christ* cengailti fa-n-coroin-

¹ fos in tan.

² iar fadter orum-sa euntus na fola firenta so do-dóirtedh tar mo-cenn a talm-hain na-teastaidhi.

³ tar mo cenn ac-denum umla ann fen dar-dóirteth.

⁴ nua.

⁵ dia fona cosaibh.

⁷ Omitted in Eg.

⁸ imurcus.

⁹ imurcus coroin crist 7 nach.

¹⁰ 7-is-d-æs graidh gach ceim in-molta tucter in radha-so.

¹¹ innillus na-daingin a-teitheth in-cined doenna acht a-creachta isa crist.

¹³ is-iat ar-creachta-ne is-teinn let a-crist.

TRANSLATION.

Gregory says, "What reason or explanation shall I give, O Lord, when I am asked why the blood of the righteous was shed on the ground for my sake, for me who lack the power (to bear without) answering the insults which Christ Himself bore humbly for me, the time the blood of the New Law was shed on this earth; and that the Jewish people trampled the Son of God under their feet without mercy after his burial?" And Gregory says, "It is indeed a great pity that men should venerate the Cross of Christ, and not follow it, which is, to consecrate his Crown and not to keep his Rule; for the true lover practises what he praises." And Gregory asks what place of refuge, what stronghold is there for the human race, save in the Wounds of Christ? And Ambrose says, "O Christ, our sufferings are near to Thee, and it is not thy sufferings that concern Thee, nor is it thine own death, but our infirmity which Thou considerest; for Thou wast sickened by reason of our sins." Augustine says, "Where is there anything more to be kept in mind, or more to be blamed than to see the Son of God stark naked, in distress after the merciless torment of the Crucifixion, and to see that man does not think to show pity to God's poor in return for those sufferings?" Ambrose says, "Grievous to me is the weight and bitterness of my sin that made it necessary for Christ to undergo the Passion for my sake, although He Himself was sinless." Again Ambrose says, "It was for our sakes Christ found suffering in everything, for He could find no cause to suffer in Himself according to his own nature." And Bernard says, "I see Christ bound under

¹³ Omitted in *Eg.*¹⁴ *fein* is dith *let acht*.¹⁷ Omitted in *Eg.*²⁰ *am-bochtaine o-curaidh mi-trocaire croichte (?)*²¹ *dia isin-aeghal-so in-agid na-pene do-fulaing a-corp co-humal mor galurach daibh 7 adeir.*²³ *pian paiss.*²⁴ Omitted in *Eg.*^{25, 26} Omitted in *Eg.*^{28, 29} *acht inn-a-inne.*¹⁴ 7 a tiagerna nís he.¹⁶ *galar-ne.*¹⁸ *fiadnaisi na-ni is truma.* ¹⁹ *dia.*²² *a-shon.*²⁵ *budh-teinn.*²⁷ *nir feleth.*

spíne¹ 7-fa-dsirsi na-sciursad² ar na-crochad 7-ní-fergach ata 7-cret³ adeir-sa an-a-brethemnus fein ris in-tan nach tiucfaidh dim sēn-briathar do-congmaíl dó⁴ tar cenn mo-pectaig don⁵ ló-deigeanach 7-adeir⁶ Adeir Bernard da-tinoilti⁷ cach bairdi⁸ dar doirtad⁹ do-fuil Christ an-aimsir a-cēsta is-maith do-coimetfa híf.¹⁰ Masead cret fa-nach coimētaid¹¹ t-anam fein óir is mó lúach an-ní¹² do cennaigh se ac-diá na-an-ní¹³ tuc-sé¹⁴ ar-a-son .i. a-fuil¹⁵ fein ór ní-mesann an ridere firindech a-sēthar an-tan coimlí'nus toil a-tigerna 7-is-mar-sin nar-mothaigh mac dé¹⁶ a-cesadh-fein ac-coimet¹⁷ toile an-athar¹⁸ ac-ar¹⁹ cennach²⁰ ne maille-re sēthar mór.²¹ Adeir Augustin da-cuim-nidi an-cruaidhi páis an-tigerna ac-ar²² cennach-ne ní-fuil ní²³ da-cruaidhi doimeocha air-fein nach-fuileongad hé co-fuighidech. Adeir²⁴ Bernard cfa nach²⁵ goidfidhi docum²⁶ foghanta díera do-denam²⁷ do-día da-cuimnigidh sé cēsad Christ 7-an faici²⁸ an-cenn arna-cromad sa-croich²⁹ do-chur failti riut³⁰ 7-a-bél dúinti³¹ do-tabairt póici duit mar comarta sída 7³² a-tæb arna-oslucad do³³ leigen a-ruin³⁴ riut 7-a-lamha arna-lethad³⁵ do-t-gabail³⁶ cuigi 7-iat arna-cengailti sa-croich³⁷ do-fulang do-toile fein duit 7-a-cosa cengailti sa croich cétna dobeth maille riut 7-a-corp uile arna-righed sa-crand cēsta docum³⁸ do-sínti ris isin gradh mar³⁹ do-ghradhaigh sé tú ar-tosach.⁴⁰ 7 Adeir Augustin tainic an-lfaidh nemda-so do-gabail asanora do-fein 7-do tabairt⁴¹ anora⁴² 7-do gabail⁴³ galar 7-do-tabairt⁴⁴ tsainti⁴⁵ 7-do-dul (fo 33b) docum⁴⁶ báis 7-do-tabairt⁴⁷ betha 7-do fechain na-n-otar 7-do-fagbail báis tar-ar-cend co documlach.⁴⁸ 7-a⁴⁹ Adeir Augustin do-curid lfaidh chucaib⁵⁰ a-eslana .i. Ísa 7-nir⁵¹ aithnebar hé 7⁵² is-aire sin do-marbabar hé 7-do slanaigthe⁵³ na-heslana o-fuil in-leaga-so do-ól. 7 Adeir⁵⁴ fós an-tan is-gruamda an⁵⁵ deoch leighis 7-is-do-óla-con-ibenn an-liaidh híf artús indus comad-lughaiti grain an-otair roimpi-sin cor⁵⁶ amlaid sin do⁵⁷ cúaid crist tar-ar-cenn-ne

¹ sbine.² cad.^{3,5} Omitted in *Eg.*⁷ sēn braen.³ hi 7-a-duine masead cad-um-nach comifa.¹⁹ an-eth.¹³ tuc; se omitted in *Eg.*¹⁴ dia.¹⁵ in aithar gar.¹⁶ gar.²⁰ 7-adeir.²² cum.²⁴ faicidh.⁴ Omitted in *Eg.*⁶ tinoltea.⁸ doirtelth.¹¹ an n-eth.¹³ fhola.¹⁵ ac comlinadh.^{17,17} Omitted in *Eg.*¹⁹ sēn ní.²¹ ce-nach.²³ Omitted in *Eg.*²⁵ isin crann-cēsta aigi cum failti docur rit.

the crown of thorns and oppressed by the scourging after his Crucifixion, and yet He is not angry. And what shall I say to Him, at the judgment, when no word will come from me to excuse my sin and keep me by Him on the last day?" Again Bernard says, "If every drop of the blood of Christ that was shed at the time of his Passion was saved, it is well thou wouldst guard it. Why then dost thou not guard thine own soul? For more precious is the thing that was ransomed by God than the thing He gave for its ransom, even his own Blood. As the true knight does not reckon his toil when fulfilling the will of his master, even so the Son of God did not consider his own suffering when, fulfilling the will of his Father, He redeemed us with great anguish." Augustine says, "If we consider the severity of the Passion of the Lord when redeeming us, we see there is nothing however harsh or painful that He did not endure with patience." Bernard says, "Who would not ask to render earnest service to God, if he remembered the torments of Christ, and saw the Head bowed on the cross to give thee welcome, and his mouth closed to give thee a kiss as a sign of peace, and his side opened to disclose his inmost love for thee, and his hands spread out to take thee to Him, those hands fastened to the cross to expiate thine own will, and his feet bound to the same cross that He might be with thee, and his whole body stretched out on the tree of torture to draw thee to Him in love, as He loved thee first." And Augustine says, "This heavenly Physician came to take to Himself insults and to give honor, to assume sickness and to bestow health, to accept death and to give life, to visit the sick and to die in pain for our sakes." Again Augustine says, "A

²⁶ *dunta cnm poigi do-thobairt dut .i. cum-sidhigad rit 7.*

²⁷ *cum a-ruin do-leigin.*

²⁸ *Omitted in Eg.*

²⁹ *in a comain fen.*

³⁰ *onora duine 7-do-chach 7-do-gabail.*

³¹ *slainti.*

³² *Omitted in Eg.*

³³ *cugaibh eslani 7-nir.*

³⁴ *do-slanaighi na-heslani.*

³⁵ *do 6l ain deoch leigis con-ibinn in-liaigh ar-dus innus nach grannaidhinn (sic) int-othar roime gurob.*

³⁶ *do-ibh crist serbus choiligh na paisi duinne ga-eisimlarndh duinn serbus caintech docur an-atrighi ar-pecaidh 7 adeir.*

³⁷ *lethnugad isin croith do-d-gabail.*

³⁸ *cum.*

³⁹ *tobairt.*

⁴⁰ *cnm.*

⁴¹ *Sic in MS.*

⁴² *gurob.*

⁴³ *Adeir Agustin in tan.*

indus nach gabaid grain sinne roim an-aitrighi doleigeas ar-peacaig do-gnáth. 7-a Adeir¹ Bernard an-cend do-eist re ceól² na-n-angel cur-eist³ re-briatraib na⁴-n-iúbul ac-cur-a-coroine fa⁵ cend 7-na-súile dob-áille na-an-grian ar-na-ndorchugad⁶ isin-páis⁷ cétna 7⁸. briatra dubalta nan iúbul ac-boghrad na-cluas do-ested ceól na-n-angel .i. ac-a-radh⁹ crochaidh crochaidh hé 7-an-bél do-tecaisc ceól na-haingil¹⁰ ac-ól domblais éi 7 aigéte¹¹ 7-an-aged dob-áille na-cach-aged do¹²-dorchaide hí¹³ an-tan-sin¹⁴ o-seilegar 7-o-salchar nan-iúbul 7-na lamha do-cruthaig neam 7-talam cur-cenglad iatt o-na-clodhaib isin-crann¹⁵ césta 7-na-cosa dar-cóir an¹⁶-doman do-cheim-niugad cur¹⁷-cenglad¹⁸ isin crann cétna¹⁹ óir ní-raibi²⁰ æn-ball ser ann²¹ acht a-teanga ar-na-coiméit do-aithne a-mathair do-Eoin bruindi ana-mathair 7-do-aithne Eoin disi ana mac dileas²² dingmala dia eisi-fein.²³ 7 Adeir Bernard do-fétus²⁴ an-talam 7-an-fairgi do-cheim-niugad²⁵ 7-ní-fuarus tú ac-rann²⁶ acht ann-sa-croich césta 7 Adeir an-suibisceluidhe nar-feth neach grad bud mó do-tabairt²⁷ na²⁸-anam do-chur²⁹ tar-cend a-escarat bunaid³⁰ 7-adeir Adeir³¹ Bernard a-Isa ro-milis is-mó tucais amach na-fuaraie oir tucais ant-anam dob-uaisli na-cach uile³² anam tar cenn anma na pectach 7 Adeir³³ Bernard³⁴ crett³⁵ fa-ndernais procision isin eclais .i. an solás ro-shocraidh roim aimsir do³⁶-césta 7-cur-aithnigis³⁷ fein chucatt hé³⁸ 7-is-é a-adbar sin do derbatar na-fáidhed³⁹ .i. curab -é an-dobron is-dered do cach solás oir dobo⁴⁰ troma serui do-chur césta (fo 33c) Christ⁴¹ na-solás an-procision dorindi⁴² domnach na-pailme an-ierusalem⁴³ gé adubrad ris-an-la-sin is-bennaighi an mac⁴⁴ tainic an-ainm dfa .i. rí clanni hisrael 7-na-beil cétna ac-a-rádh aóine⁴⁵ an-cesta na-díaidh-so-nach-roibi rí acu acht sésair 7-is éc-cosmail na-neithi so doronad⁴⁶ ris oir do-chuiredar na-tigernaighi⁴⁷ 7-na-dæine saidbri an-étaighi úaisle fa⁴⁸ chosaib domnach na-pailme 7-do-churedar na-doeine daidbri géga éxamla barra na-crand 7-tucc an⁴⁹-croch 7-an-coroin spíne torad⁵⁰ barr na-crann so co-ha-bonnaib .i. an-lictauire⁵¹ lér-slanaighi

¹ do-ibh crist serbus choilligh na paisi duinne ga-eisimlarudh duinn serbus caintech docur an-atrighi ar-peacaidh 7 adeir.

² gloir.

³ eist re duinne briatra serba na.

⁴ ma.

⁵ dorchudh duinne sa pais.

⁶ 7-na-cluas do-cluinedh in cheol siraingliadi ga-mbodhrugad o-briatraibb diabulta nan-iubul ga-rad ris.

⁷ aingli.

⁸ aigedi ann sa croich 7-in-aighi bud-socraidhi na-gach uile aighi dæna do.

⁹ trit-ne.

¹⁰ sin i.

¹¹ croich.

¹² na huili talman do-ceimniugad dar do-pogad ina onoir gur.

¹³ cengladh iat.

¹⁴ cesta.

¹⁵ roibh.

¹⁶ ann-gan-cesadh acht.

physician was sent to you in your illness, even Jesus. They knew Him not, and therefore they put Him to death, and the sick were healed by drinking the Blood of that Physician." And he says further, "When most disagreeable and hard to drink was this healing draught, the Physician drank it Himself first, to lessen the dislike of the sick for it. And thus Christ came for our sakes, in order that we might not have aversion for penance which is to be the cure for our sins." And Bernard says, "The Head that heard the music of the angels listened to the words of the Jews, as they put the crown of thorns on his head; and the eyes that were more beautiful than the sun were darkened at the Crucifixion; and the ears that were used to listen to the music of the angels, were deafened by the lying words of the Jews, as they cried, 'Crucify, crucify Him'; and the mouth that taught the angels' music was made to drink gall and vinegar; and the face that was more beautiful than any other face was darkened at that time by the spittle and filth of the Jews; and the hands that created heaven and earth were fastened by nails to the tree of torture; and the feet that should have walked the earth were bound to the same tree; for no member was left free, but his tongue to confide his Mother to John of the Breast as his own mother, and to entrust John to her, as her own son, next worthy after Himself." Again Bernard says, "Thou wast able to walk upon the earth and the sea, and Thou foundest no check but on the cross of suffering." And the Evangelist says, "No one could show greater love than to give up his life for the sake of his enemies." And Bernard says, "O most sweet Jesus, more didst Thou give than

¹⁷⁻¹⁷ Omitted in *Eg.*

¹⁸ do-timcellad.

¹⁹ do-thobairt.

²⁰ Interlinear addition in R. na a-annm fen do-cur, *Eg.*

²¹ Omitted in *Eg.*

²² Omitted in *Eg.*

²³ Omitted in *Eg.*

²⁴ a.

²⁵ faidhi.

²⁶ crist co-dethinach.

²⁷ iaruaem.

²⁸ aine cesta.

²⁹ tiagernaide.

³⁰ in coroin shine 7-in-croch cesta torad.

³¹ licnbaír.

³² dfedus.

³³ acraun an-en-inadh acht.

³⁴ Sic, *MS.*

³⁵ adeir fos.

³⁶ a-isa ro-milis cad.

³⁷ aithnis engnd-he.

³⁸ budh truma serbhe.

³⁹ dorinne se.

⁴⁰ nech.

⁴¹ dorinneth ris co-cléachclodac oir.

⁴² fa na chosaibh.

⁴³ pobuíl pecaich do-creid.

anmanna an-popuil¹ do-creitt indtu 7-an-ri-so do² fuair do-anoir la-na-pailme iter na-tigernaigib³ adubramar an-élaigi úaisle fein do cur fa-na-cosaib do-benad a-étach díles fein-de lá-na-páisi 7-do-cuiretar⁴ crandchur air. 7 Adeir Bernard curab díles⁵ proisíon do-cengal ris-an⁶ cesad da-eisimplarugad⁷ duinne⁸ cæined 7 toirrsi do-beth acaind in-dereth tsolais⁹ int-sægail.⁹ Adeir Bernard cor-sciúrsad hé o na-sciúrsedaib 7-cur-coronad on-spín 7-cur ruaimred a-chosa 7-alama o-tairgedaib¹⁰ maille-re¹¹ móran peine¹² 7-cenel udocraid an-báis 7-ataim-si mí-chuimnech ar cach-cinel peine da-fuair¹⁴ sé 7-do-athain co-foigidech da-athar na-lean a-tigerna ar-na-hiubaltaib an-ní-so¹⁵ doniat. Adeir¹⁵ Bernard re-persain an-fíreoin¹⁶ na-bí tarcaisnech art¹⁷ anam ar-son curab-é luach¹⁷ fola 7-feola mic an-athar neamda hé. Adeir¹⁸ in-sealmus a-Ísa óic umail ro-grodach cid tusa¹⁹ fuilngis an-croch is-misi adbar do-galar. Adeir Bernard con²⁰ dligenn cach-uile cristaidhi cuimne césta²¹ crist dobeth aici²¹ ana-craidhi²² 7-con²³ dligend an-sacart 7-ant-escop co-ro-mor oir is iad imcras²⁴ an-coroin coisrica Adeir an-faid²⁵ a-fidair geinemna christ curab mar-do-ferad ant-uisce (fo 33d) do-feradh mé 7-do-sceilad mo²⁶ chnamha 7-ní can adbar²⁷ aderar²⁸ fertain an-uisqui a-compraitt páisi christ óir is-glan ant-sær o-fertain an-uisqui 7²⁹ do-ní an-talam-úr ar-ar-doirter³⁰ hé 7-sgrisaidh³¹ cach³² salchar³³ 7-ar³⁴ fertain crist as-a-cathar nemda am-broind muire³⁵ o-techttairecht an-aingil docum³⁶ a-césta tar-ar-cend-ne³⁷ do-glan-sé an brú an-a-tainic-se 7-do-coiserc³⁸ an-eclais an-ar-crochad hé 7-do-glan³⁹ sé ar-peehaig-ne⁴⁰ gurab-aire⁴¹ sin adeir⁴² an-faid⁴³ do-ruaimretar mo lamha 7-mo-chosa 7-do-airmetar⁴⁴ mo-

¹ Omitted in *Eg*.² tiagernaibh.³⁴ docureth.⁵ dilus.⁶ cengal don cesad.⁷ da-eisimlarudh.⁸ dnin.⁹ tsolais aingidhi tuitimdhí ant sæghail 7 adeir.¹⁰ ona tairngedaibh.¹¹ Omitted in *Eg*.¹² pian.¹⁴ dar-uair.¹⁵ in ní-so nach fedadar cade re-denam adeir.¹⁶ na-ferinne.¹⁷ ar hanum.¹⁸ Inach césta crist e 7 adeir.¹⁹ cetusa.²⁰ Bernard gach uile cristaidhi condligenn cuime césta.²¹ Omitted in *Eg*.²² craidhehaibh.²³ co.²⁴ imurcus sgailad.²⁵ faidh da-feradh me mar-ferthar int-uisqui 7-do-sgailad mo.²⁷ cus.²⁸ aderthar.²⁹ 7-nnaguigid in talam ar an doirter. ³⁰ sgrisaidh se gach³¹ salchar 7-a-comlinad na fighrach so ar.

receive, for Thou didst give the Life that was nobler than all other lives for the sake of the life of sinners." Again Bernard says, "Why didst Thou make triumphal entry into the Temple, by which is meant, the joy and the splendor which preceded the time of thy suffering? And why didst Thou allow it for Thyself? For this reason, the prophets declared that sorrow is the end of every joy. For heavier and bitterer was the infliction of the torment of Christ than the joy of the procession which He made on Palm Sunday into Jerusalem; although they cried out to Him on that day, 'Blessed is the Son that cometh in the name of God,' that is, King of the people of Israel, yet the very same mouths said to him, after that, on Friday of the Passion, that they had no king but Caesar. And unlike each other were the things that were done to Him; for, on Palm Sunday, the princes and the rich folk put their noble garments under his feet, and the poor people spread various branches, the tops of trees. And He bore the cross and the crown of thorns, which were the fruit of those trees from leaf to root, namely, the electuary that saves the souls of the people who believe in them. And this same king was honored on the day of Palms by the princes who, as we have said, doffed their noble garments and put them under his feet, and then, on the day of the Passion, tore off his garments and cast lots on them." And Bernard says, that it was fitting to unite the triumphal entry with the Passion, to make manifest to us that sorrow and weariness shall be ours after the joys of this world. Bernard says, "He was scourged with scourges, and crowned with thorns, and his feet were pierced and his hands by the nails, accompanied by great pain and grievous forms of death, and I myself am unmindful of all the kinds of pain which He experienced. And He patiently called upon his Father; 'Do not pursue the Jews, O Lord, for what they do.'" Bernard says, "Be not scornful of thy soul, O righteous man, because its price was the Blood and Flesh of the Son of the heavenly Father." He says too, in *Psalmis*, "O Jesus, young, humble, most loving, why didst Thou endure the cross, since I am the cause of thy suffering?" Bernard says that every Christian

³³ mure oighi.

³⁴ dar cinn-ne.

³⁶ do-agris-se.

³⁸ uime-sin.

⁴⁰ in-faidh cetna.

³⁵ cum.

³⁵ do-choisric se.

³⁷ peceeth-ne.

³⁹ adubairt.

⁴¹ do-tairmhatar.

chnamha Adeir ant-udarras aca-tuicsin-so an-talam trebtar co-domin is-é-is-mó-torad curab amlaid sin is mosidi tslánaigter¹ lucht creidemna crist doimne² a-crecht tar-a-cenn ann sa-croich Adeir an-fáidh tucadar ole dam do-chind maithesa³ óir⁴ adubairt crist an-trath tucus-a-torad tucadar-sin aimritecht 7-an-trath tucus-a-betha tucadar sin bás 7⁵-an⁶-trath tucus-a-anoir tucadar sin aithis 7-an-trath tucus-a-leges tucadar sin crechta 7-do-malle ant-athar co-hobann aimridecht an-popuil gentlidi oir an-tan do iar se a-torad⁷ ní-fuair uatha acht a-duillebar .i. am-briatra dimæine in-a-sinagógaib .i. a-tighi⁸ gentlidi uarbarta ant-sean rechta 7-teach diles⁹ uarbarta de¹⁰ 7 na-croiche césta ac-a-facail folam¹¹ in¹² a-fásach.¹³ FINIT. [do sin uile a-manu scolaris].¹⁴

¹slanaighter.²doimne cr.³maithesa ar-persain crist nach adubairt.^{4,5}Omitted in *Eg.*⁶in tan.⁷torad .i. anmanna ní fuair.⁸tighibh.⁹Omitted in *Eg.*¹⁰dia 7 na-trocaire 7 na.¹¹Omitted in *Eg.*¹²folam finit amen.¹³*Eg.*¹⁴Translating from *Eg.*¹⁵Translating from *Eg.*

should be mindful in his heart of the Passion of Christ, and the priest and the bishop especially, for it is they that bear the consecrated crown. The prophet says, prefiguring the birth of Christ, "As water was poured, I was poured, and my bones were scattered." And not without reason is it said in this comparison of the Passion of Christ that water is poured, for the air is purified when the rain falls, and the rain freshens the earth whereon it falls, and all filth is banished. Now, when at the message of the Angel, Christ was shed from the heavenly city into the womb of Mary, He purified the womb into which He came, and, at the time of his suffering for our sakes, He consecrated the Church by his Crucifixion, and washed away our sins. Hence it is that the Prophet said, "My hands and my feet were pierced and my bones numbered." Authority says, to make this clear, that, as the ground most deeply ploughed is the one that giveth most fruit, so are they most healed who believe in the depth of Christ's sufferings for our sakes on the cross. The Prophet says, "Evil was given to me in return for good." For Christ said, "When I gave fruit, they gave barrenness; and when I gave life, they gave death; and when I gave honor, they gave insult; and when I gave healing, they gave wounds." And straightway the Father cursed the barrenness of the Gentiles, for, when He asked for fruit, He got nothing but leaves, that is, He got nothing but empty words in the synagogues, namely, in the houses of the heathen, the abode of the Old Law, and God's own house, the tabernacle of God and (of mercy and)^a of the cross of suffering was abandoned and deserted. Finit. (Amen. Here all this endeth, *a manu scholaris.*)^b

GEORGE W. HOXY.

SAINT THOMAS AND THE SOCIAL QUESTION.

The civilization of the middle ages differed fundamentally from that which preceded and that which followed it. The root of the difference was in the fact that religion was the source of action in the middle ages, that it dominated all spheres of effort and that it gave to life and society a character of homogeneousness which they possessed neither before nor since. The transformation from a pagan to a Christian form of society was slowly accomplished: the transition filled the centuries between the invasion and destruction of the Roman Empire by the German peoples and the restoration of political unity in Western Europe under Charlemagne. This long period of disorder and change was conducive neither to intellectual activity nor to social experiments, but it was a time of profound upheaval in all departments of life, and when Charlemagne assumed the imperial crown the Empire was Roman merely in name. Paganism was totally extinct. Pagan learning and pagan ideals had vanished, and in the ninth century the new order found its guides and the exponents of its purposes in the schools which arose under imperial and ecclesiastical patronage. These schools were preëminently Christian, and hence it is not surprising that civilization and learning took such a decidedly religious tone in the succeeding centuries. The theology and philosophy of these schools were a faithful reflection of the times. Theology was the Queen of Sciences, philosophy its handmaid. In a truly Catholic and eclectic spirit all streams of tradition were laid under contribution and all systems of thought thoroughly examined, until Scholasticism in its greatest exponent, St. Thomas Aquinas, without repudiating the idealism of Plato, pursued its ends under the realistic influence and with the objective methods of Aristotle.

In regard to social and economic questions, the change in method and environment produced no change in doctrine, and

the writings of St. Augustine remained throughout the middle ages the classical expression of the Christian concept of society and the State. A decided step in advance was made, however, through the dialectic methods of the scholastics. Because of the thoroughness with which all matters bearing on conduct and social relations were discussed, the obligations of different classes in society were set forth more fully and a much more complete and systematic presentation made of Christian duties and responsibilities than in the writings of the early Christian fathers. St. Thomas is not only the great leader of mediæval thought, but the recognized exponent of the Catholic idea of social relations.¹ Though the social question did not present itself to the mind of St. Thomas in the form in which it is understood to-day, it is possible to find in his works explicit statements and well-defined teachings which cover every phase of modern social and economic problems.² The doctrines of St. Thomas are not, it is true, expressed in a manner which corresponds precisely to the form in which these problems now present themselves, but because he did not deal *ex professo* with social and economic matters, and only discussed them incidentally in connection with his exposition of the general scheme of Christian morals, his words have all the greater weight as associating social duties and questions of wealth and property with the philosophy and practice of the Christian life.

What St. Thomas' philosophy of life and conduct was it is not necessary here to discuss. God for him was the Creator and end of all things: man was superior to all the rest of creation, by reason of the possession of an immortal soul. "There is one first of beings, possessing the full perfection of all beings whom we call God. Out of the abundance of His perfection He bestows being on all things that exist; and thus

¹ Leo XIII, Encyclical, *Acterni Patris*.

² See especially Schaub, *Die Eigentumslehre nach Thomas von Aquin und dem modernen Sozialismus*, Freiburg, 1898, and Walter, *Das Eigentum nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin und des Sozialismus*, Freiburg, 1895.

He proves to be not only the first of beings, but also the first principle of all. He bestows being on other things, not out of any necessity of His nature, but by the free choice of His will. His dominion over the things He has brought into being is a perfect dominion, since in producing them He needs the aid of no exterior agent, nor any subject matter to work upon, seeing that He is the universal efficient cause of all being.”³ “The final end of the universe being God, the intellectual nature alone attains Him in Himself, by knowing Him and loving Him. Intelligent nature therefore alone in the universe is in request for its own sake, while all other creatures are in request for the sake of it.”⁴ The end and purpose of human life being the attainment of happiness with God, the merit and value of all human action and effort was measured in accordance with the manner in which it promoted that end. “The proper act of everything is its end, as being its second perfection: hence what is well disposed to its own proper act is said to be virtuous and good. . . . To understand the most perfect intelligible object, which is God, will be the most perfect instance of the activity of understanding. To know God then by understanding is the final act of every subsistent intelligence.”⁵

Those few statements contain in substance the views of St. Thomas on the world and on man. His teaching in regard to property and wealth flowed directly from the same principles. Because God is the Creator of all things and because the world and all it contains are directly dependent on Him, it follows that He alone is the Lord of creation.⁶ He alone possesses absolute and unrestricted rights of possession. These rights extend even to men, because, being the source of all existence, His dominion knows no bounds.⁷ God created all

³ *Contra Gentiles*, III, 1.

⁴ *Contra Gentiles*, III, 112.

⁵ *Contra Gentiles*, II, 25.

⁶ *Summa Theologica*, I, XIII, 7, ad 5.

⁷ *Contra Gentiles*, III, 119.

things not for any gain that might accrue to Himself, but because it was fitting that He, the fountain of goodness should communicate Himself to others.⁸ Though creation could add nothing to the perfection of God, some created things were more perfect than others, in order that the more imperfect might serve the purposes of the more perfect. As plants use the earth for their nutriment, and animals plants, so do men make use of both plants and animals.⁹ It was because of his rational nature that man held the highest place among created things. "Since the preservation of order in creation is a concern of divine Providence, and it is a congruous order to descend by steps of due proportion from highest to lowest, divine Providence must reach by a certain rule of proportion to the lowest things. The rule of proportion is this, that as the highest creatures are under God and are governed by Him, so lower creatures should be under the higher and be governed by them. But of all creatures intelligent creatures are the highest. Therefore the plan of divine Providence requires that other creatures should be governed by rational creatures."¹⁰ The rights, however, which men possessed over the rest of creation did not impair the *principale dominium* of God, nor were they in themselves absolute. The distinction between divine and human rights was clearly drawn by St. Thomas, who pointed out that everything created can be considered either in regard to its nature, or being, and its use. As to its nature it is not subject to human but solely to divine power; but the use of external things has been granted by God to men for their benefit in accordance with the right exercise of reason and will.¹¹ The general rule therefore in regard to property is that it is to be looked on as coming from God the source and origin of all things and must be referred to Him as the end and aim of all things.¹²

⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 93.

⁹ *Sum. Theol.*, I, xcvi, l. c.

¹⁰ *Con. Gen.*, III, 78.

¹¹ *Sum. Theol.*, II, II, lxvi, ad 1.

¹² *Ibid.* I II. CII. 3. ad 1.

In everything therefore that constitutes true ownership men may be justly regarded as the masters of creation. They are such through the dispensation of the Creator, as shown in the order of the universe and in the divinely implanted needs of their own nature. This conception of the relation of man to the visible universe, namely that God is the source and real Lord of all things created, while men are merely administrators or trustees, formed the basis of the teaching of St. Thomas on property. In this connection two questions very naturally presented themselves. In the first place was the world given to the human race at large, in the sense that each man possessed an equal right to its fruits, so that men in a state of communism might be left to work out their destiny? Or if, on the other hand, private property was recognized, was its possession absolute and without restrictions? On each of those points St. Thomas expressed himself very decidedly. In regard to the first he maintained that private property was not only allowable but necessary.¹³ Its necessity was not founded in the absolute concept of human personality, or in the nature of the thing possessed, but in the actual needs of the individual, and the welfare of society.¹⁴ The basis of property rights was to be looked for in human nature as it is with all its failings and with its many wants. Private property, as St. Thomas understood it did not mean exclusively individual property. The State, the Church, the family as moral persons were also entitled to property rights.¹⁵ To the common objection against the institution of private property,—that it is opposed to the natural law according to which all things belong to men in common and that consequently private property is untenable,—St. Thomas answers that far from

¹³ *Sum. Theol.*, II. LXVI. ad 2 c.

¹⁴ *Sum. Theol.*, IIa IIæ. LVII, ad 3. Si enim consideretur iste ager absolute, non habet, unde magis sit hujus quam illius; sed si consideretur per respectum ad opportunitatem colendi, et ad pacificum usum agri, secundum hoc habet quamdam commensurationem ad hoc quod sit unius, et non alterius.

¹⁵ Walter, *op. cit.*, p. 13 seq.

justifying the claims of communism, the natural law lays down no rule or principle for the division of property. The manner in which property is divided is regulated neither by the laws of nature nor by the Creator but is entirely dependent on human industry and human effort guided by the laws of Justice and Charity.¹⁶ God endowed humanity with the earth and its fruits. Every man therefore was entitled to gain for himself from this common store what his needs demanded. This right of gaining and owning constituted the principle of private property.

While the rights of private property were thus unassailable, the laws in regard to the extent and the use of these rights were equally clear. In this matter, St. Thomas, while avoiding the errors of Communism and Socialism, was equally adverse to the teachings of the extreme Individualists and Liberals who attach neither limits nor responsibility to the possession of earthly goods. In the first place, since the earth and its riches belong not to men but to God, and since men must give a severe reckoning to the Almighty for the manner in which they use His gifts, they are entitled neither to misuse nor destroy the things they possess, because by doing so, they violate their trust, and injure the abstract rights of their fellow men to a share in the benefits intended for all.¹⁷

In defining the duties and responsibilities attaching to private property St. Thomas brings out in the clearest light the Christian doctrine of ownership, and gives an outline of the Christian social theories which prevailed in the middle ages which stands out in sharp contrast to the individualistic views which have gained ground in modern times. The fundamental idea which underlies this teaching in regard to the use of private property is that material things as such and for their own sake must

¹⁶ *Sum. Theol.*, II. II. LXVI. 2. ad 1. Ad primum dicendum, quod communitas rerum attribuitur juri naturali, non quia jus naturale dicitur omnia esse possidenda communiter, et nihil esse quasi proprium; sed quia secundum jus naturale non est distinctio possessionum, sed magis secundum humanum conductum, quod pertinet ad jus positivum.

¹⁷ *Catena in Matt.* 5. 42. See Schaub, *loc. cit.*, 257.

never be an object of effort. In comparison with heavenly things they are valueless, and are desirable only in as far as they are conducive to salvation. In addition to this the possession of earthly goods offers a real source of danger, because through solicitude for them a man may be withdrawn from the attainment of the real purpose of his existence. Nevertheless earthly goods are or can be for their possessor *bona utilia*, not in the sense that *utile* is synonymous with the "end" but merely with the "way" or "means." The real test of their value is to be found in love for God, in Charity. This is the norm and standard by which the worth of everything earthly is to be estimated. Together with this he lays down another general rule which is essential to a clear understanding of property relations, namely that man strives to attain his last end, not as an individual, but as a member of society, and hence the use of property is inseparable from obligations to one's fellows.¹⁸ This doctrine of the solidarity of mankind led to the formulation of another canon in regard to property in which St. Thomas, following the teaching of Aristotle that "it is best to have property private but to make the use of it common," lays down the principle that, "while it is right that men should have the ownership of property, the use of it should be common, so that the owner may the more readily minister therefrom to the needs of others."¹⁹

This doctrine that the use of property should be common was not intended to convey the idea that the owner was bound to share his goods with everyone, nor that everyone had the right to enjoy the possessions of his neighbor. If such was the case, there could be no such thing as private ownership. The common use of property and the right to demand a portion of another's goods was restricted to cases of extreme need. This was the principle according to which St. Thomas regulated

¹⁸ *Sum. Theol.*, II. II. XXXII. a. 5 ad 2. *Bona temporalia, quae homini divinitus conferuntur, ejus quidem sunt quantum ad proprietatem: sed, quantum ad usum non solum debent esse ejus, sed etiam aliorum, qui ex eis sustentari possunt ex eo quod ei superfluit.*

¹⁹ *Sum. Theol.*, II. II. LXVI. a. 2 c.

his doctrine regarding community of use, and having stated the principle he was careful to define the basis on which it rested and the occasions when it might be exercised. By extreme need he meant simply those cases in which life itself was at stake. The importance of the issues involved in this teaching required still further elucidation, and, in common with all Catholic moralists, St. Thomas made a distinction between different kinds of need, which he classed as extreme, grave, or ordinary. Extreme need exists when a person is so situated, that he cannot morally speaking and by his own efforts, avoid death or some other evil almost its equivalent such as a loss of health or being seriously maimed. A need is considered to be grave when heavy perils are not actually impending but are merely probable, or when there is great difficulty in acquiring things that are necessary. An ordinary need is one in which a person is so placed that he can by his own efforts escape grave or extreme evils, or when minor inconveniences cannot be removed without assistance from elsewhere. In order to still further safeguard the rights of property, and prevent the crime of theft, St. Thomas requires that before the principle of community of use in time of necessity can be invoked there must be evident signs that such need actually exists.²⁰ There can be no doubt but that such a principle could easily be misunderstood, and that it might lead to confusion and abuse, but St. Thomas had in mind rather the guidance of conscience than the formation of canons of social expediency. His teaching in the matter was a manifest conclusion from the doctrine that the earth is the common heritage of all men and that the right to existence is superior to any law of property. To supply one's necessities from the goods of another in case of extreme need was not theft.²¹ Nor was it strictly speaking a violation of the right of property, the primary function of which is the maintenance of human life.

In brief then the doctrine of St. Thomas on property is

²⁰ *Quodl.* 8. 12.

²¹ *Sum. Theol.*, II. II. LXVI. a. 7.

that God alone possesses absolute and unrestricted rights over all things created. Men, however, are proprietors in a true and real sense, but their rights are those of trustees or administrators, and because of this they are bound to exercise their stewardship in accordance with the laws laid down by the Creator. The rights of property are fixed and unassailable, but these rights have limits, and in cases of extreme necessity they have to yield before the higher right to life and existence.

The right to existence which makes the use of property common in cases of extreme need constitutes a strict obligation of Justice. There are other obligations no less binding which flow from the Christian law of Charity. These laws of Charity are inseparable from the social character which St. Thomas associated with property. It was on this point perhaps that the mediaeval view of property differed most broadly from the pagan idea of absolute ownership, and the extreme individualism of the present. It offered a bar to selfishness and egoism and, insisting on the mutual obligations of men towards one another and their duties towards society at large, brought out in the clearest light the Christian view of the solidarity of mankind. To promote and quicken this solidarity may be considered the principal object of property viewed in its social character. The manner in which St. Thomas expounds this doctrine of the social character of property offers a striking argument against the claims of socialists, and provides a remedy for the evils on which they base their claims. He lays it down as a general law of charity that the rich man and all who possess property, are bound to relieve the wants of the poor and other unfortunates out of their superfluous possessions.²² His doctrine in this matter has been the teaching of the Christian church at all times. "When what necessity demands has been supplied," says Leo XIII,²³ "and one's standing fairly taken thought for, it becomes a duty to give to the indigent out of what remains over. It is a duty, not of justice (save in

²² *Sum. Theol.*, II. II. LXVI. 7. c.

²³ *Encyclical, Rerum Novarum.*

extreme cases) but of Christian charity—a duty not enforced by human law. But the laws and judgments of men must yield place to the laws and judgments of Christ, the true God, Who in many ways urges on His followers the practice of almsgiving.” It is clear that the doctrine of almsgiving and the practice of the virtues of charity and beneficence are subjects which require considerable explanation. In view of differences of time, place and persons it is not possible to lay down general rules regarding the manner in which superfluous goods should be dispensed. As long as men are permitted to administer their property no external authority could, without violating the right of private ownership, dictate how these rules should be enforced. The only sure basis for their enforcement is that offered by the rigid adherence to the Christian law of fraternal charity. To the mind of St. Thomas beneficence founded in love constituted the true idea of almsgiving. There might be almsgiving of a merely material kind without love, but formal almsgiving when, for the sake of God, the distress of others is freely and gladly relieved, must have love as its source and principle.²⁴ The obligation of relieving the distress of those in need or the duty of almsgiving in its wide sense extends to spiritual as well as to material necessities. In regard to the latter point the obligation of almsgiving was defined by considering in the first place its character and in the second place its scope or extent. The duty of the rich or the property owner to his needy neighbors was measured by the extent of his superfluous goods, and the right of the recipient by the character or extent of his necessities. In order to make clear what is meant by superfluous goods, St. Thomas divides all property into three classes. First, that which is necessary for the preservation of the life of the owner or of those directly dependent on him; second, that which is necessary, not for the preservation of life, but for the maintenance of social position; third, that which remains after the necessities

²⁴ *Sum. Theol.*, II. II. XXXII. 1 ad I.

of life and the demands of social position have been satisfied.²⁵ The main difficulty in regard to this classification is in laying down definite and positive rules by which the goods of the third class, the superfluous goods, may be distinguished from those of the second class. As regards the duty of almsgiving, St. Thomas teaches that no one is bound to use the goods of the first class in assisting his neighbors even when these are in extreme necessity, because his action would be prejudicial to his own life and to the lives of those dependent on him, and before attending to the needs of others a man is bound to provide for himself and for those towards whom he has obligations. In regard to goods of the second class, the possessor is not *bound* to expend them in almsgiving except in cases where others are in *extreme* need. If, however, without grave prejudice to his condition in life, a man should devote some of the goods of this class to almsgiving, provided he does not go too far, he is free to follow his charitable instincts and his conduct in so doing is meritorious. In regard to the third class, the "superfluous goods," St. Thomas teaches that these are held in trust for the poor and that they must be expended in relieving the sufferings of those who are in want. This doctrine of St. Thomas has been the teaching of the Church at all times, but it is hardly necessary to say it is not a doctrine which is easily defined nor one which can readily be enforced. Fr. Garriguet holds that St. Thomas taught that a man is obliged to devote the whole of his superfluous goods to the support of the poor.²⁶ In practice, however, it is not easy to convince men that they are possessed of "superfluous" goods, nor to point out the extent of their superfluities. They can easily convince themselves that they require certain things to maintain a style of living to which they believe they are entitled, and because the economic basis of life is so thoroughly different from what it was in the time of St. Thomas, it is not hard to find reasons to excuse men who,

²⁵ *Sum. Theol.*, II. II. XXXII. a. 6.

²⁶ *La propriété privée*, Vol. II, p. 42.

because of uncertainty in business affairs and the necessity of providing for their children, accumulate a reserve fund which may serve at the same time to preserve them from need, and afford security against possible failure in the future. Consequently, even though it is not possible to lay down certain and definite rules in regard to the use of "superfluous goods," the doctrine of St. Thomas on the matter is clear, and the rich, in his view, cannot consistently with their duty as Christians, escape their obligations towards their less fortunate brethren.

The fact, however, that the rich are under this obligation does not give the poor the right to appropriate their possessions, except of course in case of extreme necessity. Their claim is merely one of charity. The rich, furthermore, if they fail to dispense what is over and above the demands of life and social station, may be considered to have kept something committed to them for the relief of others, and to have acted against the designs of divine Providence, but they are not guilty of injustice to any needy person in particular. No one, therefore is justified in considering that he has a special title to the superfluous possessions of the rich, for, conformably to the rules of charity, the rich man is free to select whomsoever he wishes as the object of his beneficence.²⁷

In dealing with the rights and obligations of property, St. Thomas was naturally most interested in the moral and religious aspect of the question. It would be an injustice to him, however, to consider him as a mere exponent of Christian morality and a social theorist. His whole line of reasoning shows that he was not concerned with the abstract question as to whether communism absolutely speaking was feasible or not, or whether it was more or less desirable than a condition of society in which the institution of private property was observed. He was eminently practical, and dealing solely with facts, and taking human nature as it is, he has offered economic reasons intended to show as well the impossibility of a socialist organisation as the absolute necessity for mankind of main-

²⁷ *Sum. Theol.*, II. II. LXVI. a. 7.

taining private property. Discussing the question as to whether private property is legitimate, he sums up his reasons under three heads, and concludes that it is not only legitimate but necessary: In the first place, because private property alone gives men a sufficient incentive to work; for everybody is more solicitous about what belongs to him alone, than about things which he holds in common with all or with many, and everyone avoids labor and leaves to others the care and trouble of things held in common, as happens in cases where there are many servants.

In the second place, the social organization itself is much better regulated, where each one has some special duties and obligations, for nothing but confusion can be looked for, if everyone is expected to interest himself in everything.

In the third place, peace and contentment will be more surely attained if everyone has his own property. Experience shows that in cases where several men hold the same thing in common quarrels constantly arise.²⁸

These three reasons show how thoroughly the views of St. Thomas are at variance with the theoretical socialism of the present. His belief in original sin and the necessity of individual effort under divine grace made it clear to him that no change in social environment could so affect the nature of men as to provide an adequate stimulus for effort, nor offer a sure foundation for permanent social relations. The modern socialist argues that, if property were abolished, zeal for the common good and the sense of solidarity would result in corresponding efforts for the common good and would eliminate passion, avarice and self-seeking from human nature.

On this point St. Thomas, by taking human nature as it is, as history has shown it to be from all time, and if the present and past are any indication of what the future will bring, as it will always be, offers a more reasonable solution of social ills than Socialists do, for he makes his theory of human society fit the facts of human nature. The Socialist, on the contrary,

²⁸ *Sum. Theol.*, II. II. LXVI. a. 2. c.

attempts to make human nature fit his theory, and, imagining human nature to be what it is not, promises to regenerate society economically by removing the most potent incentive to economic activity. Hence, in order to meet the first argument of St. Thomas the Socialist must be able to guarantee that if private property is eliminated, every man will put forth his best efforts, that production will be efficiently managed in the sense that every one will aim at producing the highest results with the least waste of effort and material, and in addition some reasonable and acceptable scheme of distribution must be devised. If the stimulus to reward in the shape of private property is removed, what manner of division can be resorted to by which the needs of the individual and society can be provided for? Shall there be an equal division of all the fruits of collective effort, or shall the reward be in proportion to the need of the individual, or according to the amount or the character of the work, or in accordance with the energy or industry shown in its accomplishment.

The second argument of St. Thomas that good order in society requires that private property should be maintained, goes directly counter to the fundamental tenet of socialism that ownership must be transferred to the community. This contradiction suggests a second category of difficulties with which the advocates of socialism have to deal and which their opponents constantly urge them to answer. It is not necessary to attempt to describe what a complete transformation of society the abolition of private property would bring about. With perhaps the exception of some novelists, the socialists themselves do not attempt such a description. They profess, however, that property is the basis of the present social organism, and St. Thomas' plea for the retention of private property in the interests of social order suggests the thought that it would be a dangerous expedient to transfer to the community rights for the exercise of which even the advocates of collectivism can offer no practicable scheme. If private property were abolished the socialist community would have no capitalist class, and

business in all its phases would be regulated by the community. Everything bearing on production and distribution would be the work of the whole body. This could be accomplished only through a highly centralized system of organisation, in which each man would be required to perform some work for the general good, to which he would be assigned by some official or board having authority from the community, and as equality should prevail some method must be elaborated by which this method of collectivist activity could be most efficiently exercised. The difficulties in the way of such a scheme, and the fact that no solution has hitherto been offered by which these difficulties might be met, can be taken as a justification for the argument of St. Thomas that public order is best conserved by respecting the rights of private property.

One of the stock arguments offered by socialists in favor of a change from a capitalistic to a socialistic regime is that most of the quarrels which arise among men are occasioned by property, and that consequently if property (the cause) were abolished, these disputes (the effect) would cease. St. Thomas did not deny that property is a fruitful source of dispute among men but he contends that private property is more conducive to social peace and order (*magis pacificus status conservatur*). The difference between the two views arises from a different estimate of human psychology. It would doubtless be admitted by both sides that the success or failure of any social scheme can be judged by the extent to which it contributes to the peace and contentment of those who compose it, but while the advocates of community control place the cause of disputes in something external to man, St. Thomas bases it on the ambition and lust for power innate in human nature which is supported by greater or less capacity for acquisition and aggrandizement. By transferring control over the instrument of power from the individual to the state, these differences in natural capacity would not be eliminated and, consequently, because the avenues of power would be open to a larger number, the reasons for dispute and disagreement would be more nu-

merous. Besides, if every man considered himself entitled to an equal share in the products of communistic effort, without regard to his contribution either of brains or muscle, nothing could be looked for except constant turmoil. Hence, because of the difficulties attending a change from one form of social organisation to another, and through the discontent arising therefrom, and because of the hardships inseparable from common control, it seems reasonable to conclude that the peace of society would be less likely to be disturbed if property rights were not interfered with.

Another prerogative of private ownership, the right of transmitting and inheriting property was based, according to St. Thomas, on the same reasons which justified the right to own private property. Social progress and the permanence and stability of social institutions demand, he says, that men, in addition to being permitted to possess private property, should have the right to transmit this to their heirs.²⁹ The same economic reasons sustain the rights of transmission and of possession, and if at the death of the owner control should pass from his heirs to the community, the stimulus and incentive to industry and effort would be removed and the same social confusion would ensue.³⁰ The right to inheritance is expressly stated by St. Thomas to be a secondary right of the natural law, because parents are obliged not only to provide for their children during the period of adolescence but for their whole lives.³¹ The right of inheritance is sedulously attacked by socialists and the incompatibility of their views with those of St. Thomas arises from the greater dignity attached by the latter to the human personality and the family in opposition to the socialist claim of the omnipotence of the state.

The reciprocal obligations of the individual as a member of

²⁹ IV. *Sent.*, xxxiii. ii. ii. 1 ad 1.

³⁰ II. *Pol.* 3.

³¹ IV. *Sen.*, xxxiii. ii. a. 1 c. *Matrimonium ex intentione naturae ordinatur ad educationem prolis non solum per aliquod tempus sed per totam vitam prolis.*

a society called the state, and of the state consisting of a number of individuals bound together for a definite purpose were searchingly analysed by St. Thomas. The fundamental postulate in his teaching regarding the state is that man is a social being and not only a social but a political being.³² While nature has provided other animals with the means of preserving life, it has endowed man with reason, by which, inasmuch as he cannot realize the full capabilities of his nature in solitary exclusiveness, he is led to seek union and fellowship with others. This necessity of nature towards organisation finds its expression in love or an inclination to the social life. Christian charity ennobles and consecrates this natural tendency and under its influence society can reach the highest perfection.

The fact, however, that men are led by nature to form political and social organizations does not mean that the individual is entirely absorbed in the community. Even as a social being he has rights which lie beyond the competence of the state. When, as may happen, the rights of the individual come into conflict with those of the state, and when the general welfare is at stake, St. Thomas asserts that the rights of the community are superior to any individual rights. "Private good," he says "is subordinate to the end of the common good: for the being of a part is for the sake of a being of the whole: hence the good of the race is more godlike than the good of the individual man."³³

Over and above the bonds of friendship and interest that exist among the members of the same state, arising from common customs and a common mode of life, St. Thomas insists that all men are brothers in the sense that all share the same nature and have the same end and destiny. The state must aid men to attain this destiny, and the means at its disposal are the exercise of its governmental powers. Such powers are necessary to the well being of men, and being ordained by God, no one is justified in opposing them.

³² *Con. Gen.*, III, 117. 128. 129, etc. *Sum. Theol.*, IIa. IIæ. CIX. 3 ad 1.

³³ *Con. Gen.*, III, 17.

Among the many functions of the State are the maintenance of peace and the preservation of Justice. But for all its functions and activities the prime source of unity and justice is Love, which alone begets peace and softens the rigors of justice. The state itself is incapable of promoting love among men. It may aid and produce conditions for its manifestation; but love and fraternity can be secured by only one power, that which works on the souls and minds of men, Religion.

Though the opinions of St. Thomas on society and the state were derived from the principles of religion, which elevates all men to equality by insisting on their common origin and common end, he did not consider that this equality extended to the possession of material things or riches. He assumed that there would be differences of class and that there would be rich and poor. The ownership of material things and the possession of riches was not in his mind incompatible with the Christian idea of society. In themselves and as creatures of God, material possessions were good: if evil was associated with them it was because of the manner in which they were abused. They might be made to minister to virtue, they were necessary for the various needs of life, and the effort to attain them was not sinful. But while they might be used as aids in promoting the salvation of the soul, they were frequently sources of danger and sin. This latter was especially true of riches in the narrow sense of the word, but St. Thomas does not find in the possession of riches anything that was contrary to the Christian religion or the Christian view of life. "To have riches and be their master," he says, "is one thing; to have them and be their slave is another. He is their master, who uses them well and derives fruit from them. He is their slave, whom they profit not."

This incomplete and summary statement of the views of St. Thomas gives no idea of the wealth of information contained in his works on all matters connected with the modern social movement. Production, distribution, equity between employers and workmen are all dealt with by him directly or indirectly.

His attitude represents the general teaching of the mediæval church, and his doctrines express fully what the early Christians aimed at without being able to impress their contemporaries, what the Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries not only taught, but in the more favorable conditions in which they lived, endeavored to make the general practice of their time. The coherence and unanimity which run through Christian teaching and Christian practice down to the end of the mediæval period show that Christianity is a real and potent social factor, that it has a social programme, and that much of the unrest of the present might be stilled by returning to the ideals of state and society and the conceptions of property and wealth which prevailed before the great social and religious upheaval of the sixteenth century.

The divergence between the opinions of St. Thomas and those expressed by the representatives of the more extreme form of socialism, arises from the fact that he viewed the world and human life teleologically, that in his mind they had meaning and purpose only in so far as they aided men to attain another and higher life in a world to come. He was equally opposed to the expression of unrestrained individualism either personally or economically, and to socialism with its depreciation of the value of personality. His system was neither individualistic nor socialistic, but was a combination of both. The individual is by nature social, but he is also dominated by self interest, and both instincts must be taken into account in attempting to formulate a scheme of social relations that will best contribute to the highest manifestation of human capabilities and best serve the ends of human existence.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

AN ACCOUNT¹ OF A RECENT PUBLICATION ON
THE GOLDEN PURPLE CODEX OF THE
PIERPONT MORGAN COLLECTION.

THE GOLDEN-LATIN-GOSPELS P In The Library of J. PIERPONT MORGAN (Formerly Known As The "HAMILTON GOSPELS" And Some times as KING HENRY THE VIIIth's GOSPELS), Now Edited For The First Time With CRITICAL INTRODUCTION And Notes And Accompanied by Four Full-Page Fac-Similes, By H. O. HOSKIER, New York, Privately Printed, MCMX, Fol., pp. cxvi, 365.

I.

THE PLACE OF THE J. PIERPONT MORGAN MANUSCRIPT
AMONG THE PURPLE CODICES.

It may not be amiss to preface the description of this sumptuously gotten up volume with some general information on the magnificent Morgan Codex and the class of manuscripts to which it belongs.

The art of Chrysography is very ancient. As early as the beginning of the second century B. C. we read in the Pseudo-Aristeas that the copy of the Sacred Scriptures which the high priest Eleazar sent to the King of Egypt was written in gold letters.² But it is not until the middle of the third

¹An *account*, not a *criticism*, our object being simply to call the attention of the public to Mr. Hoskier's work, and, especially to the P. Morgan Codex itself. We leave it for specialists in Latin Versions of the New Testament to criticise the author's methods and conclusions. *Ne sutor supra crepidam.*

²For the date of Aristeas' letter see Swete, *Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek*, Cambridge, 1900, p. 16, for the passage itself, p. 549, cf. Josephus, *Antiq. Jud.* XII, 10, Georg. Syncellus, *Chronographia*, edit. Dindorff, I, p. 517.

century of the Christian era that we find a mention of purple-dyed parchment or vellum being used further to enhance the beauty of chrysographic codices. Maximin the Younger had been presented by one of his aunts with a copy of the complete works of Homer written entirely in gold on purple vellum:³ From the time of Constantine this expensive style of Calligraphy was reserved, it seems, to the Sacred Scriptures and in particular, if we judge from the specimens that have come down to us, to such books of them as were of liturgical use, as the Psalter and above all the Four Gospels. This custom originated very likely with a desire of impressing the due reverence for the word of God upon the still spiritually untrained minds of the thousands who at that time were coming over to the Church from all ranks of society, within the Roman Empire and outside as well. St. Bonifacius, the Apostle of Germany, writing to the Abbess Eadburga (725) says: "I beg you also to write for me, in gold, the epistles of my Lord Peter the Apostle for the honor and reverence of the Sacred Scriptures before the eyes of my carnal auditors."⁴ The faithful also not unfrequently had such costly copies of the Gospels executed for their own private use, though not always for as commendable reasons. And this gave St. John Chrysostom the occasion of remarking in one of his homilies that fewer were those who cared to show that they knew the contents of the Gospels than those who boasted having them written in gold.⁵ The manuscripts were generally exceedingly large and heavy, and not always as remarkable for their correctness as for their price. "Let those who want them," says St. Jerome, "have ancient books, or books written in gold or silver on purple parchment, or in so-called uncial letters, written burdens rather than codices, *Onera magis exarata quam codices*."⁶

³ Historia Augusta, Jul. Capitolinus, *De Maxim. Jun.* iv, 4.

⁴ Epist. xix (Serrarius, xxviii), Migne, P. L., vol. 89, col. 712.

⁵ Hom. 32 in Joann. Migne, P. G. 59, col. 187.

⁶ *Praefat. in Job*, Migne, P. L., vol. 22, col. 418. Cf. *Epist. ad Eusebium, de custod. Virginit.*, *ibid.*, vol. 28, col. 1083.

None of these very early manuscripts written entirely in gold letters on purple are now extant. But we have several ones in silver letters, with, in some cases, portions in gold writing. The chief ones among the Greek manuscripts are first, the *Codex Beratinus* at Berat, Albania (Φ); it is entirely in silver letters and dates probably from the fifth century.⁷ Second, the *Codex Rossanensis* (Σ) in the Archbishop's library at Rossano, Southern Italy. It is written in silver letters, the first three lines of each Gospel being in gold, and dates probably from the sixth century if not a little earlier.⁸ Third, *Codex Purpureus* (N) the only known Greek purple manuscript until the discovery of (Σ); hence its name. Its probable date is the sixth century. The writing is in silver letters with the exception of the titles in the upper margins and the sacred names, God, Jesus, etc., which are in gold.⁹

The earliest purple Latin manuscripts are about of the same age and style as the Greek ones. The three best known are the *Codex Veronensis* (b) in silver letters of the fifth

⁷ It was described at length and illustrated with a plain photographic fac-simile by Abbé P. Batiffol who visited Berat in 1882, for that express purpose. His description is found in its ultimate form in *Archives des Missions Scientifiques*, Série III, vol. XIII, pp. 437 ff.

⁸ Gebhardt and Harnack who discovered it in 1879, published an account of it the following year, *Codex Rossanensis*, Lipsiae, 1880. "In a sumptuous form, far more satisfactory to the artist than to the Biblical critic" (Scrivener, *Plain Introduction to the N. T. Criticism*, 4th edit., 1894, I, p. 164). It is the earliest known copy of the Scripture with miniatures in water colors.

⁹ Forty-five folios only of this manuscript are known so far to be extant. Of these thirty-three are in the Library of the Convent of Patmos.—For an account and the text of these see L. Duchesne, *Mission au Mont Athos* in *Archives des Missions Scientifiques*, Série III, vol. III, Paris, 1876, pp. 386-419,—four at the British Museum (Cotton. Titus C. xv), two at Vienna (Lambec. 2) and six at the Vatican (Vatic. 3785). These last six were published with an excellent fac-simile in colors by Cozza-Luzzi, *Pergamene purpuree Vaticane di Evangelio a caratteri di oro e di argento*, Roma, 1887. It is very likely that the manuscript once was extant in its entirety at Patmos.

century.¹⁰ The *Codex Palatinus* (e) in gold and silver of the same date,¹¹ and the *Codex Saretianus* (j) in silver writing also of the same age,¹² the *Codex Brixianus* (f),¹³ and the Psalter of St. Germain, bishop of Paris († 576),¹⁴ both in silver and gold letters, and of the sixth century. To the sixth century also belongs the *Upsala Codex Argenteus* of the Gothic Version.¹⁵

For some reason or other manuscripts on purple vellum seem to have been much less common during the following two centuries. None at any rate are now extant that we could safely ascribe to the seventh century or to the first six or seven decades of the eighth, with the possible exception of a copy of the Vulgate of the Gospels in the golden capital letters which L. Delisle thinks might date from the eighth century. It contains now only St. Matthew and part of St. Mark.¹⁶

¹⁰ Published by Blanchinus (Bianchini) in *Evangelium Quadruplex*, etc. Rome, 1749. Cf. Gregory, *Prolegomena*, p. 954. The ms. is preserved in the Library of the Chapter of Verona (Italy).

¹¹ Vienna (Imper. Libr. Lat. 1185) and Dublin (Trinity College, N. 4, 18); cf. Gregory, *op. cit.*, p. 955.

¹² Published by Amelli, *Dissertazione Critico-Storica*, 2d edit. Milan, 1835, "with a fac-simile whose characters much resemble the round and flowing shape of those in a b f." Scrivener, *Plain Introduction*, etc., II, p. 48. Cf. Gregory, *Prolegomena*, p. 964, and Cozza-Luzzi, *op. cit.*, p. 5 f.

¹³ Published by Blanchinus, *op. cit.* Cf. Gregory, *op. cit.*, p. 957*. It is preserved in the Library of the Chapter of Brescia (Italy).

¹⁴ Paris, Bibl. Nation. Lat. 11947. Described in Sylvestre, *Universal Palaeography* I, p. 296 ff. *Album*, pl. cx (in colors).

¹⁵ An excellent fac-simile in colors of this beautiful manuscript (University Library, Upsala) will be found in *Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. IX, p. 616, and a brief notice, chiefly historical, in Scrivener, *Plain Introduction*, etc., 4th edit., II, p. 146.

¹⁶ Paris, Bibl. Nat. Lat. 11955. For particulars on this manuscript and information as to the literature concerning it, see Berger, *Histoire de la Vulgate pendant les premiers siècles du Moyen Age*, Paris, 1893. This is probably the *Codex Evangelii S. Matthaei* mentioned by Blanchinus, *Evangelium Quadruplex*, II, fol. dxcvii recto, col. 2, on the authority of Montfaucon, *Bibl. Biblioth.* II, p. 1041 and ascribed there to the seventh century. A few more Greek and Latin manuscripts of the Scriptures supposedly of the seventh century, are given by Blanchinus in his list of *Codices aurei, argentei et purpurei* (*op. cit.*, II fol. dxciii ff.), but we

Toward the end of the eighth century and during the early decades of the ninth century we meet again with quite a number of beautiful purple codices of the Vulgate. The appearance coincides with the revival of Chrysography, under Charlemagne. Several of them are probably due more or less directly to the Scriptorium that he had established in his own palace under the direction of Alcuin, the so-called Palatine School.¹⁷ Such are for instance the *Evangélaire de Godescalc* of 781-783, entirely in gold on purple,¹⁸ as are also the *Gospels of Abbeville* which belong to the end of the eighth or the beginning of the ninth century.¹⁹ The *Evangiles du Sacre*, found as the tradition goes, on the knees of Charlemagne when Otho III opened his tomb, are also in gold on purple, with the exception of the titles, in silver.²⁰ Let us mention also the *Bible de Théodulfe* one of the finest codices in existence. Some portions are in gold, others, in particular the Psalms and the Gospels, in silver letters on purple.²¹ Nevertheless the art of staining purple vellum was on the decline and soon after Charlemagne's death (814) it gradually went out of practice.

From the above remarks it really seems as if the seventh and eighth centuries marked the ebb in the production of manuscripts during the early medieval times. An exception, however, must be made in favor of Rome, where the pious industry of multiplying the Sacred Books for the local churches and the missions was, even then, flourishing as attested by history. St. Augustine and his companions whom St. Gregory the Great sent to preach the Gospel in England (597) were

have failed to identify them with now known manuscripts. Among them is a Greek copy of the Gospels all in gold on purple vellum which Montfaucon saw at St. John de Carbonara (Naples) and pronounces a manuscript of quite exceptional beauty, *nihil porro concinnius vidimus* (Montfaucon, *Palaeographia Graeca*, p. 4).

¹⁷ Berger, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

¹⁸ Paris, B. N. Nouv. acq. Lat. 1933. See Berger, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

¹⁹ Abbeville, Library of the city, No. 1; see Berger, *op. cit.* pp. 267, 374.

²⁰ Vienna, Imperial Treasury; see Berger, *op. cit.*, pp. 275, 421.

²¹ Paris, Bibl. Nat. Lat. 9380. For a full account of this Bible see Berger, *op. cit.* p. 149 ff., 405.

certainly well stocked with books from the Roman copying-rooms when they left the Eternal City. We know also from the *Ecclesiastical History* of Bede that St. Benedict Biscop, abbot of the two Northumbrian monasteries of Wearmouth and Jarrow, made five pilgrimages to Rome, and in at least three of them, collected a large number of books for the use of the Anglo-Saxon churches.²² Soon, however, scriptoria were established in the various monasteries of Northumbria which, in course of time rivalled—and if we judge from the specimens that have come down to us—outstripped those of the Mother-Church. It is enough to mention the famous *Codex Amiatinus*²³ which Ceolfrid († 716) companion and successor of St. Benedict sent as a present to the Holy See; the Lindisfarne Gospels (Br. Mus. Nero, D. 4) copied by Eadfrid († 721) in the “holy island” of Lindisfarne “in honor of St. Cuthbert” († 687) about 700, the Stonyhurst Gospel of St. John found in St. Cuthbert’s coffin in 1104.

It would be surprising that monks who could execute manuscripts of such exquisite taste as those should have never thought of trying their hands at chrysographic codices on purple vellum. That they did so in at least one instance is a fact that cannot be called in question. In St. Wilfrid’s life written soon after his death by Eddius Stephanus, we read that the saintly Archbishop of York who was also abbot of Ripon had presented the Church of this monastery with just

* Cf. the letter of St. Martin I (640-655) to Amandus, bishop of Trajectum (Maestricht): Reliquias vero Sanctorum de quibus praesentium iator nos admonuit dari praecepimus. Nam codices jam exinaniti sunt a nostra bibliotheca et unde ei dare nullatenus habuimus; transcribere autem non potuit quoniam festinanter de hac civitate regredi properavit (Migne, *P. L.*, vol. 87, col. 138).

²³ Thus called from the Abbey of Monte Amiato, near Siena where it was preserved for many years. It is now in the Laurentian Library of Florence. On this beautiful ms. see De Rossi, *La Bibbia offerta da Ceolfrido Abbate al Sepolcro di S. Pietro*, etc. Rome, 1887, (with fac-simile of folio bearing the dedicatory inscription, also Vigouroux, *Dictionn. de la Bibl.* I, 480 ff. (Art. *Amiatinus*, by P. Batiffol, with a good fac-simile of the upper half of a page).

such a copy of the Gospels on the day of its consecration: “. . . addens quoque Sanctus Pontifex noster inter alia bona dona ad decorem domus Dei inauditum ante saeculis nostris quoddam miraculum. Nam quattuor Evangelia de auro purissimo in membranis depurpuratis²⁴ coloratis pro animae suae remedio scribere jussit, necnon et bibliothecam librorum eorum omnem de auro purissimo et gemmis pretiosissimis fabrefactam compaginare inclusores gemmarum jussit.” (Gale, *Historiae Britannicae*, etc. *Scriptores* XV, Oxford, 1694, p. 60, cf. Hoskier, p. xii f.)

This interesting passage of St. Wilfrid's life leads us naturally to speak now of the Morgan manuscript, for no less an authority in paleography than Wattenbach suggested that it might be the very manuscript mentioned by Eddius Stephanus.²⁵

The verso of the first folio which is of purple color like the others and serves as guard-leaf, shows the coat of arms of the Kings of England, with the following inscription in a beautiful hand of the sixteenth century and in gold letters:

FATO SERVATUS TIBI SUM, TER MAXIME PRINCEPS
TE QUOQUE SERVAVUNT AUREA FATA MICH
INSTAURATA NITENT PER TE SACRA DOGMATA PER TE
AUREUS EST AUTHOR CHRISTUS UBIQUE MEUS

and, on an inserted leaf, a note states that this manuscript was sent to Henry VIII, as a present by Leo X.²⁶ How old this note is, we are not told by any of the few who have written about our manuscript. At any rate Wattenbach²⁷ is of the

²⁴ Sic! read *de purpura* (?) as in *Blanchinus*, *op. cit.*, fol. dxcii recto a, who quotes from Mabillon's *Acta Sanct. Ord. Benedicti*, Saec. IV, part II, p. 552. Yet Hoskier, who seems to quote from Mabillon, has also *depurpuratis*.

²⁵ See below in our description of Mr. Hoskier's *Introduction*.

²⁶ Wattenbach, *Sitzungsberichte d. Kön. Preuss. Akad. d. Wissensch. zu Berlin*, 1889, p. 152.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

opinion that the latinity of the inscription, the last verse in particular, is not quite good enough for the Chancery of Leo X. He would rather attribute it to Cardinal Wolsey, Archbishop of York, in whose diocese the monastery of Ripon was. Mr. Hoskier hesitates to accept this view because the supporters of the coat of arms do not tally with those of Henry VIII. For the same reason he rejects also the suggestion by the author of the Hamilton sale Catalogue—who sees in the words *instaurata . . . dogmata* an allusion to the Reformation—that the dedication might refer to Edward VI.²⁸ Samuel Berger, on the other hand offers quite a different theory. He remarks that the guard-leaf on which the dedication now is, has lost its companion. This, he supposes, once bore the dedicatory distichs addressed to Charlemagne by one of his familiars who had this masterpiece of Chrysography executed. Later, when the manuscript was presented to the King of England, the donor cut off this folio and had the inscription copied again on the companion blank folio and accompanied with the royal English coat of arms. Mr. Hoskier for reasons which will become apparent in our description of his book rejects also this hypothesis, denying in addition, that any folio was cut off, (p. 1.) So all we can say is that some time during the sixteenth century our manuscript was in the possession of one of the Kings of England or of some member of the royal family, granted that the coat of arms could have belonged to some other person than the King himself. Later it came into the possession of the Marquis of Douglas and Clydesdale²⁹ and passed afterwards into the Library of the Duke of Hamilton, where it was known as Codex Hamilton 251. In 1882 the whole Hamilton collection was bought by the royal Chalcography of Berlin with the understanding that the British Museum should have the privilege of purchasing back a certain number of

²⁸ P. 1; cf. Berger, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

²⁹ Wattenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 152. According to S. Berger, *Hist. de la Vulgate*, p. 397, the fly-leaf bears the following note: Douglas et Lyderdale, 1300, Londini, 1747.

valuable manuscripts of special interest to England. Among these were our Gospels. But the direction of the British Museum having failed to raise the money necessary for the purchase in proper time, the royal Chalcography of Berlin directed Mr. Truebner, the book-dealer of Strassburg, to resell those manuscripts at auction. The sale took place at Sotheby's, London, in 1889, when the Hamilton purple Gospels fell to Mr. Quaritch, the well-known English antiquarian, who sold them the following year to Mr. Thomas Irwin of Oswego (N. Y.). They now belong to Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan the American *Mæcenas*. To him from its folds of purple the golden voice of this truly royal manuscript justly repeats the first distich of the dedicatory inscription:

FATO SERVATUS TIBI SUM, TER MAXIME PRINCEPS
TE QUOQUE SERVAVUNT AUREA FATA MICHI.

The literature on our manuscript is scanty. In 1887, W. Wattenbach published a first notice in the eighth volume of the *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere Deutsche Geschichtskunde*, pp. 343-346, and a second one: *Ueber die mit Gold auf Purpur geschriebene Evangelienhandschrift der Hamilton'schen Bibliothek* (in *Sitzungsberichte d. Preuss. Akad. d. Wissenschaften*, 1889, pp. 143-156). A description with a facsimile in gold and colors appeared in *Catalogue of manuscripts chiefly from the Hamilton collection*, 1889, No. 1, gotten up in view of the auction sale, we suppose, and another one in *B. Quaritch's rough list*, No. 99. Finally, Samuel Berger who examined the manuscript while it was in the hands of Mr. Quaritch, and obtained additional information on its text, through the Rev. B. W. Bacon, when it had become the property of Mr. Irwin, devoted to it several pages of his excellent book, *Histoire de la Vulgate dans les premiers siècles du Moyen Age*, Paris, 1893, pp. 37, 259-262, 277, 397 f. The descriptions of W. Wattenbach and S. Berger, though not as complete as one might wish, are well worth reading; from them chiefly

we have gleaned most of the information, just imparted to our readers, on the history of the Morgan Codex.

II.

DESCRIPTION OF MR. HOSKIER'S PUBLICATION.

The title³⁰ adopted by Mr. Hoskier does not convey quite an accurate idea of the various elements of the publication to which it is prefixed. In fact the book consists mainly of an *Introduction*, *Preliminary Remarks*, four full page *Fac-similes* and a collation of the text (not an edition) with full critical apparatus, written in Latin, under the title of *Lectiones Variae*, etc. Of special importance among the accessories (Preface, Indexes, Colophon of the printer, etc.) is the *Appendix*, a collation, in Latin equally, of a fragment of the Gospels also in Mr. Morgan's collection.

We shall now proceed to describe each of the five chief portions of the book.³¹

INTRODUCTION, (pp. xi-cxvi).—In the first fifteen pages the writer tries to establish that the Morgan Codex was written on the British soil, in the last decades of the seventh century, as against Samuel Berger,³² who considers it a product of the Palatine school inaugurated by Charlemagne, or of the north of France. He disagrees also with Wattenbach, who while ascribing the manuscript to the same date as Hoskier (since he identifies, or at least grants the possibility of identifying it with the famous manuscript executed by order of Wilfrid, Archbishop of York, and presented by him to the monastery of Ripon) still doubts whether it was written in Rome or in

³⁰ See above.

³¹ In this description square brackets indicate our insertions where we quote Mr. Hoskier, whether verbatim or not.

³² *Histoire de la Vulgate*, etc., pp. 259 ff.

England.⁸³ To prove his position, Mr. Hoskier establishes a comparison of the Morgan Codex with a number of well-known Codices of undoubted British origin and generally ascribed to the same age as he claims for the former. After this Mr. Hoskier goes into a detailed study of the text of the old Latin manuscripts and of some of the most famous Greek Codices and investigates the relation of the Latin texts to the Coptic, all this with a view to show the ancestry and affinities of the Morgan text, which he, afterwards traces through the *Saxon Versions*. "When we find," says Mr. Hoskier in his preface, "that our manuscript is sometimes alone, or nearly alone with *a* [*Cod. Vercellensis*], or *b* [*Cod. Veronensis*] or *d* [*Cod. Bezae*], or with *ff*² [*Cod. Corbeiensis* 2], or *h* [*Cod. Claramontanus*], or *k* [*Cod. Bobbiensis*],—or *r* [*Cod. Usserianus* 2], or *g1* [*Sangermanensis*],—as to forms; and when we find ourselves alone with *ℵ* [*Sinaiticus*] or *A* [*Cod. Alexandrinus*], or *D* [*Cod. Bezae*], or 59, 73 (Syr. S. Goth.) or *CS* [*Cod. Ephraemi* and *Cod. Rossanensis*] of the Greeks, or with *a d δ* together in Greek order; or alone with Irenaeus' translator, or Lucifer, or with Coptic, we realize that we are face to face with a problem of deepest interest. For this does not mean that the text is a mixed text, but that the *Ur-text* or *base* goes very, very far back and contains some of the elements of the other texts, which have come down to us by branches, yet originally was another recension, lost to us otherwise, which we recognize by a few unique readings which have weathered the storm of revision and transmission and still linger amid the older surroundings." A few lines further, the author states his method as follows:—"From Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, the Curetonian, Syriac and the Coptic versions, we carry the history of our text through the *Codex Vercellensis* (*a*) to St. Patrick, then, with the *Codex Bezae* (*d*) and Columbanus' less pure *r* on Irish soil through the VI and VII centuries with the

⁸³ *Ueber die mit Gold auf Purpur etc., Sitzungsab. d. Preuss. Akad. s. Berlin, 1889, p. 153.*

Book of Durrow, to the time when the Manuscript itself was written; and thence running concurrently with the other English Texts A (*Amiatinus*) and Y (*Lindisfarne*) with L (*Chad*) through D [*Liber Armachanus*] Q [*Book of Kells*] R [*Cod. Rushworth*] to E [*Cod. Marmoutier*—British Museum Egerton 609], and beyond.”

PRELIMINARY REMARKS (pp. 1-71).—In the preliminary remarks Mr. Hoskier treats of the external appearance of the Codex (size and color of parchment, arrangement of folios into quires, signatures, disposition of text on the page, etc.) and especially, of the script (shape of letters, ligatures, abbreviations) and of various peculiarities or defects of spelling and accentuation. He insists more than on any thing, on the script and spelling in this manuscript. While Wattenbach distinguishes but two hands, Mr. Hoskier sees forty-five different ones.³⁴ Some extend over one or more quires, most of them over but a few folios, or even a dozen lines or so. This number seems formidable. It is “unheard of so far in a manuscript,” says Mr. Hoskier, “but, if we have erred we cannot possibly have erred fifty per cent, and therefore over twenty different hands would remain” (p. 3). Occasionally also he calls attention to some special or rather characteristic readings of the several scribes. Mr. Hoskier finds it difficult to account for so many hands writing such a very varying amount of copy. At first he supposed that the execution of the manuscript was on the nature of a rush order. Why so, he explains on page 3. This manuscript he *hesitatingly* suggests was perhaps written by order of St. Wilfrid like the one which he presented to the Church of Ripon (see above, page 592). “It might be that he wished to offer something to the Roman authority before

³⁴ He describes every one of them in the greatest detail, with an amazing perspicacity. Here he sees that the scribe is a man of versatile character, or over-confident, there, that he was tiring, or sick, in another case although the writing of a scribe is large “and writing becomes smaller as we advance in age” Mr. Hoskier judges that he was an old man, for his style favors the ancient division of lines.

whom he was twice cited to appear (and twice acquitted of the charges preferred against him) and that he deliberately had the members of his monastery at Ripon (or elsewhere) enter the Scriptorium and assist in executing the present he designed, also deliberately copying Italian rather than English or Irish forms, though enough of them linger to show the local origin of the ms. . . . Haste in execution might also be accounted for by his order to appear at Rome within a certain time. Or again, upon his return, he might have wished to show his gratitude to Pope Agatho, or the later Pope John. At any rate a voyage of such a ms. to Italy might well account for the inscription later on its return as a present in the XVI century." This way, however, of accounting for a rush order was abandoned by Mr. Hoskier. "The above," he says in a foot note to the preceding words, "written long since we allow to stand; but it is our conviction that the ms. never left England at all, as the continuity of its text runs straight on through R to W in the XIII century³⁵ as shown elsewhere." Still on page 57 Mr. Hoskier seems to cling to the theory of the rush-order—though for what other reason he does not state—and he tries to explain how time could be gained by multiplying the copyists "it being evident that each scribe must have completed his task before the other could begin at the proper place where the former left off, and there is only one place in the whole book where the scribes do not meet exactly and only two letters are missing there." We confess that we fail to grasp the solution he offers. But this does not matter, as probably Mr. Hoskier having abandoned the only reason he mentions anywhere for a rush order abandoned also this explanation.³⁶ And this is very likely why on this very page 57 he

³⁵ R = Rushworth Gospels, IXth century, Oxford, Bodl. Auct. D. 2, 19, also called Gospels of Mac Regol. W = Brit. Mus. Reg. 1 B. XII.

³⁶ We give it here however, for the benefit of our readers and in justice to Mr. Hoskier . . . "if we suppose that the exemplar serving as a model was recopied line for line, we establish two things, 1st, the probability of the "rush-order" and the possibility of its being carried out

proposes another theory to explain the large number of hands, viz., that all the brothers of the monastery were given an opportunity of writing a part—large or small according to their ability and handwriting—for an important *patron*, or purpose or occasion." A question of sentiment, therefore, not one of expedition.

FAC-SIMILES.—These are evidently intended for the *Preliminary Remarks* which we have seen are chiefly concerned with the Paleography of the manuscript. However, they have been distributed throughout the book as follows: The first, before the general title, in colors, showing golden letters on purple vellum: (S. Matthew, x, 29-xi, 1); the second, also in colors, showing golden letters on bluish vellum: (S. John, xviii, 6-19); the third, between the INTRODUCTION and the sub-title of the PRELIMINARY REMARKS, plain phototype, letters in white on gray ground: (Luke, xviii, 43-xix, 14). The fourth one, immediately after sub-title of *LECTIONES VARIAE*, letters and ground as above: (S. Matthew, vi, 13-24).

LECTIONES VARIAE (pp. 175-344).—The collation of the text is based on the Clementine edition of the Vulgate, Rome, 1592. Mr. Hoskier first undertook it at the request of Abbot Gasquet for the use of the Benedictine revisers of the Vulgate. But he soon detected that the text of the Morgan manuscript was of considerable importance for the history of the Old Latin version and incidentally for that of the original Greek, and for the textual history of the Syriac, Northern Coptic and Gothic versions, and could not refrain from extending his collations to all of these, for the Synoptic Gospels. For the Gospel of St. John he went even further, drawing in the Southern Coptic, the Armenian, the Arabic, the Ethiopic and even the Old and later Saxon. The readings, where not appearing for the first time, are generally taken from the latest and most reliable editions and authorities, and to these Mr.

by a large number of scribes; and 2nd, that an exemplar (since perished) of a much earlier date existed with this very text.—Thus we add an indeterminate number of years to our manuscript's age."

Hoskier, in some instances refers us for fuller statement, the evidence in the collation being, as he says, "perforce condensed to the limit." In the case of Wordsworth, when our author differs from him, "the evidence has been checked and should be correct." Nor has Mr. Hoskier neglected the Fathers, such as S. Justin, S. Cyprian, S. Jerome, S. Patrick. This great accumulation of readings, he warns us "is not a rehash but a careful attempt to show action and reaction of the versions one upon the other and to help to untangle the intricacies of the transmission, as such it is hoped that it will be found useful and not too elaborate. Care has been taken, when possible, to bring into juxtaposition readings which may have a bearing upon each other.—The late Saxon has been occasionally introduced to show our [manuscript's] influence and that of others upon it." (p. cxvi). An *Elenchus* of the codices used in this collation is prefixed to it. It shows in every case the edition or authority followed by Mr. Hoskier, together with the presumed age of the Codex. We find there all the best known manuscripts of the Vulgate (32 mss.) and Itala (28 mss.) which Mr. Hoskier cites throughout his collation, and a good many others which are cited occasionally only, as a rule from some good authority, as the Catalogue of Ancient Manuscripts in the British Museum,³⁷ (16 mss.), the "*Ada Handschrift* of Corssen *et al.* Leipzig, 1889 "³⁸ (40 mss. mostly from *Bibliothèque Nationale* of Paris and other French Libraries) and from the "*Schepps edition*, Würzburg, 1887 "³⁹ (13 mss.). Then come the editions of the Vulgate: Stephanus (1546) Henten (1583) the Sixtina (1590) and the Clementina (1592),—the Oriental Versions: Syriac, from the editions of Gwilliam (Peshitto), Burkitt (Curetonian and Sinaitica) and Gibson-Lewis (Hieronymian); Arabic Diatessaron mostly from

³⁷ With autotype Facsimiles, Part I, Greek, 1881, Part II, Latin, 1887.

³⁸ *Die Trierer Ada-Handschrift bearbeitet und herausgegeben*, Leipzig, 1889, (with 38 plates) by several authors; the dissertation by Corssen.

³⁹ Presumably *Die ältesten Evangelien handschriften der Würzburger Universitätsbibliothek*, Würzburg, 1887.

the edition of Hogg, Coptic (Bohairic) from the edition of Horner; the others from Tischendorf and others.—Finally the Fathers from Galland and other ancient and modern editions. In this formidable array of Codices and authorities we miss entirely the Greek Codices, a good many of which, the Sinaiticus especially, appear quite often in Mr. Hoskier's Critical Apparatus.

APPENDIX (pp. 345-357).—The subject of the Appendix is a fragment of 18 folios of the VII or VIII century. It shows portions of St. John and St. Luke, bound, as it seems, without regard to the order of books and chapters. This fragment comes from the Libri Collection, and originally belonged to the same ms. as a Nuremberg fragment published by Dombart in *Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftliche Theologie* (Leipzig, 1881, pp. 465-478). The collation was undertaken by Mr. Hoskier at the request of Abbot Gasquet and the sign $\overset{\circ}{M}$ has been adopted to designate this fragment.

H. HYVERNAT.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Handbook of the Divine Liturgy. A Brief Study of the Historical Development of the Mass, by Charles Cowley Clarke. St. Louis, 1910. Herder, 90 cents net.

The professed object of this book, which is to provide beginners with the results arrived at by liturgical scholars who have written on the Mass, is surely most praiseworthy. It is not an object, however, which the author has very successfully achieved, for his work leaves much to be desired both as to matter and manner. Parts of the Mass are only slightly commented on, other parts are altogether passed over, and the explanations which are given are wordy and confused. The English translation of the prayers of the ordinary is certainly not rhythmic, is often unidiomatic, and in some places is quite faulty as a rendering of the Latin. This is especially true of the three prayers before the priests' communion. The rubrics, for some reason, have not been translated. In their place the author has substituted a set of rubrics of his own. This will be quite misleading to the reader who is unacquainted with the Latin text. A popular and at the same time a scholarly account of the missal is still a *desideratum* for the English reader who desires to know something of the history of the Latin liturgy.

WILLIAM I. MCGARVEY.

On the Priesthood. A Treatise in Six Books by Saint John Chrysostom, translated by the Rev. Patrick Boyle, C. M. New York, 1910. Benziger Bros.

The spiritual works of the Fathers, unlike other books of piety, have an enduring vigor and freshness which make them suitable for every age. This is especially true of St. John Chrysostom's treatise *On the Priesthood*. Written about A. D. 373 its counsels and warnings are just as pertinent today as they were in the fourth century. This translation by Father Boyle is from Migne's

text collated with the edition of Marion, and in its smooth and readable English is an example of what a translation ought to be.

WILLIAM I. MCGARVEY.

A Medieval Mystic. A Short Account of the Life and Writings of Blessed John Ruysbroeck, Canon Regular of Groenendael, A. D. 1293-1381, by Dom Vincent Scully, C. R. L., London, 1910. Thomas Baker.

This is an interestingly written biographical sketch of a Flemish priest whom the Supreme Pontiff has recently enrolled among the Beati. John Ruysbroeck was one of the most eminent of the mystics of the Middle Ages, and exerted a profound influence upon his contemporaries. For thirty years he, with a number of others, lived together as secular priests bound by no other rule than their profound spirit for prayer and intense desire for purification. In deference to the wish of the Bishop they were in A. D. 1349 organized into a community under the rule of the Canons Regular of Saint Augustine. Blessed John's reputation for sanctity, and spiritual insight attracted to him many disciples, among whom was the famous Gerard Groote, the Founder of the Brethren of the Common Life. It was from Ruysbroeck that Groote drew his spiritual principles for the guidance of this new community. And it was these principles under which Thomas à Kempis was formed, and which found expression in his immortal work, *De Imitatione Christi*. Tauler was also deeply indebted to Ruysbroeck, or at least to his writings, which he laid under generous contribution. A critical edition of all the works of the Mystic of Groenendael is now in course of preparation in Louvain, and an English rendering is expected to be undertaken before long.

WILLIAM I. MCGARVEY.

The Roman Breviary. Its Sources and History, by Dom Jules Baudot. Translated from the French by a Priest of the Diocese of Westminster. St. Louis, 1909. Herder. \$1.00 net.

The Breviary is one of the great storehouses of the Church's

tradition, for in it are gathered the treasures of piety and devotion which faith has produced during the ages. If we would have a right understanding of its contents an acquaintance with the history of its development is of the first importance. We welcome therefore this translation of Dom Baudot's compendious work, providing as it does the English reader with a clear succinct account of the growth of the Divine Office. The book is largely a résumé of Dom Baumer's great work, but Batiffol, Cabrol and others have also been laid under contribution, so that the reader has in this volume a fair epitome of the latest conclusions of scholars in this department of research. Dom Baudot agrees with Baumer, Lévêque, and Morin, as against Batiffol, in attributing to St. Gregory the great credit of having codified the Roman Office. He also takes sides against Batiffol with regard to the influence exerted by Pope Gregory VII on the office. Batiffol maintains that this Pontiff made no sensible modification in the Roman Office. Baudot, on the contrary, sees in him a liturgical reformer laboring to revive Roman usages in opposition to innovations which had shorn the liturgy of much of its dignity and beauty. The work done by Franciscans in popularizing the shortened office of the Roman Curia, the efforts at reform prior to the Pian Breviary, and the manifold French schemes are all tersely yet clearly and interestingly related. The author concludes by expressing the wish that, in case of any further revision of the Beviary, the ferial office may be reinstated, that a new distribution of the psalms be made, and that the length of the office may be reduced on certain ferias and especially on Sundays. A few notes are added at the end by Baudot himself which are not in the French original. The whole volume as a translation is a most creditable piece of work, and is a valuable addition to English liturgical literature.

WILLIAM I. MCGARVEY.

Études de critique et d'histoire religieuse. Deuxième Série. Par L'abbé E. Vacandard, Aumonier au Lycée Corneill à Rouen. Paris. Victor Lecoffre. (J. Garabalda et cie), 1910. 120. Pp. iii + 308.

The essays which compose this volume all deal with subjects of living interest. Most of them have already appeared as articles

in the *Revue du clergé français*, the *Revue des questions historiques*, and the *Revue pratique d'apologétique*. The author, however, has taken advantage of this new edition to enlarge, and in some cases to make more clear the views which he expressed when the studies first appeared. In the essay on the "Formal Institution of the Church by Christ" which opens the series, M. Vacandard replies to the attack made on the origin of the Church and shows the futility of attempting to make a distinction between the "Christ historique" and the "Christ resuscité." The second essay, dealing with the origin of confession, is a short account of the early history of that sacrament. The other studies deal with the question of military service among the Christians of the first centuries. The council of Macon and the question regarding the souls of women, the Albigensian Heresy in the time of Innocent III, and the nature of the Coercive Power of the Church which is an elaboration and defence of some opinions expressed by the author in his work on the Coercive Power of the Church and the Inquisition. A series of appendices still further elaborating some points touched on in the text is found at the end of the volume. They are the work of the Abbé Misset, and were originally written as replies to some of the critics of M. Vacandard. Though the subjects dealt with are for the most part controversial, the author has not failed to draw at times a useful lesson, as for instance in his chapter on the Christian and Military Service, where he has pointed out the impropriety of requiring priests or those destined for the ministry to bear arms. The question regarding the Council of Macon and the souls of women is disposed of in a few pages, but in such a thoroughly convincing manner that it is to be hoped that this old legend will no longer be offered as historical fact.

PATRICK P. HEALY.

The Parallel between the English and American Civil Wars.

The Rede Lecture delivered in the Senate House, Cambridge, on June 14, 1910. By Charles Harding Firth, M. A., Regius Professor of Modern History, Oxford. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1910. Pp. 50.

This lecture offers a good example of a process of education, the purpose of which in former times was said to be *ad torquenda*

ingenia. The author commences his discourse with the assurance that history never repeats itself, and ends with the statement that "an historian needs the fuller evidence which time alone can bring in order to complete the parallel between the results of the two civil wars." Until all the evidence is in it would perhaps be better not to pronounce judgment on the present attempt to point out similarities in these two great events. The drawing of parallels will know no restrictions if authors permit themselves the liberties taken by Mr. Firth, who in his quest has at times ranged very far afield, as for instance in comparing the social and political difficulties in Ireland, which he considers a racial question and a consequence of the policy of Cromwell and the Puritans, and the negro question in the United States which is the result of giving the suffrage to the negro race. The book is well written, The publishers have made a volume that is a credit to them, but, to what purpose?

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Religion in New Netherland. A History of the Development of Religious Conditions in the Province of New Netherland (1623-1664). A dissertation presented to the University of Louvain to obtain the Degree of Docteur ès Sciences Morales et Historiques. By Frederick J. Zwierlein, L. D., Professor of Church History at St. Bernard's Seminary, Rochester, New York. Rochester, John P. Smith Co. 8vo. Pp. vi + 365.

This work deals with religious conditions in the Province of New Netherland from the time of the establishment of the Dutch Reformed Church down to the English Conquest in 1644. The causes which gave rise to the peculiar development in the religious life of the Dutch settlers in the short period of their occupation of New Netherland are dealt with in several chapters in which the author discusses: The Dutch Background of the Religious History of the Province of New Netherland, Religion in New Sweden before and after the Dutch Conquest and the Religious Factors in the English Immigration. The concurrence of these elements gave rise to a situation which was unique in its kind, it being, not a miniature replica of the religious conflicts in Europe from which these dissident interests had arisen, but a new form of

religious antagonism in which racial and of course commercial antipathies intensified sectarian bitterness. An excellent account is given in other chapters of the peculiar organisation of the colony under a chartered company, which, though it made no provision for religion, afterwards extended its control not only to regulation of the affairs of church and school but also to the supervision of general public morals. The manner in which this supervision was exercised under the vigorous Peter Stuyvesant and some of his successors forms not the least interesting part of the work. These chapters are devoted to the Persecution of the Lutherans, the Quakers and the Jews. The anti-semitic policy of the Dutch settlers was based on economic as well as religious grounds, and the fear that if they were tolerated "liberty could not be refused to Lutherans and Papists." The last chapter is devoted to an account of the missionary activity of the Dutch and the Jesuits among the Indians. It is creditable to the Dutch that while they failed themselves in impressing the Indians with the truths of Christianity, and confessed their inability to do so largely because of the bad example given by their own people, they used their influence at times in securing the release of the Catholic missionaries from the Indians and succoring those who had been delivered or who were so fortunate as to escape. The good offices of the Jesuit Fathers were invoked also to bring about better relations with the French in Canada. Two appendices contain respectively a chronicle of the more important events in the history of New Netherland, and a select bibliography. This latter which fills twenty pages contains not only lists of printed materials, but an excellently arranged catalogue of the manuscript materials to be found in the various libraries and archives. In itself it forms an excellent introduction to the history of New Netherland. The work as a whole is a model of correct historical composition. The style is crisp and forceful, the facts are well marshalled and excellently presented, while the thoroughness in exhausting all sources of information and the judicious spirit exhibited in the choice and presentation of evidence, give proof of the scholarly attainments of the author and his thorough familiarity with the requirements of modern historical science.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Saint Léger, Evêque d'Autun. (616-678). Par le R. P. Camerlinck. Paris. Lecoffre. (J. Gabalda et Cie) 1910. 12mo. Pp. xxiii + 176.

It seems strange that the history of St. Léger (Leodegarius) should have hitherto been so completely neglected. Though he was not less famous as a statesman than as a saint during his lifetime, and though his activities profoundly influenced the course of events in Merovingian Gaul, his life remained unwritten. The merit of the present work in addition to filling this want, consists largely in freeing the name and reputation of the saint from the charge of guilt or complicity in the murder of Childeric II. This accusation which is frequently repeated in works of reference (see *Dic. of Christian Biography*), the author shows to have been utterly without foundation. Léger and Ebroin were both compelled to retire to the monastery of St. Columbanus at Luxeuil, but there is not a scintilla of evidence to show that the saint, from his retreat instigated the murder of the king. The author lays stress on the fact that Ebroin, the Mayor of the Palace, found it suited his schemes at a later date to discredit Léger, whose influence he feared, and, as the best means of removing him, trumped up this accusation. The Saint himself denied it with indignation, no evidence was presented against him, and so generally was it believed to be a fabrication that no one could be found to make the accusation when he was brought to trial. A little more attention to the political conditions which prevailed in the time of St. Léger would have added to the attractiveness of the present Life.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Dante's Gastmahl übersetzt und erklärt, mit einer Einführung. Von Dr. Constantin Sauter. Freiburg and St. Louis, Herder, 1911. Pp. ix + 385. Price \$2.00, net.

This is a translation, with Introduction and Notes, of Dante's *Convivio*. All students of Dante now recognize that, for a right understanding of the masterpiece, the *Divina Commedia*, a knowledge of Dante, the Troubadour of the *Vita Nuova*, of Dante the political theorist of the *De Monarchia*, and of Dante the phil-

osopher of the *Convivio* is absolutely necessary. Dr. Sauter has this motive in view. He does not fail to call attention to the intrinsic value of the *Convivio* as a contribution to that Italian tradition in philosophy which, starting with the somewhat mystic speculations of the Pythagoreans of Magna Grecia, descended through Cicero, Seneca, Lucretius, Marcus Aurelius and Boethius to medieval Latin Christianity. At the same time, he appreciates the fact that, for us, the *Convivio* and the other minor works are of interest chiefly because of the light which they throw on the purpose and meaning of the *Divina Commedia*. The chapters "Die philosophische Lyrik," "Dantes symbolische Liebesdichtung," and "Die philosophische Quellen des Convivio," are especially valuable. Perhaps the author slightly exaggerates the importance of the Arabian doctrines in the philosophical training of Dante. The question is, however, open to discussion. In any case, the assertion (page 74) that in 1210 the physical and metaphysical works of Aristotle were proscribed by ecclesiastical authority until freed from error should be recast so as to distinguish accurately between the enactment of the year 1210 and that of 1215. On the whole, the work bears evidence of painstaking and accurate research, and deserves to be translated into English, so as to take its place in the library of the English-reading student by the side of Bowden's excellent translation of Hettinger's work.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Protestant Thought Before Kant. By Arthur Cushman M'Giffert. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911. Pp. 261. Price 75 cents.

The author is the professor of Church history in Union Theological Seminary, New York, and the dedication is "to Adolf Harnack, Teacher and Friend." It is an able account of the ebb and flow of Protestant thought from the Reformation to the beginning of the 18th century. The Reformation, we are told, "was not exclusively nor even chiefly a religious movement." Until Kant's day, Protestant thought was largely dominated by mediaeval ideas, especially by the theory of the total depravity

of human nature. After giving his interpretation of mediaeval Christianity, Dr. M'Giffert describes in four interesting chapters, the theological systems of Luther, Zwingli, Melancthon and Calvin. Luther, he tells us, could not be just to the old system. Branding the mediaeval church as an apostasy from the principles of the ancient church, his own system was neither Pauline nor Patristic. "The mediaeval church was at one with the ancient church, and the difference between Luther and the early Fathers was at bottom as great as between him and the schoolmen." Luther's efforts to harmonize his theory of "justification by faith alone," with the demands of morality, involved him in so many difficulties and contradictions as to amount to a repudiation of the principle itself. Zwingli, whom Luther regarded as "no Christian," was the forerunner of Calvin in his theory of the absolute will of God. He overshadows Luther in his influence upon subsequent Protestant theology. The differences between Melancthon and Luther are marked. In each succeeding edition of his *Loci Communes*, Melancthon departs more and more from Luther, and his doctrine becomes more and more "reactionary and Catholic." Calvin accepted the principle of Zwingli, though, unlike the latter he drew back from its dreary, even terrible conclusions. Credited by posterity with being the promoter of civil liberty and democracy, he was, as a matter of fact, opposed to both. "He had a deep-rooted aversion to democracy." In the chapter on the English reformation, Professor M'Giffert maintains that Henry VIII in his break with Rome, acted in accordance with a widespread popular demand. The Protestant historians Maitland and Gairdner, and Father Gasquet differ with him. They tell us that at the beginning of the 16th century Lollardy was absolutely dead and that the masses of the English people were not only Catholic but Papal. The attempt of Protestantism to systematize and justify itself is told in the chapter on Protestant Scholasticism. Our Protestant friends who are fond of ridiculing the mediaeval schoolmen for their wranglings and useless disputations, will find this chapter very painful reading. "Compared with that of the Middle Ages," says our author, "Protestant scholasticism was much more barren and at the same time narrower and more oppressive." It was barren and dreary to the last degree. The reaction against all this manifested itself in Pietism. Germany was the first

to feel it. In England it was preceded by a period of rationalistic deism. The Evangelical pietism of Wesley, found an echo in New England, in the theology of Edwards. Becoming identified in the minds of many with Christianity, the result of the whole movement in many quarters was disaster. This is brought out in the chapter on Rationalism.

The author is in error when he identifies, as he seems to, the Catholic doctrine of human nature, with the Protestant doctrine of total depravity. According to Catholic teaching, when man fell, he fell to the level of man, not below his manhood. Many of the pessimistic views of man, expressed by the Fathers, refer to man considered historically. Dr. M'Giffert has not caught the meaning of the Tridentine decrees on this point. However, this misconception does not affect his conclusions on Protestantism, which is the subject of this book. This latest production of Dr. M'Giffert, will more than repay the reading.

BART. A. HARTWELL.

Bibelatlas in 20 Haupt- und 28 Nebenkarten. Von Hermann Guthe, Dr. Theol. und Phil., Professor an der Universität Leipzig, mit einem Verzeichniss der alten und neuen Ortsnamen: H. Wagner & E. Debes, Leipzig, 1911. Preis gebunden M. 12.

This Bible Atlas, the work of Dr. Guthe, of Leipzig, a scholar well known for his many important contributions to History and Theology, contains 20 principal and 28 secondary lithographic maps representing Palestine and the countries mentioned in the Holy Scriptures. This Atlas is a decided improvement on works of this kind. The author has availed himself fully of the recent discoveries in History, Geography and Archaeology. For example the latest results of the explorations and surveys of Drs. Brunow and Schumacher in the lands east of the Jordan, and those of Dr. Musil in the Sinaitic peninsula have been judiciously utilized, so that Maps 1, 2, and 4, as regards the delineation of the soil's surface, are entirely new. To facilitate the use of the Atlas for historical studies the maps have been arranged to correspond with the chronological order of the events which caused the geographical

changes. Thus there are 12 maps of Palestine showing at a glance the political vicissitudes of the Holy Land from the time of Saul to the destruction of the Second Temple. This series is completed by a map of modern Palestine and a plan of the City of Jerusalem. Students of Assyriology will be interested especially in Map 5 which shows the extent of the Babylonian and Assyrian empires during the eighth and seventh centuries B. C. They will find on it the names of all the important places mentioned in the cuneiform inscriptions so far deciphered. This beautiful map is accompanied by small plans of the ancient sites of the cities of Niniveh and Babylon as known to us from recent excavations.

The artistic make-up of this Atlas is not inferior to its intrinsic value. Though the pages are large, the book is not unwieldy, being of the same convenient size as the excellent *Handatlas* of Ernst Debes. The maps are very good lithographic prints; the mountain ranges are represented in gray brown, the frontiers of countries are marked in different bright colors, and the proper names in black letters, so that each map presents a neat appearance and every name on it is very distinct and legible. The Index contains 7000 geographical names, and the modern equivalents for ancient names are given whenever possible. We earnestly recommend this Atlas to teachers and students of the Holy Scriptures. It is up to date in every respect.

A. A. VASCHALDE.

Modern History. By Rev. Doctor Peter Fredet, revised and enlarged by Charles H. McCarthy, Ph. D. Professor of American History, Catholic University of America. John Murphy Company, Baltimore and New York, 1910. Pp. ix + 788 + 73.

Fredet's *Modern History* is well known and extensively used in our Catholic schools. According to the Publisher's Preface, hardly any alterations have been introduced in this new edition up to page 600. We may, therefore, confine our review to the latter section of the work. It is pleasing to note that in the revision more attention has been devoted to the social, economic and educational conditions; also that the newer tendencies in government such as the Initiative and the Referendum, have not

been overlooked. In regard to the individual countries, Ireland, too frequently little noticed in non-Catholic text-books, receives due attention. The gradual disappearance in England of the traditional bitterness towards the Catholic Church is recorded and the recent separation of Church and State in France is discussed. In the paragraph on the reconstruction of Germany the political difficulties springing from the national antipathy of the Polish provinces, of Alsace-Lorraine and of Schleswig-Holstein are indicated. Pertinent and impartial citations from non-Catholic periodicals help the student to form a correct judgment of the notorious Ferrer case out of which so much capital has been made to malign the Church. Several maps have been added in this revision and numerous attractive illustrations introduced. The book sells for the very modest price of ninety cents, an exceptionally low figure for a Catholic text-book.

N. A. WEBER, S. M.

Mass of the Immaculate Conception, No. 8 in C: For Men's Voices, in Two Choirs by Abel L. Gabert. Published by G. Schirmer, New York. Pp. 32. Price 50 cents, net.

Dignity and power, depth of religious feeling and intimate skill in its expression, mark this new choral work by Father Gabert. The inexhaustible wealth of suggestion embodied in that glorious liturgy which the One Church has handed down in uncorrupted purity from the early ages of the history of the Faith, has been utilized, musically, with keen appreciation and pious reverence.

The solemn beauty of the ritualistic words, the potency of their traditional appeal, are heightened rather than impinged upon by the clear and simple eloquence of their modern harmonic setting. The movement of the voices has been admirably managed throughout, and their separation into two choirs—one for first and second tenors and basses, the other (unison) for voices of medium range—gives ample opportunity for effective contrast and blending of tone-color. The absence of solos need not be regretted: so strong is the unity of spirit evinced in the choral development that, as the work stands, they would be practically superfluous.

The dramatic moments that occur in the text find an entirely logical working-out in the music, but in no way does this music make concessions in the direction of the theatrical or over-emphatic. A pure naturally expressive style and spiritual sincerity of utterance are common to the entire work, which merits, not only on this account, but because of its practical usefulness as well, the widest appreciation on the part of Catholic church musicians.

FREDERICK MARTENS.

The Chief Ideas of the Baltimore Catechism. By Rev. John E. Mullett. New York, Benziger Bros., 1911. Pp. 96.

Pastors and Catechists will welcome the appearance of this new work, which combines all the essential elements of the Baltimore Catechism with some timely additions, put in the form of simple questions and answers. This catechism has all the advantages of the older ones hitherto in use, and possesses in addition a simplicity and directness of presentation which greatly facilitates the labor of the teacher by enabling the child-mind easily to grasp and retain the matter proposed. The success of the method of catechetical instruction introduced by Father John Furniss, C.S.S.R., has long been recognized and appreciated; and it has been the aim of the author of the present new catechism to arrange his work along the same lines. This little book, therefore, is highly worthy of recommendation.

C. J. C.

The following important publications have been received and will be reviewed later:—

The Coptic Version of the New Testament in the Southern Dialect otherwise called Sahidic and Thebaic, with critical apparatus, Literal English Translation, Register of Fragments and Estimate of the Version. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1911. 3 vols., 8vo: Vol. I, The Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Mark, pp. xii, 648; Vol. II, The Gospels of St. Luke, pp. 479; Vol.

III, The Gospel of St. John, Register of Fragments, etc., Fac-similes, pp. 399, plates 1-x.

ETUDES BIBLIQUES :—

Les Livres de Samuel, par le P. Paul Dhorme des Frères Prêcheurs, Paris, Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1910, 1 vol., 8vo, pp. 10, 448.

Le Livre d'Isaïe, traduction critique avec notes et commentaires par le P. Albert Condamin, de la Compagnie de Jésus. Paris, Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1905, 1 vol. 8°, raisin; pp. xix, 401.

L'Evangile Selon S. Marc, par le P. M.-J. Lagrange, des Frères Prêcheurs, Paris, Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1911, 1 vol. 8°, raisin; pp. cli, 456.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

The Summer School. The registration for the University Summer School for Teaching Sisters and Women Teachers has reached a gratifying figure, and the success of the School in point of numbers seems assured. So far the students come from more than twenty States and represent over fifty teaching communities. The Dean of the School is Rev. Dr. Thomas E. Shields; the Vice-Dean, V. Rev. Edward A. Pace, D. D.; and the Secretary, Rev. Patrick J. McCormick, S. T. L., all three professors of the University. Many of the Sisters will find accommodation in the vacant buildings that can be conducted as convents; others will reside in various convents of the city. The teaching staff numbers twenty-two and the School will be open from July 3rd to August 7th.

The Engineering Building, that accommodates also the new Heating, Light, and Power Plant of the University, is now in full operation. The professors and students have taken possession of their commodious and elegant quarters, equipped with all the latest devices for the teaching of these sciences. The classrooms, drawing-rooms, library, and professors' offices leave nothing to be desired. These Schools are located on the second floor of the Engineering Building, and they have also considerable space on the mezzanine and basement floors. All visitors admire the spacious and lofty boiler room, the splendid engine room, the hydraulic engineering room, etc. The new building is also an artistic edifice, and, with its 125 foot chimney, is a striking land mark. It is also the first University building to be erected on the new Boulevard Avenue that separates the University grounds from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Already a large number of prospective students from Washington and elsewhere have announced themselves.

Meeting of the Trustees. The Trustees of the University met in Divinity Hall Wednesday, April 26th, 1911. Archbishop Farley was elected Vice-President of the Board in succession to the late Archbishop Ryan. The plans of the new Cardinal Gibbons Memorial Hall were approved, and the immediate erection of one wing and the basement of the tower was authorized. A new Department of Ascetic and Pastoral Theology was created in the School of Theology, and in the School of Science the Department of Drawing, to include all the drawing common to the various classes of the School of Sciences.

The Teaching Staff of the University now numbers fifty. Of these 19 are full professors, 5 associate professors, 20 instructors, 6 assistants. They are distributed as follows:—10 in the School of Theology, 3 in the School of Law, 11 in the School of Philosophy, 10 in the School of Letters, and 16 in the School of Science.

Gifts. From the estate of Martin J. Kavanagh of Brooklyn, the University has received the sum of \$10,082.59. Mrs. Mary Mahony, of Brooklyn, left by will to the University, the sum of \$5,000. for a theological scholarship, and Miss Ellen Haggerty, of the same city, bequeathed to the University the sum of \$1,000. These donors have the profound gratitude and the constant prayers of the University for their eternal welfare.

Hibernian Scholarships. By the action of the late convention of the Ancient Order of Hibernians at Portland, Oregon, the scholarships established by various States have been raised from two hundred and fifty to four hundred dollars, and it is expected that this generous provision will increase the demand for these scholarships that are now among the best academic prizes within the reach of Catholic youth.

The Cardinal Gibbons Memorial Hall has been begun, and one wing of it will be ready for the opening of the Uni-

versity in October. This wing will contain rooms for sixty students, and will have in the basement a large and commodious recreation room. The basement of the tower will also be built and will give room for a commodious temporary chapel for the students of Gibbons Hall and Albert Hall. The material used is Port Deposit granite and the trimmings are Bedford limestone. This wing, 105 by 40 feet, will be three stories in height, and will be fire-proof throughout.

Lectures. Reverend Doctor Kerby will deliver an Address on "Catholic Women in Charity Work," at the National Convention of the St. Vincent de Paul Society in Boston June 6. Reverend Dr. Fox will deliver five Lectures on Socialism at Fordham University, New York, in August, at the invitation of the German Catholic Central-Verein.

The Catholic Educational Association will hold its eighth annual meeting in Chicago on June 26-29, 1911. The arrangements for the meeting have been practically completed.

Most Rev. Archbishop Quigley appointed the School Board and the presidents of educational institutions to act as a committee to take charge of the work, and with the energy and enterprise characteristic of Chicago people the work was promptly organized and the success of the convention is now assured. From the present indications it is safe to predict that the Association will hold its most important and successful meeting in Chicago.

The sessions of the conventions will be held at De Paul University, 1010 Webster Ave. The University has a splendid group of buildings, which the Vincentian Fathers have kindly placed at the disposal of the Association for the purposes of the convention.

A reception to the delegates will be held at the headquarters, the Great Northern Hotel, on Monday evening, June 26th, and the sessions of the convention will open with Mass on Tuesday morning, June 27. The usual order will be followed

in the various, meetings, and the Association has the reputation of holding hard working conventions. The interest of the various departments in their special work is shown by the crowded programs which they offer, and it will only be by careful adherence to the schedule that the work outlined can be accomplished. The usual public meeting will mark the close of the convention, and for this meeting the Chicago Auditorium, which is noted for its historic gatherings, has been secured.

Gifts to the Department of Mechanical Engineering. The New York Air Brake Co., Watertown, N. Y.:—One No. 5a Piston Valve Duplex Air Pump, Complete; One 26½ x 34 inch, Main Reservoir; One 12 x 33 inch, Auxiliary Reservoir. This equipment to be used for running volumetric efficiency, and steam consumption tests; and such other tests as are possible.

The Peneberthy Injector Co., Detroit, Mich. One Working Steam Injector; One Model Steam Injector.

The Ohio Injector Co., Wadsworth, Ohio. One Working Steam Injector. These injectors afford, in a practical way, a means of applying some of the most important principles in thermodynamics.

The D. V. Anderson Steam Trap Co., Cleveland, Ohio. One Sectional Model Anderson Steam Trap. This model is very useful in showing the working conditions, by which the steam condensation is drained from the steam mains.

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No. 7.

"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

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JAMES CARDINAL GIBBONS,
First Chancellor of the Catholic University.

The Catholic University Bulletin.

Vol. XVII.

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CARDINAL GIBBONS AND THE UNIVERSITY.

The rejoicings on the occasion of the double jubilee of Cardinal Gibbons find nowhere a more responsive echo than in the Catholic University of America. In the chapters of history that will one day exhibit the main course of Catholic life and thought in the United States during the latter quarter of the nineteenth and the first quarter of the twentieth century, Cardinal Gibbons will necessarily stand forth as the prelate who more widely and permanently than any other affected the minds and hearts of the American Catholic people. In his long episcopal life he has never ceased to be the *dux verbi*, has never failed to administer to its fullest capacity his high office as a principal exponent of Catholic truth in its relations to our own time and people, our own moral and social problems, our domestic needs and duties. So true is this that no one disputes his right to be heard with reverent attention when it is question of the larger and more vital interests of American Catholicism, those interests that concern its future in this nation, the character and lines of its influence on the new race that is now forming amid the most wonderful political and social conditions yet known to mankind.

As missionary-priest and bishop in remote and prejudiced parts of our country; as metropolitan of the mother-see of our extensive hierarchy; as a prince of the Church and authoritative adviser of the papacy; as a prelate during whose career

American Catholicism has reached the height of its development and public influence; as an American ecclesiastic more widely and intimately than any other cognizant of the conditions, needs and ideals of our Church; as an active citizen whose personal acquaintance and influence in the highest circles is without parallel; as a religious writer of world-wide authority and power, he can claim the right to speak as our Nestor and to point out to the Catholic Church in the United States not only the dangers to be avoided but also the ways it must follow if it would maintain its growth and round out the rich promise of its first century.

It is significant, therefore, that his long and active ministry should culminate in the work of the Catholic University; that to the creation and development of a specifically Catholic higher education he should have devoted the supreme efforts of a particularly crowded and energetic career. In this, too, he is distinctively American, since in the last fifty years no feature of our national life is more marked than the devotion to higher education, the numerous monumental evidences of which are conspicuous in every section of the United States. More strongly than any one else the Cardinal has voiced the just sentiment of our Catholic clergy and laity that the heart of a great Catholic University should be a theological school of the highest order, fed and sustained by other excellent schools of philosophy, jurisprudence, languages, literature, the natural sciences and the fine arts, so that in coming generations nothing shall be lacking in the way of academic equipment, from a religious or intellectual point of view, to the typical Catholic scholar, priest or layman. In company with the leading minds of the Church he has felt most profoundly the need of Catholic leaders in every department of our American thought and activity, so that in the crises of the future the incalculably beneficent influence of the Church may not be lost to our American society for want of organs through which to reach a people peculiarly fitted to exhibit one day to the world all the forces of social regeneration and moral elevation that are ever latent in Catholicism, a religion essentially of life,

growth, and manifold attainment wherever it breathes its native air of freedom.

The first Chancellor of the Catholic University has been from its opening so intimately and helpfully united with the great enterprise in all its phases that he may with justice be awarded the foremost place not alone of honor but also of accomplishment. From the beginning he was the guide and the friend of the small body of devoted men who brought the project before the American Catholic people, with ardent eloquence enthused and persuaded them, and ceased not until it was realized, at least in such essentials of a great school of universal learning as may reasonably be asked from the generation that witnesses its birth. And when the work began his patient but resolute and steady spirit sustained and united the directors, encouraged the professors and students, heartened and comforted the administration, and communicated to all his own persuasion that so holy an enterprise, on which hung so many high and noble hopes, could not fail amid so generous a people, a clergy so numerous, devoted and active, and at the very dawn of a new Catholic life. He has always welcomed every act of good will, or useful suggestion, every manifestation of interest in the University, and has at all times thrown in its favor the weight of his unique influence. No one has been more thoroughly persuaded of the necessity of a great Catholic seat of learning at the National Capital, growing with each generation in power and splendor, attracting from decade to decade manifold devotion and generosity, and eventually ranking by every academic title with the proudest creations of our Catholic past. Nor has any one been more firmly persuaded of the possibility of such a great work or of its actual timeliness. He has lived to see a fair realization of the plans and hopes of the first days, to behold a widespread acceptance of the noble and fertile idea by the American Catholic people, and to know that the prospects of larger growth in the near future are very encouraging. He has lived to behold an imminent unification of all Catholic educational interests under the guidance of the American hierarchy through the University established and sustained

by them, the very ideal of its noble founder Leo XIII. Under Cardinal Gibbons the University has become not only a large school with its regular output of academic results, but also a new and influential centre of social service to our holy religion. Our growing Catholic activities in education and charity, in the foreign missions, in social economics, in the arts and along other useful and elevating lines, already find in the University a sympathetic centre admirably located, and variously equipped to further all such ideals by inspiration and suggestion as well as by scientific direction, regularity and centralization of effort.

Few Catholic enterprises of a large character escape a period of trials and difficulties proportioned to the importance of their scope. Nor were such wanting in the early life of the University, grave and numerous enough to threaten its existence while retarding its growth, checking the original current of sympathy and generosity, and saddening hearts that had conceived the highest hopes of its future usefulness in the great spiritual and intellectual warfare that extends about us on all sides, and broadens menacingly from day to day. But the Cardinal never lost courage, nor allowed that of his brethren in the episcopate to weaken. In the darkest hour he manfully took the lead and by voice and pen stimulated and encouraged not only the hierarchy but also the professors and students, and by his annual appeals touched the hearts of the entire Catholic people and kept them acquainted with the nature and purposes of a Catholic University. On all sides he rallied new friends to the support of the enterprise, pointed out more urgently than ever its rich promise, secured generous donations, and breathed into the situation a new life that has not ceased to put forth regularly fresh evidences of vigor and viability. Amid painful vicissitudes the University profited by the universal esteem in which the Cardinal was held. His protection was a tower of strength, and it was felt on all sides that the institution which had cost him so much anxiety and concern must appear to him as fundamental in the new life of the American Catholic Church.

The great rôle of our country in the new political and social order that has now so widely supplanted the conditions of a previous age, has been seized by no one, perhaps, more fully or been more constantly and happily emphasized than by Cardinal Gibbons. Similarly no one has seized more accurately the new and helpful rôle of the Catholic Church as the natural friend and ally of the great republic to which it owes, on so vast a scale and in such fulness, the freedom denied it in other nations whose public titles to consideration and honor were first earned in its school. But institutions work through men, and the future continuance of the amicable and mutually serviceable relations of our country and our Catholic Faith all largely depend on the wisdom of those to whom the highest interests of the latter are confided. Hence the importance of a superior education for the Catholic clergy and for an ever increasing proportion of the Catholic laity. Religion and patriotism are natural allies and only when ignorance or malice separates them do we behold the evil consequences of their divorce. The common education in our Catholic University of so many chosen representatives of the clergy and the laity will inevitably create, in due time, a body of Catholic priests and laymen intimately acquainted with the nature and the ideals of Catholicism and similarly with the nature and the ideals of the American State. In this central school of the Church they will imbibe, amid the most favorable surroundings, a sincere devotion to their Catholic Faith and an ardent love for their fatherland that now stands in the foremost rank of the great nations of history. With time these profound sentiments will find expression in movements of many kinds, in religious and patriotic deeds, in political, economic and social services of surpassing importance, in immortal triumphs of art and literature, all of them easily traceable to the great school in which zealous and noble hearts had provided for the manifold equipment that now conditions all intellectual progress and without which it is seriously hampered or retarded. In those days no name will stand out more prominently in the annals

of the University than that of James Cardinal Gibbons, to whose devotion, generosity and protection will be largely owing all its forms of success and all its titles to the love and gratitude that are usually bestowed on great institutions of learning, once they have fitted themselves to the popular life and needs.

While the Catholic University joins in the vast acclaim of praise and joy that in Church and State does honor to the unique jubilees of its first Chancellor, it also offers earnest prayers that he may long be spared to witness the fruits of the noble foundation for which he has made so many sacrifices and borne so many trials.

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

DR. BOLLING AND HOMERIC ARMOUR.

When I had read, in the spring of 1911, Dr. Bolling's article "Homeric Armour and Mr. Lang,"¹ I was eager to rush into the field in defence of myself, and of Professor Van Leeuwen's recent confession of faith, "One Homer, one Iliad." I even covered many sheets of paper with my answer; I laid it aside, looked at it again, and came to the conclusion that but few words were needed.

Dr. Bolling, when he wrote, entertained the misapprehension (pp. 670-671) that, in my book, *Homer and his Age* (1906) I made "an effort to appeal the Homeric Question from expert to popular judgment," and that I addressed "the general English-speaking public." In the name of the Ashmolean, what has popular judgment or the English-speaking public to do with the Homeric Question? I wrote for a few men of education who take a special interest in that great problem, and if I used "a sprightly style of polemic," it was because the opportunity, the astonishing logic of the learned persons whom I oppose, offered irresistible temptations. "The present status of expert opinion" in the camp, or rather the many camps, of the opponents of Homeric Unity,—is chaos. So Blass said in his latest work, so says Professor Van Leeuwen (for thirty years a wanderer in the Wolfian wilderness), and if you would know exactly how chaotic is "the present status of expert opinion" read *The Lay of Dolon* (Macmillan, 1911) by my friend, Mr. Shewan, of St. Andrews.

Meanwhile the special point with which Dr. Bolling deals is Homeric Armour. He professes (p. 673) that he "has nothing new to say upon the subject," and "stands essentially on the position of Robert." Now Robert's book is of 1901, and I write in 1911. Robert modified the views of Reichel,

¹ *Catholic University Bulletin*, October, 1910, pp. 668-708.

and we now know a multitude of archaeological facts which were unknown to Reichel and Robert in 1901. Some of them I knew in 1906, more when I wrote *The World of Homer* (1910), and now I know more than I did in that year.

By way of crushing me quite, Dr. Bolling (p. 673) says that "Cauer simply waives" my book of 1906 "aside,"—as if the opinion of that scholar settled the question. But Cauer does rather worse than "waive aside" the book of Robert which is the key of Dr. Bolling's position. Foreign critic for foreign critic, Dr. Bolling may probably be unaware that Drerup in his *Omero* (1909), prefers my treatment of Homeric Armour to that of Reichel; while one of our most distinguished archæologists, in *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* (June, 1911), vastly prefers mine to that of Drerup! I am not a lone fantastic amateur, and casual man of letters. Our chief archæologists in the field and in the study, Sir Arthur Evans, the founder of the archæology of Minoan Crete; Mr. Hogarth, the excavator of the Dictæan Cave and of Ephesus; Mr. Dawkins, the Head of the British School of Athens, are all favorable to the greater part (not all), of such novel views on Homeric armour and costume as I have ventured to put forward: indeed my ideas are based on their researches, on those of Professor Halbherr at Phaestos, and on a great mass of other evidence which Dr. Bolling ignores.

With Sir Arthur Evans I believe that the Homeric poems were composed in the early post-Mycenaean age; that age of the early overlap of bronze and iron;—between the period of the great folk-wanderings, when (about 1200 B. C. and later) the Vikings from the coasts and isles of the Mediterranean invaded Egypt,—and the dawn of the very early Boeotian art on vases in the manner of the "Dipylon" pottery at Athens. It is the age of the Cypro-Mycenaean relic at Enkomi in Cyprus (now in the British Museum), and while the poet has behind him the great Mycenaean memories transfigured in song and story, throughout his age, and later, the influences of Mycenaean craftsmanship in gold work and bronze work, in ivory and crystal, were still potent, as we know from the evi-

dence of the Aeginetan treasure in our Museum; and from the treasure in the earliest temple at Ephesus, discovered and described by Mr. Hogarth (see the Catalogue, and Mr. Hogarth's book *Ionia and the East*).

As for the relative positions of bronze and iron in Homer, they may be described thus; iron "is used for agricultural instruments" (and for woodmen's axes and for some knives or dirks, not employed in war), "while bronze is retained for weapons and for personal adornment." I pointed out these Homeric uses of the metals (as Helbig had done, though he did not believe that this state of things ever existed), but the words within marks of quotations in the last sentence are from Mr. Macallister's account of what he actually found in a stratum of Gezer, in Palestine. He goes on "Thus we found sickles and hoes of iron, iron arrowheads" (like that of Pandarus in *Iliad*, Book iv), "knives, daggers, bracelets, brooches, pins, and needles of bronze," and "spearheads always in bronze," while knives were now of bronze, now of iron, as in Homer.² A Mycenaean bronze sword was also found at Gezer.

Thus, as to bronze for weapons, iron for implements, Homer describes a state of things which has been actual, though not found, so far, in Greece; and in this state of things, this Homeric form of overlap of the two metals, Helbig could not believe.

Dr. Bolling, with Reichel and Robert, finds in Homer the armour of two widely sundered periods; the huge suspended targes,—figure of 8, semi-cylindrical, and oblong,—of late Minoan or Mycenaean art (say 1500-1300 B. C., or later) and the round Ionic buckler worn on the left arm, common on early vases or, say, 750 and later. He says that our duty is to ascertain "from the archaeological evidence what sort of armour Homer could possibly have seen with his own eyes," and that I am "unwilling to be bound in this fashion." "For instance we know of no targes that Homer could possibly have seen except the huge targes" (suspended shields) "depicted in Mycenaean art" (p. 677).

² *Palestine Exploration Fund*, 1903, pp. 197, 198.

Both the poems, he declares, describe these targes, and also the Ionic round (or oval, or otherwise shaped) buckler worn on the left arm. The epics are thus partly Mycenaean (say 1500-1200) partly Ionic (say 750 and later). But I think that Homer sang in neither period. Moreover, Helbig proves that small bucklers existed in the hands of common spearmen of the late Mycenaean age; his proof is derived from bronze figurines found at Tiryns and Mycenae. In these figurines a warrior in Minoan cincloth holds his right arm up on high, his left is held forward—the former grasped the spear, the latter the buckler. The art of the period in which I place Homer shows suspended targes, some large and circular, some covering the body from neck to below the knees (these are huge suspended shields slightly scooped out at the edges) and there are also suspended oblong shields. All these (and even round bucklers worn on the left arm, which Homer never explicitly mentions) are recorded in the art of the age to which I assign the poet. But Dr. Bolling omits this long period, and never mentions the evidence of its art,—Egyptian, Cyprian, and Boeotian: in the two former at least corslets are also exhibited, as on the relief of the Hittite Amazon at Boghaz Keui. All these things are much earlier than the Ionic corslets of the seventh century, which Dr. Bolling regards as the earliest. Moreover the famous corslet of Menelaus in *Iliad*, Book iv, is not of the Ionic pattern: but on this topic I may refer Dr. Bolling to Miss Stawell's *Homer and the Iliad* and to my *World of Homer*; where the *mitrê* and *zoster* of Menelaus are also discussed and illustrated. My critic never takes any notice of Helbig, *La question mycénéenne*, or of the following studies of Homeric and Minoan armour,—Evans, *Scripta Minoa*, Vol. i, pp. 42, 75 and note; Evans, *Journal of the Anthropological Society*, Vol. xxx (a study of Cypro-Mycenaean antiquities); Halbherr, *Monumenti Antichi*, Vol. xiii, pp. 42, 114, 1903; Ostern, *Die Bewaffung in Homers Ilias*, pp. 68 ff.; Miss Stawell, *Homer and the Iliad*, pp. 206 ff. (1909). Above all Dr. Bolling overlooks the very careful study of the Greek shield, including the shield in the Epics, by Dr. Lippold (1909).

According to Dr. Lippold (*Münchener Archäol. Stud.*, p. 461, *et seqq.* 1909) we have the impression, he says, that Robert and Reichel permit their prepossessions to divert them from the true interpretation of the facts. Their premises imply a gap in our knowledge of the subject. The archaeologists who, like Sir Arthur Evans and Mr. Hogarth, agree with me in dating the epics in the overlap of bronze and iron,—that is during the “Folk-Wanderings” of 1200-1000 B. C.—study the armour of that age of transition. In art,—Egyptian, Cypro-Mycenaean, and Boeotian,—they and Dr. Lippold find examples of numerous types of shield, not merely of huge suspended “Mycenaean” types, and (in Boeotian art) of the Ionic round buckler held on the left arm. The various types would be familiar to the poet of that age, nor need we with Reichel, Robert, and Dr. Bolling, look across a gulf of several centuries to the Ionic period for circular shields, whether suspended by the *telamon*, or held on the left arm or by the left hand.

As regards archaeological evidence for shields that Homer might and probably did see, shields neither Mycenaean nor Ionic, but of the intermediate period, I leave Dr. Bolling to study the books of which I offer a list. As for the corselets concerning which he, like his German authorities, makes so many difficulties, and as to the costume described in the Epics, I respectfully advise him to consult the same sources, and especially, as has been said, for the corslet, Miss Stawell’s *Homer and the Iliad*, and my *World of Homer*. Working independently, Miss Stawell and I came to precisely the same conclusion, but her statement of them is as much preferable to mine (she has avoided two errors of mine), as her scholarship in the interpretation of the Homeric texts is beyond comparison superior. On the other hand my remarks on Homeric and later costume in *The World of Homer* (a topic not treated by Dr. Bolling), are novel, and, I think (with exceptions as to the very archaic dress of women in Greece), recommend themselves to our archaeologists. But, for the women’s dress, I still trust to the testimony of archaic art.

To put the results of my humble studies briefly, Homer

describes not the Minoan, not the Ionic, but a *northern* costume for men in active life; namely the smock and brooched plaid or mantle; and this costume, for men in active life, does not appear either in Mycenaean or Ionic art, to my knowledge. It is of the intermediate period, the period of the introduction of the fibula, the period of the northerners, the Achaeans. As far as my limited reading goes, this important fact has not been observed by Homeric critics. It was a surprise to myself, and from the moment when I noticed the very un-Homeric costume of a Hercules hunting a Centaur, on an extremely archaic gem, I pursued the study of costume in the vases of the British Museum, and in all the reproductions of Ionic and archaic Greek art which were accessible to me. My position, for these and many other reasons, especially on account of Homer's absolutely northern fashion of burial,—with cremation, the urn or *larnax* for the ashes; the chamber which contains the urn; the cairn over all, with its bounding circle of erect stones,—is that the epics were composed in a period neither Mycenaean nor Ionic, though he has copious Mycenaean memories. Dr. Bolling, on the other hand, if I understand him, believes that what is not Ionic in the poems is Mycenaean. If Dr. Bolling will consider the armature of Goliath and Saul in the Books of Samuel, and the passage about the unarmoured Asahel, slain by a thrust of the *σάμωρίς*,—the spike in the spear-butt,—of the armed Abner, he will perceive that Homeric armour existed in Palestine long before the Ionic age; and apparently in the eleventh century B. C.

Dr. Bolling's statement (p. 696) that, in my part of the translation of the *Iliad* (Lang, Leaf, and Myers), I "strove to conceal a flaw," in my present theory, by "beginning a new paragraph" at a certain point, involves an impossibility. When the translation was written, thirty years ago, neither I, nor Mr. Leaf, nor Mr. Myers dreamed that the question of Homeric armour would arise; and certainly I had no ideas on the subject. In fact the passages on armour, in the translation, have not been corrected in the light of any theories which we, the translators, have since entertained. The translation of *μίτρη* as "taslets,"

that is *cuisse*s or thigh-pieces, is impossible; we borrowed "taslets" from Dugald Dalgetty in Scott's *Legend of Montrose*.

My full reply to Dr. Bolling in matters of detail lies beside me, but I spare the space of *The Catholic University Bulletin*, and the patience of the English-speaking public, which may turn to the books of Miss Stawell, of Mr. Shewan, and to the papers of Professor Scott of the Northwestern University, Illinois, for unexpected light on the language of the Epic. I never (p. 706) assumed that the Homeric poems "are at the very beginning of Epic poetry," they are the culmination of Epic poetry—and they were not made with paste and scissors, by dove-tailing extracts from preëxisting poems of various ages.

* * * * *

I am a most lucky person! I began this essay by asking "What, in the name of the Ashmolean has the English-speaking public to do with the Homeric Question?" As I corrected my type-written paper I received by post two proofs of the amount of interest which that large, lazy public takes in the studies of Dr. Bolling and myself. In *The Quarterly Review* of July (p. 29) Dr. Grundy (an Oxford don) complains that, "amid the distractions of the Homeric Question and other Fairy Stories," I have not been doing the Greek Anthology into English rhymes! Give me pen and paper and the Anthology, and I will rhyme it as much as Dr. Grundy either desires or deserves. The other proof comes from the pen of Father Francis Donnelly, S. J., writing in a periodical named *America*. The learned Jesuit says:—

"Mr. Lang's more recent books, however, 'Homer and His Age' (1906) and 'The World of Homer' (1910) are with the exception of a chapter or two wholly given over to archaeology. The former was disheartening enough, but the latter moving among the monsters of mythology and handling the other gruesome subjects in which folk-lore and Comparative Religion delight, is worse still. No blame attaches to Mr. Lang. He deserves the thanks of all lovers of Homer for his vigorous championship of Homer. No one probably regrets

more than he that 'the sacred soil of Ilios is rent with shaft and pit.' He would gladly 'turn and see the stars and hear, like ocean on a western beach, the surge and thunder of the Odyssey.'

"Mr. Lang's heart is felt in his book in many a line of silent protest or what would seem protest, that the enemies of Homer's 'crown of indivisible supremacy' should force him to take such weapons. No lover of Homer but is glad to seem him overcome one after another every enemy who lays a rebellious hand upon that crown. The limbs must sweat in such a conflict, and the hands be soiled that stoop like Homeric heroes to throw the stones of earth against attacking foes. We honor the conflict; we proclaim the hero; we rejoice in the last battle where Mr. Gilbert Murray with his 'Rise of the Greek Epic' (1910) [wrong date] goes down to defeat and has his new theory of 'Expurgation' worsted. But all this can not make us grow enthusiastic over the sweat and the earth. Mr. Lang of the Homeric sonnets is more to our liking. When we read his sonnets we want to read Homer; when we read his books we cannot see Homer for the shields, and spears, and copper, and iron, and tombs, and funeral rites, and purification processess. Let Mr. Lang write us a book on the art of Homer; we care not for the archaeology."

"We care not for the archaeology." Of course you don't. But I want to get the archaeology right; and what my book has to do with "the monster of archaeology," except when I say that Homer does not deal in them, I do not know. Certainly, I do not appeal to "the popular judgment," nor to the University of Oxford and the Society of Jesus, as represented by Dr. Grundy and Father Donnelly, though both are most benevolent towards me as a rhymmer.

A. LANG.

ARISTOTLE'S INFLUENCE IN MODERN TIMES.

The subject of the preceding lecture was the influence of Aristotle on Medieval Christianity. That influence, we saw, was very great, and, on the whole, beneficial. But it was not so great as to be any time unopposed, nor was it so beneficial as to exclude all other influences or render them useless. There was always, we saw, the great, though somewhat hidden, force of mysticism, which could not harmonize with Aristotelianism. At times, that force was very strong, and, while it did not affect the attitude of the official Church, or of the great centers of learning, it often lay nearer to the hearts of the people than any other force. Mysticism was often taken up as a study and a pursuit by the village pastor, or the wandering friar, or the cathedral canon who taught in the chantry school. A word of depreciation or condemnation spoken casually, would sink into the minds of the uneducated, and thus, I think, there originated the body of later medieval legends in which Aristotle figures in a way that does him little credit. Moreover, there were the alchemists and dabblers in the mysterious arts of magic, who were looked on with suspicion by the simpleminded and pious, and who were known to delve in the works of Aristotle as well as in many curious treatises falsely attributed to him. In this way, Aristotle took his place by the side of Virgil in popular legend. With this difference, that, while Virgil was a kind of white magician, a seer and a prophet who somehow favored the cause of Christianity, and never did anyone any harm, Aristotle was represented as a dark magician, dangerous, forbidding, and inclined to be malevolent. Many a harmless searcher for the philosopher's stone, which was believed to have the power to change lesser metals into gold, was supposed to have dealings with the half-Greek, half-Saracen spirit of Aristotle. And many an untoward event, many a weird happening,

many diseases and mishaps, were traced to a wizard's spell cast in the name of the Stagyrite. The wildest imaginings were indulged in, as to his personality and history. A story very commonly believed in medieval times was to the effect that his real name was Nectanebus, that he was an Egyptian necromancer, and that Alexander the Great was his son.

These were, as you may well believe, nothing but popular superstitions. They had no influence with the official Church or with the world of learned men. Still, they persisted throughout the later Middle Ages, and they had by no means disappeared when a series of events took place in the learned world which shook the influence and prestige of Aristotle to its foundations. I refer to Humanism and the inauguration of the scientific era.

Humanism dates from the first decades of the fifteenth century. The event, however, which gave the greatest impetus to the humanistic movement was the taking of Constantinople by the Turks in 1452. Just as the capture of the same city by the Crusaders in 1204 had among its results the introduction of the Greek Aristotle into Western Europe, so now the advent of the Turk and the dispersion of the Greek scholars who lived in the city on the Bosphorus resulted in a wider knowledge of the Greek Classics throughout the Latin world. The humanistic movement was essentially a literary movement, although it, naturally, had its effect on art, philosophy and life in general. It consisted in an attempt to restore the style of the classics, but, being of its nature nothing short of fanatical, it was not content until it restored pagan customs, pagan modes of thought, and pagan standards of living. The humanists, one and all, professed nothing but contempt for the Middle Ages, which, they contended, had cultivated the divine to the exclusion of the human in literature and in life. They themselves were the advocates of the human element—Humanists. That, having adopted a merely human standard of life, they soon fell short even of that standard is a matter with which we are not concerned here and now. We are interested rather in the attitude of the humanists towards

Aristotelianism. That attitude, we may say at once, was one of hostility. In the first place, the Greek scholars who, like the great Bessarion and Gemistus Pletho, came to Italy to attend the council of Florence, were convinced Platonists and helped to found at Florence an Academy of Platonic philosophy. Others—for the most part, Italian followers of these two—identified Aristotelianism with scholasticism, which they ridiculed and villified in every conceivable manner. The most violent of these anti-Aristotelians were Vives, Lorenzo Valla, Ficino, the two Mirandolas, and Erasmus. "Whence," asks Vives, "comes all the incredible laziness and mental slovenliness of the men of our day? It comes from this that, rather than investigate and find out for themselves, they prefer to see with another man's eyes and believe on the authority of another," namely Aristotle. The schoolmen are "like sheep led to the shambles, an ignoble herd unworthy of the name of learned, and a lasting disgrace to philosophy." You will find, if you care to read them, that these Humanists can use strong language. They are masters of the art of bitter invective. Their wit is clever, and cruel. They can shoot straight, and every arrow is poisoned. But, you will look in vain in their writings for any attempt to discuss in a serious way the merits of the scholastic Aristotelianism. As Cervantes is sometimes said to have laughed chivalry out of Spain, so the humanists tried by ridicule and abuse to drive Aristotle from the world of Western Christendom.

The fifteenth century witnessed another important event, the advent of scientific discovery. It is the century of Copernicus, Kepler, Tycho Brahe and Galileo, and was followed by the century of Boyle and Sir Isaac Newton. With these names, as you know, are associated the most important discoveries in the history of the natural sciences. Copernicus taught that the sun, not the earth, is the center of our stellar universe; Tycho Brahe furnished accurate observations to confirm the Copernican theory. Kepler discovered the laws of planetary motion and described the orbits of the planets, Galileo taught the twofold motion of the earth, and Boyle and

Newton established the fundamental laws of physics. It is now too late to do anything but deplore what we cannot in the least remedy or improve. There was no necessary conflict between these discoveries and the fundamental principles of Aristotelianism. In astronomy, especially, Aristotle merely recorded the opinions prevalent in his day, and the greatest of the schoolmen spoke with almost prophetic vision of the advent of new theories that would upset the theories generally accepted in their time. Had these men lived in the fifteenth century, they would most certainly have given credit to the discoverers and perhaps welcomed the discoveries. What their successors did is a matter of history. Unworthy of the great scientific spirit to which they were heirs, they refused to consider the discoveries of science as even probable. They fell back on Aristotle, and abused the scientists. The discoverers, or most of them, being only human, retaliated in kind, and thus an unnecessary and historically an unjustifiable, barrier was built between the philosophy of Aristotle and modern science, a barrier which all the irenic efforts of subsequent centuries have not entirely torn down. This, I say, is a matter for useless regret. The fact remains, that the scientists opposed Aristotle, because the Aristotelians would have nothing to do with the new science. Francis Bacon, who, though himself no discoverer, is looked upon as the philosopher of the age of discovery, is the spokesman of the scientists. He sounds the first note of the modern call to break away from Aristotelian tradition. The doctrine of the Schools, he says, is false and contains in itself the germs of decay. And the reason is that most of the schoolmen, with all the leisure at their disposal, and with all the acuteness of mind which they undoubtedly possess, do not give themselves to study as they ought. Their minds are shut up within the works of a few authors, especially of Aristotle, their dictator, just as their bodies are shut up in their cells. Perhaps this criticism was not altogether undeserved. There may have been in Bacon's time representatives of Aristotelianism who merited this reproach. But that was no reason why Bacon should spurn

the whole system of Aristotle and judge it unjustly. He did judge it unjustly when he pronounced it unscientific. And it was nothing but colossal vanity on his part to imagine that in the new method which he himself proposed he had superseded Aristotle. There are some, you know, who think that Bacon wrote Shakespeare's works. Of them a hostile critic has said that "he is a fool who agrees with them, and a greater fool who argues with them." Fortunately, we are called on here, neither to agree with them nor to argue with them. But, if Shakespeare the actor has, indeed, been parading in Bacon's borrowed plumes, then Bacon himself is the victim of a still more ridiculous self-imposed imposture. For he poses as the second Aristotle. The very title of his great work *Novum Organum* asserts this claim. As Aristotle had been the master of method during the Middle Ages, Bacon, so Bacon himself claims, is the master of the only method which suits the spirit of modern science. Nothing could be more preposterous. Aristotle was the founder of the inductive method, the method of investigation of facts, the method of observation, the scientific method, as it is called. Friar Roger Bacon was the medieval representative of that method; to him Francis Bacon owes more than he acknowledges, so that, without being in the least unjust, we may say that Francis Bacon's method of scientific investigation was neither new nor original. For centuries it has been the fashion, especially in England, to ascribe to Francis Bacon and the use of his method the credit for all the discoveries that have been made in science since his time. But recently a saner view has prevailed, and modern historians see behind the Bacon who wrote the *Novum Organum* the shadow of his countryman and namesake Roger Bacon the Franciscan, and behind him the gigantic figure of Aristotle who inspired the medieval friar.

Still lingering in the fifteenth century, the period of transition from the medieval to the modern view of Aristotle, we cannot fail to notice besides humanism and the scientific movement a third very important factor in the change from medieval to modern. I refer to the Protestant Reformation.

And here one may ask at once: What has religion to do with Aristotelianism? One may repeat Tertullian's question: What has Aristotle in common with the Church? If you look closely, you will see that here, as elsewhere, changes in one department of human life effect changes in many other departments. Luther, when he broke with the past, in matters ecclesiastical, did not stop at questions of theology, liturgy and Church discipline. To his mind, Aristotle was indissolubly bound up with the Catholic system; Aristotle was associated with certain methods in theology which did not meet Luther's approval and, strangely enough, with the sacramental system of the Church which pleased him still less. Hence the bitterness I might say, the virulence of his denunciation of Aristotle. He calls him a triple-headed Cerberus, an unhappy juggler of words, a public and professed enemy of all truth. Wherever the influence of Luther was felt, Aristotelianism was vilified and misrepresented. It is true, Melancthon took a different view. Less violent by nature and more scholarly of habit than Luther, he wished to retain something of the truth which he found in the Aristotelian philosophy, and in theory, at least, confined his opposition to what he considered to be ecclesiastical accretions to the doctrine of the Stagyrte. Academic distinctions count for little in such a contest as was then waged. Luther's sweeping condemnation of Aristotle and all his works bore down the mild protests of Melancthon, and the Protestant movement may be counted among the forces which swept Aristotle down from the pedestal on which the medieval world had placed him.

Meanwhile another kind of Aristotelianism had sprung up, which was little more than a revival of the Averroism of the thirteenth century. As a school of interpretation it rejected most emphatically the Christian understanding of Aristotle, and went back either to the Arabians or to the oldest Greek commentators. I will mention here but a few of the names of these men, Achillini, Nifo, and Pietro Pomponazzi. They were, no doubt, important men in their day. Pomponazzi, especially, made a great stir, although, to us, his pompous pedan-

try and his monstrous pretensions to extraordinary erudition seem nothing short of ludicrous. He wrote a work on the immortality of the soul, in which, influenced by the old Neo-platonist commentators, he held Aristotle to have taught that the human soul progresses from one form of existence to another, that, according to our conduct here below, we shall advance to be lesser and then greater angels, hereafter, or, contrariwise shall descend to a lower form of demoniac existence, and that, since this progress has no limit, the soul is immortal. Of all the interpretations of Aristotle, this, I think, is the most extraordinary. The contemporaries of Pomponazzi were content to restore Averroism, more or less unmixed. The controversy raged chiefly around the question of immortality, and the Averroist solution was that, so far as philosophy goes, the individual soul cannot be immortal. But these men all claimed to be believing Christians. They styled themselves faithful children of the Catholic Church, and some of them had powerful patrons in the vicinity of the papal throne. They had, therefore, the audacity to advocate the twofold standard of truth. In philosophy, they said, the doctrine of immortality is false: in theology, it is true, so that, like Averroes himself, they proposed to believe as a matter of faith what their reason told them to be false. This, I need hardly tell you, was in direct contradiction to the very foundation of medieval Aristotelianism. The schoolmen maintained, as the justification of all their intellectual activity, that there cannot be a contradiction between reason and revelation, and that no Christian should be asked to believe, because no human being can believe, what he knows to be false or what his reason tells him to be false.

You see for yourselves that the period of transition from the medieval to the modern estimate of Aristotle was one of immense activity in the intellectual order. The literary movement, the scientific movement, the religious upheaval, the new interpretation of Aristotle, all these were active, living forces. There is one more that must be added, the so-called Italian philosophy of Nature, represented chiefly by Giordano Bruno. It had its immediate inspiration in the scientific discoveries.

The new view of the universe as a vast system centered in the sun, appealed to the imagination. It opened up new vistas. It tended to exalt matter and material forces. The exaggeration of this sentiment in the fervid, restless disposition of a man like Bruno resulted in a deification of Nature, and the pantheistic doctrine that God and Nature are one. This, also reacted against the traditional Aristotelianism. The Aristotle that came first from the Arabian world appeared to be pantheistically inclined. But the Christian Aristotelians showed conclusively that there is no pantheism in Aristotle: on the contrary, they saw that Aristotle places God too far, so to speak, from Nature and from us. Therefore, the new naturalistic pantheism made war on Aristotle as interpreted in the schools, and joined the forces of humanism, scientific reform, religious reform and so forth, in their opposition to the Aristotle of tradition.

All these elements were, as I said, active forces. During the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries they were in a state of solution. They reached no definite form or system. The world of those days was like a seething caldron in which many substances were being melted down, like a fermentation vat in which froth and clearest essence and useless waste were boiling up in one ever restless mass. There were many philosophical tendencies, but, as yet, no system of philosophy. Of all the great countries in Europe, France was the last to be affected by these changes in the realm of thought. And, yet, France was the first to see a definite system simmer down from the formless mixture. Descartes is the first clear thinker in the modern era, and his attitude towards Aristotle has been, on the whole, that which every great philosopher since his time has adopted.

There is something that appeals to the imagination in the beginnings of Cartesianism as described by Descartes himself. In the winter of 1619-1620, he was, he tells us, in winter quarters at Neuburg on the banks of the Danube. His occupation as a soldier being suspended for several months, he spent that time in learned leisure, shut up day and night

in a room comfortably heated. While his companions in arms were occupied with such amusements as they could contrive, he devoted himself to meditation: "Undisturbed," he says, "by any cares or passions, I remained the whole day in seclusion, with full opportunity to occupy my attention with my own thoughts. Of these, one of the very first that occurred to me was, that there is seldom so much perfection in works composed of many separate parts, upon which different hands have been employed, as in those completed by a single master. Thus, it is observable that the buildings which a single architect has planned and executed are generally more elegant and commodious than those which several have attempted to improve, by making old walls serve for purposes for which they were not originally built." Fully persuaded, then, that he was acting for the best, Descartes resolved to "sweep away" all that his predecessors taught in philosophy. He determined to tear down all the structures which antiquity had reared, clear the foundation of all the debris, and build a new edifice, of which he should be the sole architect. In this universal demolition he made no exception in favor of any one philosopher. Aristotle was to go down with the rest. What his feelings were in regard to Aristotle we do not know. It is possible he may have looked on the peripatetic philosophy as the most imposing, the most carefully planned, the most solidly built. It made no difference. Down it should go with the rest, and make room for the new building, the foundation of which was Descartes' own thought, implying his own existence. "I think, therefore, I exist," is the rock on which the first course of masonry in this new edifice is laid. It matters little, for our present purpose, what we think of Descartes' foundation, or of the building which rests on it. It matters much that his work of demolition was complete and effective, so far as all modern philosophy was influenced by him. He broke definitely with tradition, and though others have built on him, none have cared to restore what he tore down and build on that. We can only deplore the imprudence of the man; we can only condemn the folly of his wholesale destruc-

tion. We may compare him to the person who burned down his house to destroy the one rat in the wainscotting. We may point out that, while esthetically and economically his comparison may hold good, pedagogically and historically, he is entirely wrong. It may be that when several builders have "tinkered," as we say, with an edifice, it would be piling monstrosity on monstrosity to add another story or another wing; it may be cheaper in the end to demolish the whole building and put up a new one. But that figure does not apply to systems of thought. The past is part of our inheritance: we have a right to what is true in it. A large part of education consists in putting the immature mind in possession of its social inheritance, and history has proved that it is impossible for any thinker, even for Descartes himself, to break entirely with the past. Descartes did wrong: that is our verdict, now that we see the consequences of his folly. There was nothing of the vandal in him: he was the gentlest of men, gentle to the point of timidity. Yet, vandalism is the only word which we can apply to the act of one who tears down without discrimination what former centuries have built, whether the building be of brick and stone or the stuff of which intellectual systems are constructed.

Descartes, to change the figure of speech, snapped the thread of tradition, so far as Aristotle was concerned, and no great philosopher of modern times has tried to tie the broken ends together. The eighteenth century ignored Aristotle: its greatest thinkers hardly mentioned him. Leibniz alone appreciated him. He was as anxious to conciliate as Descartes had been to obliterate. He was by profession a diplomat as well as a scholar: his aim was to conciliate all parties and reconcile all schools. It was his influence, combined with the general constructive tendency of nineteenth century thought, that revived interest in Aristotle during the last hundred years. That interest, however, was largely historical and critical. So far as building on the foundation of Aristotle is concerned, such a procedure was as far from the minds of the nineteenth century philosophers as it was from Descartes'. Instead, philo-

sophers built on the Cartesian foundation of subjectivism and introspection. Over all the philosophical efforts of the nineteenth century is the trail of the so-called first principle "I think, therefore I exist." Some, indeed, like Kant, substitute the practical for the theoretical reason, without, however, changing the essential nature of the method or the character of the results. Aristotle built his philosophy on the broad basis of science. In his ground plan there was room for both observation and introspection, and every stone of the edifice was fitted into its place and cemented into the structure by a logic which is valid in nature as well as in human nature. Nineteenth century philosophy was content to follow Descartes and construct on the basis of introspection, whether psychological or ethical, using as a principle of cohesion the logic of theoretical consciousness or of moral conscience, but neglecting always the logic of the sciences, the reasonableness of nature, the principles of common sense. It turned the pyramid upside down, attempting the impossible feat of balancing it on its apex. Not human nature, but nature, is the foundation of philosophy, and the folly of neglecting this principle has resulted, as we now see, in creating a conflict between philosophy and natural science. Philosophy should have known better. Even on general principles, it should have recognized that a complete break of continuity can result in nothing but disaster. It is out of the Middle Ages that the modern world grew, and, like Anteus of old, who gathered strength from contact with mother-earth, the world of thought at any period has much to gain and nothing to lose by keeping in touch with the foregoing generation of thinkers, whose work makes progress possible.

It is one of the singular inconsistencies of historical development that, although Aristotle was greatest as a philosopher, his influence in philosophy practically ended with Descartes, while in other departments of knowledge, his influence continued to be real and efficient. The science of the nineteenth century and of our own day, I need not tell you, is very different from Aristotle's. We now know many things

about nature which he did not know. Were he to come back to earth, a highschool pupil could teach him many things that would astonish him in physics and physiology and the elements of medical theory—and he would, I think, be willing to learn. But, while our acquired knowledge is so much vaster than his, and corrects his views on many points, the general outlook of science on nature is not very different from his, and the greatest scientists are the first to acknowledge that he it was who blazed out the paths which they follow. In literary criticism, too, his influence has not died out. The great struggle between classicism and romanticism in the early decades of the nineteenth century resulted in a compromise. Classicism yielded, without being obliged completely to abdicate its claims. And Aristotle is a representative of the classic spirit. Modern literature is wiser, if I may say so, than modern philosophy. It knows how to preserve what is best in the heritage of the past. It has combined romanticism with classicism. It has not neglected the contributions that came from the Teutonic spirit, its sombre, grandiose, and mystic imaginings, its love of the weird, the supernatural, the grotesque. Neither has modern literature spurned the rich legacy of the Celtic civilization, the Celtic spirit of gayety and piety, its love of the whimsical, the ludicrous, the humorous, the pathetic and the spiritually pure. With these elements, however, modern literature and modern art have retained the classic love of the tangible, the clearcut, the definitely human, and the healthy classic sense of naturalness. Our outlook on life—which is the material of literature and art—is wider and more sympathetic than Aristotle's. Christianity as a social force has contributed a good deal to that result. At the same time, we have not, I repeat, discarded the classic element and, in judging that element, in estimating its value, in testing literature according to it as a standard, we still follow the principles of literary criticism as formulated by Aristotle. Even when Aristotle's reputation as a philosopher was at its lowest, his rank among the literary critics was acknowledged by literary men. Voltaire, I need hardly tell you, had little

sympathy with Aristotle's philosophy. Yet, it was Voltaire who exclaimed "What a wonderful man Aristotle was! He traces the rules of tragedy with the same hand which penned the rules of dialectic, the principles of Ethics and the laws of political science, with the hand which lifted, in the measure in which it is possible for human nature to do so, the veil that hides the mysteries of nature. Who can refuse to admire him when one sees how profoundly he knew the principles of eloquence and of poetry? Where is there today a physician who could teach us how to compose a discourse or write a tragedy? He, like Plato, saw that true philosophy is the secret guide of the mind in all the arts. The laws that he lays down are still the laws which are followed by our best authors."

The general discredit of Aristotle as a philosopher was not, however, admitted in the official schools of the Catholic Church. During the period of the Reformation and afterwards, the teachers in Catholic universities, colleges and seminaries saw no reason to change their estimate of Aristotle's philosophy. Not only his logic, but his metaphysics, his ethics, his psychology and his philosophy of nature continued to be taught in the great centers of learning in Spain, France and Italy, wherever the influence of the Catholic Church was dominant. In those institutions, elaborate commentaries were written on his philosophical works, and his doctrines were defended against the humanists, the new scientists and the philosophers of the modern era. The wit of the humanists made no impression on these Aristotelians. The discoveries of the scientists, when they were appreciated at all, were appreciated as contributions to science which did not alter Aristotle's general outlook on nature. The plea of Descartes for a wholesale demolition of the past in philosophy was estimated at its true value. It was judged to be unwise in principle and unwarranted in point of fact, so far as Aristotle was concerned. There may have been obstinacy in the unwillingness of some of the Aristotelians to consider the just claims of the new thought. But there was, I think, justice and enlightenment in the estimate which they placed on Cartesianism when they pronounced it

false in its initial assumption, wrong in its course of development, and disastrous in the conclusions to which it leads. The pantheism of Spinoza, the immaterialism of Berkeley, the skepticism of Hume, Kant's destructive criticism of theoretical thought, the rationalistic gnosticism of Hegel, the Agnosticism of the English School and the violation of common sense by the Absolutist School,—all these the Aristotelians consider to be the luckless legacy of Cartesianism to modern thought. Philosophical criticism takes no account of good intentions. We know that the purpose of Spinoza was admirable. We sympathise with the effort of Berkeley to construct along the lines of Platonic spiritualism. We realize that Kant was deeply concerned for the great ethical and religious truths. We acknowledge the honesty of the Agnostic and the earnestness of the Absolutist. We can even admire the purpose of the pragmatist who has the courage of his convictions. Logic takes none of these palliating circumstances into account. The logic of the Aristotelian leads him to the conclusion that these men did wrong when they built on the false foundation of Cartesianism, and he cannot but deplore that they did so.

What, then, one may ask, do the Aristotelians expect of the student of philosophy today? Do they ask him to ignore the whole progress of modern thought? By no means. There is much to be learned from the great thinkers whose errors I have just now enumerated. What the Aristotelian contends is that the starting-point of modern thought is wrong, that we should not be content with going back to Kant or to Berkeley or to Descartes, but should go back to Aristotle, whose starting point is observation of the whole field of nature, and whose guiding principle in philosophy as well as in science is organized, reflective common sense. But, the modern student protests, are not the Aristotelians asking too much? We live in the twentieth century, in an age of enlightenment and universal education. We have come into a rich inheritance of achievement and progress. We know infinitely more than Aristotle did. We have conquered, or almost conquered, the forces of nature, and in all that pertains to civilization and culture, in our spiritual

life, above all, we have advanced far beyond anything that he ever dreamt of. He was a pagan in an age long gone, an age inferior to ours in all that makes life worth living. Is it not preposterous, then, to ask us to go back to Aristotle in philosophy?

And yet, the request is not so preposterous as it seems. We go back very willingly to Homer to learn the art of poetry, and no modern writer of an epic would resent comparison with the blind bard whose theme was Achilles' wrath and the wanderings of Odysseus. We go back to Aeschylus and Euripides as models of dramatic composition, and I am sure no dramatist of today would consider that he had failed had he succeeded as they did in putting on the stage a great episode of human life or a portrayal of human character. No singer of today would scorn comparison with Sappho or with Pindar. And in the plastic arts are the Greeks not still our masters? To emulate the success of Phidias and Praxiteles in the sphere in which each excelled is no mean ambition in a modern sculptor or painter. I do not mean to say that there is no inspiration elsewhere for poet or artist. What I mean is that the achievements of the Greek mind in some of its departments of activity are still a standard, an inspiration and, indeed, the despair of the modern mind in the same departments. But, you will say, perhaps, you are forgetting that philosophy is a science, not an art. No one would think of going back to the childish notion of Thales that the earth is a solid disk floating on an immense body of water, that the stars are the boats in which the heavenly gods float around on a sea above us, each twinkling light being the lantern at the prow of some celestial barque. No one would be so absurd as to ask us to believe with Aristotle that fire mounts upward because it is a light substance and its home is in the heavens, while a stone falls towards the earth because in it the earthly element predominates and its home is underneath our feet. The science of the Greeks is, indeed, antiquated, and philosophy is a science. But, I answer, philosophy is not a science like other sciences. It is a science *sui generis*. More than any other science, it

depends on a few fundamental truths, on a right beginning and a sound concept of method. Therefore, it is more independent than the other sciences in regard to the *Zeitgeist*, the spirit of the times. In this it is like the arts. For, artistic productions of the highest excellence are preserved perennially supreme in their own order according to the acknowledged principle that "a thing of beauty is a joy forever." The quality which makes the artist supreme is elusive. You can hardly define it. Certainly you cannot reduce it to definite principles of composition or execution. You cannot parcel it out and distribute it to pupils in the studio or the classroom. It belongs to the region of genius. Similarly, the philosopher is not the man who knows most, but the man whose outlook on the world of knowledge is sane and true. That, I contend, is a quality which time and its vicissitudes do not affect. It is a quality which knowledge does not affect; for the philosopher dominates the world of knowledge, is not dominated by it. Plato was right when he called philosophy "the divinest music." For it is an art; it may become a lost art, and if it is once lost, it is not knowledge that will restore it, whatever else will do so. There is then, no chronological line drawn across human history that would warrant us in saying: *Before* this time Aristotle was a safe guide; *after* it he is not. If Aristotle is right in his starting-point, and has the correct conception of the method of philosophy, then, no matter what progress science has made, no matter what advancement humanity has made in every direction, he is still a safe guide in philosophy, and will be, for all time. Science may modify his conclusions—our conclusions—progress may affect the results that we reach by means of his method; but no changes need affect the principles with which we start or the method that we follow, if these are fundamentally right.

I have said that there is no chronological line separating the age that should find Aristotle adequate in philosophy from the age in which his inadequacy would become apparent. There is, however, a line which separates, and always will separate, those whom Aristotle satisfies from those who find him

unsatisfying. The line to which I refer is not historical but psychological, not determined by the succession of events but by the varieties of temperament. It was a favorite saying of Schlegel that we are all born either Aristotelians or Platonists. To some, the scientist appeals; to others the poet and metaphysician. Some love the light that Aristotle brings; others prefer the warmth of Plato's presence and the fire of his inspiration. For some, the supreme quality in the philosopher is clear-sightedness; for others it is fervor. One man demands a calm, cold presentation of facts: he will prefer Aristotle. Another looks for spiritual thoughts that will lift him to a higher plane and wean him away from the sordid material world: he will prefer Plato. Recently some learned English writer whimsically proposed a practical test of this temperamental difference. The Aristotelians, he said, are lovers of dogs and Platonists are fonder of cats. There is, indeed, in the restless inquisitiveness of the dog, in his persistent pursuit of something or another, an emblem, albeit an inadequate one, of the spirit of Aristotelianism. And is not the fireside sphinx, sitting still for hours and blinking blissfully in the warmth, a picture of the contemplative life, and a not inapt image of Platonism? However this may be, there is truth in the underlying principle. We may be indifferent both to cats and to dogs, or we may admire both. But, if we are philosophers, we shall find that we naturally incline either towards Platonism or towards Aristotelianism. Each system attains the ultimate goal in its own way; and there they meet. For no matter how much difference of method there may be at the beginning and during the quest, since one sets out to find the Beautiful and the other to attain the True, if the one ends by realizing that God is the Supreme Beauty and the other reaches at last the conviction that God is Supreme Truth, their paths have at last converged, and the conclusion of Christian Platonism is identical with that of Christian Aristotelianism. Nevertheless, it remains, that, for some, salvation, in the intellectual sense, is through Aristotle and not through Plato. What a pity, then, that modern thought has been so misguided as to

break with the historic past, so far as Aristotle is concerned. Many a student is barred from the sympathetic study of Aristotle because the whole world in which he lives has put so low an estimate on Aristotle's philosophy, while for this particular searcher for the truth perhaps Aristotle is the one leader whose guidance would be salutary.

But, as I said at the beginning of this course, we cannot stem the tide of modern progress even if we would, and no system of philosophy has been benefitted by indulging in useless regrets or quarrelling with the course which history has taken. I believe, as I said then, that common sense will once more have a hearing in philosophy and, when that day comes, Aristotelianism will not be ignored.

And now, instead of trying to sum up the achievements of Aristotle in the various departments of human endeavor, let me make a somewhat appalling supposition. Let us imagine that the world, our world, was visited by some overwhelming catastrophe, destructive not only of our material achievements, but also of all that has been accomplished in the intellectual order. Let us imagine that all our public monuments, our newspapers, magazines and books were destroyed. Let us suppose that the work of devastation was carried farther than ever before, that the destroyer was more ruthless than the Vandal or the Goth, more destructive than the Dane, more truculently opposed to all literature than the Hun or the Ostrogoth. If, now, you were asked to select the writings of one man, which were to be excepted from the general catastrophe, and handed down to a new generation, to the race of conquerors, by which they were to judge the past, what writer would you select? You would not select your favorite poet; for his works would tell the newcomers nothing about history or science or philosophy. You would not select the historian, for a similar reason, nor the scientist nor the philosopher. You would, in that imaginary case, look around for a work more comprehensive than the works of any of these. You would, perhaps, think of some vast encyclopedia, the new *Britannica*, for instance, and, you would say: Let that survive; that tells more about our present civili-

zation than any other work. There is something in it about our literature, our science, our philosophy, our institutions, our history, and if there is only one work to survive and tell the conquerors about us, let that be the work. But, your encyclopedia is a product of many minds, of hundreds, at least, each of whom is an expert in his own line. The ancient world in a similar crisis, could have selected the works of one man, and that man was Aristotle. Too much of the literature of the past has been lost to us, and no one would be so lacking in appreciation as to wish more of it had been lost. But, *if* more of it had perished, what one collection would we, would the Greeks themselves, have wished to save? I think there can be no hesitation about the answer. Aristotle's works are the most comprehensive and complete record of what the Greek mind achieved in every department. He did not write poetry like Homer's nor prose like Plato's. But, more completely than these or any others of his countrymen he left in his collection of writings a record of Greek achievement and a critical study of the spirit of Greek civilization. This is, perhaps, the secret of his extraordinary influence. His mind, somehow, recapitulated all the past of his country and his race, and this is why, since the links between the present and the past are few, his spirit it is, more than any other, that binds the years and even the centuries together. His genius, in that sense, is secular. In no age and in no country will his voice be entirely unheard, and as long as men know how to appreciate overtowering genius, Aristotle will not be without some, at least, to admire his greatness. The world of thought may never again be obliged to rely on him alone, as it did for several centuries, but it will never be able to ignore what he has done, and, let us hope, it will never again try to forget what it owes him.

WILLIAM TURNER.

THE MATERIALISTIC INTERPRETATION OF EARLY CHRISTIAN HISTORY

The Materialistic Interpretation of History is the name given to a theory or philosophy of history according to which all the facts and stages in the social progress of mankind and all existing or extinct social institutions are declared to be products of economic causes. The credit for having originated this theory belongs to Karl Marx, the founder of scientific socialism. Long before the time of Marx, however, scientists and philosophers had been seeking for some category under which the phenomena of history might be placed or some principle round which they might be grouped. The traditional transcendental or religious view of history which had prevailed in Europe since the time of St. Augustine, was not seriously questioned until the seventeenth century, when many writers, especially Vico (1668-1744), the Founder of Modern Italian Philosophy, and Montesquieu (1689-1755) insisted on the predominant influence of the external world on the progress of human affairs. The first who worked this theory out philosophically was Buckle, who, in the second chapter of his *History of Civilization*, referred all progress to the influence of physical laws and geographical environment, asserting, however, with some reservations, that history is to be interpreted through the effects of climate, food, and soil upon social environment.¹

In the meantime a different tendency was observable in Germany, when under the influence of Lessing, Herder and Kant an idealistic method of interpretation was introduced which reached its culmination in Hegel, by whom History was defined as the Process of Reason as Spirit.² Both

¹ See Seligman, *The Economic Interpretation of History*, 2nd Ed. Chaps. II and III on the subject of the Philosophical Antecedents of the Theory and its Genesis and Development.

² Turner, *History of Philosophy*, p. 579.

these currents may be said to have united in Karl Marx. Marx was born at Trier in 1818 and after finishing his course at the University of Bonn was on the point of devoting himself to an academic career by seeking admission to the University as a *Privat-Dozent*, when a change in the political horizon in Germany induced him to take up journalism. His journalistic work commenced as a member of the staff of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, a paper founded in Cologne by the young Hegelian or Philosophical Radical Party. His writings exhibited such vigor and boldness that he was appointed editor in 1842. He held this position for a little over a year, when the paper, because of its radical tone, was suppressed by order of the Prussian Ministry. From Cologne, Marx went to Paris, when after an unsuccessful effort to continue his journalistic labors as collaborator on another paper the *Deutsche-französische Jahrbücher*, which ceased publication after one or two numbers, and on *Vorwärts* and other radical organs, he turned his attention to the Young-Hegelians and in conjunction with Frederick Engels a former newspaper colleague in Cologne he wrote a pamphlet entitled *Die heilige Familie* directed especially against Bruno Bauer, "who had offended him as Jew, as Radical and as journalist." In this work which appeared in 1845 and which was written almost exclusively by Marx, are to be found, according to Professor Seligman, the first incidental allusions to the doctrine of materialistic interpretation. It was not until two years later that he was sufficiently convinced of the force of his theory to explain it more in detail and to use it as a means to combat the older socialists. In his *Misère de la philosophie*, written in reply to Proudhon's *Philosophe de la misère*, Marx boldly advanced the theory that history must be interpreted under the aspect of an economic development, and that social relations are based on the variations of productive forces.

"In changing the mode of production," he says, "mankind changes all its social relations. The hand-mill creates a society with the feudal lord; the steam mill a society with the industrial capitalist. The same men who establish social re-

lations in conformity with their material production also create principles, ideas and categories in conformity with their social relations . . . all such ideas and categories are therefore historical and transitory products.”³

Having seized this view of history, Marx lost no time in giving it circulation. In the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, which he and Engels prepared, and which was adopted by the General Congress of the Communist League in London in 1847, and published the following year, we find a direct application of the principle to industrial problems. As explained by Engels, “the *Manifesto* assumed as its fundamental proposition: that in every historical epoch the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organization necessarily following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch, that, consequently, the whole history of mankind (since the dissolution of primitive tribal society holding land in common ownership) has been a history of class struggles, contests between exploiting and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes: that the history of these class struggles forms a series of evolution in which nowadays a stage has been reached where the exploited and oppressed class—the proletariat—cannot attain its emancipation from the sway of the exploiting and ruling class—the bourgeoisie—without at the same time and once and for all, emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression, class-distinctions and class struggles.”⁴

It is not necessary to discuss the further elaboration and development of the theory, by which, under the stress of adverse criticism, Marx and Engels sought to meet the arguments and objections of their adversaries. They made some concessions; but the theory in principle remained unchanged. Engels, in letters written towards the close of his life, admitted that “the actual form of social organization is often deter-

³ Quoted by Professor Seligman, p. 35.

⁴ *Introduction to Manifesto*, Eng. Tran., p. 7.

mined by political, legal, philosophical and religious theories and conceptions." ⁵ but as he was positive in asserting that all these forces find their basis in economic need, the admission induced no essential modification in the original claim.

It is impossible to find any subsequent defence or application of the theory which may be considered authoritative. What Marx understood by economic cause with relation to social life and history is clearly expressed in one of his letters. "We understand by the economic relations, which we regard as the determining basis of the history of society, the methods by which the members of a given society produce their means of support and exchange the products among each other, so far as the division of labor exists. The whole technique of production and of transportation is thus included. Furthermore this technique, according to our view, determines the methods of exchange, the distribution of products, and hence after the dissolution of gentile society, the division of society into classes, the relations of personal control and subjection, and thus the existence of the state of politics, of law, etc. . . . Although technique is mainly dependent on the condition of science, it is still more true that science depends on the conditions and need of technique. A technical want felt by society is more of an impetus to science than ten universities." ⁶

Understanding, then, by the economic factors, all the forces that are directly or indirectly connected with man's effort to sustain life, and, assuming that the "history of mankind is the history of mankind in society," we may accept as a succinct, though conservative statement of what the economic interpretation of History means, that of Professor Seligman: "The existence of man," he says, "depends upon his ability to sustain himself: the economic life is therefore the fundamental condition of all life. Since human life, however, is the life of man in society, individual existence moves within the framework of the social structure and is modified by it. What the conditions of maintenance are to the individual,

⁵ Seligman, *loc. cit.*, p. 63.

⁶ Quoted by Seligman, p. 59.

the similar relations of production and consumption are to the community. To economic causes, therefore, must be traced in last instance those transformations in the structure of society which themselves condition the relations of social classes and the various manifestations of social life.”⁷

How the various factors which enter into the human struggle for existence have modified the form of society at different epochs and in different localities according to the defenders of this Philosophy of History is clear from their theory of social evolution. It is assumed, especially by the later advocates of the economic theory, who have accepted the doctrine of biological evolution, that there was a time when men lived in a condition little better than that of the brutes, with no morals, no science, with merely the rudiments of speech, and consequently with no social organization. All the means of subsistence were in common, or rather, life depended on the physical strength and skill of the individual. This condition represents the struggle for existence in the lowest form. Through experience these primitive human beings discovered that co-operation was advantageous, and from the same physical need for the means of subsistence they formed groups, held together by different ties. Society in this inchoate and rough form has no other end than the preservation and conservation of life. This character and purpose according to Marx and his followers it has never lost. “The final causes of all social changes,” says Engels, “are to be sought not in men’s brains, not in man’s better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange. They are all to be sought, not in the philosophy, but in the economics of each particular period.”

Proceeding on the hypothesis that groups were formed in the manner indicated, it is clear that they were subject to two sets of influences, to which are attributed all the changes in life and thought which make up what is called progress. One set of influences, affecting all the members of this group

⁷ *The Economic Interpretation of History*, p. 3.

alike, arose from physical environment, climate, soil, food and clothing, and produced what are called racial characteristics. Thus, as Professor Patten expounds one phase of the theory, "a people who live on barley, whose fuel and timber come from pine forests, whose transportation depends on cattle, and who fight with spears, have little use for fine sensory distinctions, and still less for the analytic faculties and logical powers. . . . Men reared in such an environment have an overflow of energy and activity. Their activity usually takes the form of war and conquest, through which the motor powers are developed out of proportion to the other sides of national character." ⁸

The other set of influences, operative within the group itself, arises from the struggle between man and man for the means of subsistence. To the various manifestations of this economic struggle are traced the different kinds of social institutions, which are classified as economic, aesthetic, moral and religious. "Each nation," says Professor Patten, "rose out of the peculiar conditions of its environment, developed groups of ideas in each of the four fields, and then through contact with other civilizations received ideas from them which were blended with those acquired in its own history." ⁹

It is needless to say that this theory of life and history, dealing as it does with the most profound and far-reaching questions that can occupy the thoughts of men, has not gone unchallenged. Many objections have been brought against it which it will be sufficient merely to enumerate. First, it has been pointed out that the theory of Economic Interpretation rests on the logical error of confounding a *conditio sine qua non* with an efficient cause, and hence, that its defenders are guilty of asserting, that—because food, drink, clothing and shelter are necessary for men in order that he may exercise his faculties and his social capabilities, that he may think and plan, and play politics and paint and write

⁸ *The Development of English Thought. A Study in the Economic Interpretation of History*, p. 6.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

poetry,—the cause of all these various activities is to be found in what he eats and drinks, in his clothing and his habitation. Another objection arises from the erroneous *method* followed by the defenders of the theory, who, exaggerating the organic character of society, and forgetting that it is an organism only by analogy, attribute to it all the organic characteristics, or as Mr. Gilbert K. Chesterton has pithily expressed it, of arguing that “because man is a biped fifty men are a centipede.”

A third objection is that the theory of Economic Interpretation is deterministic, that it is opposed to the doctrine of free will. A general discussion of the merits of economic determinism is not possible here. It will be sufficient to appeal to the general consciousness of freedom and responsibility to show that the character of the social organisation does not rob a man of this prerogative. Closely connected with this objection is the obvious failure in the theory of Economic Interpretation sufficiently to account for the part played by great men in history. “If anything is humanly certain it is that the great man’s society, properly so called, does *not* make him before he can remake it.—Can it be that the convergence of Sociological pressures so impinged on Stratford-upon-Avon about the 26th of April, 1564, that a W. Shakespeare, with all his mental peculiarities, had to be born there—as the pressure of water outside a certain boat will cause a stream of a certain form to ooze into a particular leak? And if the aforesaid W. Shakespeare had died of cholera infantum, would another mother at Stratford-upon-Avon have engendered a duplicate copy of him, to restore the sociologic equilibrium,—just as the stream of water will reappear, no matter how often you pass a sponge over the leak, so long as the outside level remains unchanged? Or might the substitute arise at Stratford-atte-Bowe?”¹⁰

Many other objections have been brought against the theory, such as: that it assumes the operation of historical laws, the

¹⁰ W. James, *The Will to Believe*, p. 235.

existence of which has not been proven; that it fails to account for progress or degeneration among nations;¹¹ that it entirely neglects the ethical and spiritual forces in history; and that its adoption as an actual determining factor in life would result in absurdities and confusion.

Notwithstanding these objections, however, the Theory of Economic Interpretation of History has had a tremendous influence on the historiography of the last quarter of a century. In the hands of some writers it has been a means of unravelling the complicated movements of whole epochs, or has afforded grounds to explain the existence and nature of social institutions: others have been influenced less strongly; but in discussing historical matters, they do not fail to make due allowance for the play and interplay of social and economic forces. The most important contribution to the elucidation of the working of economic forces in history was perhaps the work of Lewis H. Morgan on *Ancient Society*, in which tracing the evolution of Society through the different stages of the horde, the clan, the family and the state, he called attention to the economic importance of the change from the Matriarchate to the Patriarchate.¹² Other writers have pursued the same or allied themes, such as Grosse¹³ developed in economic conditions. Ferrero in his "Greatness and Decline of Rome," has given a popular exposition of how this theory can be applied to a higher form of civilization, and Prutz and Kautsky have dealt with the Crusades and the Reformation as manifestations of economic antagonism. Pöhlmann¹⁴ finds in the economic condition of Greece the basis of its

¹¹ Professor Patten thinks he has found the solution of this difficulty. He proposes to "use the economic interpretation of history to explain the degenerate tendencies in civilization, and then to employ social psychology to set forth the opposing forces of regeneration." *The Social Basis of Religion*. Preface, p. v.

¹² L. H. Morgan, *Ancient Society*, New York, 1877. On the importance of Morgan's work see Bernheim, *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode und der Geschichtsphilosophie*. (4th ed., p. 672).

¹³ *Die Formen der Familie und Formen der Wirtschaft*, 1896.

¹⁴ *Geschichte des antiken Kommunismus und Sozialismus*.

political constitution, and even Greek Philosophy has been explained as an outcome of social conditions.¹⁵ Professor Patten traces to economic causes the development of English thought, and in a recent work has propounded the theory that Religion has a social basis.¹⁶ As viewed by Professor Patten "religion is a natural movement based on social feeling, and focused by external conditions. It is an expression of a reaction against conflict, degeneration and depravity."¹⁷ In fact not only religion, but the moral code and conscience or the ability to distinguish between good and bad have been described as historical products of social forces.

The most striking attempt, however, to carry the theory to its fullest logical conclusion was that in which it was sought to find an explanation of the origin of Christianity in economic facts alone. The first who applied the materialistic theory of history to Christianity was Engels.¹⁸ He was followed by Kautsky, the editor of the socialistic organ, *Die Neue Zeit*, who in 1885 devoted several articles to expound the same views. The subject was subsequently dealt with by Engels and Schmidt in divers contributions to the same publication, and by Kautsky in his work, "Forerunners of the Newer Socialism."¹⁹ The thought which all these writers strove to accentuate, namely that Christianity was primarily an economic movement arising out of social unrest, has entered into the very fibre of modern socialistic literature, though as a general rule no special pains are taken by most of the writers who make this assumption to prove its accuracy. Kautsky, who may be regarded as preëminently the historian of the socialistic party in Germany, has made a fresh presentation of the subject in a work on the origin of Christianity which appeared last year.²⁰ This contains what may reasonably be

¹⁵ Eleutheropoulos, *Wirtschaft und Philosophie*, 1900.

¹⁶ *The Social Basis of Religion*, 1911.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

¹⁸ "Bruno Bauer und das Urchristentum" in the *Züricher Sozialdemokrat*. 1882 (nos. 19, 20).

¹⁹ *Vorläufer des neueren Sozialismus*, 2te Auflage, Stuttgart, 1909.

²⁰ *Der Ursprung des Christentums*. Stuttgart, 1910.

regarded as the final result of about thirty years of effort to apply to Christianity the principles of the materialistic Philosophy of History.

In the Introduction to this work Kautsky confesses that he can make no claim to be regarded as a specialist in the field of early church history, and bases his competence to speak on the subject on the fact that his life has been passed in the study of social problems. The experience he received through participating in the class struggles of the proletariat, gives him, he considers, an insight into the real character of Christianity which can never be attained by the student of Theology or the History of Religion. True to the spirit of his philosophy and the principles of his school, he assumes as the fundamental idea of his work that it is not necessary to take into account the Person or the work of Jesus Christ in order to explain the rise and spread of the Christian religion. Christianity, he asserts, was, in the beginning, nothing but a movement among the proletariat, which originated in the economic conditions of the time, and which aimed primarily and solely at social reform.

In regard to the first of these assertions it is hardly necessary to state, that Kautsky derived his opinions and his arguments from Bauer and the representatives of the extinct school of Tübingen critics. To support his contention that Christ never lived, he finds it necessary to discuss the pagan writers Tacitus, Suetonius and Dion Cassius, in whose works references are found to Christianity and the Christians, and while not actually committing himself to the statement that all the passages in these authors are fabrications, he says that their genuineness is far from being established, and that even admitting that they are genuine, they contain no evidence that Jesus ever lived, for they do not speak of Him but of Christus, which after all is nothing but the Greek translation of Messias. Kautsky neglects to speak of the testimony of Pliny the Younger, whose writings ante-date those of either Tacitus or Suetonius, and lays great stress on the fact that if Jesus had ever lived these authors or the contemporary Jewish

writers would not have failed to speak of Him. The question of the authenticity of the passages in these pagan authors referred to by Kautsky, is one which has received such a thorough sifting at the hands of competent critics, that it seems disingenuous, to say the least, in view of the unanimity which prevails regarding their genuineness among those who have specially studied the matter, to reopen the discussion or to hint at their spuriousness, without advancing a shred of new evidence or without having taken the trouble to examine the old.

The argument from silence is not necessarily a reliable one in the eyes of the historian, and in the present instance it is not only not pertinent but valueless. In Josephus there can be found statements which are applicable to nothing else in contemporary Jewish history but the beginnings of Christianity, and in the case of the other authors, Jewish as well as pagan, there is no reason why they should have gone outside the scope and purpose of their works to speak of Christ or His teaching, because even if they knew Him they were not in a position to judge of the importance of His doctrines, and unconverted as they were, He was to them merely an insignificant prophet in a remote province of the vast Roman Empire.²¹ In dealing with the Christian sources for the Life of Christ Kautsky adopts a Bourbon attitude of learning nothing and forgetting nothing, that could hardly be looked for in a progressive advocate of the rights of the proletariat. He asserts that he is unable to convince himself of the genuineness of the New Testament documents, that he regards them as utterly devoid of value as historical sources, that they originated as party pamphlets to convince the unthinking and

²¹ An excellent presentation of the case against Kautsky and the defenders of the economic view of the origin of Christianity may be found in Herman Köhler, *Sozialistische Irrlehren von der Entstehung des Christentums und ihre Widerlegung*, Leipzig, 1899, to whom the author of the present article wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness. The subject is also dealt with by Schaub, *Die Eigentumslehre nach Thomas von Aquin und dem modernen Sozialismus*, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der beiderseitigen Weltausschauungen. Freiburg, 1898.

unsuspecting populace and that their authors escaped detection through the general credulity of the public and the universal thirst for the sensational. One of the few survivors of the radicals who drew inspiration from the works of Baur and Strauss half-a-century ago, Kautsky can find none among the more recent authors to give him comfort except Pffeiderer. He sets himself in opposition to all the present day critics of the New Testament in clinging to the old theories regarding the late origin of the New Testament writings. He admits that Mark's Gospel was written sometime shortly after the fall of Jerusalem, but describes it as the result of half-a-century of legend building. The other gospels were from a later date, that of John from the middle of the second century. All the rest of the early Christian literature he considers to be unquestionably spurious in the sense that it was written at a date much later than that claimed by the documents themselves, and by persons other than the reputed authors.

It is not easy to know how to answer such Rip-van-Winkle views as these. Had Kautsky not buried himself in the affairs of the proletariat for forty years and had he any knowledge of what was being accomplished in the meantime, he might have known that the world of Biblical research has been peopled with eager investigators, and that such men as Theodor Keim, Eduard Reuss, Carl Holstein, Carl Hase, Weiszäcker, Heinrich Holtzman, Bernhard Weiss, Adolf Hilgenfeld, Theodor Zahn, Adolf Harnack, Lightfoot, Funk, Westcott and hosts of others, orthodox and rationalistic, had devoted themselves to the solution of problems which he handles so lightly, that their conclusions are in opposition to his, that he speaks a language which has grown old in the field of New Testament study and that he defends theories which are now mentioned only to cause a smile. He might have known that even the most radical of modern critics will not set the date of Mark later than the year 70; of Matthew later than 75; of Luke's gospel and Acts, later than 90, and of John scarcely later than the end of the first century. He might further have known that in all cases the usually accepted date is much earlier.

This is not the place to enter into a disquisition regarding the chronology of the New Testament documents and of early Christian literature. The same necessity which presented itself to the authors whom Kautsky follows of denying the historicity of an entire literature in order to destroy the historic character of the gospels and the historic Person of Christ, still exists. In order to remove the gospels and the epistles from the category of genuine and trustworthy historical sources it will be necessary not only to prove the spuriousness of the few scattered passages in pagan writers, but to remove from the field the copious fund of literature which came from the pens of Christian authors in the first and second century. The writings of Clement and Papias, of Ignatius, of Polycarp, of Irenaeus, of Justin and many others must be proved to be forgeries before the reliability of the New Testament can be assailed. These are the outworks. While they stand the citadel is impregnable. If modern historical criticism has any achievement to its credit, it is that of having established upon a secure footing the character and genuineness of the writings of these early Christian authors. The problems regarding early Christian history have very largely ceased to be of a critical nature. The materials are ready for the investigator, their trustworthiness and genuineness are guaranteed by the erudition and zeal of the scholars, who won concession after concession from their opponents, until the documents, witnessing to the earliest records of Christianity, are no more assailed in critical circles.

Here, of course, it would be perfectly justifiable to take leave of Kautsky and the other upholders of the Materialistic Interpretation of History as applied to early Christianity and its Founder. If they choose to follow the methods of the old Roman tyrants who knocked the heads off the statues of their murdered predecessors and substituted graven images of themselves, relying on the terror and self-interest of the mob to see in them the unimpaired work of the original artist, they can hardly expect that the intelligence of the modern world or even the desire for social reorganization can endure such

fetters. Modern scholarship has gone on record for certain well-defined facts regarding the life and Personality of the Founder of Christianity, and the theory, whatever it may be, either of Theology or history, which attempts to gain recognition must be made to fit the facts, not the facts the theory. If the doctrine of the Materialistic Interpretation of History can be made applicable to the origin of Christianity, only by denying the historic reality of the Person of Christ and refusing to take into account His life and His works, then either the theory falls or the students and scholars of half-a-century have worked in vain.

The other phase of the question, viz., that Christianity originated as the result of economic needs and that in essence it was primarily an economic movement is much too elaborate to permit of detailed examination. At the outset, however, we are confronted by a strange and inexplicable contradiction. All the defenders of the Materialistic Philosophy are unanimous in rejecting the gospels as sources for the Life of Christ, but by a strange inconsistency the same documents are accepted without question or explanation as affording valid evidence for the early history of Christianity when it is viewed in the light of a communistic movement. In fact the most pronounced advocates of the system not only accept these documents as trustworthy when they are to be used as sources for a supposed communistic revolt, but they quote with approval as containing the very essence of communistic teaching, the words of Christ to the Rich Young Man, Matt. xix, 21, "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all thou hast and give to the poor."

Passing over, then, the unquestionable inconsistency of procedure by which the same documents are alternately accepted and rejected, we find that in order to explain the origin of Christianity on purely natural grounds, or to find a means by which economic need might be substituted for the Person of Christ and His religious teaching, the defenders of the Materialistic Interpretation of History were under the necessity of showing that the economic conditions at a certain period

in the history of mankind were such as to call for reform, and that the movement known as Christianity was the expedient adopted by certain of the proletariat to relieve themselves from the pressure of economic burdens. In other words that all the elements which went to make up Christianity were pre-existent in the life or thought of the people, and that by a convergence of economic factors in the time of Augustus, these elements were synthesized and found expression as a communistic movement for social reform to which the name Christianity has been applied. Two distinct streams of influence, it is said, contributed to the new movement, one originating in Rome, the other in Judea.

In Rome the causes which led to the proletariat effort for betterment, are, according to these writers, classed, either as social, political or intellectual. To these three sources it is claimed, can be traced all the elements which are afterwards found in the Christian communist movement. The social condition according to the manner in which it is described can be summed up as universal servitude; the political as class domination upheld by absolutism and characterized by oppression and extortion; the intellectual as chaotic, as shown in the general credulity, the growing spirit of humanity, and in the religious upheaval tending towards monotheism and internationalism. Here, it is represented, were all the elements, ready and suitable and needing only some skillful hand or perhaps a little additional pressure from the economic screws to be converted into Christianity. It would be interesting to follow the picture which the experts in the social sciences have painted of the economic conditions in Rome in the first years of the Empire, to learn in the language of the present as Ferrero has taught, what the actual conditions were, of the bad political bosses, the corrupt political rings, the capitalists and so forth, but all that has nothing to do with the origin of Christianity. The Christian religion did not originate in Rome, it was not preached by the sorely tried Roman proletariat, and even when they learned of it they do not seem to have taken to its practices or its doctrines very eagerly. Why,

then, speak of their miserable condition, of the cruelties of slave owners, of the vices of slavery, the destruction of free working classes, etc., in connection with the origin of Christianity when Christianity did not arise in the place where these conditions prevailed, nor among the people who fostered them. The fact of the matter is that Christianity was first preached in Palestine, the first Christian community was in Jerusalem, and Christian doctrines were carried by the Jews from Palestine to other parts of the world.

In order to show that Christianity was in the beginning a movement for social reform, and that it was a protest of the masses against the grinding conditions under which they lived, it would seem more reasonable to pay no attention to the place where it might have originated but to study in detail all the places where it first appeared, to find out what class of people it attracted and above all to determine exactly what it was that attracted them. In regard to this latter point, if there is any truth in Christian records, if there is any continuity, anything organic in Christian doctrine, it is certain that the members of the Christian communities were drawn together, through a common faith in Christ as the God made Man, as the Redeemer who had atoned for their sins, and through Whom they might hope for eternal salvation. All the facts we possess concerning the early missionary efforts of the Christians fail to reveal a single shred of evidence to prove that churches or congregations were organized with the purpose of relieving economic needs or of improving social conditions.

To go a little more into detail, the very places in which the Christian religion first took root, were precisely those portions of the Roman Empire where economic conditions were best. Syria which received Christianity directly from Jerusalem, became the second cradle of evangelization, and on the authority of Mommsen²² we have the assurance that "the brilliant aspect of the conditions of Syria was the economic one." "In no city of antiquity was the enjoyment of

²² *Provinces of the Roman Empire*, vol. II, p. 148 (Eng. trans.).

life so much the main thing, and its duties so incidental as in Antioch upon Daphne." ²³ And yet it was among the citizens of this city of pleasure by the Orontes that the followers of Christ were first called Christians. So well established was the prosperity of Antioch that the wars and conquests of the third and fourth centuries do not seem to have interfered with the comfort of its inhabitants to any considerable extent. In the time of St. John Chrysostom, when the Christians in Antioch numbered about one hundred thousand, ²⁴ a tenth part were rich, a tenth part were of the poor that have nothing at all, and the rest of the middle class." ²⁵ There is no evidence to show that in the flourishing cities in Asia Minor, where St. Paul preached, in Corinth, in Ephesus, in Laodicea, etc., the people felt the stress of grinding poverty or oppression. Speaking of Asia Minor Mommsen says "Of this happiness of life there was abundance in Asia Minor under the Roman imperial government. 'No province of them all,' says an author living in Smyrna under the Antonines, 'has so many towns to show as ours, and none such towns as our largest. It has the advantage of a charming country, a favorable climate, varied products, a position in the centre of the Empire, a girdle of peaceful people, all round good order, rarity of crime, gentle treatment of slaves, consideration and goodwill from the rulers.'" ²⁶ So too in other places, in Egypt, Africa and Gaul where the same level of pagan contentment with material things prevailed, Christianity was received, not as a means of alleviating economic needs, but as a response to the spiritual cravings of human nature. It is unquestionably true that there was much room for improvement in the conditions under which the populace in the time of Augustus were compelled to pass their lives; but it does the Plebs of Rome and the Roman Empire too much honor to give them credit for having judged their conditions by standards of life

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

²⁴ *Hom. in Matt.*, LXXXV, 4.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, LXVI, 3.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 384.

which have grown up since then. Their condition was deplorable because of its moral baseness, and its lack of a serious sense of the responsibility of existence, and consequently any opinion regarding their desire for change must be based on the point of view they possessed respecting life and its opportunities. On this point other historians do not judge the aspiring proletariat so favorably as do Kautsky and his colleagues. "We need not waste much compassion upon the life of the Roman working class," says Tucker.²⁷ "It is true that there was then no doctrine of the 'dignity of labor,' but, that there was a reasonable pride taken in a trade reputably maintained, is seen from the frequent appearance of its tools upon a tombstone. In respect of the mere enjoyment of life, the laborers of the Roman world were, so far as we can gather, tolerably happy. They had abundant holidays, mostly of religious origin; but like our own so frequently added to, and so far diverted from religious thoughts, that they were more marked by jollity and sport than by any solemnity of spirit."

On the other hand the people who formed the first Christian communities were not beggars, nor do they seem to have been discontented with their station in life. They were working-men who plied their trades with success, and who were on a friendly footing with their well-to-do neighbors. From the time the earliest Christian communities were organised in the East, there were men and women in them who had wealth and station, and yet, at no time was their right to call themselves Christians questioned in any way, nor were they required, as a condition of membership, to abandon their possessions.

The most convincing proof, however, that Christianity did not originate as an economic movement among the masses is found in the fact that they were so slow to receive it. There were unquestionably thousands of unfortunates in Rome and elsewhere whose condition was deplorable in the extreme and who would gladly have accepted relief from any quarter. If Christianity was the reply which their oppression had formed in

²⁷ *Life in the Roman World of Nero and St. Paul*, p. 253.

answer to the universal demand for relief and betterment, why did they not accept what they themselves had called into being? It has been calculated that the number of Christians in the city of Rome in the middle of the third century was about 30,000, which, if the entire number of inhabitants is placed at 900,000, would amount to about one-thirtieth of the entire population or between three and five per cent. of the people of the city.²⁸ This brings up a problem which the upholders of the economic view of history will find hard to solve. They assume that the multitude, through the pressure of economic necessity, turned to a scheme of life which promised them relief and yet after two centuries of propaganda in the very place where the need for reform was most urgent, the very persons to whom the scheme owed its existence stood aloof from it. Economic interpretation has no answer to this riddle. The facts are, that in Rome, which it is assumed, was distinctively the church of the proletariat, there were from the beginning Christians of all classes and what is more confusing still the Church in Rome was not in the beginning drawn from the houseless and poverty stricken Romans but principally from the Greeks and converted Jews. From that nucleus there was formed the flourishing Church of later days which numbered among its members representatives of the oldest patrician families, senators, philosophers and consuls. If the great mass of the proletariat did not join the Christian community it was because their desires and aspirations were not such as would induce them to practise the life of renunciation, of self-sacrifice and of humble submission to the ills and inconveniences of life which Christian faith demanded. Thus it is clear that Christianity did not originate among the discontented masses in the Roman Empire, it came to them from the Jewish capital and was first preached by Jews, it did not gain its first adherents exclusively from among the proletariat to whom it penetrated generally only after the time when, on

²⁸ This is figure arrived at by Harnack after examining the opinions of Renan, Friedländer, Döllinger, etc. *Mission and Expansion of Christianity*, vol. II, p. 248 (Eng. trans.).

the confession of the upholders of the materialistic theory, it had lost all semblance of an economic movement. The other contention that Christianity in the beginning was essentially communistic in character is equally erroneous and misleading. The evidences of this communistic tendency, it is asserted, can be found in the class hatred which it fostered and in the destruction of family ties and the contempt for work which it engendered. How far this is from historic reality is clear from the entire course of Christian development. There is not a single fact in early Christian history which would tend to show that men were induced to join the Christian church through the hope of enjoying the benefits of a communistic regime. The only incident that can be adduced in favor of such a statement is that narrated in the Acts of the Apostles concerning the primitive Church in Jerusalem, when it is said "All they that believed were together, and had all things common. Their possessions and goods they sold and divided them to all according as every one had need." It is a perversion of the sense of this passage to see in it a legal ordinance requiring the surrender of personal property and not rather an exemplification of the brotherly love with which the first members of the Church were filled. In the memorable incident which has enriched the language of denunciation with the name of Ananias, we find rather a proof of the impossibility of any project of a communistic character, because as the Acts state, neither Ananias nor his wife were under any obligation to surrender their property. The incident related by Luke must be read in conjunction with his further statements on the subject of wealth and property, and his further description of the community in Jerusalem which shows that the church there contained rich as well as poor. The other assertions regarding the class hatred and the political insubordination of the early Christians are too far from the actual facts as history has revealed them to merit any notice. The truth is that Christianity had no social nor political programme, "if by programme is meant a set of definitely prescribed

regulations.”²⁹ Neither the founder of Christianity nor His disciples troubled themselves about economic conditions nor contemporary circumstances. Had they done so Christianity would have ceased to exist with the conditions in which it was born. It might have served the needs of that day but its usefulness would have vanished with the next change in economic environment. If the gospel aimed at founding a community among men, this does not mean that it was communistic, unless as has been said “the transformation of the socialism which rests on the basis of conflicting interests into the socialism that rests on the consciousness of a spiritual unity and destiny”³⁰ can be called communistic.

There is no need to discuss the remaining counts in the economic indictment of the traditional view of the origin of Christianity. If the supposed social and economic environment which was ripe for reform cannot be considered as being in any way responsible for the birth of Christianity, then it is useless to pursue the followers of Marx in their task of tracing the scattered rays of light which at different times and in different places penetrated the pagan mind in the hope of building therefrom an intellectual environment as the source of Christian doctrines. Hence the attempt to apply the Materialistic Interpretation of History to the Origin of Christianity, as far as can be judged from the writings of those who uphold that system, fails at every point. It fails because it does not connect what its advocates are pleased to call economic cause with what they style economic result, because they fail to show any relation between the economic distress which called for reform and the economic relief offered by Christianity, or to present Christianity in the light of an economic movement. It is useless to conjecture what results an attempt of that kind might have yielded under the hands of competent historians, but nothing but failure could be anticipated from a method so arbitrary and unscientific in character as that

²⁹ Harnack, *What is Christianity?* Eng. Trans., p. 97.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

of attempting to build a Philosophy of phenomena without regard for pertinent facts. "The science of History is not something separate from the facts of history, but something contained in them, it is simply the meaning, the rational interpretation, the knowledge of the true nature and essential relations of the facts. It is the Philosophy of History."³¹

PATRICK J. HEALY.

³¹ Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*, p. 15.

INCREMENT VALUE TAXES IN GERMANY AND GREAT BRITAIN.

While there is truth in the proverb as to the certainty of taxes, there are few economic or fiscal questions upon which there is more uncertainty than that of the proper measure of taxation. Of the various theories which have been invoked to determine how the burden of taxation should be distributed among the subjects of a state, two especially have found wide favor, namely, the benefit theory (the amount of tax collected from the subject should be in proportion to the benefit which the subject receives from governmental activities), and the faculty or ability theory (the subject should pay to the state in proportion to his ability). The first of these was more widely accepted among economists a century ago than at present and is now upheld mainly by the lawyers. Present day writers on public finance are inclined to accept ability as the just measure in distributing the burden. But whichever theory we adopt we shall meet with difficulty in its practical application. With regard to the first-named theory, the benefit which we receive from government is in proportion to neither our wealth nor our income, for our lives and liberties are protected as well as our property. And if it were merely a question of property, the benefit from government would not necessarily be in exact *proportion* to the amount, for the man who has a million dollars' worth might be in a position to secure private police and thus not be benefitted ten times as much by the protection of the state as the man who has only one hundred thousand dollars' worth.

Accepting the faculty theory, on the other hand, we shall find a similar difficulty. Has A, whose income is a thousand dollars a year, the same ability to pay fifty dollars in taxes as has B, whose income is two thousand dollars, to pay twice

the amount? Clearly not, for A possibly has one hundred dollars left after securing the necessities of life, while B undoubtedly has twice that surplus. It is, therefore, easier for B to pay one hundred dollars to the state than it is for A to pay fifty dollars. Clearly a *proportional* tax on income is not a true measure of ability to pay.

Some theorists have proposed that taxation should be progressive, that is, as the income increases not only the absolute amount of the tax but also the *rate* should increase. Other writers have proposed and legislators have enacted that a definite amount should be exempt from taxation and that a uniform rate or a nearly uniform rate be applied to the remainder. This is technically called *degressive* taxation. Most writers on public finance whether socialistic or conservative are inclined to agree that the tax system should be *degressive* or *progressive* and that strictly *proportional* taxation does not answer the demands of justice. Again, it is maintained that under the *faculty* theory, as a general thing an income which is due to personal services should not be taxed so heavily as an income from property. The personal services, it is argued, furnish an income only for a part of the lifetime of the individual and a greater part of it must be deducted to furnish the necessities for that proportion of the life when the individual cannot work, whereas the income from property will continue through the lifetime of the owner and afterward. This thought found expression in the British income tax of 1907 granting "relief" to "earned" incomes under two thousand pounds. This "relief" has been continued and amplified in the later budget.

It is, of course, not necessary or desirable that every tax should be assessed in proportion to ability to pay. For example, an excise might be levied on beer under such circumstances that some poor men might contribute twice as much to the treasury as some rich men. But it is desirable that all of the taxes taken together should impose a burden as nearly as possible in proportion to the ability of the several taxpayers.

In fact, with the growing expenditures of the different nations it becomes necessary to seek out new sources of taxation and to levy the taxes with a finer discrimination for the needs of justice than was necessary in former times when a smaller revenue was required by the state. These demands for increased taxes have recently led the national governments of Germany and Great Britain to propose that a part of the "unearned increment" of land values be taken in taxation by the state. This suggestion, although it employs the phraseology of the "single taxers," is really not any more dangerous to the institution of private property in land than our American fiscal practice.

I.

When the Germans established a protectorate over Kian Chow in 1898 it was seen that the German administration would effect a considerable increase in land values. Accordingly the value at that time was determined and an arrangement was made whereby one-third of the increase in the value of the land, in as far as such increase was not due to expenditure on the part of the owner, was taken by the government as a tax. In 1903 the city of Frankfort-on-Main introduced a similar tax on "unearned increment" (*Wertzuwachssteuer*). Under the Frankfort ordinance as amended in 1906 there was to be levied when a piece of real estate was sold (1) a two per cent. tax on the whole purchase price of the real estate and (2) an additional tax which varied under varying conditions. If the land was built upon and had not changed owners for twenty years, the second part of the tax amounted to from one to two per cent., depending upon the length of time which had elapsed since the last sale. If the land was not built upon and had not changed hands for twenty years the additional tax levied upon the purchase price was from two to six per cent., depending likewise upon the time which had elapsed. But if less than twenty years had elapsed since

a previous sale the additional tax was determined in the following manner, and this is the essence of the "increment value" tax: if the increase in value of the property amounted to fifteen per cent. since the last sale, a tax of two per cent. of the increase was collected. If the increase was twenty per cent., three per cent. was collected. If twenty-five per cent., four per cent. was taken and so on, one per cent. being added to the tax rate for every five per cent. increase in value. This increase in the tax rate continued up to the point at which twenty-five per cent. of the increase was taken in taxes.

In 1905 Cologne introduced an increment tax similar to that of Frankfort. In Cologne the increment tax begins with a rate of ten per cent. of the increase where the increase in value amounts to ten per cent. The rate advances rapidly until twenty-five per cent. of the "unearned increment" is taken.

Hamburg, from 1903 to 1908, required profit made on real estate transactions to be reckoned as income and to be taxed under the income tax. This was of course the increment value tax in another form. On account of the ease with which citizens of Hamburg could and did change their place of residence to avoid paying the tax it was found advisable to change the tax to an increment value tax, thus making it a real instead of a personal tax and collectible where the land was located rather than where the owner had his residence.

The increment value tax was accepted pretty widely by German municipalities at the time of its adoption last year by Berlin. In many of the cities it has yielded a large revenue. In February of the present year it was adopted as a German imperial tax, and is expected to furnish about twenty million marks annually for the imperial treasury. The municipalities are to be permitted to continue to levy the tax but the local and "state" rate must not exceed the imperial rate and together they are not to exceed thirty per cent. of the future "unearned increment" of land values.

II.

The present constitutional struggle in Great Britain is due chiefly to the opposition of the House of Lords to the tax on "unearned increment." The Government brought in a finance bill which was passed by the Commons but rejected by the Lords principally on account of the land increment duty. An appeal was taken to the people and the Government felt that it was sustained sufficiently to warrant it in bringing in the same bill again. This time (April 1910) the Lords allowed it to become law. The Finance Act 1910, levies three different duties on land values, namely, the increment value duty, the undeveloped land duty and the reversion duty. The increment value duty is levied at the rate of twenty per cent. on the difference between the site value of the land when the duty becomes due and its site value on the thirtieth day of April, nineteen hundred and nine. By site value is meant the value of the land irrespective of improvements. The duty becomes due on the occasion of any transfer of the fee simple of the land or of any interest in the land or of any grant or a lease of the land for a longer term than fourteen years. Provision is also made for the periodical collection of the duty where the land is held by a corporation or by a body unincorporate. Of course the twenty per cent. tax is to be collected only once upon any specific part of the increment. *Bonâ fide* agricultural land is exempt from the payment of the duty. The tax will be felt principally by the landowners in growing towns.

Under the system of long term leases prevalent in Great Britain it usually happens, especially in the larger cities, that at the termination of the lease the value of the interest of the lessor is greatly enhanced. Under the Act of 1910 it is provided that on such occasions where the term of the lease exceeds twenty-one years a tax of ten per cent. on such increase in value, known as the reversion duty, shall be

collected. Agricultural land is exempt from the payment of this duty also. Where the same increment of value is subject both to reversion duty and to the increment value duty, only twenty per cent. of the increment shall be collected.

The undeveloped land duty is an annual tax of one-half penny in the pound (equal to about two mills on the dollar) on land which has not been developed by the erection of dwelling houses or of buildings for the purposes of any business, trade or industry other than agriculture. This duty is not to be charged if the site value of the land does not exceed fifty pounds per acre. Provision is also made for the exemption of parks and open places to which the public may have access. The purpose of this measure is to make it unprofitable to keep land from being built upon when there is a demand for it for that purpose.

FRANK O'HARA.

BOOK REVIEWS.

The World of Homer, by Andrew Lang, with illustrations. Longmans, Green, and Co. 39 Paternoster Row, London, New York Bombay and Calcutta. 1910. 8vo, pp. xvi + 306.

The contents of the work may be indicated briefly by quoting the headings of the chapters. Homer's World. The Four Ages (1-9); Homeric Lands and Peoples (10-20); Homeric Polity. The Over Lord (21-27); Homer's World in Peace (28-33); Men and Women (34-44); The Homeric World in War (45-50); Homeric Tactics (51-59); Men's Dress in Homer. Armour (60-80); Women's Costume (81-95); Bronze and Iron. Weapons and Tools (96-104); Burial and the Future Life (105-112); Religion in Greece: Pre-Historic, Homeric, and Historical (113-127); Temples. Altars. Ritual. Purification (128-136); Homer and Ionia (137-153); Attic *versus* Achaean Traditions (154-160); Homer and "the Saga" (161-187); The Story of Palamedes (188-196); Homer and the Cyclic Poems (197-221); The Great Discrepancies (222-245); Conclusions (246-255). Appendixes. The Catalogue (257-259); The Supposed Expurgation of Homer (260-280); The Alleged Athenian Rescension of Homer (281-288); The Lost Epics and the Homeric Epics (Wiederholungen) (289-294); Index (295 ff.).

The book shows the same brilliant polemical style which was recognized in the author's *Homer and his Age*, and is devoted to the exposition of the same fundamental ideas. My opinion of these ideas has recently been set forth in a *Bulletin* article, *Homeric Armor and Mr. Lang*, and the reading of the present book has not caused me to modify my opinions. For reasons explained in my article it seems to me that the interests of the *Bulletin* readers cannot be served by general criticism of such works, but only by a detailed analysis of their treatment of some one topic. It is possible that I may return to this book in such a fashion; and, if so, will select the chapter *Homer and the Cyclic Poets*.

In the meantime I may mention two trifles in passing. Fig.

7.—*Lady Pouring out Wine for Warrior*, is commented on as follows: "In the third picture (fig. 7) a warrior, fully armed, has his hand in the richly adorned belt (*zoster*) which he is fixing over the juncture of corslet and mailed kirtle." p. 77. Looking at the illustration one can see that Mr. Lang has fallen victim to a trick of perspective. The warrior is holding 'a richly adorned' flat vessel to catch the wine, and as it is level with his waist Mr. Lang has taken it for a belt.

In explaining the wounding of Menelaos in the fourth book of the *Iliad*, Mr. Lang writes, p. 76: 'When the arrow is extracted (line 216) the corslet is not mentioned, as I suppose because the arrow passed through the place where the corslet clasped in front. When the corslet was unclasped the arrow had only to be pulled out of the belt and kirtle.' According to Homer the arrow struck where 'the corslet met the blow double,' according to Mr. Lang it strikes where there is no corslet to meet it. The true interpretation of this passage which was long a *crux* has been given by Robert; it shows how the wound could be treated without 'unclasping the corslet' of which act there is no mention in the text.

G. M. BOLLING.

Le droit ecclesiastique matrimonial des calvinistes français,
par Joseph Faurey. Paris. Librairie de la Société Recueil
Sirey. 1910. Pp. 149.

Not a few readers, probably, will consider that the value of this work is increased by the fact that it is not only an interesting and thorough exposition of the laws enacted by the Calvinists of France to govern the marriage contract, but also a comparison of those laws with the canons of the Catholic Church on that important subject. After an introduction dealing at some length with the matrimonial discipline of the Catholic Church, the author, who is a Catholic, studies exhaustively the many enactments of Calvinistic synods regarding engagements, impediments, the solemnization and effects of marriage, divorce and remarriage.

On four principal heads a marked opposition is noted between Catholic and Calvinistic ordinances,—the sacramental character of marriage, the range of impediments, mixed marriages and

divorce. For the Calvinists marriage is merely a contract of natural law; their impediments are certain degrees of affinity and of consanguinity, defect of consent of the parties or of their parents, impotency, age, difference of religion, and bewitchedness; in more recent times they tolerate mixed marriages, but during a long period marriages between Catholics and members of the Reformed Church were absolutely forbidden, the Catholic party being always required to abjure "papisme" and profess Calvinism; they allow divorce for adultery, for malicious desertion, for prolonged absence, and also when a married priest or monk returns to the Church.

The treatment throughout is accurate and painstaking, the comparisons instituted between Catholic and Protestant teaching are well done, the bibliographical references are valuable, and the work deserves to be highly recommended.

JOHN T. CREAGH.

Summa Iuris Ecclesiastici Publici, auctore Augustino Bachofen, O. S. B., S. T. D. Rome, Pustet. 1910. Pp. 156. (\$1.50 bound).

One does not look for much in the way of novelty in an exposition of the public law of the Church, nevertheless new literature on this topic is always read with interest. Father Bachofen's work is, as was to be expected, mostly a restatement of what had been often said before, but he has taken pains to incorporate the latest literature and the most recent decisions, and has arranged his matter in a new way, under the three heads,—*De Iure Constitutivo*, *De Iure Gubernativo*, *De Iure Internationali*.

This is the first book on our public law in which a President of the United States has been cited as an authority—a brief passage from one of the speeches of "clarissimus Roosevelt" is quoted—or readers have been referred to a number of the *New York Freeman's Journal*. We are glad that occasion is taken to deny and refute Aichner's assertion that the United States is "status pure atheus."

Father Bachofen is already well known to American readers through his excellent "*Compendium Iuris Regularium*," and the same soundness of doctrine and clearness of exposition that won

for that earlier work so favorable a reception characterize this present treatise on a still more difficult subject. We recommend it heartily to all who desire to possess a compendious, thoroughly up-to-date and reliable explanation of the public law of the Church.

JOHN T. CREAGH.

De Administrativa Amotione Parochorum, seu Commentarium in Decretum "Maxima Cura." A Sac. Felix M. Capello. Rome, Pustet, 1911. Pp. 124. (Bound, 80 cents).

La Rimozione dei Parroci in Via Disciplinare secondo il Recentissimo Decreto "Maxima Cura." 2nd ed. Naples, D'Auria, 1911. Pp. 41.

Important as the decree *Maxima Cura* is for parish priests in every country, it assumes a special importance in the United States, where it will assimilate removable to irremovable rectors in so far as purely administrative transfers and removals are concerned, and thus effect a serious change in the discipline of the Church in this country. This explains the general desire to become better acquainted with the meaning and operation of the new law, and the interest which has attached to it especially since the Consistorial Congregation decided that there can be no doubt about the application of the *Maxima Cura* to the United States.

The above-mentioned works are both clear and thorough commentaries on the decree. Dr. Capello's exposition being somewhat fuller than that of the Marquis de Gennaro.

JOHN T. CREAGH.

Recollections of Abraham Lincoln (1847-1865). By Ward Hill Lamon, edited by Dorothy Lamon Teillard: Published by the Editor, Washington, D. C., 1911. Pp. 337 + xxxvi.

It would not be easy to prepare on the career of Abraham Lincoln a book that would not find a few readers. His fame has attracted all sorts of pens, eminent as well as obscure. Few of his characteristics have altogether escaped observation, and but

a few of his achievements have failed to beget a monograph or a book. The life and the public career of the great war President is so attractive a theme that many writers have yielded to its fascination and with meagre information have given us books that are really readable. For its popularity, however, this work, which has long been familiar in another form, is not indebted to the intrinsic interest of its subject. Ward Hill Lamon did not belong to the class of writers which culls from works in prose and verse impressions of the great Emancipator, and with the patience of the worker in mosaic imparts to minute and dissimilar materials something of color and of form. He saw clearly the events that were passing before his eyes. He has been sharply censured for making of President Lincoln a human being and for ascribing to him some human limitations. Nevertheless, it is well known to students of the era of the Civil War that Colonel Lamon was among the most intelligent of Lincoln's admirers and that he was certainly the most devoted of his friends. Indeed, except, Ignatius Donnelly, a Representative from Minnesota, in the 38th Congress, no eminent public character of that epoch appears to have seen so clearly the real Lincoln and to have described so accurately the place that he was destined to occupy in the chronicles of time. Addressing the House of Representatives on one of the Reconstruction measures Mr. Donnelly said:

"I am aware, Mr. Speaker, of the great claims which Mr. Lincoln has upon the people of the United States. I recognize that popularity which accompanies him, and which, considering the ordeal through which he has passed, is little less than miraculous. I recognize that unquestioning faith in his honesty and ability which pervades all classes, and the sincere affection with which almost the entire population regard him. We must not underrate him even in our praises. He is a great man. Great not after the old models of the world, but with a homely and original greatness. He will stand out to future ages in the history of these crowded and confused times with wonderful distinctness. He has carried a vast and discordant population safely and peacefully through the greatest of political revolutions with such consummate sagacity and skill that while he led he appeared to follow; while he innovated beyond all precedent he has been denounced as tardy; while he struck the shackles from the limbs of three million slaves he has been hailed as a conservative! If to adapt, persistently and continuously, just and righteous principles to all the perplexed windings and changes of human events, and to secure in the end the complete triumph of those

principles, be statesmanship, then Abraham Lincoln is the first of statesmen."¹

This was the estimate of a radical Republican who did not believe in President Lincoln's plan for restoring the erring States to their normal relations in the Union. On that subject Colonel Lamon could not have disagreed with his old friend. He would assuredly not have criticised Lincoln while the conflict raged.

For the most eventful part of Lincoln's career Marshal Lamon alone was qualified to speak with authority. Readers of his interesting biography have often regretted that he did not tell more of the President's theory of reconstruction. In all probability he has told us as much as Mr. Lincoln himself knew, for with his remarkable sagacity the President, while forever reflecting upon the great problems that oppressed him, was not accustomed to announce in advance a policy to which consistency required him afterwards to adhere. It was Mr. Lincoln's practice to meet the emergencies of the moment by the contrivances of the moment, at least so far as concerned *new* questions. As is well known, he often found himself drifting out upon perilous seas. In other words, he was compelled to cut loose from the towing ropes of tradition.

Messrs. Nicolay and Hay, the thrifty secretaries of President Lincoln, have written a useful and interesting history of those troublous times. Their work has its value, but it is not to be expected that even intelligent clerks could have enjoyed the same confidence as did the former law partner and the cherished and devoted friend of the President. In their voluminous work speculation may fairly claim a place. With the brief sketch of Colonel Lamon it would have been entirely out of harmony. His information was obtained at first hand. It is greatly to be regretted that he did not find an opportunity of telling us more concerning the secret history of those stirring times.

The present edition, by including a memoir of Marshal Lamon and also a considerable number of letters addressed to him by eminent contemporaries, is a very useful as well as a very reliable work. For the first time the general reader sees the standing of Ward H. Lamon, and the opinion which the great men of Illinois and of the country entertained of his influence with the President.

¹ *Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction*, 245-246.

Indeed, his character and intelligence required no vindication. His book is a sufficient proof of his intellectual attainments. That he enjoyed the continued and intimate friendship of Mr. Lincoln is undoubted proof that he was no pedestrian character. Every student of the era of the Civil War has been placed under obligations to Mrs. Teillard by this new edition of her distinguished father's book.

As we have just remarked, the Appendix contains many documents that add materially to our knowledge of Mr. Lincoln. Of these additions perhaps the most interesting is an excerpt from a letter of 1855 to his old friend Joshua F. Speed. In it Lincoln says: "You enquire where I now stand. That is a disputed point. I think I am a Whig; but others say there are no Whigs, and that I am an Abolitionist. I am not a Know-Nothing! that is certain. How could I be? How can any one who abhors the oppression of negroes be in favor of degrading classes of white people? Our progress in degeneracy appears to me to be pretty rapid. As a nation we began by declaring that '*All men are created equal.*' We now practically read it, '*All men are created equal except negroes.*' When the Know-Nothings get control it will read, '*All men are created equal, except negroes and foreigners and Catholics.*' When it comes to this, I should prefer emigrating to some country where they make no pretence of loving liberty,—where despotism can be taken pure, and without the base alloy of hypocrisy."

The reader is probably aware that the same opinion was held by Horace Greeley, though the famous editor of the *Tribune* did not give so clear a statement of his reasons for that opinion.

CHAS. H. MCCARTHY.

Francis Bacon: A Drama. By Mervyn Murray. The Albert F. Grazer Company, Spokane, Washington, 1911.

A notable contribution to the Bacon *vs.* Shakespeare controversy has just appeared. It is entitled "Francis Bacon," and is a play in five acts, in which certain phases of Bacon's career from his early manhood to his death are vividly set forth. The author is a distinguished lawyer who veils his identity under the alliterative

pseudonym of Mervyn Murray. His knowledge of happenings in the spacious days of great Elizabeth is great and intimate. The vehicle of expression that he uses is blank verse, and he handles it with superb ease, rising at times to a sonority and a dignity which recall Marlowe's mighty line. If the metre has a fault it is too uniformly regular, and that in scansion emphasis has to be laid too often on unaccented or unimportant syllables.

The method employed is to take for granted the fact that Bacon wrote the poems and plays and, in order to save himself from any imputation of frivolity, passed them off as Shakespeare's; and on that assumption to bring together such a cumulus of proof from all quarters as to leave on the mind of the reader no doubt of the correctness of the original thesis. The scene (Act II, Sc. I.) in which the pact is made between Bacon and Shakespeare is cleverly conceived to show the contrast between the fat and clumsy, the money-grubbing and almost illiterate boor from Stratford and the lofty intellectual "Columbus of inductive thought." The whole thing is so naturally done that, if you could think of any one bearing to its perusal a virgin mind, there is no doubt that conviction would follow that the real author was Bacon, and that by no stretch of imagination could Shakespeare be supposed to be the writer. This impression is heightened by the later scene between Bacon and Ben Jonson in which, Shakespeare being now dead, Bacon arranges with Jonson to write the laudatory lines on Shakespeare prefixed to the first folio of the plays with the object of still keeping up the original delusion. Elsewhere, by a splendid literary device, the author of the beautiful lines from *The Merchant of Venice* beginning

"How sweet the moonlight sleeps upon this bank!"

is shown to be Bacon; and so throughout.

The opinion that Bacon wrote the poems and plays that go under the name of Shakespeare is diametrically opposed to the view entertained by the writer of this notice; but candour compels the admission that this play is the most plausible piece of pro-Baconism that has been for a long time put forward. Its assumption of the whole case carries one off one's feet. Mervyn Murray has no need of the tactics of sapping a solemn creed with solemn sneer or of abusing the other side: calmness of assumption and proof piled

on proof without any appearance of argumentation are the weapons he so effectively uses.

Incidentally, we are introduced to Queen Elizabeth, to Lord Burleigh, to the Earl of Essex, and to other personages who played important parts in the high heroic time of the last of the Tudors, and in every case there is some deft character-sketching. There are thirteen full page illustrations. The little book is splendidly printed and turned out by the Albert F. Grazer Company of Spokane, Washington.

P. J. LENNOX.

The Inner Life and the Writings of Dame Gertrude More.

Revised and edited by Dom Benedict Weld-Blundell, Monk of the Order of St. Benedict. 2 vols., pp. xlii + 310 and xvi + 290. Benziger Brothers, New York, Cincinnati, Chicago. 1910 and 1911.

Helen (afterwards Dame Gertrude) More was, apparently, one of those saintly beings who are made perfect in a short space. A great-great-granddaughter of Henry the Eighth's famous Lord Chancellor, Blessed Sir Thomas More, she was born March 25, 1606, at Low Leyton in Essex, England; she died in her twenty-eighth year August 17, 1633, at Cambray, France. In 1623 she was induced by Father Benet Jones, O. S. B., to join eight other maidens who passed over from England to France to enter the religious state in the Benedictine order in a monastery founded under the title of Our Lady of Consolation at Cambray. She had grave doubts as to her vocation, and even after her profession, made through the Archbishop on January 1, 1625, she was so uneasy in her mind regarding its validity that she afterwards asked and obtained permission to renew her vows privately to the President.

She was, it appears, suffering from wrong direction: the confessors assigned to the community followed one another in quick succession; being mostly men of mature years who had been for long periods on the English mission, they were more accustomed to the work of trying to save souls than fitted to direct contemplatives. When things were in a very bad way spiritually with Dame Gertrude, when her natural virtues had decayed and her

soul, in her own words, "was grown to be as hard as a stone as to God and divine things," and she thought of removing to some other house of her order, she was induced to place herself under the direction of Father Augustine Baker. This pious man had left England in consequence of a proclamation banishing all priests, and he was sent by his superiors to Cambray. Many of the nuns sought his advice and direction and profited greatly by it: Dame Gertrude, thinking that there was peril in his method of direction and that therefore he was safer left alone, was the last to apply to him. The results at first were not very encouraging, and, as Father Baker himself tells us, she mocked and jested in her gifted way at those who followed his instructions. When she noted that her sisters were better or more at peace through these instructions she said to them, "Ah, it is well for you that you can get good from them, for I can get none."

Accordingly, she stayed away from Father Baker for several months, but at length, towards the close of the same year in which she had made her profession, she was persuaded by her Mistress to try him again. This time all went well. Father Baker enabled her, as he phrases it, to "get into her interior," and put her in the way of effective prayer, and for the remainder of her life she strictly adhered to the course he laid down for her.

The first of the volumes here under review is Father Baker's exposition of how he led Dame Gertrude along the path of perfection. Incidentally, it is a defence of his own method of direction, which was formally called into question by his superiors, but, on full investigation, was triumphantly vindicated. A human as well as a highly devotional interest attaches to the chapter in which is told the tale of her last sickness and death. When the end came she had been nearly ten years in religion and some seven years in the practice of that spiritual course which enabled her to live the life and die the death of a saint.

The second volume is divided into three parts. The first part contains the *Confessiones Amantis*, or *The Confessions of a Loving Soul*, being the prayers and meditations of Dame Gertrude. The second part consists of *Fragments* of other devotions which she wrote on loose sheets and kept in her breviary, and the third part contains her *Apology for herself and her Spiritual Guide and Director*, Venerable Augustine Baker. Parts I. and II. are mostly devotional and are certainly edifying. The fifty-three *Confessions*

in particular appear animated with something of that strain which we admire so much in the *Imitation of Christ*. The third part is disputatious, and, especially on the question of obedience, shows an independence of spirit and thought which, if not tempered by divine love, might conceivably be productive of trouble in a community of nuns.

The work is throughout on a high spiritual plane. It is not meant to have practical application to those who lead an active life, although such persons, too, can derive from it edification and consolation, and can learn a lesson on the non-advisability of the repetition of confessions. To those whom Providence has placed in the contemplative state it can scarcely fail to be of excellent use and to afford profitable reading.

The two volumes passed the Censor, and bear the imprimatur of the Vicar General of the Archdiocese of Westminster. They are very well edited. Some of Father Baker's sentiments, which, standing alone, might appear to be "hard sayings," are so judiciously interpreted and explained in foot-notes by Dom Benedict Weld-Blundell that, seen in this light, they commend themselves to our acceptance. A special word of praise is due to the preface and to the index, nor should the clearness of the type and the two fine illustrations be forgotten.

P. J. LENNOX.

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1. **Geoffroy Chaucer**, par Emile Legouis, professeur à la Sorbonne. I vol. in 160 de la collection des *Grands Écrivains Étrangers*. Ouvrage orné d'un portrait hors texte. Prix: 2 fr. 50. Paris, Bloud et Cie, 7, place Saint-Sulpice. Pp. vii. + 261. 1910.
 2. **Les Soeurs Brontë**, par Ernest Dimnet. I vol. in 160 de la collection des *Grands Écrivains Étrangers*. Ouvrage orné d'un portrait. Prix: 2 shillings. Paris, Bloud et Cie, 7, place Saint-Sulpice. Pp. xii. + 276. 1910.
 3. **La Jeunesse de Shelley**, par A. Koszul, docteur ès lettres. 1 vol. in 160. Prix: 4 francs. Paris, Bloud et Cie, 7, place Saint-Sulpice. Pp. xxii + 439. Deuxième Édition, 1910.

The recent publication of the three foregoing volumes shows the

attraction which the great names in English literature continue to hold for people of other lands. It may be at once said that all three books afford most valuable and interesting reading. In each case the appreciation of the English writer under notice is most intelligent.

M. Legouis has evidently made a careful study of the Chaucerian period. Chaucer's relations with John of Gaunt, Edward III., Richard II., and Henry IV. are clearly traced with an abundance of detail which to many readers will come in the nature of a revelation. French and Italian influences on the formation of Chaucer's style are vividly pointed out in two very interesting chapters (II. and IV.). M. Legouis falls foul of the commonly accepted theory that there were three successive periods in Chaucer's poetic development, French, Italian, and English. He claims that the French influence was a constant quantity. "Il n'est pas un moment," he says, "où l'influence française ne se soit exercée sur Chaucer; elle est non moins manifeste dans les *Contes de Canterbury* que dans le *Livre de la Duchesse*."

M. Legouis devotes a chapter to what he calls "Les Poèmes Allégoriques," namely, the *Dethe of Blaunche the Duchesse* ("The Book of the Duchess"); the *Parlement of Foules*; the *Hous of Fame*; and the *Legende of Good Women*, and makes of each a careful examen. Of the *Dethe of Blaunche the Duchess* he says:

"C'est le premier poème en langue anglaise où l'art atteinne par endroits à sa plénitude. Ceci doit être affirmé sans aucune restriction."

Naturally, in tracing the Italian influence on Chaucer, M. Legouis dwells et same length on *Troilus and Creseyde*, which is based directly on the *Filostrato* of Boccaccio. He correctly describes the *Troilus* as

"le premier grand poème d'amour en langue anglaise, celui qui n'aura de pendant que le jour où Shakespeare prendra à un autre Italien le thème de *Romeo et Juliette*."

The three chapters in which the *Canterbury Tales* are discussed, analysed, and critically studied are very valuable. The importance of the *Tales* in the literature of the world M. Legouis thus summarises:

"C'est le jour où il choisit un sujet anglais qu'il devient un poète fait pour tous les pays. Il le devient parce que du même coup il dégage de la servitude sa vraie nature. Sentant ses forces

suffisantes, il se fonde sur l'observation. Il dira ce qu'il a vu; il exprimera directement sa vision personnelle de la vie et des hommes."

Not the least noticeable feature in the book is the way in which M. Legouis, using all the liberty of the fourteenth century with regard to hiatus and ignoring the alternation of masculine and feminine rhymes, renders portions of Chaucer into spirited French verse. Compare, for example, the original description of the Clerk of Oxenford with this translation:—

Un clerc d'Oxford était de notre bande,
Dont la science en logique était grande;
Tout épilé luisait son vieux manteau;
Plus maigre était son bidet qu'un râteau
Et lui n'était guère plus gras, j'avoue:
Sous un front grave il avait creuse joue,
Trop peu mondain pour gagner un office
Ou dans l'Eglise atteindre un bénéfice.
A son chevet aimait-il mieux avoir
Vingt livres grands vêtus en rouge ou noir,
Un Aristote et ceux de son école
Que riche habit belle harpe ou viole

There is a great treat in store for those who will study attentively the *Chaucer* of M. Legouis.

In *Les Soeurs Brontë* M. Dimnet sets himself the difficult task of interpreting to his countrymen the temperaments of three literary women totally alien to the French mind. He has succeeded admirably. His narrative is plain, direct, and straightforward; his critical insight is remarkable; and his sympathy, while not morbidly pathetic, is generous and heartfelt. He gives us true, telling, and abiding pen-pictures of Charlotte, Emily, and Anne Brontë, and brings out vividly the tragedy of their lives. His analysis of *Jane Eyre*, of *Shirley*, of *Villette*, and of *Wuthering Heights* leaves nothing to be desired.

M. Dimnet has a very sane outlook on literature and on life. He judges correctly the self-suppression of Charlotte Brontë. The wisdom of his words may not appeal to an age which makes a fetish of art for art's sake; but to the right thinker that wisdom will be apparent. Take for example the following sentences, which occur towards the end of the volume:—

“Cependant une leçon et un encouragement sortent de cette petite vie manquée. Notre siècle est matérialiste, utilitaire et court: il voit une honte dans l'échec. On n'entend parler que du devoir de se réaliser soi-même. Bien analysée cette formule signifie ce que plus d'un dit tout haut qu'elle veut dire. Se réaliser soi-même c'est évaluer jusqu'au dernier centime ce que l'on croit valoir et n'en vouloir rien perdre; c'est penser qu'on est dupe si l'on sacrifie son bonheur du moment à un avenir problématique ou au bonheur d'autrui. Il se trouve une théologie pour affirmer qu'on plaît à Dieu quand on se plaît à soi-même. A ce compte Charlotte Brontë fut bien sotte. . . . Mais un retour viendra. On reverra clairement quelque jour que le talent n'est pas l'homme, que l'inspiration est un accident, que le poème n'est que trop souvent supérieur au poète et que l'écrivain vieillissant voit ses livres s'éloigner de lui comme des enfants étrangers. On remettra la littérature à sa place, qui est secondaire, comme on y remet déjà l'intelligence. On ne se fera plus des dieux d'hommes qui n'auront que le brillant, on n'aura plus un culte matérialiste pour ce qu'on appelle leurs reliques. Ce jour-là, on n'ira plus en pèlerinage à Haworth où la poussière des Brontë achèvera de se dissoudre, mais Charlotte paraîtra grande d'avoir, ayant du génie, consenti à vivre et mourir petite.”

M. Dimnet has of course availed himself of the labours of his predecessors—Mrs. Gaskell, Clement Shorter, Mrs. Humphry Ward, Augustine Birrell, Eugène Forcade, Emile Montégut, Mme. Darmesteter, M. de Wizeva, and M. Maeterlinck—but none the less he has succeeded in giving us a work which is stamped with the originality which individuality confers.

La Jeunesse de Shelley is a remarkable work. Distinguished by an almost Teutonic attention to detail, it is saved from being cumbersome or merely chronological because the author so clearly establishes the interaction between the poet's life and experience on the one hand and his work on the other. Of a study of cause and effect, of poetic genesis from surroundings alike objective and subjective, there is here given a most lucid demonstration. M. Koszul is evidently quite at home with the literary and political history of early nineteenth century England. He brings out vividly Shelley's relations with the members of his father's household, with Harriet Grove, Harriet Westbrook, Thomas Jefferson Hogg,

Elizabeth Hichener, Southey, Byron, Keats, Godwin, Mary Godwin, Jane Clairmont ("Clara"), Pecoek, and Leigh Hunt. The ghastly tragedies of Harriet Westbrook and Fanny Godwin are told simply but in a way well calculated to rivet the reader's attention. Much patient investigation of Shelley's earlier literary efforts is shown, and to those who know the poet only by his greater works this section will afford a series of delightful surprises. The examens of *Queen Mab*, of *Alastor*, of *Julian and Maddalo* (taken out of its time order) and of *Laon and Cythna* (afterwards called *The Revolt of Islam*) are, each in its own way, fine examples of what is meant by analytical insight.

The narrative ends in 1818, with Shelley's final departure from England. It is to be hoped that M. Kuszul will take up the theme where he left it off, and give us his complete picture of the great poet, for there is magnificent material still to be dealt with.

In the eleven pages of the "Conclusion" there is some telling constructive criticism expressed in a sustained style which is the outward symbol of thoughts that lie deep. In particular the relations of Shelley to Romanticism are judiciously weighed out and set forth. We are made to see plainly the longings of an unsatisfied religious need which are found in him as well as in Schlegel, Novalis, Wordsworth, Chateaubriand, and de Vigny; and the clash of eternally opposed philosophic tendencies, the resultant of a revolt from an established order of thought, is clearly heard in an eloquent and fascinating, if somewhat involved, paragraph.

The final passage expresses so well the poetic doctrine by which M. Kuszul believes Shelley to have been animated that this notice may be appropriately closed by quoting it:—

"Par une conséquence naturelle, le poète absorbant en lui tout l'homme, il devenait en art ce qu'il avait été en politique et en philosophie: un individualiste: moins que tout autre de ses contemporains il se souciait désormais de la socialité de sa muse. Et à la fin, il saura voir clairement ce rôle spécifique de la poésie, il osera accepter hautement cet enseignement qui, disant simplement 'le meilleur de nous-mêmes en nos meilleurs moments' (*A Defence of Poetry*, 1821), chantant spontanément quelque vision fugitive, quelque éphémère tendresse, se trouve être plus durable et précieux que les systèmes patiemment élaborés par le concours des savants, des philosophes ou des hommes d'état: 'Les poètes, s'écriera-t-il, sont les législateurs méconnus du monde!' Et si

peut-être il n'aura pas toujours pleine conscience de tout ce que suppose cette fière parole, il n'en sera pas moins l'éclatante preuve qu'un poète, parti de la plus intransigeante haine des mysticismes systématisés et formulés, ne devient grand, profond et humain, qu'en ranimant pour lui-même le mysticisme fluide qui est la source vivante de tous les autres, et, selon Emerson, l'essence même de la poésie."

P. J. LENNOX.

BOOK NOTICES.

Among recent contributions to our text-book literature in philosophy are two little volumes of the series *LEITFADEN DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN PROPÄDEUTIK* by Professor Peter Vogt. They are entitled *Logik* and *Psychologie*, published by Herder, St. Louis, 1911, and sell for 90 cents each.

From the same publishing house comes a beautiful volume on *THE GRACES OF INTERIOR PRAYER*, by Father Poulain, S. J., translated by Leonora L. Yorke Smith. It is a treatise on a most important portion of Catholic mystical theology, a very welcome addition to our English literature on the subject. The price of the volume is Three Dollars.

A new and enlarged edition of *THE SPIRIT OF ST. FRANCIS DE SALES* has recently been published by Benziger Brothers, price \$1.80, net. It is not necessary to speak of the merits of this treatise on the Christian Virtues by one who, while he was a devoted admirer, was also a critical observer of the saintly bishop.

The series entitled *Economie Sociale*, published by Gabalda et Cie, 90 rue Bonaparte, Paris, may be recommended to all Catholic students of Economics. The latest volume is from the pen of Professor Lepelletier. It discusses a very important social-economic problem under the title *CAISSES D'ÉPARGNE*. The price of the volumes of this series is Two Francs each.

From an entirely different point of view, Edgar Gardner Murphy, author of "The Present South," discusses one of our domestic problems, under the title *THE BASIS OF ASCENDENCY*. The volume is published by Longmans, Green and Company.

LITTLE SERMONS ON THE CATECHISM is the title of a volume published by Joseph F. Wagner, New York. It is a translation from the Italian of Cosimo Corsi, Cardinal-Archbishop of Pisa. The price is One Dollar.

Bloud et Cie, 7 Place St. Sulpice, Paris, are the publishers of a series entitled *Etudes de morale et de sociologie*, to which Maurice Legendre has just contributed an important study *LE PROBLÈME DE L'ÉDUCATION*, Price, francs 3.50. The work is a calm dispassionate presentation of the claims which Catholics, all the world over, are urging in the matter of religious instruction.

Students of Moral Theology will be interested in the latest contribution to the Treatise on Conscience, entitled *TRACTATUS DE CONSCIENTIA*. It is published by Desclée of Tournai, and on sale by Herder, St. Louis. The author is Father Beaudoin, O. P.

EARLY FIRST COMMUNION, by Father Zulueta, S. J., is a timely topic, which will interest pastors and teachers. It is published by Benziger Brothers.

Seminary Professors and Spiritual Directors as well as Confessors will welcome Abbé Hurtaud's *LA VOCATION AU SACERDOCE*, a substantial volume of 453 pages published by Gabalda, 90 rue Bonaparte, Paris.

A beautiful little volume on an important phase of Apologetics, the relation between religion and science, has just come from Herder, St. Louis. It is entitled *CHRISTIANITY AND THE LEADERS OF MODERN SCIENCE* and is from the pen of the Jesuit Father Kneller. The English translation by Mr. Kettle is provided with a Preface written by Father Thomas A. Finlay, S. J. The volume sells for One Dollar and Eighty Cents.

THE ORIGIN OF TRAGEDY by Dr. Ridgeway, published by the Cambridge University Press is a valuable aid to the student of the Greek Drama and is also of interest to the student of comparative literature. Type, illustrations, etc., are up to the usual standard of the Cambridge University Press.

The recent controversy concerning the Pope's Encyclical on St. Charles Borromeo gives timeliness to the publication of a volume entitled *SAINT CHARLES BORROMEO*, by Louise M. Stacpoole-Kenny, published by Benziger Brothers.

The Life and Teachings of Blessed John Ruysbroeck (1293-1381) is the subject of a volume by Dom Vincent, entitled *A MEDIEVAL MYSTIC*, New York, Benziger Brothers, 1911.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Power Plant and Engineering Laboratory: A New Central heating and electric power plant has recently been completed for the heating of the entire group of buildings comprising the University, as well as for the supply of all electric current required for the lighting and power in each of these buildings, and power in the laboratories. Prior to the construction of this central plant, the heating of the several buildings was supplied from independent boilers in the basement of each building, while the electric current for lighting and power was generated by a small steam driven electric plant located in the basement of McMahon Hall.

In planning the New Central Heating and Power Plant, the question of supplying the existing buildings, etc., satisfactorily and economically was not alone carefully considered, but, in addition, the new plant has been so designed as to be capable of ready extension of both its heating and electrical capacity to meet fully the increased demand upon the same, which will result from time to time from the addition of future buildings, additional laboratories, etc.

After careful consideration of the relative merits of a number of sites upon the University's property, it was finally decided to construct the new plant as near as possible to the tracks of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, so that by means of a siding, the fully loaded coal cars of the railroad could be run directly over the coal bunkers of the plant, and coal directly dumped into the same, thus minimizing the cost of coal handling, formerly an item of large expense on account of the isolated location of the various buildings.

In considering the installation of the Central Plant, also, full consideration was given to the advantages to be secured by concentration at one point of all noise, dirt, ashes, etc., incident to the production of power and, also, perhaps more

fully to the great lessening of the fire risk secured by removal from all of the present and future buildings of the University, of all necessity for use of boilers or fires of any character.

The heating and power plant is located in a two story and basement building, with the boilers, stokers, etc., installed in the basement, level with the floor of the coal bunkers, and with the fronts of the boilers directly opposite the same, thereby facilitating, by means of small firing cars, the conveying of the coal direct from the bunkers to the stokers. The coal bunkers, further, are of sufficient capacity to store the contents of approximately seven standard railroad coal cars, insuring the plant against stoppage due to the non-delivery of coal on account of strike, weather conditions, etc.

The basement of the building also provides space for all pumping apparatus and general equipment of the heating system, as well also as an isolated space for oil storage. In the basement stories are also located the main toilets of the building, locker rooms for students and the hydraulic laboratory of the Mechanical Engineering Courses of the University.

The Engine Room of the plant is on the first floor, and is provided with a gallery and stair leading to the boiler room, from which point the Engineer in charge has a full view of the plant. The first floor also provides space for the Engineer's Room, Laboratories, etc., and provides through stairway and vestibule, for access to the upper floor of the building.

The entire second floor is devoted exclusively to the electrical Laboratories, Class and Drawing Rooms, etc.

The boiler equipment of the plant which supplies all steam required for the heating of the entire group of present Buildings, operation of the electric lighting units, and all steam required in the Laboratories, consists, at the present, of three 200 horse-power, water tube boilers, these boilers are arranged with two in a single battery, and the third with space at the side for the future installation of an additional 400 horse-power boiler to meet the increased demands upon the plant, due to the growth of the University. Each of the boilers is equipped with automatic stokers, so that the boiler plant will

comply in all respects with the ordinances of the District of Columbia, as to smokeless operation, and at the same time be operated with the minimum amount of labor.

The boilers further are connected by a rectangular smoke breeching to a radial brick chimney, 125 feet high, located at the side of the Power Plant Building.

The equipment of the plant, for supplying electric current for lighting and power, consists of two, fifty kilowatt, direct current generators, each direct connected to an automatic simple, non-condensing steam engine; both units being located in the engine room on the first story of the building. In addition to providing in the Engine Room for the two present generating units, space has been provided for a larger additional generating unit, to meet, in the future, the increased demands upon the plant, incident to the extension of the University. Space has also been allowed for the installation of a small oil or gasoline engine electric unit, to furnish current during the summer months for such lighting as would be required by those of the University's Faculty who remain at the University during the summer. This has been planned so as to avoid the necessity of operating either of the large generating units or boilers, to supply such a small portion of the total capacity developed by the same.

To tie in and not change the arrangement of the lighting in all of the present buildings of the University, which up to the present have been supplied by 125 volt, two wire direct current from the small power plant in McMahon Hall, and without the necessity of running excessively heavy two wire, 125 volt feeders from the plant to the main distribution Junction Board in McMahon Hall, a new three-wire, 125-250 volt feeder and pole line has been constructed from the plant to this building. With the three wire system further, as installed, additional buildings at remote parts of the University property, may be very readily supplied with current for lighting and power, and the amount of copper in the transmission lines reduced materially below that which would be necessitated by a two wire, 125 volt system. The present two wire branch feeders

from McMahon Hall to Caldwell and Albert Halls, and St. Thomas College, have also been each increased by a third conductor so as to provide for the supply of these buildings on the three wire system from the new plant.

The switchboard in the engine room consists of three generator panels, (one for each of the 50 kilowatt generators and one for the summer lighting unit;) one balancer panel, one feeder panel, and space at each end for addition of future generator and feeder panels. The panels of the switchboard are fitted with all necessary instruments, circuit breakers, etc., and in addition to supplying new three-wire lighting and power feeder to McMahon Hall, the feeder panel supplied also lighting and power in the plant and Laboratory Building, and all power required in the various laboratories.

From the power plant a system of underground steam mains has been constructed to a central point of distribution located near St. Thomas College building, from which point heating supply lines have already been constructed to the existing buildings of the University. The main steam lines from the power plant to this center of distribution have, however, been made of sufficient capacity to care for the heating requirements of a number of future additional buildings, and the arrangement of the central point of distribution has been made such as to permit in future, the ready construction of additional heating supply lines from this point to such additional buildings as may be erected.

In carrying out the construction of the new heating system, such changes as were incident to the alteration of the present heating apparatus of the existing buildings, have been made, and all of these buildings were operated in very satisfactory manner throughout all of the past winter from the new plant.

In the construction of the heating mains throughout the property of the University, every possible provision has been made to secure the maximum permanence of the work, and particularly where located below the ground, all piping has been laid in conduits of terra cotta and concrete of the most permanent character. Furthermore, wherever valves and con-

nections have been necessarily located below ground, large concrete pits have been constructed below the ground surface with cast iron manholes for access to the same. By this means the life of the whole piping installation should be increased to a material extent above that of the ordinary construction, wherein wooden or other forms of insulation are used around the piping, but which, by reason of the rapid decay and disintegration of the covering, insures only very short life of the work.

The entire power plant and heating system was designed by Mr. Charles L. Reeder, of Baltimore, Md., and installed under his supervision as Consulting Engineer for the University.

COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES, 1911.

On Wednesday morning, June 7, the Annual Conferring of Degrees and Commencement Exercises of the University took place in McMahon Hall, in the presence of His Excellency, the Most Rev. Diomedea Falconio, Apostolic Delegate. The Rt. Rev. Thomas J. Shahan, Rector of the University, delivered the principal address, and the Delegate closed the exercises with benediction.

The Deans of the several schools of the University presented the following students for degrees:

In the School of Sacred Sciences, for the degree of Bachelor of Sacred Theology (S. T. B.): Rev. Dominic Joseph Cannon, of the Congregation of the Holy Cross; Rev. Wendell Phillips Corcoran, of the Congregation of the Holy Cross; Rev. Patrick Francis Crawley, of Scranton, Pa.; Rev. Edward Patrick Dalton, of Albany, N. Y.; Rev. Aloysius Charles Dineen, of New York, N. Y.; Rev. Sigourney Webster Fay, of Baltimore, Md.; Rev. John Joseph Finn, of Albany, N. Y.; Rev. Michael Ambrose Gilloegly, of Scranton, Pa.; Rev. William Anthony Hemmick, of Baltimore, Md.; Rev. Francis Henry Kehlenbrink, of St. Louis, Mo.; Rev. William Peter McNally, of Philadelphia, Pa.; Rev. Joseph Aloysius Nelson, of New York, N. Y.; Brother James O'Keefe, of the Order of St. Benedict; Rev. James Francis Palmowski, of the Marist Congregation; Rev. Joseph Michael Sullivan, of the Marist Congregation; Rev. John Paul Ritchie of St. Louis, Mo.; Rev. Andrew Aloysius Walls, of the Marist Congregation; Brother Celestine Smith, of the Order of St. Benedict.

For the degree of Licentiate in Sacred Theology (S. T. L.):

Rev. Walter Thomas Bazaar, of Albany, N. Y.; Dissertation: The Power of the Human Reason to Know God; a Critical Defense.

Rev. Eugene Paul Burke, of the Congregation of the Holy Cross; Dissertation: Some Notes on the Christology of St. Paul.

Rev. Robert Emmet B. Gardiner, of Scranton, Pa.; Dissertation: Pope Leo XIII and Anglican Orders.

Rev. John Francis Georgelin, of the Marist Congregation; Dissertation: The Authority of the Vulgate according to the Council of Trent.

Rev. Michael Joseph Keyes, of the Marist Congregation; Dissertation: The Doctrine of the Church on Frequent Communion.

Rev. Francis Michael O'Reilly, of New York, N. Y.; Dissertation: The Catholic Doctrine of Atonement: a Reply to A. Sabatier.

Rev. John Michael Ryan, of the Congregation of the Holy Cross; Dissertation: The Social and Economic Teaching of Clement of Alexandria.

Rev. John Carter Smith, of the Paulist Congregation; Dissertation: Substitution, and the Doctrine of Atonement.

For the degree of Bachelor of Canon Law (J. C. B.):

Rev. John Ignatius Barret, of Baltimore, Md.; Rev. Walter Thomas Bazaar, of Albany, N. Y.; Rev. Andrew Joseph Carroll, of San Francisco, Cal.; Rev. Edward Patrick Dalton, of Albany, N. Y.; Rev. Aloysius Charles Dineen, of New York, N. Y.; Rev. Thomas Joseph Finnegan, of Sioux City, Iowa; Rev. Michael Galvin, of Los Angeles, Cal.; Rev. William Humphries, of Baltimore, Md.; Rev. Felix McCarthy, of Omaha, Neb.; Rev. Thomas Ligouri McEntee, of Harrisburg, Pa.; Rev. Leo Ligouri McVay, of Providence, R. I.; Rev. Thomas Aloysius Needham, of Scranton, Pa.; Rev. Thomas Joseph Toolen, of Baltimore, Md.

In the School of Law, for the degree of Doctor of Law (J. D.): Joseph Lepaspi Villafior, of Manila, P. I.; Dissertation: The Authority and Sanction of International Law.

In the School of Philosophy, for the degree of Doctor of

Philosophy (Ph. D.): Rev. Cornelius Joseph Hagerty, of the Congregation of the Holy Cross; Dissertation: The Problem of Evil.

Rev. Patrick Joseph McCormick, of Norwich, Conn.; Dissertation: The Education of the Laity in the Middle Ages.

Rev. Patrick Joseph Waters, of Boston, Mass.; Dissertation: Studies in the Principle of Apperception.

Rev. Virgil Daeger, of the College of the Holy Land; Dissertation: The Origin, Primitive Meaning and History of the Dagesh Forte.

Rev. Francis Xavier O'Neill, of the Order of St. Dominic; Dissertation: Some Aspects of the Medieval Miracle Play.

For the degree of Bachelor of Philosophy (Ph. B.):

Louis Joseph Bour, of the Paulist Congregation.

For the degree of Master of Arts (A. M.):

Rev. Daniel Joseph MacDonald, of Antigonish, Nova Scotia; Dissertation: Radicalism and Some English Poetry of the Nineteenth Century.

William Augustus Maguire, of South Bethlehem, Pa.; Dissertation: On the Fate Passages in the First Three Books of the Aeneid of Virgil.

For the degree of Bachelor of Arts (A. B.): Timothy Vincent O'Donnell, of Albion, N. Y.; John Joseph Daly, of Phoebus, Va.

For the degree of Bachelor of Science (B. S.): James Joseph Boillin, of Clarksville, Tenn.; John James Cantwell, of Washington, D. C., in Electrical Engineering; Thomas Hackman Carter, of Washington, D. C.; Joseph Roland Devries, of Arlington, Md.; Charles Stephen McCarthy, of Brookland, D. C., in Civil Engineering; Peter Leo McGeady, of Wanamie, Pa.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

The University Summer School for Teaching Sisters and women teachers has proved a great success. The registration has reached very nearly three hundred, by far the greater number being Sisters. They come from nearly forty States of the Union and from points as far apart as Oregon, Florida, Texas, Louisiana, Minnesota and other States. Some twenty-five religious orders and congregations are represented and about sixty independent houses. The University buildings have been placed at their disposal, and several of them serve as convents. A number of Sisters also reside in Trinity College and others in various convents in the city. All classes are conducted in McMahon Hall, whose excellent equipment was never more serviceable than at present. The students of the Summer School are all enthusiastic over the opening of the University during the vacation months to our Teaching Sisters and women teachers and it seems quite certain that a successful future is assured to the School. The professors are 25 in number and all the branches usually taught in a summer school of the highest order are well represented. During the recent excessive heats Washington was particularly favored and the health of the Sisters remained very satisfactory. The University grounds are considerably higher than the rest of the city and constitute a very agreeable park-like reservation. Immediately adjoining is the Soldier's Home with its splendid park of some seven hundred acres. No more agreeable or healthy situation could be found for this great work. The Sisters continue to live precisely as they would in their own convents at home, observing with great exactness all their religious exercises. On Sundays there is a Solemn High Mass with a sermon in the University chapel and during the week they have frequent Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament. Classes are conducted regularly from 8 to 1 and from 3 to 6.

Many classes are very largely attended, so that the capacity of McMahon Hall is seriously taxed. On Saturday July 8th, all the students visited Mount Vernon and placed a beautiful wreath on the tomb of George Washington. They were very cordially received by the Superintendent of the grounds who showed them personally over the historic site. On Thursday, July 13th, the entire School was received at the White House by President Taft, who shook hands with each Sister and congratulated all most heartily on their good work. Public lectures, frequently illustrated, are given several evenings in the week by speakers of distinction in the Assembly Room, McMahon Hall. It may be said without exaggeration that through this School the University is entering on a new and larger field of usefulness. Hitherto it opened the way to a higher education for the sons of our Catholic people, but henceforth its advantages are open also to their daughters, and to the noblest and most devoted among them, those chosen souls who have given themselves entirely to Jesus Christ and the spread of His kingdom.

Department of Electrical Engineering. The following gifts are acknowledged:—

1. National Carbon Co., Cleveland, Ohio:—One exhibit of samples of their various carbon products.
2. John A. Roebling Sons Co., Trenton, N. J. One set of sample insulated wire and cables.
3. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., Pittsburg, Pa. Six framed photos (24" x 30") of Westinghouse apparatus.

The above gifts, are located in the quarters of the Engineering Department in the new Engineering Building.

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"Let there be progress, therefore: a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit.* c. 6.

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AN EXAMINATION OF KANT'S FUNDAMENTAL TEACHINGS.*

I.

It may be said without fear of opposition that no one has done so much to color and shape the current of modern thought as Immanuel Kant. Men may not agree with him, at least as to the totality of his system; schools may rise up against his teaching as against one whose pernicious purpose was to shake the foundations of thought and overturn the intellectual achievements of the ages, and yet, unconsciously as unwillingly, many even of his opponents have been swayed to think and act as he thought and did. Vigorously opposed especially by the followers of Scholasticism, his influence has nevertheless been so widespread as to mould the philosophic thought of almost every other school. His philosophy laid the foundation for Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer in his own country, it was the inspiration of the Agnostic School from Hamilton to Spencer in England, and in France it gave birth to the Positivism of Comte and the neo-Criticism of Renouvier. Nor has the influence of Kantism been confined to the field of philosophy. It has made its way into theology, and is in reality

* The citations to the *Critique of Pure Reason* in this article are taken from the Berlin Academy Edition and from the English translation by Meiklejohn. In the references to the former the Roman numeral refers to the volume, the Arabic to the page. The references to Meiklejohn's translation are enclosed in brackets.

the basis of most of the contemporary religious thought now prevalent outside the Catholic Church.

It is the aim of the present paper to expose and examine the salient features of Kant's philosophy as expounded in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. His critical philosophy is divided into three distinct portions, the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment; but as Kant's philosophy stands or falls on the merits of the Critique of Pure Reason, which purports to be a critical examination of all our scientific knowledge, the doctrines of the second and third Critiques may be reckoned as of little value until the true worth of the first is clearly established.

In fact, Kant himself maintained that the whole purpose of philosophy was to give answer to three questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope for? And he further held that the answer to the first must precede and regulate the answers to the second and third.

It will, perhaps, be of service to a better understanding of our subject to observe that Kant's intellectual career is commonly divided into two periods, the pre-critical, extending from his twenty-third to his fifty-seventh year (from 1747 to 1781), and the critical, which embraces the remaining twenty-three years of his long, laborious life. At the age of sixteen he entered the University of Königsberg, where for six years he applied himself to the study of Wolff's philosophy and Newton's physics. On leaving the University he spent nine years as tutor in several distinguished families, and then returned to the University of Königsberg, where for fifteen years he filled the position of a licensed but unsalaried teacher. At the end of this period of service he was appointed to the chair of philosophy in the University of Königsberg, which he held until 1797, seven years before his death. The whole pre-critical period was a time of indefatigable labor, during which he profoundly considered all the great problems of the physical sciences and ethics. The philosophy taught by Kant during these years was the modified, dogmatic rationalism of Wolff

which he had learned as a student, and which at that time was the prevailing philosophy of Germany. In accordance with the principles of Wolff's philosophy he made reason the basis and test of all knowledge and metaphysical truth. Toward the end of the pre-critical period, however, Kant's faith in reason as the basis of all metaphysical knowledge began to weaken. Disturbed on the one hand by the apparent contradictions which he discovered in the physical sciences and by the scepticism of Hume on the other he determined to call to account all human experience. In this way he hoped to solve the difficulties thought to exist in the natural sciences and to place the truths of metaphysics on an unquestionable foundation. According to Kant's own words it was Hume who first interrupted his "dogmatic slumber, and gave his investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction."¹ It may be well here to recall the chief features of Hume's philosophy.

Hume was a radical empiricist. For him experience was the one universal rule of philosophical procedure. He subjected all knowledge to the criticism of experience. He denied the substantiality of the mind holding that what we call mind is simply a "heap or collection of different perceptions united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with simplicity and identity."² Locke had explained away everything except substance and the primary qualities of bodies. Berkley did away with these, and finally Hume completed the work of empiricism by denying even the substance of the mind, leaving only phenomena. Consistent with his doctrine regarding the mind, he explains causation as nothing more than a succession of relations between our ideas; and these relations, moreover, are not *a priori*, but gathered from experience. Repeated experience, argues Hume, shows us that whatever event has a beginning must have a cause, and hence *a posteriori* we conclude that an effect must

¹ *Proleg.* Berlin ed., iv., 260; Carus translation, 14.

² *Cf. Works*, I., 534.

have a cause. The dependence, therefore, between cause and effect is not ontological, but psychological—engendered in our mind by repeated experiences, and reason, accordingly, is unable to conclude *a priori* any necessary connection between cause and effect. Hume did not deny the utility of the concept of cause, but he did contend that it could not be conceived *a priori* by the reason, and that consequently, it possessed no *inner truth independent* of all experience in virtue of which its application could be extended beyond the objects of experience. In short, the principle of causation must not be extended beyond its source; if the concept of cause originates with experience, its use and application must be confined to the things of experience; but if it could be shown that it has its origin *a priori* in the reasoning faculty, then naturally it may be extended beyond the objects of sense.

Now it was this empirical solution of the principle of causality, as Kant tells us, which gave a new direction to his own speculations. It awoke in him the belief that the old *a priori* dogmatism of Wolff had put too much stress on the part played in our knowledge by the reason, while the empiricism of Hume had gone too far in the opposite direction, by making experience the sum total of all possible cognition. To get at the happy medium in which the truth was to be found he determined to subject all knowledge to a severe criticism in order thereby to ascertain how much of it is *a posteriori*, or from experience; how much *a priori*, or transcendental. Kant's philosophy is called a transcendental criticism precisely because it is an attempt to determine chiefly the *a priori* forms of all human knowledge.

Starting, then, to analyze the principle of causation, Kant tells us that he soon discovered "that the concept of the connection of cause and effect was by no means the only idea by which the undertaking thinks the connection of things *a priori*, but rather that metaphysics consists altogether of such connections."³ By determining these *a priori* concepts, which he

³ *Proleg.* I. c.

found to be many, he was able to bound and designate the entire scope and content of the field of metaphysics. For, according to Kant, metaphysical cognition is a *a priori* knowledge coming from the pure understanding and pure reason, and hence by its very nature it abstracts from all empirical sources.⁴ Its principles can never be derived from experience of any kind, whether internal or external, and this not only for that it deals solely with a *a priori* concepts, but for the further reason that metaphysical knowledge must be universal and necessary—properties which experience is altogether impotent to supply. This brings out the Kantian distinction between a *a priori* and a *posteriori* knowledge,—the former, being metaphysical, is characterized by universality and necessity, while the latter, as based on experience, is of a particular and contingent nature. Since then, we possess knowledge which is strictly necessary and universal, it is evident to the mind of Kant that our knowledge, in its entirety, is not confined within the borders of experience, as Hume would have us believe; but that, on the contrary, we can boast of real a *a priori* cognition which constitutes the basis and principles of metaphysics. It must be noted, however, that Kant held that all our knowledge begins with experience. Here are his own words: “All our knowledge begins with experience, but that it all originates *from* experience by no means follows. It may well be that experience itself is made up of two elements: one received from impressions of sense; the other supplied by our faculty of knowledge on occasion of those impressions; an element added by the mind to the material furnished by the senses, an a *a priori* element, an element independent not only of this or that experience, but of all experience and anterior to it.”⁵ It is also needful to bear in mind that Kant maintained that knowledge is the result of the action of the intellect on objects, and not vice versa. Rightly understood, this is correct, but not in the sense in which Kant meant it, as we shall see presently.

⁴ *Proleg.* Berlin ed., IV., 266; Carus translation, 14.

⁵ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 27; (1).

In general Kant distinguishes a twofold object of cognition: phenomena and noumena. Phenomena are the appearances of things, the sensible representations of objects as pictured to us by and through our senses from the world of experience.⁶ Noumena are the substantial realities underlying these sensible appearances, or phenomena, and are the proper objects of intellectual and rational activity. Phenomenon is the external appearance of the thing which strikes the senses, noumenon is the thing in itself (das Ding-an-sich). The subjective faculties by which we acquire knowledge are three, according to Kant: the senses, or sensibility (Sinnlichkeit), which is the power of receiving sense-impressions, or sensible representations of things, called phenomena or empirical "intuitions"; the understanding (Verstand), or faculty of knowing *a priori* by which the perceptions of phenomena are regulated and unified; and reason, or the reasoning faculty (Vernunft), by which the rules of the understanding are in turn regulated and reduced to unity.⁷ The critical examination of the knowledge coming to or acquired by us through these three faculties is the burden of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

In order, therefore, to determine with regard to each of these three faculties of knowledge what is *a priori*, or transcendental, Kant finds in each species of knowledge, sensible, intellectual, and rational two distinct elements: the one a material, the other a formal element. Hence all knowledge is made up of matter and form. The material element, that is, the matter or content of knowledge is that which comes from experience, the form or formal element is that by which knowledge is determined to this or that particular kind. The form is given *a priori*, independently of all experience, arising solely from the activity of the knowing faculty.⁸ It is, indeed, the application of form to matter which alone makes experience possible.—So much as to the material and formal element of

⁶ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 50, 202, 212; (21, 156, 165).

⁷ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 237, 239; (189, 191).

⁸ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 100; (69).

knowledge in general. But each of the three kinds of knowledge just explained has its own particular matter and form. The matter or content of our sense-knowledge is phenomena, or sensible representations of things existing about us in the world of sense; the formal element consists of the two subjective forms of time and space which, anterior to all experience and innate in the sensitive faculties, are the conditions of all sensation.⁹ The form, then, of sense-knowledge is *a priori* and altogether independent of anything objective in the realm of experience, moreover these subjective forms of time and space are imposed by the mind on the material element of sensation first, in order to render sense-perceptions possible, secondly in order to make them universal and necessary. All our sense-perceptions, therefore, according to Kant, are mere representations of phenomena—representations which manifest the qualities of things *not as they are in themselves*, but according to the *innate subjective forms* which precede all actual sensibility. These representations are consequently dependent on our sensitive faculties, and would be different if our faculties were otherwise constituted. The fact that all men with normal senses perceive the same phenomena in the same way comes not from the uniformity of the objects perceived, but rather from the uniformity in construction of our faculties.¹⁰ Again, Kant would have it remembered that although these *a priori* forms of time and space make possible, regulate, and render universal and necessary all sense-perceptions they are not to be extended outside the narrow-range of the senses; they are meaningless beyond the data of sensation, *i. e.*, the appearances (*Erscheinungen*) of things.

We now come to the knowledge acquired through the understanding or faculty of judgment, with which, according to Kant, intellectual cognition really begins. The sense-representations (sense-intuitions) which result from the imposition of the *a priori* forms of space and time on sensible objects

⁹ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 50; (21).

¹⁰ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 55, 59, 65; (25, 59, 35).

constitute the material element of intellectual cognition.¹¹ The senses intuite, the understanding reflects on the intuitions of the senses, coördinates and reduces them to states of clear "consciousness" called judgments. Some of these judgments are contingent and particular, others, which only are proper objects of philosophical speculation are necessary and universal. Now as was the case with sense-knowledge, so here with judgment, universality and necessity must come *a priori*. Experience is at all times and in every instance unable to supply these attributes. That, then, which gives universality and necessity to our judgments exists *a priori* in the intellect, or faculty of understanding, and is imposed by the intellect on sense-intuitions in a similar manner and for a similar purpose as the *a priori* forms of space and time are imposed on phenomena. This formal element of intellectual cognition comprises twelve forms termed *categories*.¹² Although undetermined in regard to any object these *categories* or functions of judgment are calculated not only to give universality and necessity to the operations of the understanding but to guide and direct it in the formation of all its judgments. Being purely logical functions inherent in the nature of the understanding prior to all experience, they do not afford the least concept of an object aside from experience. They require sensible perceptions as a basis and are useless for any other application, hence they do not extend our knowledge, they relate only to the appearances of things, and tell nothing about the noumenal reality underlying those appearances.¹³

Attention must be called right here to Kant's well known *synthetic a priori* judgments. It is well to remember that his division of judgments comprises two classes: *a priori* and *a posteriori* judgments, and secondly those called *analytic* and *synthetic*. As already said, by *a priori* judgments he means those which are formed from pure concepts without any reference to or dependence on experience, except in a material way,

¹¹ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 93; (62).

¹² *Crit. of Pure Reason*, I. c.

¹³ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, I. c.

inasmuch as the notion of the subject and predicate may come from experience; for example, "every change must have a cause." Thus the fact of a change we know from experience, but that it is *always* and *necessarily* connected with a cause we know only *a priori*. When the connection of subject and predicate is known only from experience, and is by consequence contingent and particular, as, "John runs," the judgment is *a posteriori*.¹⁴ An *analytic* judgment is one in which the predicate is contained in the notion of the subject, as, for example, the judgment, "all bodies are extended." In judgments of this kind the predicate adds nothing to the notion of the subject; it only explains by a different term what is expressed by the subject, hence there is an identity of meaning between subject and predicate as can be seen from a simple analysis of each. But the reverse is the case with synthetic judgments. In a synthetic judgment the predicate not being contained in the notion of the subject, but, on the contrary, being something which no analysis of the subject could have ever disclosed, really augments the significance of the latter. Thus "all bodies have weight" is a synthetic judgment, because "weight" is an idea not essentially bound up with the idea of body; it is a contingent addition to the notion of body.¹⁵ So far it would appear that Kant and the Aristotelian philosophers are on a common footing; but Kant goes on to observe that while all analytic judgments are *a priori*, synthetic judgments are sometimes *a priori*, sometimes *a posteriori*. A judgment is "synthetic *a posteriori*" when the predicate is not contained in the subject, and when the nexus between the two, as being the result of experience, is not necessary but contingent as in the proposition, "John Smith is wealthy."

A judgment is "synthetic *a priori*" when its predicate is not contained in the notion of the subject but when the nexus, or linking together of subject and predicate is necessary and universal, for example, "every effect has a cause." Judgments

¹⁴ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 28; (2).

¹⁵ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 33; (7).

of this kind are *synthetic*, says Kant, because the putting-together (synthesis) of the subject and predicate is the result of experience,—the ideas of cause and effect are not connected because the idea of one is contained in that of the other (as the Aristotelians would contend), but only because it is a matter of experience that the one is not found without the other. Further, this sort of judgment is *a priori*, because the universality and necessity which it involves must come from the understanding independently of experience. Experience can give us only contingent and particular data, and hence the universality and necessity which characterize “synthetic *a priori*” judgments can have no other source than the pure concepts of the understanding. Therefore, the proposition, “every effect has a cause,” expresses a judgment which is, first “synthetic,” because the subject and predicate are not intrinsically connected, but associated through experience, secondly, it is “*a priori*,” because the pure concepts of the understanding have endowed it with universality and necessity.¹⁶

Nearly all the judgments which constitute science are “synthetic *a priori*,” according to Kant. These only, in fact, enter into true science, because in these alone is found the two-fold element requisite for scientific judgment: they are necessary and universal in their application and veracity; and moreover they are of such a nature as to add to knowledge, since the predicate always enlarges upon the notion of the subject. Analytic judgments, he holds, do not contribute anything to knowledge, although they may give clarity to our conceptions. And “synthetic *a posteriori*” judgments have no scientific value, since, depending as they do entirely on experience, they are always particular and contingent. To the “synthetic *a priori*” judgments only, then, can we have recourse for knowledge truly scientific, but even these are useless beyond the realm of phenomena; of noumena, or things in themselves they tell us absolutely nothing.¹⁷

¹⁶ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 35; (8).

¹⁷ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 207, 231; (161, 183).

The third part of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is occupied with an examination of the reason, or reasoning faculty together with the knowledge acquired through it. It is the office of the reason to order and reduce to unity the concepts and judgments of the understanding, which concepts and judgments make up its material element, or content. The form of rational cognition Kant places in three "norms," or "ideas" existing *a priori* in the mind. The function of "ideas" in the rational faculty is similar to that of space and time in sensation, and that of the categories in the understanding.¹⁸ These three ideas correspond to the three distinct operations which Kant finds in the reasoning faculty: the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive operations of reason. The categorical reasoning is based on the category of substance and accident, and leads to a certain absolute subject that can not be predicated of any other, and this constitutes the "ego" or psychological idea. Hypothetical reasoning, resting on the category of cause and effect, leads to the notion of the dependence of all singular, contingent things upon a certain totality, and this is the idea of the world, or cosmological idea. Disjunctive reasoning rests on the category of mutual action and leads to the idea of absolute unity of all realities, which is the idea of God, or Theological idea. These three ideas as being made up of purely subjective elements, do not represent anything outside the mind "in rerum natura." Their one purpose being to direct the mind in its reasonings, they constitute a *norm* by which the mind is able to know and to reason within the limits of experience; but by them or through them nothing can be known, nothing concluded beyond the range of phenomena.¹⁹ There is in us, Kant admits, a certain necessary and natural inclination to extend the use of these ideas beyond the realm of sense to noumena, or things in themselves, and this especially with respect to the nature of the human soul, the world and God. But this tendency of our nature, he urges, is an error, a vain

¹⁸ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 239, 241; (191, 192, 193).

¹⁹ *Proleg.* Berlin ed., IV., 350 ff.; Carus trans., 120 ff.

delusion. These ideas are to regulate our knowledge of the things of experience, and nothing more.²⁰ By yielding to our natural desire to extend them beyond the sphere of experience we fall into lamentable errors: false conclusions about the nature of the soul, cosmological contradictions, and sophistic Theological reasonings. The office, therefore, of true philosophy, in Kant's opinion, is to discover these errors of pure reason and help us to guard against them.²¹ Truly the natural impulse of the human mind to pass from phenomena to noumena, from the things that appear to the things that are is inevitable and unchangeable like nature itself, and yet Kant warns us that this is a vain and deceptive tendency. Nature and reason, it would seem, are false and erroneous at the root.

One must not, however, infer from the foregoing reasoning that Kant did not believe in a spiritual soul in man, the reality of the material universe, and the existence of God. He simply maintains that we cannot prove these things, that as realities they must ever remain unknown to us. His position in this regard is a logical conclusion from his principles already explained. The senses are the source and ground-work of all our knowledge, and they do not go beyond phenomena. So far as the objective reality of things is concerned understanding and reason are unable to go beyond the data of sensation. That there is within us a spiritual principle destined by force of its nature to survive the body, that the world about us is no sham but a substantial enduring reality, that there is outside and above this perishable world a supreme, though, as far as speculation can tell us, an unknowable God,—all this, Kant concedes, we may believe and hope but can never prove. In view of such doctrines it is not difficult to account for the origin and progress of Agnosticism, and of the general sceptical tenor of modern philosophic thought.

From this exposition of Kant's philosophy his aim throughout the *Critique of Pure Reason* is clearly manifest. His chief

²⁰ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 349 ; (288).

²¹ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 234 ff. ; (186 ff.)

purpose, as against Hume, is to vindicate "certain ingredients of our knowledge as belonging to mind, not to matter; to the subject not to the object; to the understanding, not to sensation; to the *a priori*, not to experience."²² And yet, as has been repeatedly observed, Kant insists that these *a priori* concepts, or laws of thought must never be applied outside the limits of sensuous experience. All our objective knowledge is phenomenal. The nature of objects considered in themselves, and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility, is quite unknown and unknowable. Our own peculiar mode of perceiving appearances is all we can lay claim to. Noumena really exist and sustain the phenomena that appear, but that is all we know about them.²³

To the question, now, which Kant set out to answer, whether, namely, we can know anything of those things which transcend experience; and, by consequence, whether metaphysics is at all possible, he would reply: *a*) We can know nothing beyond the phenomena of objects that come under the senses; as to noumena, or the realities underlying phenomena they cannot be denied to exist, but what they are we can never know; *b*) Metaphysics, as a science, is altogether impossible, and this for the reason that it consists of transcendental truths to which pure reason is unable to attain; *c*) that we should attribute objective validity to our transcendental concepts is a natural delusion.

Stopping with the conclusions thus reached in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant's doctrine evidently leads to open scepticism, so far at least as respects the world of reality. He undertook a thorough criticism of all human knowledge, not to destroy or tear down, but with the sole purpose of determining what part or how much of it had a footing *a priori*, and he ended by overthrowing, (to his own satisfaction, at least), the possibility of proving by speculative reasoning those truths which, before his time, had been considered most sacred in the range of knowledge. But Kant did not consider his

²² Max Müller, *Science of Thought*, p. 144.

²³ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 65; (35).

efforts destructive, especially when regarded in the light of their final issue,—far less did he wish to be stigmatized as a sceptic in any sense. What he took away from the realm of speculative knowledge he endeavored to restore to humanity by having recourse to Practical Reason.²⁴ The truths which, through his *Critique of Pure Reason*, he had deprived of all metaphysical moorings he tries in the *Critique of Practical Reason* to establish and vindicate on an unshakable moral foundation. The dictates of the Practical Reason, and the force of the inner written moral law are a supreme criterion of truth unto every man. By his practical reason man discovers this moral law, and, by consequence, his personal moral obligation. To this moral obligation, called the “Categorical Imperative,” three truths, says Kant, are necessarily presupposed: the liberty of the human will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. Without liberty there would be no merit in harkening to the voice of conscience; without another, enduring life, law would be lacking its proper sanction; without God virtue would frequently go unrewarded, vice unpunished.²⁵ Hence these truths are, as it were, preambles to the moral law, they pave the way for it, they solidify its basis, they contribute to render it that unquestionable bulwark of truth and sanction which make its dictates supreme, imperative, and universal. It is in virtue of this employment of the practical side of pure reason, that Kant says we may have *belief* in the supersensible. While insisting on the rights of both faith and knowledge, Kant’s critical philosophy carefully distinguishes the domain of the one from that of the other; knowledge rules in the phenomenal order, but faith in the noumenal.

II.

So much for a general exposition of the teachings found in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. With these salient features of

²⁴ *Crit. of Practical Reason*, Berlin ed., v., 132; Abbott trans., 229.

²⁵ *Crit. of Prac. Reason*, l. c.

Kantian philosophy before us, it will be interesting to apply to his teaching something of his own method, by subjecting it to the test of criticism. For this purpose it is not at all necessary to go minutely into detail, nor to give here all the arguments, multitudinous as they are, which can be leveled against the seer of Königsberg. It will be sufficient to hold up to light a number of his most glaring fallacies.

In the first place it would seem that any philosophy, any teaching, which rejects truths at all times and by all men admitted as certain and above question; and which, on the contrary, holds as true that which all are by nature wont to deny,—it would seem, that such a philosophy can not be other than false and absurd. And yet, as has been seen, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is a philosophy of this kind. All its conclusions, as he elaborated them, are opposed to the common consent of those, who preceded its author, as well as to the natural judgments and dictates of the human mind. Almost on its face, therefore, it merits rejection. For what can be more preposterous than to believe that all the sages of antiquity, and all the men of genius and learning down to the time of Kant were deceived and in error regarding the most fundamental and momentous questions of philosophic thought and investigation. "It is human to err," but human nature is not intrinsically erroneous. Moreover, the very things which Kant denies, as well as those which he affirms fare thus at his hands without sufficient reason; his contentions are wanting a foundation; his position has not a valid justification even in itself,—it is arbitrary and gratuitous, as will become clearer as we proceed.

Kant is quite Aristotelian in his teaching that the senses are the gate-ways of our knowledge. That there is nothing in the mind which is not in some way the result of sensation is axiomatic in the schools of sound philosophy. Human knowledge always begins with the senses. He is also quite right in allowing that the mind is able to generalize upon the contingent impressions received from particular sensible objects, thereby constructing the universal and necessary laws which govern

science and lift it above the variable, singular objects with which it deals, but in assigning the source whence springs the possibility of such universality and necessity, Kant goes woefully astray. Unlike the Aristotelian he does not find running through the various classes of singular things which confront the senses a universality of nature and necessity of law which, as a foundation, give to science its invaluable character and unfailing sanction; but on the contrary, seeing in the objective world only particularity and contingency, he has recourse to a vain, groundless fancy as the basis of science. Knowing that science must be universal and necessary in its certainty, and being unable to discover these qualities *a posteriori* he concludes by an astonishing assumption that they exist as forms *a priori* in the mind. Space and time, then, which are the two great regulating conditions of all phenomena, and which impose on the raw material, so to say, of our knowledge the qualities that constitute science, have no existence outside the mind except as applied to objects by the mind, but are *innate, a priori* mental forms. Not only is proof for this contention wanting, but the reasons which led Kant to it, seem so devoid of common sense, let alone sound reason, that one is tempted to disregard his whole system as an idle dream—a novel fiction unworthy of serious consideration.

A similar treatment merit Kant's "synthetic *a priori*" judgments, on which he seeks to base his whole system, and, in fact, all scientific knowledge. Thought and real knowledge, according to Kant, begin with judgment; but only that kind of judgment can be the source of knowledge truly scientific which at once amplifies and extends our knowledge, while imparting to it stability and certainty. This is effected, he teaches, only by "synthetic *a priori*" judgments: analytic judgments remaining within their own concepts do not enlarge upon the notions they express, while *a posteriori* judgments are unable to furnish the qualities which science must possess. So he reasons. By arbitrarily restricting the meaning which has always attached to analytic judgments he formulates a new class calculated to answer his purpose. In the first place he

jumps at the conclusion that an analytic judgment is one whose predicate is convertible with its subject and thus lacks the quality of expansion; and secondly, being unable to discover any intrinsic, necessary and universal connection between subject and predicate in those synthetic judgments which are otherwise suited for science, he gratuitously conceives that these qualities of universality and necessity are supplied extrinsically by *a priori* mental forms. His whole difficulty arises from a misconception of analytic judgments. For this kind of judgments it is only necessary that by a simple analysis of subject and predicate these be found to agree or disagree, and that either because the predicate is contained in the notion of the subject, (as when we say, "man is an animal"); or because in our analysis of the terms we discover a reason why one should be attributed to the other. Thus in the proposition, "the world has been created by God," we find on analysing the subject "world" that its contingent and limited nature are inexplicable apart from the predicate, "has been created by God." Synthetic judgments on the other hand are those in which, from a simple analysis of the terms, we could never associate them, their connection or bond of union being entirely a matter of experience. Given this correct understanding of analytic and synthetic judgments there is clearly no room or demand for Kant's middle class, "synthetic *a priori*." The example he gives to prove their existence, only serves to show his own erroneous notion of the two classes admitted by the followers of Aristotle. For example in the proposition, $7 + 5 = 12$, Kant insists that no analysis of $7 + 5$ will ever convey the idea of 12. It is only, he says, by a blind synthesis, born *a priori* in the mind which gives a necessary and unfailing connection between $7 + 5$ and 12. Here it is plain that Kant was more concerned with the symbols than with the concepts expressed by them. If we consider the ideas conveyed by these sensible signs $7 + 5$ and 12, the position of Kant seems absurd. In fact the very contrary of his conclusion is the obvious one. For the most simple analysis of the meaning of 7 and 5, makes it clear to the mind that, when united, they

signify a quantity or number identical with that expressed by the symbol 12. The sensible figures count for nothing aside from the meaning they give out, and hence when one clearly understands the idea which 7 and 5 expresses, and the further idea expressed by the figure 12, he at once perceives they are one and the same,—that one is entirely contained in the other. Therefore the association of the concepts expressed by $7 + 5$ and 12 results from their respectively intrinsic significance, and not from any extrinsic or *a priori* source.²⁶ If, however, we attend, as perhaps Kant did, to the mere symbols $7 + 5$ and 12, then we may say that it is only by experience and custom that the particular arbitrary signs of 7 and 5 have come to be associated with the other arbitrary sign 12. Kant's mistake evidently comes from confounding the origin of the association of the sensible signs with that of the ideas. Because of the identity of their meaning the ideas have a necessary connection, while the symbols expressing them are associated only because common consent of men has decided that the arbitrary signs 7 and 5 should when united, signify or be equal to the arbitrary sign 12.

Take another example. In the proposition, "this world had a beginning," Kant admits that there is a necessary connection between the predicate, "had a beginning," and the subject, "world"; but as usual he assigns no reason for it other than an innate mental necessity whereby we are compelled, so to say, to connect these two concepts. And since his position is purely gratuitous, it may be denied without hesitation. Truly there is between the extremes of this proposition, that is, between the concepts expressed by the extremes, a necessary connection, and that for reasons intrinsically objective. On looking into the nature, structure, and composition of the object which is called "world," it is at once evident to the mind that such a contingent, changing thing as it is, could not have been from everlasting, independent and self-existing, and therefore must have "had a beginning." In short, we analyze the subject and

²⁶Cf. Hugon, *Logic*, 126.

predicate and find an intrinsic bond between them. The same process discloses the intimate connection between subject and predicate in that other Kantian example, "everything that happens has a cause." This is an abstract and general proposition, and yet the very fact that a thing happens, or takes place, or is effected or produced (these are all synonymous terms), is a proof that it has not within itself the reason of its existence and is, therefore, dependent on something else for its existence, which is to say it had a cause.²⁷ The very examples, then, which Kant adduces to illustrate his "synthetic *a priori*" judgments prove, (since they are in fact illustrations of analytic judgments), that his new division or class of judgments is without a basis or a reason, and consequently that his fanciful theory about *a priori* forms which he calls categories, excogitated to supply extrinsically an element which these judgments already possess by force of their own intrinsic nature, falls useless to the ground. He is wrong in his outset, and the farther he proceeds and the more hypotheses he formulates, the more does he become involved in error. That this is the case is proved by a glance at his theory respecting the knowledge acquired by the reasoning faculty.

In treating of the elements of rational cognition, Kant, as has been shown, asserts the existence of three kinds of ideas innate in the mind: the idea of self or the "ego," the idea of the world, and the idea of God. Nobody wishes to deny that we have in our minds these distinct ideas; but that, as Kant maintains, they exist *a priori* in the mind, and are for the sole purpose of regulating our empirical knowledge is one more mere assertion unsupported by the slightest argument. Equally groundless is the supposition that these transcendental ideas, not born of any experience, can not, nevertheless, be extended beyond the range of our experience. As to their existence, we are told they are entirely independent of experience, but for their use and application they are strictly limited to experience. And why? What is the reason for

²⁷Cf. Hugon, l. c.

this? Granted that all our knowledge begins with the senses, why can not the mind afterwards transcend sensibility? Why must it forever remain within the limits prescribed by the data of sensation? That it must be so is Kant's supposition. This is his starting point. This it is which has given rise to the *a priori* fabrications which he places in sensibility, understanding, and reason respectively. And hence all subsequent explanations of his *a priori* forms, Kant treats in a manner suited to fit in with his philosophical dream. He started with a dream, and he is determined to dream on, logically indeed, to the end. It seems beside his purpose to take into account any difficulties that may be connected with his system,—none, in fact appear to have occurred to him.

Again it may be asked why there is within us, engraven in our nature, a mighty and irresistible desire to extend these transcendental ideas of God and the human soul beyond the order of phenomena? Can it be that a desire so universal and constant is but a vain delusion? Is human nature in error, and Kant alone right? Hardly so. At least a sound mind is rather inclined to accept the uniform and noble promptings of man's nature in preference to the wild assertions of one troubled brain. But the extension of these ideas outside the pale of experience leads to a whole network of antinomies the most lamentable, Kant replies. As a matter of fact these antinomies or contradictions are born of Kant's own ignorance, or self-deception. An equivocation lies at the bottom of all his antitheses. For example "The world has, as to time and space, a beginning," *i. e.*, it is limited (thesis)—"The world is, as to time and space, infinite," *i. e.*, it is limitless (antithesis).²⁸ His conclusion here is that the world is at once finite and infinite. It is finite, since it had a beginning in time and space; it is infinite because it may be indefinitely extended and prolonged as to space and time. In the first place, one is a little confused to hear Kant talking this way in regard to space and time, since he holds as one of the corner-stones of

²⁸ *Proleg.*, Berlin ed., iv., 338; Carus trans., 104.

his system that space and time are mere mental forms having no objective existence or essence, save as applied here and now by this or that mind. However, granting the objectivity of space and time for his present purpose, we may solve his difficulty by simply calling attention to the fact that there is not the remotest contradiction between a thing having a beginning and no end. Because a being is to endure indefinitely is in no wise repugnant to its having had a beginning. The human soul has been created in time, and yet, being spiritual in nature, is destined never to have an end. Where is the antinomy here? Kant has confused the idea of indefiniteness with that of infinity. Infinity means limitlessness, without beginning or end, and hence there is but one infinite being, God.

Another example of Kantian contradiction: "There are in the World Causes through Liberty" "There is no Liberty, but all is Nature."²⁹ Let it be noted, before examining this antinomy, that one of the chief ends of Kant's labors was to defend human liberty for on it he grounded the great Moral Law, the certainty of whose existence was to his mind beyond all question. In liberty he found the sanction of this law, and consequently man's freedom and responsibility were as certain to him as the existence of the phenomenal order. What, then, does he mean by "nature"? Nature in itself is not necessarily opposed to liberty. It is natural to man to be free. It is a part of his nature. Therefore by "nature," which would be opposed to liberty, he perhaps wishes us to understand necessity. Yes, this is his meaning, for he says, "All the actions of rational beings, so far as they occur in any experience, are subject to the *necessity* of nature; but the same actions as regards merely the rational subject and its faculty of acting according to mere reason, are free."³⁰ And by "necessity of nature" he means the determinability of every event in the world of sense according to constant laws, that is, a reference to cause in experience." Now, if this

²⁹ *Proleg.*, I. c.

³⁰ *Proleg.*, Berlin ed., IV., 343 ff., Carus trans., 111 ff.

means anything, it is that every sensible event (effect) has a cause, "nature" demands so much; and this law of nature remains whether the actions of rational creatures proceed from free choice or election, or whether they are elicited without regard to reason. "In both cases the effects are connected (with their causes) according to constant laws," and this is what is meant by natural necessity. But when acts proceed from rational agents according to reason, that is, freely, "it is reason," says Kant, "which is the cause of these laws of nature (he would better have said, reason fulfills or verifies these laws of nature), and (is) therefore free." If the actions are not determined by reason, "they are subjected to the empirical laws of sensibility, but reason is not therefore determined by the sensibility, and hence is free in this case too." Now the upshot of all this abstruse, unwarranted line of reasoning is that freedom and necessity both exist in the world, each controlling its own domain unimpeded by the other. Where, then, is the real antinomy or contradiction? According to Kant's own reasoning it does not exist.

Kant has generally been given the credit of having conceived and elaborated an eminently architectonic system of philosophy in so far, at least, as he brought it to completion. The novelty and logic of his reasoning have been highly extolled. To the majority of the present age, who follow him so blindly and are so imbued with his principles that all their thoughts and writings are Kantian in tone and tendency, it does not seem to occur even in the remotest way that his wonderful system is, in its very outset, based on a contradiction. His initial principle is that no truth, no knowledge is to be admitted until the faculties by which it is acquired have been rigorously subjected to criticism. Be it remembered that criticism of all our knowledge and knowing faculties is the key-stone in his imposing philosophical edifice. And of "pure reason" this is especially to be observed.³¹ This is the whole aim of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and yet he undertakes his gigan-

³¹ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, IV., 9, (xv).

tic task presupposing (as he must if he would ever make a start) the unquestioned veracity of the dictates of that pure reason. It is plain then, that he wishes to except from criticism or question the reliability of the initial dictates of pure reason. So much he needed as a basis on which to start, and with this beginning, gratuitous or contradictory (it is one or the other), he proceeds to establish the following conclusion: "Pure reason divested of all experience has no objective validity." Again we look in vain for proof of this conclusion; but passing over here as elsewhere the absence of proof as one of Kant's habitual failings we may presume to ask if he really means that at least this his dogmatic conclusion has any objective worth? Is it merely something subjective appealing to Kant alone (if so it need not cause anybody else any concern), or is it something objectively true so that every one who wishes to be on the side of truth must hold it. The latter is obviously the sense in which it is to be understood. There is then something, even according to Kant, which has objective truth, independently of Kant or any other particular individual. This is consoling; but how does Kant arrive at the conclusion that *this his fundamental conclusion* is objectively certain? How can he prove, or whence does he infer it? Surely not through the senses, since they are impotent to deal with the problems of pure reason. This conclusion must, then, be an inference of pure reason independently of the senses and experience; but the conclusion itself is that "pure reason divested of experience has no objective validity"; that is, pure reason at once has and has not objective validity.³² Here we have Kant in an open contradiction. He would reply, perhaps, that pure reason has objective validity in drawing the conclusion that "pure reason divested of experience has no objective validity," but in every other deduction pure reason has no objective worth apart from experience. Some such reasoning as this would suit his purpose and help him out of the difficulty, and without doubt he would have called it into

³² Cf. *Lepidi Elem. Phil. Christ.*, 1, 350.

service, had he been pushed to the wall. But although it is the only refuge to shield him from an overwhelming difficulty, it is absurdly groundless. If pure reason, independent of experience, has any objective meaning or validity in one instance, why not in every instance? If it can deduce a valid conclusion in one case, why not in all similar cases? If it is freed from the trammels of sense as to one of its inferences, why should it be enslaved by them in all others? As much warrant, (to say the least), have we to assert the objectivity of all our ideas, as Kant has to assert the objectivity of one and deny it of all the rest.

Kant's main purpose in writing his philosophy was, as has been explained, to refute the scepticism of Hume and place human science on a firm and unshakable basis. His was to be the only really sound and uncontrovertible system so far excogitated by the mind of man; it was to be logical, unanswerable, high above all errors. Lofty his aim and tireless was his toil,—fascinating, to himself at least, the prospect of his life's work. With all his acuteness he did not even suspect the presence of the baneful errors that pervade his entire system of thought; he would have revolted at the suspicion that the outcome of his philosophy was also scepticism, yet so it is. Scepticism is inevitable to any one who pursues to their logical conclusions the fundamental teachings of Kant. Thus did Fichte, one of Kant's most illustrious disciples, end in idealism, (another name for scepticism), as a result of pushing to their logical conclusion the principles of his master.

To be convinced that the philosophy of Kant terminates inevitably in scepticism, we need but call to mind and examine carefully the purport of his final, grand conclusion,—that, namely, we can know nothing beyond phenomena. He insists throughout that all our knowledge is necessarily restricted to the *sensibilia* which strike our senses in one way or another; of things in themselves—the realities underlying phenomena, we can know absolutely nothing. Phenomena alone have for us objective validity. This is Kant's reiterated plain teaching. But if we are true to his principles and examine closely the

process of reasoning by which he established this conclusion, it falls out logically that even our knowledge of phenomena is not at all objective,—that phenomena like noumena, so far as we can know, at any rate, have no objective worth. This is not to imply that Kant makes the whole external world a sham. No, he does not wish to be considered an idealist, for he holds fast to the reality of phenomena. He persists in declaring that the world of sense is an objective reality, and that it is supported by an underlying reality called noumena; but just as he denies the possibility of our knowing anything of the real nature of noumena, so, conformable to his principles, ought he to hold that we do not and can not know anything of phenomena beyond the mere fact of their existence. All our sense-impressions, he tells us, are nothing but appearances of things which represent objects not as they are in themselves, but according to the mode in which these objects affect our senses. But these appearances, or representations, as we have seen, are dependent on the senses, that is, on the *a priori* forms of sensibility, so that, were our innate subjective forms, which precede and regulate all sense-perceptions, otherwise constructed, these appearances would be other than they are.³³ Given different subjective faculties, or, which amounts to the same, different *a priori* forms which alone render experience possible, and all our sense-perceptions would be entirely different. From this it is evident that, according to Kant, our perception of phenomena does not depend on the phenomena perceived, but rather on the *a priori* sense-forms which make possible and govern all empirical knowledge. Hence it follows that all the knowledge which Kant allows as possible to us—a knowledge of phenomena—is entirely subjective, dependent on forms innate in the mind anterior to all experience, and whether the phenomena rendered possible by these forms really exist outside the mind as pictured by the same forms in the mind, we do not and can not know. Indeed how could we know, if Kant's reasoning is correct? What means of assurance have we that

³³ *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 55, 59, 65; (25, 59, 35).

the color or shape existing outside our senses is in exact conformity with our subjective impression of it, since the latter is entirely regulated by and dependent on something subjective and altogether distinct from the object perceived? And if this is so, what is to save us from pure subjectivism and pure idealism? What is there to stay our despair of ever attaining any knowledge really and truly objective, of phenomena as well as noumena? Thus in harmony with Kant's principles, we should hold that all the knowledge which is possible to man is bound up within him as in a prison, and whether or not there is anything outside him in the objective world corresponding to the impressions and perceptions which he possesses, he is unable to say, he can not know. As to a uniformity of perception among all men,—the fact that all, or the majority perceive the same objects in the same way counts for nothing as to the objectivity of their perceptions, so long as these perceptions, or the forms which mould and make them are products *a priori* of subjective faculties. To be consistent it should be said that the uniformity of perception is due to the uniformity of subjective forms, and not to the uniformity of the phenomena existing without. But more, Kant's principles must logically deny to him all knowledge of a uniformity of perception among all men. How could he know this except by allowing the objective testimony of his senses, which, as has been shown, are entirely enslaved by *a priori* forms.³⁴ All this is especially emphasized against Kant, if we further remember that for him formal truth does not consist in a conformity between the mind and the object it perceives, but in conformity of our knowledge with itself.³⁵

To eschew these undesirable yet necessary inferences from his principles and teaching, perhaps Kant would explain that, since the inborn subjective forms of time and space are for the sole purpose of determining, regulating, and making possible all our sense-impressions, they have been preordained and predestined, (by whom he knows not), to be of that exact and

³⁴ Cf. Farges, *Études Philosophiques*, 4c ed., v., 72.

³⁵ Cf. Farges, l. c.

peculiar nature and construction which makes their own creations (sense-perceptions) exactly correspond to the sensible objects (phenomena) existing in the objective world. In other words, the forms of all sense-perceptions exist *a priori*, independently of every thing objective, these forms create and shape and make possible all our phenomenal impressions (sense-impressions), and yet there is perfect agreement between these subjective impressions and the objective phenomena they represent because the latter have been *made to order* to fit the former, (or vice versa, if this would please Kant better). In the light of this novel solution of the problem one can see, (though he may fail to understand), how our sense-perceptions have objective validity, and how consequently, we may have a true knowledge of sensible objects or phenomena. This is a noble specimen of the efficiency of a lively imagination; it shows something of the power and unlimited extent which that faculty is capable of when unrestrained and allowed to roam at large. At any rate it would follow, according to Kant's own teaching, as we see, that, since our sense-perceptions depend on our sensitive faculties, if these faculties were to undergo a change, or had been otherwise constructed, the phenomena of the world would likewise have to be changed and rearranged in order to have perfect harmony between them and our perception of them.

This sounds rather specious even if ludicrous; hence for the sake of a little further argument, let it be entertained as the only means of explaining Kant's position. Immediately arises the question, on what grounds does Kant deny the possibility of our acquiring a knowledge of noumena, or things in themselves? If there is something really existing objectively in the phenomenal world which to a nicety corresponds to the *a priori*, *made-to-order* types existing in our sensibility, and concerning which we have real knowledge (the only knowledge we do or can have, according to Kant), on what authority, and by what rules of consistency does Kant maintain that of noumena, or things in themselves we can not have real knowledge—a knowledge equal in certainty and completeness to that which

we possess of phenomena? Have we not as much reason to believe that the knowledge which our intelligence frames of the objects of pure understanding is as real and as comprehensive as that given us by the *a priori* forms of sensibility? Is that object which we see and understand by the mind less real, less understood than that perceived by the senses according to forms, not dependent on the sensible object perceived, but innate in sensibility? Over and over again Kant admits that the human mind in its sweep ranges far beyond the things of sense and experience,—he repeatedly owns, as has been observed before, that there is engraven “in our nature an indomitable tendency, an insatiable desire to probe beyond the world of time and space to learn what lies hidden in that vast unknown”; and yet withal he makes bold to aver that this expense of power, these wild desires that haunt the human heart are fruitless and vain, impossible of even the faintest satisfaction. Here as elsewhere he does not prove his claim, he merely states it, as consistent with his initial principle that the senses are the measure of our knowledge, and so leaves it unsubstantiated by a single further argument. That noumena exist is certain, but what they are must forever remain a mystery to us. His words are: “Objects of the understanding are granted, but with the inculcation of this rule which admits no exception: that we neither know or can know anything at all definite of these pure objects of the understanding, because our pure concepts of the understanding as well as our pure intuitions extend to nothing but objects of possible experience, consequently to mere things of sense, and as soon as we leave this sphere these concepts retain no meaning whatever.”³⁶

From this, and from his entire line of reasoning, it is evident that Kant's mistake is that of one who, having begun with a false principle and laid a faulty foundation, does not discover his error, but continues on adding mistake to mistake and fallacy to fallacy unmindful and regardless of the accumulation of absurdities to which his method leads. For this reason, if

³⁶ *Proleg.*, Berlin ed., iv., 315; Carus trans. 76.

for no other, one is as justified in denying his groundless assertions, as Kant himself is in affirming them. If Kant admits, (as he must do, if we have any knowledge at all really objective), that the *a priori* forms of sensibility have been made to order to represent exactly the phenomena of the world, or, if he prefer it, that the phenomena of the world have been made in order to correspond with the *a priori* forms of our senses, he should, to be consistent, allow that noumena likewise have been made to correspond to the pure concepts of our understanding, so that there is an exact agreement between noumena and the concepts which exist *a priori* concerning them. And further, it being once admitted that our pure concepts have objective validity, whether by reasons of made-to-order concepts, or made-to-order noumena, there remains no reason why the intellect may not rise above all things connected with the sensible order and take hold on objects purely spiritual, thus enriching its store of knowledge from the spirit-world as well as from the realm of sensibility.

It comes to this, then, to be at all in harmony with the principles of Kant's philosophy, we must hold, either that all knowledge truly objective, whether phenomenal or noumenal, is impossible of attainment, contenting ourselves with pure subjectivity and scepticism, or that the knowledge which we possess, or seem to possess of noumena is as real and as full of meaning as that which we have of phenomena. We have both or neither, we may not consistently admit the one and reject the other. Let the disciple of Kant think the matter over and make his choice.

CHAS. J. CALLAN, O. P.

THE PASSING OF MEDIEVALISM.

When the figure of Martin Luther shall have receded to its proper historical perspective, along with those of Arius and Nestorius, and be regarded as the originator of a religious following since become fairly innocuous, then will be written an adequate and serene account of the passing of Medievalism and of its chief incident, the Reformation. Until then it seems hopeless—at least so far as the reception of such a book is in question—because it is idle to expect the average reader to wish for a perfectly fair account in his present bigoted state of mind.

However, even now progress is being made, even if slowly. The old authors of the Froude type are pretty generally discredited by non-Catholics, whilst Catholics themselves are rather diffident of such well-meaning but unwise defenders as Darras. So that, though we cannot even yet, after almost four hundred years, boast of an adequate and perfectly just history of that momentous change in human affairs, nevertheless we are really beginning to judge of it more calmly and, as a consequence, beginning to see beneath the crust of religious strife down to the great causes underlying it. The following is a rough sketch of what seem to the writer as those causes. In proportion as all of us look at the event in such a light, just so much, we believe, will the way be gradually prepared for a real history of the Reformation.

Now, whilst considering the causes usually given credit for the Reformation, it has ever increasingly seemed to the present writer that sufficient influence has not been assigned to three which are herein insisted upon as paramount, almost adequate. The average, practically all, historians harp upon the religious side of the movement, whereas, this on closer investigation will, we predict, become more and more regarded as secondary and a result of others far deeper and vaster. Such a view is slowly, but surely gaining ground amongst Protestants themselves.

For instance, Arthur Cushman M'Giffert in his very suggestive "Protestant Thought before Kant" boldly says that "The Protestant Reformation was not exclusively nor even chiefly a religious movement" (p. 9).

What was it then at bottom? It was a general movement away from medieval civilization because of the very exhaustion of medieval civilization, accentuated by both racial and political dissatisfaction with the established order. This, we prophesy, will become the ultimate verdict of history, when religious bitterness will have become sufficiently softened to consider this momentous revolution with unbiased calm.

I.

THE RACIAL CAUSE.

What strikes the student of medieval civilization at the very start is the obvious fact that it was overwhelmingly Latin in spirit, form and expression.

The very head, the leadership, the supreme apex of that civilization personified in the Papacy was Latin, Roman. Now and then a German or Frenchman (one Englishman) filled Peter's chair. But they are, at least during the best of the Middle Ages from Hildebrand to Boniface VIII, only exceptions. Italy ruled then in the Church as she did in the arts and letters later on.

The legislation of the Church was Latin, distinctly Roman. Her Canon Law, as it came forth from the decretals of Popes and perfected under the master hand of Gratian, was based upon the old Roman Civil Law very largely as to judicial spirit and more so in expression. The Teutonic or Anglo-Saxon or Frankish "Custom" made practically no impression, rather was itself impressed.

The religious ceremonial of the peoples in that strange medley of young races was Latin in speech. Allowing for some exceptional rite here and there in Spain or the Slavic lands, Mass and the other services of the Church were carried on in the

tongue of the *Cæsars* from Benevento to the British isles. It was the only common tongue for Europe. It was the language of law courts even in such far lands as England until what seems quite a recent date.

In view of this, it is hardly necessary to add that the Latins furnished chiefly the brains and the inspiration for pretty much every great movement.

The great Doctors and Fathers of the Church, who represent all that was most brilliant in intellectual life, were Latin from Jerome and Augustine to Aquinas, with an occasional "barbarian" like Alexander of Hales thrown in to relieve the monotony. The Universities, wherein centred far more than even now the highest and broadest learning, were practically all situated in Latin lands. Up to the beginning of the fourteenth century there was not a single university situated in a non-Latin Country, Oxford and Cambridge excepted, and even these being modelled on and mere imitators of Paris and Bologna. The Rhine and Danube were, in this sense, the boundaries of science.

So with all the great movements of the age. The great religious Orders are founded by Latins—Benedict, Augustine, Dominic, Francis. It is another Latin, Hildebrand, who stamps his genius upon the Church's policy for over two hundred years. A Latin kindles the fires of the Crusades and the bulk of the fighters come from a Latin land, France.

Everywhere, in all directions it is Latin genius directing, forming, developing, controlling. The reason is evident. The present European races were in an inchoate state. Above all is this true of non-Latin nations. Germany, with all its imperial honors, was a confused conglomeration of independent fiefs. There was no such thing as English consciousness until the time of Edward I. The rest of Europe was even worse off. Therefore, whilst even France and Italy, above all Spain, were not yet the complete national entities they afterwards became, still their very heritage of Latin blood and civilization easily gave them, at least the two former, a tremendous prestige over the rest of the civilized world. The German Emperors might

make or unmake Popes, and Richard Plantagenet be the hero of medieval warfare; but Germany and England and every other non-Latin race, because of their very undeveloped racial consciousness, accepted unreservedly the lead of the mentally superior Latin in religion, science, ritual and general policy. Cæsar's ghost dominated Europe in the thirteenth century as much as he did when alive B. C.

Now, then, here is the point. So long as the non-Latin peoples were racially undeveloped, little or no antagonism was to be expected towards the Church so intensely Latin in character. True, there was always an undercurrent of hostility, chiefly in England, but not enough to break out openly. But once these young Teutonic races became fused into complete political entities, conscious of their strength, of ideals racially distinct, possessed of a language of their own in which these ideals were being expressed, no longer timidly looking to old Rome for either ideas or systems of polity, but rather developing their own innate strength, it is only natural to expect that a change in their relations with Rome was inevitable. A complete break such as really came was not inevitable. But some change and a vast change was inevitable.

It is with this broad fact in mind that a student can understand the purely non-Latin character of the Reformation, something which at the very start makes him sweep aside, as merely secondary, its religious character. If it were religious, why did it not permeate Latin peoples also; for surely discontent because of the abuses in the Church was as great in Italy as in Germany and minds in France were as active in the quest of knowledge as they were in England.

Against this will be urged that Ireland, Belgium and Southern Germany remained faithful to the Church, whilst the Reformation made for a time substantial progress in France. In answer, let me state that I do not mean to infer the too broad conclusion that a revolt from Catholicity was inevitable in non-Latin lands or that it is impossible in Latin. After all, neither Catholicity as such, nor heresy, nor schism know geographical or racial boundaries. All I do maintain is that the growing

racial consciousness of non-Latin races was bound in time to alter the submissive mental attitude of these peoples towards a so distinctly Latin civilization; that it was bound to readjust their relative positions to a more equal standing; that this constituted a mental condition fundamentally favorable to a real revolt once the man and the situation arose capable of bringing on such a revolt. It was the soil. And that soil lay across the Rhine and the Danube and the British Channel. Allowing for exceptions made so by peculiar conditions, the Reformation was remotely a racial movement of newer peoples away from Latin influence.

II.

THE POLITICAL CAUSE.

It was secondly a political movement parallel with and part of the racial. In fact, it was more than anything else clearly a political revolt—a phase of that eternal conflict between the Church and the State; between the nation and the international religion; between Cæsar and Christ; between the spirit of this world and the spirit of eternity; between temporal and supernatural authority.

There had always been such a conflict off and on from the days of the Cæsars. The long duel between the Hohenstauffen and the Hildebrandine Popes, the conflict of the latter with a Philip the Fair or a Henry II were echoes of the same. But during the Middle Ages proper the authority of the Papacy and of ecclesiastics in general was too powerful even politically for the various nations to do more than spasmodically enter their protest.

The reason for the tremendous political power of the Church lay in and was justified by the political incapacity of the nations themselves, say what will Protestant critics of ecclesiastical ambition; in fact, such clerical domination was a political necessity for peoples so little advanced in political training.

Consider for a moment that there was no such thing as a "nation," as we understand it now, in the real Middle Ages. Germany as such dates practically from Bismarck's day. France was struggling for political entity with the English Kings as Norman feudal barons up to the days of Crecy and Poitiers. England, in the personnel of her rulers was more French than English up to the accession of Edward I. Spain was just emerging as a nation out of Castile and Aragon and Moorish domination. The rest of the world was a checker-board of little principalities. There was little or no national unity. The only real unity was what they all enjoyed as members of the Universal Church and the Holy Roman Empire. What law they had was a confused mass of customs expressed in charters and cartularies generally issued here and there to meet particular exigencies but only rawly codified and only rudely inspired and guided and classified by any legal principles.

Is it any wonder then that such peoples, political children, should have been overawed for the time being by the infinitely superior political wisdom of the Church and her priests; that they should not merely have allowed, but themselves favored the centering of so much political prestige in the hands of the same? Was not the old Church the inheritor of the ancient Imperial law that had once made peace and order from Britain to Persia? Was not her own Canon Law largely perfected on the model of that same as it came from the skilful hands of Justinian? Were not her clerics the best educated, practically the only higher-educated class, men versed in all known legal knowledge, men, moreover, trained by the very government of the Church in all departments of legal procedure? It was absolutely inevitable, even more, it was necessary for the very political training of nations that a vast amount of political prestige should fall into the hands of clerics as by far the most competent to handle such affairs.

It was, in fact a really tremendous power. Witness the Emperor Henry humbly seeking pardon from the Pope outside the gates of Canossa or the arms of his soldiers falling from their hands

as the thunder of excommunication against him rolls from beyond the Alps; a King John laying England as a fief on the steps of Peter's throne and Henry Plantagenet baring his back for the murder of Becket to the lash of a priest—and so on—Emperors and Kings ascending and descending their thrones at the word of a venerable priest without other arms but his spiritual authority.

And what brings out more clearly than even this the marvellous political power of the Church is her authority over and actual guidance of the purely local affairs of even such a supposedly independent people as the English. Even in legitimately spiritual concerns Papal authority was far greater than it has ever been since. Papal legates presided over National Councils, not as polite figureheads, but as real presidents, notwithstanding the prestige of Canterbury or York. Rome appointed bishops at will, often from foreign lands, chiefly Flanders and Normandy. Thousands of even the smallest benefices were held by absentee Roman ecclesiastics. English benefices contributed a constant stream of money in the shape of Papal taxation.

And what is most significant of all, the English clergy itself was a powerful political force. It is not exaggeration to say that from the Conquest to the reign of Edward I the English clergy supplied the larger part of the legal brains that so prudently evolved England out of feudal chaos. In fact, there was not until Edward's reign such a thing as a lay class of lawyers, so largely did clerics monopolize the law. Their influence is seen to be again all the greater when we remember that they had their own law courts wherein clerics (a considerable part of the population, by the way) were tried to the exclusion of secular control; courts too before which came an immense amount of causes involving wills, marriage, etc.

So then the Church was a veritable *imperium in imperio* precisely because of the political infancy and relative incapacity of the nations. But one can easily see that this political power would be inevitably curtailed just in proportion as national consciousness became acute, national entity

developed, the nation as such grew up to political manhood. With the coronation of Edward I this development begins to be apparent. It was by no means complete; not for a very long time to come. But it was at hand. And, in confirmation of the above it is precisely under Edward that we first notice the beginning of that steady, unswerving deliberate effort of the State to take over into its own hands so much of the political power hitherto exercised by the clergy. The famous "*Circumspecte Agatis*," which curtailed the procedure of clerical courts, was but the first of many other acts that eventually culminated in Henry VIII's absolute State supremacy.

Here again will be objected that there is no inherent antagonism between Catholicity and the State, and, therefore, no essential connection between their medieval quarrels and the rise of Protestantism. All of which is quite true.

But we are dealing with facts, not theories, and later medieval history bears unmistakeable testimony to the fact that these eternal quarrels over temporals did pave the way more than any other cause for Protestantism. With this in mind, Protestantism is easily explained, both as to its origin and as to its essential nature and subsequent history.

For surely this is written in big letters all over Protestantism from Luther to our own day, namely, it was the creation of the State and has ever been its willing creature. Not heresy, not scandals robbed England of her faith, but royal absolutism. The real parent of Protestantism was not Luther, but Machiavelli, the supreme philosopher of State supremacy and his later imitator, Erastus. Luther was its voice, its immediate general, and Calvin its theologian. But Machiavelli was its spirit and Erastus the chief unconscious application of that spirit.

And this explains why Protestantism is unlike any other heresy or schism, yet is a compound of them all. It is unlike the earlier Arianism and Nestorianism, in that it has no definite, fixed belief; yet it embraces all from Arianism to Swedenborgianism in that it complacently embraces all their errors. What differentiates it sharply from every other revolt from

the mother church is this, that it bows to the State in fact, however much it may assume the demeanor of spiritual independence. Wherever it flourished it instantly became not only a State-Church even as Catholicism was, but a subject of the State, regulated by the State; whether it were Episcopalian in England, Lutheran in Germany or Calvinistic in Geneva. Never, never, in its history has it opposed a Protestant Government. It did oppose a Catholic Government determinedly, but no Protestant Church ever fought its Protestant Government as such for the sake of the principle that the church as such was independent of the State. Never. Whereas, the history of the Catholic Church has been one long, deathless struggle for this principle from Cæsar to the French Republic.

This is the essential nature of Protestantism—the mark of Erastianism. And this is why Protestantism has ever used so effectively one murderous weapon against Catholicity, namely, ever accusing it of disloyalty to the State. Such was the cry from Henry Tudor's days to the coarse latter-day defamers right here in the United States. It has indeed been a terrible weapon. But it betrays clearly that Protestantism is essentially a State concern. It was never disloyal to its Protestant Government simply because it was the subject of that Government wherever possible.

Nor is this position weakened by the reflection that Catholic countries like France and Spain remained Catholic in spite of their political quarrels with the Church. Because we see now the same process taking place in them that took place in Northern Europe. Racial affinity with Catholicity, as above noted, kept Latin peoples loyal for some three centuries. But now even with them the leaven of Protestantism is working at last, and they too are becoming Erastian, they too embracing this latest and most comprehensive of all heresies. They are naturally the last to give up Medievalism.

This, I repeat, is the master-key to the unlocking of the mysterious Reformation which marked the passing of Medievalism. Without it, the history of the civilized world from Dante to our own times is a veritable enigma. With it in

hand, all becomes astonishingly lucid. Medievalism has passed wherever the State exercises superiority over the Church, either directly, as in England, Germany, France; or indirectly, by completely ignoring it as a civic factor, as in the United States. The old friendly union of Church and State, with deference of State to Church under Hildebrand and Louis IX, has passed. And with it civilization is changed; mankind's whole attitude towards religion has changed. Medievalism has given way, whether in Protestant England in the sixteenth century or in Catholic France in the twentieth, to something new, something utterly different in spirit—call it Modernism or anything else you will.

GENERAL EXHAUSTION.

The more remote, but also more profound cause of the passing of Medievalism lies in that seemingly universal law of decay, which affects peoples as groups no less than as individuals. Each civilization brings something new into human experience, flourishes for a period in proportion to the intrinsic value of that contribution, and then the inevitable exhaustion sets in just as a plant weakens in its very blossoming. Sooner or later all go the way of things that were, leaving only a residue of its genius for the permanent heritage of those that come after. Memphis, Ninevah, Babylon, Susa, Athens, Rome, Bagdad are so many milestones marking the passing of the great civilizations preceding the medieval. Augsburg and Spiers also mark its passing.

The reason must be, as above stated, that civilizations become exhausted and die simply because the peculiar genius of each can no longer produce anything new and is, like all old men, incapable of learning or assimilating anything new.

Such was the case of medieval civilization when the black cloud of Lutheranism was hanging over the Alps like Odoacer's warriors a thousand years before. It had been the most energetic, the most pure in its ideals, the most prolific of any

civilization the world had ever seen. It had shown all the titanic grandeur of Assyrian militarism, all the superb idealism of Israelitic spirituality, all the philosophic depth and artistic delicacy of the Greek, all the fiery fanaticism of the Arab, all the calm judicial temperament and world subduing sense of order of the Roman. With its marvellous Catholicity, it had all the traits of its predecessors, and yet stamped its own individuality upon them and besides produced more new ideas and institutions in astounding luxuriance. New ideas of the relation of state to religion, relation of governed to those governing, relations of employers and employes, a new architecture, a new art, a new philosophy, new languages with their literatures, new forms of government, the utterly new idea of a university. Other civilizations could glory in one or two of such creations. But Medievalism created anew in every department of life—political, economical, spiritual, artistic, intellectual, and created out of practical chaos in the face of almost superhuman difficulties and in a space of time astoundingly short. Allowing for the later artistic development of the 15th century, it accomplished all this in, roughly speaking, about three centuries, *i. e.*, from about 1000 A. D. to 1300 A. D. Never before had humanity put forth its powers with such tremendous energy or such brilliant and universal results.

Exhaustion, therefore, was inevitable. There must come a time when from sheer weariness it could produce no more. And what is to our point, the time was inevitable when, if it could not assimilate the new, then the new was bound to push it out of its way even as the Aryan Cyrus forever wrested the sceptre of empire from the Semitic race by the banks of the Euphrates or as Odoacer rudely swept aside Rome from her throne of the world.

By the opening of the sixteenth century Medievalism was exhausted. It had been practically exhausted since the day of Boniface VIII and Dante and was living on only with the inertia that seems to keep a civilization going until the final crash. With the exception of its great Catholic faith, which is ever new, though ancient, because of its divine character,

it had nothing new to offer. Its political creations, feudalism and the Holy Roman Empire were becoming as harmless as expiring chivalry so mercilessly laughed to death by the last of the Knights, Cervantes. The last word in its philosophy had been uttered over two centuries ago by Thomas of Aquin. Its religious militarism had fretted itself away in the Crusades. Its economic system of Gilds was going to pieces before the gradual advance of a wider mercantile system. It had said its last word in architecture as in philosophy and sung its last song with the Trouveres and Troubadours and Meistersingers and Minnesingers. In the university it had reached the limit of its mental capacity. Everywhere, except in art, it was at a standstill, and producing nothing new. The very gloriousness of its artistic splendor in the quattrocento seems, after all, only the hectic flush of destroying fever on its cheeks, only the gorgeousness of the setting of its sun. Babylon too was never so wondrous as on the eve of its destruction, nor Rome nor Athens so apparently marvellous as in their later days of decay. Perugino, Da Vinci, Michael Angelo, Raphael and that host of stupendous men of that age unconsciously mark its passing as much as Wycliffe and Savonarola. The very fact of its developing its aesthetic sense last shows that its energy in more substantial and virile directions was gone. It had put forth stupendous energy, and could now do no more than, like an old man, sit back at his ease midst the comforts of his prettily ornamented house.

Such being the case, either Medievalism inspired by some newly acquired force must assimilate the new or the new would push it aside in the rush of historic progress. Unfortunately it did not assimilate enough to guide the new. It did make a pathetic attempt to do so. Its painters enthusiastically embraced Greek art and its Academicians Greek and Latin literary culture. But there it stopped. In fact, in spite of their enthusiasm, these men never were quite Pagan. With all their ever increasing devotion to the physical beauty of Greek art, they could never completely accept its sensuousness as we moderns do so shamelessly. Fra Angelico dreams with his

sweet angels, Perugino ever paints like a sacristan, Botticelli's nude Venus rising from the sea looks ashamed of her nakedness as the hurrying winds speed to clothe it, Michael Angelo broods over the Last Judgment, Da Vinci's weary Christ sits at the Last Supper, even Raphael—most classic of all in sheer beauty of line—is ever the modest Christian. Whilst the Florentine Academicians pathetically struggled to combine Catholic asceticism and dogma and purity with classic daring of thought and love of the flesh, at best it was a feeble attempt to assimilate and guide the new.

No assimilation seems to have been even attempted along other lines. That splendid nerve of the Hildebrandine age seemed all gone. The courage that had assimilated Greek philosophy into Catholic theology seemed scared before the face of the new Humanism. The skill that made order out of feudal chaos was sadly impotent before the state-tyranny of a Henry Tudor. The old-time capacity to foresee and to start great movements like the Crusades gave way more and more to a policy of hesitating timidity, of negative opposition, instead of positive creation or leadership. Unlike his predecessor of the thirteenth century, who spurred on Dominic and De Montfort to wipe off the face of the earth the Albigensian heresy and Provençal culture on the field of Muret before it could become formidable, Leo X is blind to the seriousness of Luther's defection and Catholicity is allowed to perish by sheer default in more than one locality; perish by sheer political inanity, by a sort of hopeless incapacity that must have been delicious amusement for such a superbly wise woman as Elizabeth.

And so it went all along the line. And unless we grasp this fact of the "senility" of Medievalism, along, of course, with the other causes just mentioned, we will never comprehend how it was that just when it seemed most gorgeous, just when Raphael was working on his Transfiguration, just when the Roman Court was the Athens of all known culture; when the dismal prophecies of that poor, misguided hero, Savonarola, were become memories; when the anxieties of the Avignon period and the stormy excesses of the Borgias had become only

more horrid memories; when a Catholic empire, that of Charles V, stretched from the Baltic to the Pillars of Hercules and across leagues of water to a new continent; when Wycliffe and John Huss were dust in their tombs! when, in a word, the serenity of Raphael's Transfiguration was typical of the cerulean peace overhanging the world—unless, I say, we once realize that Medievalism was senile and going the way of all other civilizations by force of the eternal law of birth and decay, we will never comprehend how it was that across that blue sky shot so suddenly the bolt of Protestantism, that at the shove of a mere Augustinian friar (not a fraction equal in genius or intellect to Arius or Nestorius or Pelagius) the system tumbled down like so many old unsteady castles into the waters of the Rhine and the Elbe and the Thames and the Firth of Forth. To attempt to explain it otherwise as just another heresy is futile. It was not a heresy, not a Reformation, not even primarily a religious movement—it was a revolution, a complete change in the mental attitude of civilized mankind.

AFTERMATH.

One or two reflections demand attention before this subject is finally dismissed. They bear upon the resulting trend of human affairs subsequent to the passing of Medievalism.

And, now, looking back over all that terrible time, it would seem that neither have Catholics reason to despair nor Protestants reason to boast in triumph over the dying of that civilization. It is true that the Church lost heavily, yet suffers from the blow, will suffer for a long time to come. But the Church is not hopelessly bound with any age, race or human system. Catholicity is not Medievalism, rather was Medievalism only an historic phase in her existence. It can die and she live on just the same. She is not wedded to the human past. Though ancient, she is ever in the present with an eye for the future. Still less is she inextricably bound up with the genius of any one race. Though Roman as to her seat of government, though Latin genius directed her counsels in the

Middle Ages, she is by nature Catholic and essentially as much Teuton or Scandinavian or Chinese as she is Latin. Nor is she wedded to any human political system, be it Roman Imperialism or Medieval Feudalism or American Democracy or English Royalty. Her intrinsic principles are those of Christ. And, therefore, it is idle, it shows a lack of understanding of her nature, a poor estimate of her recuperative power and general intelligence, if her children sit down amidst the ruins of Medievalism and bewail its passing as an irretrievable disaster to her. It is at bottom a form of "protestantism" to forever protest against present-day evils, to ever be a negative complainer, instead of girding one's loins and emulating the "positiveness" of medieval Catholics. It is Catholic to face the world boldly, like Benedict and Francis and Dominic and Hildebrand did in much more perilous times. After all, it is only faith to believe that the Church is just as capable of winning the world now as she did in those awful days when Rome fell crashing to the earth. It is a lack of faith to sit idly by bewailing the "good old days that are no more."

And Protestants—on calm reflection, have they such cause for triumph? After all, theirs is being daily seen more and more as a Pyrrhic victory, a disastrous success. In de-Catholicizing half the world, they have de-Christianized it. The names of Luther and Calvin and Wesley are yet powerful names; but only names. The religious principles those gigantic men fought for so fiercely are now matters of past history. The non-Catholic half of the world has no faith at bottom, at least none that its votaries would die for and few do live for. The pall of religious indifference lies sombre and still over the faith of Augsburg and Spiers and Geneva and Westminster. And what is worst of all, the old joyousness of religion, the old logical mental habits of minds in studying the relations of religion to life in all aspects, the intimate and beneficent connection of religion with every act of daily life, the old serenity of a universal faith brooding over the world, fine and peaceful and vast as the ancient "Pax Romana," all of which was the happy possession of medieval peoples—all that has gone. And

what have they in its place? Ah, me! the weariness and the dreariness of it all!

Luther's bronze statue boldly fronting Thomas Circle in Washington is an anomaly. Many a time passing it I say to myself—"Too bad we lost such a force." I have utter contempt for his moral character. Father Denifle has forever de-canonized Luther. But, oh! what a strength is there, what a rugged savageness, what an untutored directness, what a boisterous "sense of self," loud and brawling (if you wish) and "beery"—so essentially different from the "wine" exalted visions of a cultured Pico della Mirandola. Say what you will, there is power, tremendous, crashing, crunching like a glacier, except that it moves swiftly, and the sculptor did well when he worked in bronze—not casting on a small scale as he of the doors to the Florentine Baptistry—but in the rough and the big. Yes; Catholic as I am—that is all there.

But how many present-day Protestants see that! A Catholic can grasp it. Why? Simply because with all the heroism and legends and logic of the Middle Ages chasing one another through his head, he can grasp the bigness of this man of bronze.

But to the Modern Protestant—What does that statue mean? Nothing but some sort of historical and more or less sentimental "protest" against Rome; without reason, without logic, without history,—just a blind insensate "protest" against something not drank in with his mother's milk. He cannot even comprehend the bigness of that weak man whose name he utters in traditional reverence. Why? Because he himself, a Protestant, has become religiously anaemic, philosophically a "squarer of the circle," historically a contradiction of all historical continuity, practically a Hedonist wearing a Christian garment. Yes! Protestantism cannot admire even the very rugged grandeur of its own founders, simply because it cannot understand the grandeur of a "conviction." And having lost this, it is starving, hungering for that spiritual food which Catholicity so liberally feeds to its children.

Hence it is not strange to see it turning back to Medievalism

in a timid, half-shamefaced fashion, like the Prodigal returning home from the husks. For what else mean all this otherwise inexplicable revival of interest in Medieval culture? Botticelli's wan Madonnas and Fra Angelico's joyous Angels once more look down into the faces of Luther's children in their parlors and bedrooms. Old wood-carved stalls, once filled by chanting monks, now serve as chairs for the very people whose ancestors drove out the monks. Joan of Arc finds her devotees among the kin of Shakespeare who maligned her. The tremendous idealism of Francis of Assisi is like sweet waters to these men and women dying of thirst in the Sahara of spiritual dryness. And so all along the line. The spiritual children of Luther and Calvin and Cranmer and John Knox are ever seen wandering almost pathetically among the ruins and records of Medievalism for the spiritual life denied them by their chilly Protestantism. Old castles, cathedrals, carvings in ivory and wax or wood or bronze, vestments, time-worn missals, armor, objects of piety, bed-room furniture, anything touched and beautified and blessed by that wondrously live and joyous and brave spirit of Medievalism is hunted after with feverish eagerness by even the most money-mad American financier. It is because Protestantism is weary and hungry for all that beauty and life which it killed long ago.

And so, in conclusion, it is not exaggerated to say that the Passing of Medievalism in the long run is a greater loss to Protestantism than to Catholicity. Because, after all, Catholicity can get along without it, or rather Catholicity has it always. The same joyousness and bravery that carved monks' stalls and put sweet songs on the lips of Francis and Catherine of Siena, today, though in different ways, repeats all that in the sweetness of the First Communion of the little children and in the lives of a Philip Neri and a Curé of Ars. Under different forms there is and always will be the same abundance and variety of spiritual life.

But, strange as it may sound, Protestantism cannot get along without Medievalism, simply because it cannot do without Catholicity. No mere negation or "protest" can live by itself.

It is a parasite of its very nature. Protestantism cannot, I repeat, live happily without that very spirit of Medievalism it once boasted of destroying. Because that Medievalism, with all its barbarity in some ways, essentially represented an all-around healthy view of life, a catholicity of mind which saw good in all things and thereby rejoiced in all things, which put each thing in its proper relation to all others and hence was at peace, which solved the vexatious problem of the relation between soul and the body, between the Church and the State, between God and Cæsar. It was the only logical view of life, and it is a view which even now any Catholic can have as clearly as did Francis or Godfrey. But it is a view utterly of its very essence impossible to the spirit of division represented by Protestantism. It is not Catholicity, but Protestantism, which lost most in the Passing of Medievalism.

LUCIAN JOHNSTON.

MR. LANG'S REPLY.

In his article, *Dr. Bolling and Homeric Armour*, *Catholic University Bulletin*, xvii, pp. 629-636, Mr. Lang has touched lightly upon many sides of the Homeric question. His paper was occasioned by my article, *Homeric Armor and Mr. Lang*, but the full reply to this, although written, he has preferred to suppress and to content himself with an outline of his criticism, and the treatment of other topics. His criticism of my paper—and it is only with this that I shall deal—is that I misapprehended the purpose of his book; that I advocated a position taken in 1901—but merely as a modification of a still earlier view—which has been rendered untenable by more recent discoveries; that the study of certain works will show the error of my objections to the theories advocated in his *Homer and his Age*; and that I absurdly accused him of attempting an impossibility. To each of these points I shall reply as briefly as is compatible with the fact that the discussion is carried on before a body of non-expert readers; to experts I should simply have said, “form your own opinions.” What I have to say I should have preferred to print immediately after Mr. Lang’s article, but this was unfortunately impossible on account of my absence in Europe. The fact that the November *Bulletin* is devoted to the Rector’s annual report has rendered necessary a further delay. For the convenience of the reader I shall therefore reprint the few passages on which I intend to comment.

“*Dr. Bolling, when he wrote, entertained the misapprehension (pp. 670-671) that, in my book, Homer and his Age (1906) I made ‘an effort to appeal the Homeric Question from expert to popular judgment,’ and that I addressed ‘the general English-speaking public.’ In the name of the Ashmolean, what has popular judgment or the English-speaking public to do with the Homeric Question? I wrote for a few men of*

education who take a special interest in that great problem. . ."

Of course no one can possibly know as well as Mr. Lang what audience he was addressing. Unfortunately for us he has chosen to tell us in a phrase which I do not find unambiguous "a few men of education who take a special interest in that great problem." When I first read the phrase I understood it to mean a few Homeric scholars, a few men whose study of the question give them the right to an expert opinion on the subject. This is what the phrase must mean to prove that my regarding his book as an appeal from expert to non-expert judgment was a 'misapprehension.' But as I recalled the book I became more and more convinced that this couldn't be what Mr. Lang meant. To give the grounds for this conviction in detail would lead too far. I should have something to say about the way in which writers of books familiar to scholars are introduced to Mr. Lang's audience; I should have to discuss the different use made of authorities in scientific and in popularizing books.¹ Instead I shall quote three passages from *Homer and his Age*. The first is in the preface, p. viii: "But the number and perseverance of the separatists make on 'the general reader' the impression that Homeric unity is *chose jugée*, that *scientia locuta est*, and has condemned Homer. This is far from being the case; the question is still open; 'science' herself is subject to criticism; and new materials accruing yearly, forbid a tame acquiescence in hasty theories.

May I say a word to the lovers of poetry, who, in reading Homer, feel no more doubt than in reading Milton that, on the whole they are studying a work of one age, by one author? Do not let them be driven from their natural impression by the statement that Science has decided against them." On p. 25 f. Mr. Lang explains why his criticism is directed in the first instance against Mr. Leaf, and (wrongly or rightly) I apprehend that he intends to reach the audience described as

¹In passing I may remark that "Foreign critic for foreign critic" (*Reply*, p. 630) would be a beautiful example, not without parallel in *Homer and his Age*.

Mr. Leaf's; "His most erudite work is based on a wide knowledge of German Homeric speculation, of the exact science of Grammar, of archaeological discoveries, and of manuscripts. His volumes are, I doubt not, as they certainly deserve to be, on the shelves of every Homeric student, old or young, and doubtless their contents reach the higher forms in schools, though there is reason to suppose that, about the unity of Homer, schoolboys remain conservative."²

It may however occur to some one that Mr. Lang is not speaking directly to these "general readers" who are in danger of being "driven from their natural impression" by the mere statement that the verdict of science is against them and that he is trying to reach "the higher forms in schools" only indirectly by inciting a "few men of education and special interest" in the Homeric Question to appeal to a wider audience. The supposition may not be excluded by the letter of these passages, but I know of nothing in the rest of the book that would support it nor can I conceive of any more effective appeal to "general readers" than Mr. Lang's own book. However the question is settled by turning to page 249: "Any scholar who looks at these pages"—a strange phrase in a book written for scholars—"knows all about the proofs of grammar of a late date in the *Odyssey* and the four contaminated books of the *Iliad*. But it may be well to give a few specimens, for the enlightenment of less learned readers of Homer." The specimens which follow should be intelligible to any freshman who has offered Greek for matriculation.

These passages show pretty clearly what elements are present in Mr. Lang's audience, and how we must interpret his reply. He means as I understand him, that his book is not an appeal to popular judgment because it does not appeal to the judgment

²I am haunted by the feeling that the close of this sentence is an allusion to a passage in the *Classical Review* about the staunch Unitarianism of sixth-form schoolboys, and the value of their impressions for Homeric criticism. I am unable however to lay my hand immediately upon the passage; and my argument can spare the aid to be gained from it.

of all the people. He appeals, it is true, to "general readers" guided by "natural impressions," and endangered by rumors about what science has determined; but not to *all* general readers, only to such as can read Homer, and care to do so, and those who possess this "education and interest" are after all "few." This view of his book coincides with my original opinion of it. Whether my opinion was badly expressed or whether Mr. Lang was careless in his "apprehension" of it, anyone may decide for himself by referring to pages 670-671 of my article. But I should like to ask: What—in the name of the Smithsonian—has the opinion even of this élite body of (non-expert) "general readers" got to do with the decision of the Homeric Question?

"He professes (p. 673) that he 'has nothing new to say upon the subject' and 'stands essentially on the position of Robert.' Now Robert's book is of 1901 and I write in 1911. Robert modified the views of Reichel, and we now know a multitude of archaeological facts which were unknown to Reichel and Robert in 1901. Some of them I knew in 1906, more when I wrote the World of Homer (1910), and now I know more than I did in that year."

I understand Mr. Lang to mean a multitude of facts relating to Greek archaeology. Of these only the ones that bear on the question of armor concern us, and we may fairly presume that Mr. Lang published what he knew. In *Homer and his Age* (1906) he devoted pp. 108-175 and ten illustrations to the question of Homeric armor. Among the illustrations we would naturally look for the new facts; they are: Fig. 1.—The Vase of Aristonothos (published apparently 1878, cf. Pauly-Wissowa, s. v.); Fig. 2.—Dagger with Lion-Hunters (discovered in 1876); Fig. 3.—A Dipylon Vase (not from *Jour. Hell. Stud.*, xiii, 21-24, 1892, as one would naturally understand from the reference; but from *Ath. Mittheil.*, xvii, (1892), p. 215); Fig. 5.—Rings: Swords and Shields (discovered in 1876); Fig. 6.—Fragments of Warrior Vase (discovered in 1876); Fig. 7.—Fragment of Siege Vase (discovered in 1876); Fig. 9.—Gold Corslet (discovered in 1876). There is (p. 121)

an allusion to the Aeginetan treasure now in the British Museum, and published by Evans, *Jour. Hell. Stud.* xiii, 1892. The other facts on which Mr. Lang's reasoning is based are derived from: Schuchhardt (-Sellers) 1891; *Class. Rev.*, ix, 1895; Helbig, *Sur la question Mycénéenne*, 1896; Tsountas and Manatt, 1897; Maspero, *Hist. anc. II*, 1897; *Jour. Hell. Studies*, xx, 1899, and previous volumes; *Jour. Anthr. Institute*, xxx, 1900; Murray, *Excavations in Cyprus*, 1900; Ridgeway, *Early Age of Greece*, 1901; and Reichel's and Robert's works. The only citations of works later than 1901 which I can find are: p. 115 n. a paraphrase from the *Odyssey*, made in Browne's *Handbook of Homeric Study*, 1905, is reproved as inaccurate; p. 123, Walters' *History of Ancient Pottery*, 1905, is cited for the Dodwell *pyxis* (discovered about 1800); p. 155, the same for the *amphora* of Euthymides (catalogued by Jahn 1854). Mr. Lang's reasoning in this part of *Homer and his Age* (1906) may have been right or wrong, but it was not based on a single fact of Greek Archaeology³ not known in 1901.

This was the book which I criticized and I might stop here; but nevertheless let us look for the "more when I wrote the *World of Homer* (1910)." We are concerned with pages 60-80 and the accompanying illustrations. Figs. 1, 5, 6, 7, are familiar vase-paintings, all occurring in Engelmann and Anderson's *Pictorial Atlas*, 1895; I shall not take the time to run them down in detail. Fig. 2.—Dagger with Lion-Hunters (see above); Fig. 3.—Tirynthian Vase (published 1885). New material is the Frontispiece, a *pithos* from Sparta, published in *Ann. Brit. School at Athens*, xii, 1905-6, cited here to illustrate a type of armor which is *not* Homeric. Fig. 4.—Cretan Seal-Impressions: Minoan Armour, at last brings us "the multitude of facts which were unknown to Reichel and Robert in 1901."

³ Mr. Lang might have claimed with correctness that he had introduced new ethnological evidence—armor of American Indians, and Normans, cf. Frontispiece, and Figs. 4 and 8. Had he done so, it would have been easy to show its worthlessness. Omission of reference to it in my article was intentional.

It is interpreted by Mr. Lang as representing "a man in a cuirass of plate, a thick belt of plate, and a mailed kirtle" p. 71 n. At Haghia Triada in Crete 161 such seal impressions were found, and published by Halbherr, *Mon. Ant.*, XIII, (1903); and in the same volume was published by Savignoni a steatite vase showing a corslet (?) of similar design. The "multitude" is therefore two closely related facts, the seal and the vase. Does this revolutionize the subject? I think not. That a corslet is represented at all is extremely uncertain, for the vase Mr. Lang professes (p. 73) that he is unable to decide between a corslet and a cope. It is hard to see why he should be so positive about the seal which fails to show the man's arms at all. Even granting that it is a corslet, the material is indeterminable as Savignoni says. I should prefer—if I could convince myself that the thing is a corslet—to take his second alternative "*una specie di cuoio o di stoffa esternamente tutta coperta di anelli o di scaglie metalliche*," in which case it would be a confirmation of Robert's recognition, p. 37 ff., of a Mycenaean corslet⁴. For the sake of completeness I may add that of works later than 1901, Mr. Lang now cites Miss Stawell and Mr. Murray but never as witnesses to new facts, and repeats the second of his citations of Walters' book.

As Mr. Lang has not printed his full reply I cannot ascertain fully what facts he has learned in the last year, but cf. below.

"Robert modified the views of Reichel."

Reichel held that Mycenaean armor was practically universal in the *Iliad*; Robert limited it to something like one-fourth of the poem. This is a modification. I used to think that Mr. Lang had selected Reichel as his objective merely because Mr. Leaf had disseminated Reichel's views among such "general readers" as come into consideration, and even in "the higher forms of schools." Now I am convinced that Mr. Lang has never grasped the important difference between Reichel's and

⁴Savignoni polemicizes against Robert, but in my opinion, unsuccessfully.

Robert's position. Whatever refutes Reichel is in Mr. Lang's eyes destructive of Robert also, and this is one of the fundamental defects of his treatment of the question. For example Mr. Evans argued in 1900, *Jour. Anthr. Inst.*, xxx, p. 213 f., from certain Cyprian discoveries that round shields and metal corslets must be expected in the earliest parts of the Epic. This was intended to tell against the view put forward in Reichel's first edition that such weapons were extremely late intruders in all parts of the *Iliad*. Obviously it has not the same force against Robert's 'modified' view, that such weapons are found in about three-fourths of the *Iliad*. Later discoveries—cf. Hogarth, *Ionia and the East*, p. 54—have since shown that Mr. Evans dated the finds several centuries too early. Yet Mr. Lang continues to appeal to this article as if it refuted Robert's view. So also he derives satisfaction from the fact "that Drerup prefers my treatment of Homeric Armour to that of Reichel." In some respects I myself could say, cf. p. 700 of my former article, as much for Mr. Lang.

"I leave Dr. Bolling to study the works of which I offer a list."

To ascertain that Mr. Lang was right I presumed, but this has so far proved a misapprehension. For *Journal of Anthropological Institute* (not *Society*), xxx, and *Monumenti Antichi*, xiii, pp. 42, 114 (not both by Halbherr) enough has been said; Evans, *Scripta Minoa*, i, p. 42 represents "what, from some of the better drawn examples, which show the plate and shoulder pieces more clearly, may with great probability be regarded as a cuirass." This is too uncertain to build upon; p. 75 and note adds nothing. Miss Stawell, *Homer and the Iliad* (1909) and Lippold, *Griechische Schilde* (1909), had not reached me at the time (July 1910) of the writing of my article. That they do not hold the same views which I do is true; but this is not the place for a discussion of such serious and careful studies. The cardinal point at issue between Mr. Lang and myself was whether there was one or more types of shield in Homer; both these authors like Robert, whom

I was following, take the latter side of that question. Lippold calls the recognition of the round shield in the *Iliad*, the chief merit of Robert's work, p. 462; this is the one point which Mr. Lang is most reluctant to concede. Again Lippold would see in Homer not Mycenaean but Dipylon shields; while Mr. Lang pronounced Dipylon shields manifestly post-Homeric (*Homer and his Age*, p. 142), and thought—disregarding fluctuations—that Mycenaean shields plated with bronze were the real Homeric armament. Ostern, *Die Bewaffnung in Homers Ilias* is unfortunately still inaccessible to me; his views are to be expected to resemble those of Lippold, cf. Lippold, p. 402.

"Dr. Bolling's statement (p. 696) that, in my part of the translation of the *Iliad* (Lang, Leaf, and Myers), I 'strove to conceal a flaw' in my present theory, by 'beginning a new paragraph' at a certain point, involves an impossibility. When the translation was written, thirty years ago, neither I, nor Mr. Leaf, nor Mr. Myers dreamed that the question of Homeric armour would arise; and certainly I had no ideas on the subject. In fact the passages on armour, in the translation, have not been corrected in the light of any theories which we, the translators, have since entertained."

The passage cited contains no reference whatsoever to "a flaw in Mr. Lang's present theory." The "flaw" discussed is in the text of Homer, and is caused by the intrusion of a single line which provides Patroklos with a corslet. When I find now that this line does not harmonize with the previous description of what happened to Patroklos' helmet and spear and shield when Apollo struck him; I am liable to be told that I am "making (unnecessary) difficulties," and following "my German authorities" who "permit their prepossessions to divert them from the true interpretation of the facts." It is therefore of some use to show that Mr. Lang when "he had no ideas upon the subject" and consequently no "prepossessions" also felt the incongruity, and sought to minimize it (the best thing possible thirty years ago) by separating the

incongruous elements so as to bring them in different paragraphs. That Mr. Lang, like the rest of the world thirty years ago, "had no ideas on the subject" was precisely the reason why he was cited. For further, though unnecessary, proof that I was perfectly aware that the translation dates from a time when neither Mr. Lang "nor Mr. Leaf, nor Mr. Myers," nor anybody else "dreamed that the question of Homeric armour would arise," I may refer Mr. Lang to p. 673 f. and p. 687 of the article to which he was replying.

GEORGE MELVILLE BOLLING.

CARDINAL GIBBONS MEMORIAL HALL.

At the close of the meeting of the Board of Trustees on Thursday, October 12, the cornerstone of the Cardinal Gibbons Memorial Hall was laid by His Eminence, the Chancellor of the University, in the presence of a large gathering of bishops, priests and people representing nearly every diocese and every State of the Union. This ceremony formed the central feature in the academic celebration of the Cardinal's jubilee, and, in a certain sense, the national celebration also, since the people in all parts of the country have contributed towards the building and, while aiding the development of the University, have paid to the Cardinal the most acceptable tribute that could have been offered. It is extremely gratifying to him that the permanent memorial of his priestly and cardinalial jubilee should take the form of a Hall on the grounds of the University and especially that it should be devoted to the service of our Catholic people as a residence for lay students.

On the other hand, this occasion is significant as showing that our people, as time goes on, have more accurate ideas of what is at once appropriate and practical in connection with such celebrations. They have come to realize the value of education for its own sake and its necessity for the cause of religion; and they understand that the most fitting tribute to personal worth is the furtherance of those large beneficent designs for which the recipient of their tribute has lived and labored. It was the Middle Ages, the Ages of Faith, that gave Oxford and Cambridge those halls and colleges which have grown more beautiful during the centuries and which in their outward forms are still the most graceful expression of the academic spirit. They bear the names or perpetuate the memory of men who were equally devoted to the Church and to learning. Most of them were ecclesiastics, some were bishops, all were men of sound practical sense. They were concerned

for the interests of religion not merely in one parish or in one diocese but in all England, or rather in the whole world, since the universities of that day were in the highest degree cosmopolitan. Thus all the nations of Europe were the beneficiaries of the great English founders—of Merton and Balliol, of Wykeham and Balsham and Gonville; and the names of these men will live long after the last trace of the structures which they built has disappeared.

What is more important, there is still strong in the Catholic Church that love of intellectual and spiritual things which created the universities of old. It was manifested at the inception of the Catholic University and it has proven its efficacy at each new phase of the University's growth. It has never been more timely or more energetic than in projecting and constructing the Gibbons Memorial.

It is less than a year since the erection of this Hall was decided upon, and barely six months since the work began. That it has advanced so rapidly is due chiefly to the activity of the Association which had charge of the undertaking and which included in its membership prominent representatives of the clergy and laity, with the following officers:

President and Treasurer, Rt. Rev. Owen B. Corrigan, D. D., Auxiliary Bishop of Baltimore; *Corresponding Secretary*, Very Rev. George A. Dougherty, D. D., Vice-Rector of the University.

Executive Committee: Baltimore—Samuel S. Bennett, Charles J. Bonaparte, Rev. Fred. Bott, C. SS. R., Joseph W. Brooks, Rev. M. F. Foley, Frank Furst, Michael Jenkins, Jerome M. Joyce, Philip C. Mueller, Jev. James A. Nolan, Thomas O'Neill, T. Herbert Shriver, William C. Sullivan, Rev. John T. Whelan, James R. Wheeler, George Yakel. Washington—D. J. Callahan, Aidan Dillon, O. H. P. Johnson, Patrick J. Halligan, George E. Hamilton, Rev. J. D. Marr, Rev. J. R. Matthews, Rt. Rev. James T. Mackin, P. J. Nee, Joseph E. Ralph, Rt. Rev. Dr. William T. Russell, B. F. Saul, Nicholas H. Shea, P. C. Sullivan, J. Selwin Tait.

The plans were prepared by Messrs. Thomas H. Poole and Co., of New York City, and the contract was awarded to the

Boyle Robertson Construction Company of Washington. The building is located on Michigan Avenue a short distance west of Albert Hall. It is in the Tudor Gothic style, three stories high with a total length of 267 feet and a depth of 40 feet. A central tower 36 feet square rises to a height of 70 feet. The material is Port Deposit granite with Indiana limestone for trim. In its interior finish, arrangement and furnishings, the Hall provides fully for the safety and comfort of its occupants. When completed it will accomodate 130 students. At present the portion west of the tower is finished and is occupied. The tower is also in course of construction and it is hoped that the entire building may be completed within a year.

The cornerstone was laid on the northwest angle of the tower, which at the time had been built up to the water table and upon which a temporary platform was laid for the accommodation of the speakers, the prelates and the invited guests.

The procession moved from McMahon Hall at 4 p. m., crossed the campus and preceded the Cardinal to the platform. During the ceremony, appropriate anthems were sung by the university choir with accompaniment by the U. S. Marine Band. When the stone had been placed in position, the Most Rev. John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York, addressed the Cardinal on behalf of the Board of Trustees.

ARCHBISHOP FARLEY'S ADDRESS.

As Vice-President of the Board of Trustees, I am privileged to stand here before this distinguished assembly and speak on this historic occasion—the double jubilee of him whom we are proud to regard as the *decus, honor et gloria* of the Church in America.

The massive and majestic monument, of which we have just laid the cornerstone, is to be known while its walls shall stand as the fitting but all-inadequate testimonial of our gratitude to James Cardinal Gibbons, ninth Metropolitan of the venerable See of Baltimore, the mother see of the Church in the United States, America's second cardinal and the first chancellor of the

Catholic University of America, the most beloved man of the American Church today.

This cornerstone is one of the milestones in the path of our University on its way to what we may now confidently regard as a glorious future; and on such occasions as this it is usual and useful to look back for a moment on our history.

Although only twenty years have elapsed since its birth, our University was conceived in the minds of the fathers of the Second Council of Baltimore (1866) nearly half a century ago. They desired earnestly to have in this country, under Catholic auspices, a university in which all branches of literature and science, both sacred and profane, should be taught. But the time was not yet ripe for the realization of this hope. This came when the young and energetic archbishop of this venerable diocese was appointed by the great Leo XIII as his legate to preside over the most important council ever held in this country, the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore in 1884.

The priestly experience of Cardinal Gibbons seems to have been, in all its phases a preparation for the great work of founding and fostering the Catholic University of America. Like the present Holy Father he has filled every position in the ranks of the clergy. Beginning as a young curate he became pastor and then secretary to the great Martin John Spalding, one of his illustrious predecessors, who found in him the Leonidas well fitted to man the Thermopylae of the mountains of North Carolina where hostility to the Church was strong and where opposition grew out of ignorance because there was none to break the bread of life to the people. There, as bishop, Monsignor Gibbons passed the most laborious years of his early missionary life—"in journeying often, in perils of waters, in perils in the city, in perils in the wilderness, in perils in the sea, in labor and painfulness, in much watchings," to the end that he might become all to all and win all to Christ. There he gathered from contact with many outside the Church, from meditation and study, materials for the work which has made him known through all the land and beyond its borders, the "Faith of our Fathers," which has led so many in the way of peace and which will go down the ages enlightening souls when these memorial walls shall have crumbled into dust.

The prudence, learning and zeal evinced by Archbishop Gibbons during the Council, and his tactful guidance of the deliberations

of the entire American episcopate in dealing with the most momentous questions, told that the hour and the man had come for the inauguration of the great work of a Catholic university. Then and there it was decided to establish a "*seminarium principale*" as the nucleus out of which a complete Catholic university should later develop.

In 1885 the Sovereign Pontiff expressed his great pleasure at learning of this decision and gave his formal approval in a letter to Archbishop Gibbons in 1887; two years later the Pope approved the constitution of the University and granted it full power to confer degrees. In this letter the Holy Father defined the scope of the Catholic University, viz., "to provide instruction in every department of learning to the end that the clergy and the laity alike might have ample opportunity to satisfy fully their laudable desire for knowledge."

It was thus that this great central seat of learning sprang up under the control of the bishops of the United States, immediately governed by a board of trustees composed of bishops, priests and laymen who represent the American Catholic Church in the ownership and direction of the Catholic University. While the responsibility in general for the working of the institution rests on the Board of Trustees, the central pivot in which every movement of the great and growing mechanism of the institution turned was the Chairman of the Board, the Chancellor of the University. In times of stress all learned to turn to him; to him everyone looked for inspiration in each new departure in the career of the institution, and in every change and circumstance he was found equal to the demand.

But while Cardinal Gibbons thus rendered invaluable service from the beginning in every juncture, never in its history was his indomitable courage, the quality most needed in every vast undertaking, so notably shown as in the dark days of its greatest trial. For trials it has had in common with all great things begun for God and the good of religion. For then even those who loved the University with the love of a strong man's soul lost heart and hope, felt in all sincerity that the work had been premature and that this trial was the extremest test under which it must go down, to await other times and other men in generations to come. And these did not even hesitate to advise that the enterprise be abandoned. Then it was that he whom we delight to honor by these walls proved the bulwark of the people. "Never,"

he said, "while I have the power to wield a pen in appeal or lift a voice in pleading, shall this work of religion stop. God wills it; the work must go on."

And he triumphed, aye, almost alone. Yes, in that crucial time he might be said to have tread the winepress alone. And today is laid upon his venerable brow the crown which is the fruit of this courage of the Cross.

If today the Catholic University stands forth before the world a thing of beauty and of fairest promise, fairer and more prosperous than at any time in its history, no longer a source of painful anxiety, not only for its future but for its very existence, it is, under God, wholly due to the indomitable labor of his Eminence Cardinal Gibbons.

It is said, "Put not your trust in princes." In this our prince of the Church we have trusted, and we have not been confounded. His principedom is not of this world. He worked and prayed and hoped in the Lord and has not been disappointed.

These things, too, he has done for the University not only while he was laboring in his own diocese, but while his influence was being cast in favor of every good and patriotic cause throughout the length and breadth of the land. And with it all he seems to renew his youth, like the eagle. The winter of discontent seems never to have dawned for him, but rather does he seem to enjoy a perpetual Indian summer. Long be it so.

Your Eminence, you may see the years of Leo, your great friend whose noble purpose in founding this University you have so zealously and so successfully striven to realize, and may the abiding hope of the Apostle of the Gentiles be yours, that through all the vicissitudes of effort and success, of solicitude and of joy, you may say with him: "As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day."

The Archbishop was followed by Rev. Dr. Charles F. Aiken of the Faculty of the Sacred Sciences, who spoke as follows:

DR. AIKEN'S ADDRESS.

Your Eminence:

It is with mingled feelings of pride and gratitude that we greet you here today. We, members of the Catholic University

of America, esteem it an honor to add our tribute of hearty congratulation to the many expressions of good-will that your jubilee has called forth. To have lived a faithful priest of God for half a century, bearing as time went on the accumulating honors and responsibilities of bishop, archbishop and cardinal, and giving ample proof that each successive dignity had been deservedly bestowed, all this, surely, is a sign of greatness and a cause of just pride to every Catholic heart. What a beautiful and inspiring example is not a life like yours, consecrated to the spiritual uplift of your fellow-men and rich in good deeds! You "have taught many and have strengthened weary hands," and glorious is the promised reward, for "they that instruct many unto justice shall shine as stars for all eternity." In your long life of unbroken devotion to the priestly ideal set forth by Christ, one may learn many a useful lesson,—that there is nothing nobler than a life of generous activity in the service of God and one's fellow-men; that true devotion to the Church does but foster loyalty to a State like ours; that dignity of office need not exclude simplicity of manner; that the authority of the priesthood shows grandest when exercised with kindness and fatherly affection; that the influence of the church leader on his generation is enlarged beyond measure by a sympathetic interest in the great social problems that are pressing for solution.

In length of service you stand today the dean of the bishops and archbishops of this country. Yet, despite your long span of life, we would not call you old. There is a pathos in a busy, useful life that runs out into a sterile old age, indifferent to the urgent calls of the present, ever gazing with vacant stare into the dim past. Beautiful, on the other hand, is an age like yours, advanced in years, but still active and fruitful, giving to your youthful contemporaries a high example of untiring industry and of keen interest in the rising questions of the day. Old age like this is something precious. It is one of the brightest ornaments that can grace a man. It is the nearest approach to perpetual youth.

While we congratulate you on having attained so happily the jubilee of your priesthood and the twenty-fifth anniversary of your elevation to the office of cardinal, we are glad, as members of the University, to take this occasion to express to you our feeling of profound gratitude. The laying of the cornerstone

of this handsome building does but call attention to an act of beneficence on your part as gracious as it is far reaching in its benign influence. Through a singular love of the University, over which you have exercised the office of Chancellor from the beginning, and for which you have made many a generous sacrifice in the past, you have ordained that the visible token of esteem, with which a host of admirers throughout the land wish to mark your jubilee, should take the form of a hall of study, with the view to promote the efficiency of this noble seat of learning. We deeply appreciate this generous act of faith in the Catholic University of America. The Gibbons Memorial Hall, in the shadow of whose ornate walls we are gathered to-day, will tell to coming generations of the large-heartedness of the prelate whose name it bears, who, unmindful of self, turned a gift from the people into a perennial source of usefulness in the cause of higher Christian education, verifying the words of the great Master he served so well, "it is more blessed to give than to receive."

The third speaker was Dr. Daniel W. Shea, Dean of the Faculty of Sciences.

DR. SHEA'S ADDRESS.

Your Eminence:

Permit me, in the name of the lay faculties of the University, to give in a few words, expression to thoughts which the beautiful and noble significance of today's celebration awakens.

In the development of mankind, it has been permitted to but few men that their names should mark both the founding and the splendid growth of a great undertaking. Your Eminence belongs to those few. And more fortunate than most of them, Your Eminence still lives, in the fulness of strength, to see the fruits of your work before you in this large body of professors and students, in these many costly buildings, large libraries of rare volumes and spacious laboratories full of modern appliances. Well may your Eminence be elated that today there is united with the deeply felt recognition of educators in all parts of this country the thankfulness of hundreds of your men who have passed out from these portals with your approval upon them.

As was most fitting, Your Eminence and those associated with

you began the University with the founding of a School of Sacred Theology, for the education of priests is the highest education, since the ideal of the Christian priest is the most exalted, his vocation the most sublime, his office the most holy, his duties the most spiritual and his mission the most important and most sacred thing which can be assigned to a human being.

But the conquests of the mind in other realms of learning had produced a world-wide ferment of thought, an intellectual activity without a parallel in the world's history; they had increased the power of man to an almost incredible degree, had given him control of earth and seas, had placed within his grasp undreamed of forces, had opened to his view unsuspected mysteries, had placed him on a new earth and under new heavens, and thrown light never seen before upon the history of his race. As a part of this development new questions had arisen, new theories had been broached. For the study of these, for the making of new conquests, education was needed that would enlarge the intellect in new directions, and strengthen its faculties in new ways, so as to enable it to take connected views of new things and their relations, and to see clear amid the mazes of human errors and through the mists of human passion.

In order that the University might have its share in the imparting of this education, in the new conquest in many departments of learning, in the solution of innumerable problems, and in the building up of new theories, Your Eminence devoted great energy to the fuller development of the University in founding the lay faculties, although the heavy duties of your high ecclesiastical office taxed your strength already nearly to the utmost with spiritual and intellectual activities.

With joyful expectation, the lay faculties have looked forward to this day as a particularly fitting time to pay you homage, for none knew better than they how much Your Eminence has sacrificed for them and how lively and how constant has been your interest in them, and how much you have had at heart that they should have a very large share in the education of the youth of America, and in the widening of the yet narrow boundaries of human knowledge. They know with what clearness of spirit you have penetrated into all details and with what nobility of sentiment you have accomplished all the affairs of the University, with what fortitude you have met misfortunes and with how

great wisdom you have overcome them. And in the darkest days of the University, when it seemed that the work of the lay faculties must be ended, we know with what correctness of thought, with what openness of mind, with what flexibility of view, you took up against almost insurmountable opposition, the consideration and the formulation of plans that would forever guarantee the integrity of all the existing lay faculties, and make ready the way for new ones.

The world-wide and respectful recognition which the work of these lay faculties has received, indicates that their activities have not been without large success, and, under the stimulus of your cultivated intellect, your rich imagination, your eloquent expression, these faculties will continue to strive for the attainment of still greater successes in the acquisition of knowledge, in the imparting of knowledge, even though it may not be a means to wealth, or power, or any other common aim of life, to the end that we may have: judicious lawyers of wide mental culture and superior strength of character; men of letters who will produce literature that will elevate and refine the spirit of the whole people; philosophers with clear, calm, accurate comprehension of all things so far as the finite mind can embrace them; scientists who will regard the mind as the organ of truth, and train it for its own sake without reference to the exercise of a profession; engineers who will serve the highest purposes of the nation in the development of its vast natural resources. They will progress with religious zeal, high courage and strong endeavor, and imitating Columbus, who wrote in his journal day after day, those simple, but sublime words, "sailed westward today which is my course," they will write in their faculty records day after day, "progressed knowledgeward today which is our course," and like him give new knowledge to the world, and enlarge the boundaries of the scope of the earthly life.

It is of great interest to note that the inception of the University was almost coincident with the beginning of your priestly life, for it was in the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore that the establishment of the University received its first consideration. It is also of great interest to note that the actual establishment of the University was almost coincident with the beginning of your Cardinalate, so that your life as priest and as cardinal has been closely interwoven with that of the Uni-

versity, in the first part in the consideration of the needs and the possibilities of a university, in the second part, in the actual building of the University. Thus the jubilees which Your Eminence is about to celebrate are, in some measure, also jubilees of the University.

Our warmest thanks and the thanks of mankind are due you for the devotion which you have given in founding these lay faculties deep and firm. The latest evidence of that devotion we have in this splendid new hall for lay students of which the cornerstone has been laid today.

Our warmest wishes go with you into the new half century of your life as priest so rich already in great spiritual and intellectual accomplishments, into the new quarter century of your Cardinalate.

May many years be granted to you of spiritual and bodily freshness and vigor, so that Your Eminence may continue to be our guiding light in our efforts to attain the highest ideals of mankind.

In reply to these words of congratulation, His Eminence expressed his heartfelt thanks, his joy in the progress of the University and his confidence in its future. Continuing he said:

THE CARDINAL'S REPLY.

I cannot but recall today the first occasion on which a ceremony of this sort was performed in these grounds—when the cornerstone of the first building was laid as the rain fell in torrents from a sky which gave no promise of sunshine and the earth itself offered no suggestion of the edifices that now meet our view. What a pleasure by contrast it is to stand here this afternoon, for winter is now past, the rain is over and gone. Well may we exclaim: "Now is the winter of our discontent made glorious summer." The University, indeed, has had its days of wintry gloom, when misfortunes fell upon it fast and thick. Yet Almighty God has been pleased to preserve it through all adversity and even has turned to its advantage the evils which befell and the disasters which threatened it. Under the divine blessing the University now looks with courage and even with enthusiasm to

the coming years to the larger work that awaits it. Its inner life has been strengthened, its departments have multiplied, its faculties have grown in numbers and efficiency. It is even now under the happy necessity of providing a home for the students who, year by year, become more numerous. And I trust that this Hall may be followed in due time by other buildings to meet the demands created by the University's growth.

As the prosperity of the University, since the day of its foundation, has ever been uppermost in my thought and foremost in my endeavor, I rejoice exceedingly in its present good fortune and in its splendid prospect. I am in particular pleased to note that its efforts in behalf of our Catholic people, in behalf of our lay students, are winning appreciation; and I sincerely hope that we may soon be in a position to extend the facilities of the University to a much larger number.

But our first care must be to complete this Hall which already represents so much generosity and good-will on the part of the Catholics of this country. We owe it to them to make this a perfect work, a home in which our students may pursue, in safety and comfort, the courses of study for which their parents have sent them to the University. For their sake as well as for the sake of the University, I earnestly trust that all who hear me now or to whom my words may come, will do whatever they can towards completing this structure and thereby extending to greater numbers of our young men the benefits of Catholic education. In my own name and in the name of the Trustees, I desire again to thank all who have had a share in this noble undertaking and have afforded us so many reasons for pressing forward in our efforts for the cause of God and His Church.

MISCELLANEOUS.

The Summer School.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY.

The first session of the Summer School at the Catholic University was officially opened Sunday, July 2, and was closed Sunday, August 8. On both occasions all the members of the School attended Solemn High Mass, celebrated in the Chapel of Divinity College by the Rt. Rev. Rector, who also delivered an appropriate address. Lectures, laboratory work and other exercises began Monday, July 3, and continued, on five days of each week, until August 5. With the exception of a few courses given in Caldwell Hall, the work was conducted in McMahon Hall. The school day lasted from 8 a. m. to 6 p. m., with a recess of two hours at noon.

A list of instructors and a program of the courses were published in the June number of *The Catholic University Bulletin*. It was later found necessary to supply courses in Greek and these were given by Rev. George W. Hoey, S. S. An additional instructor in Latin was also secured, Rev. Benjamin F. Marcetteau, S. S. The total number of instructors was 24, including 6 lecturers who are not members of the University staff. The officers of the Summer School Faculty were: Rev. Thomas E. Shields, Ph. D., *Dean*; Rev. Edward A. Pace, Ph. D., *Vice-Dean*; Rev. Patrick J. McCormick, Ph. D., *Secretary*; Mr. Charles F. Borden, *Registrar*. In all, 36 courses were given: 32 of 25 lectures each, 3 of five lectures each, and 1 course of ten lectures—a total of 825 lectures. The laboratory exercises included 50 hours each in Physics, Chemistry and Biology. At the close of each course, a written examination was taken by students who desired academic credits counting for degrees. A series of evening lectures (illustrated) was given by Very Rev. A. P. Doyle, Superior of the Apostolic Mission House.

STUDENTS.

In accordance with the preliminary announcements, the School was open only to the teaching Sisterhoods and to women teachers in public or private schools. The total registration was 284; of this number 255 were religious, representing 23 orders or congregations; 29 were lay teachers. According to nationality: the United States had 274 representatives; Canada, 9, England, 1.

CLASSIFICATION OF STUDENTS.

Religious Orders (23)

Benedictines	36	Jesus-Mary	7
Blessed Sacrament.....	3	Loretto	4
Charity	11	Mercy	52
Charity of the B. V. M..	6	Missionary Helpers of	
Charity of the Incarnate		Sacred Heart.....	4
Word	4	Notre Dame, Congrega-	
Divine Providence.....	9	tion of.....	2
Dominicans	27	Providence	8
Gray Nuns of the Cross..	6	St. Francis.....	5
Holy Child.....	2	St. Joseph.....	31
Holy Cross.....	9	St. Mary.....	6
Holy Names.....	8	Ursulines	6
Humility of Mary.....	2	<i>Lay Teachers</i>	29
Immaculate Heart.....	7		

Dioceses (56)

Albany	7	Louisville	1
Alton	3	Manchester	1
Baker City.....	1	Mobile	4
Baltimore	46	Montreal	4
Boston	1	Nashville	2
Brooklyn	8	Newark	17
Buffalo	11	New Orleans.....	4

Chicago	4	New York.....	15
Cincinnati	4	Ogdensburg	2
Cleveland	6	Oklahoma	5
Concordia	4	Oregon City.....	2
Covington	5	Peoria	6
Dallas	3	Philadelphia	14
Davenport	2	Pittsburgh	4
Detroit	5	Providence	1
Dubuque	6	Quebec	3
Duluth	2	Richmond	4
Erie	6	St. Augustine.....	2
Fall River.....	1	St. Louis.....	7
Galveston	1	St. Paul....	2
Harrisburg	8	San Antonio.....	8
Hartford	6	Scranton	4
Indianapolis	8	Toledo	2
Kansas City.....	2	Tucson	1
La Crosse	2	Westminster (Eng.)....	1
Lead	2	Wheeling	3
Leavenworth	2	Wilmington	2
London, Ontario.....	2	Vic. Ap. North Carolina.	5

States (31)

Alabama	4	New Jersey.....	17
Arizona	1	New York.....	43
Connecticut	6	North Carolina.....	5
District of Columbia....	29	Oklahoma	5
Florida	2	Ohio	12
Illinois	13	Oregon	3
Indiana	8	Pennsylvania	36
Iowa	8	Rhode Island.....	1
Kansas	6	South Dakota.....	2
Kentucky	6	Tennessee	2
Louisiana	4	Texas	12
Maryland	17	Virginia	6
Massachusetts	2	West Virginia.....	3

Michigan	5	Wisconsin	2
Minnesota	4		
Missouri	9	Canada	9
New Hampshire.....	1	England	1

The religious were accommodated in Albert Hall, Caldwell Hall, St. Thomas' College and the Apostolic Mission House, on the grounds of the University in Trinity College, Holy Cross Academy, the Benedictine Convent, the Dominican Convent, Sacred Heart Academy, St. Catharine's, the Immaculata Seminary and Georgetown Convent. They were provided with every facility for the performance of their religious duties and of the exercises special to each community. The usual weekly devotions with Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament were held in the chapel of Divinity College.

Efficient assistance was rendered by the Welcome Committee of the National Catholic Woman's Circle who met the Sisters on their arrival and directed them to their respective places of residence. For courtesies extended in the way of transportation, acknowledgment is due the City and Suburban Line of the Washington Railway and Electric Company and the Mt. Vernon and Marshall Hall Steamboat Company.

Pleasant and instructive excursions were conducted for the sisters on the holidays. The Capitol, Library of Congress U. S. Treasury, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, were each visited and their features pointed out by efficient guides. On July 8, all enjoyed a delightful sail to Mount Vernon, where they were cordially received by the superintendent of the grounds who personally showed them over the historic site. The Sisters placed a beautiful wreath on the tomb of George Washington. July 13, President Taft received the entire student body at the White House, and greeted each sister and lay teacher individually. His Excellency, the Apostolic Delegate, Diomedea Falconio, favored the School with his presence on the afternoon of Sunday, July 9. On this occasion the students congregated in the Chapel of Divinity Hall and listened to an inspiring address from the Delegate who afterward im-

parted the Apostolic Benediction. Benediction of the Most Blessed Sacrament followed, at which His Excellency presided. Tuesday, August 1, His Eminence, James Cardinal Gibbons, Chancellor of the University, visited the Summer School, and was tendered a reception by the professors and students. The Rt. Rev. Rector made the address of welcome to the Cardinal who responded with an enthusiastic discourse on the significance of the First Session of the University Summer School. At the close of the exercises each student was presented to the Cardinal.

PATRICK J. McCORMICK,
Secretary.

New Appointments to the Teaching Staff.

In the School of Theology Rev. Dr. Franz Cöln has been appointed Instructor in the Old Testament. He will also conduct a class of exegesis in the New Testament. Dr. Cöln taught for several years in the ecclesiastical seminary at Trier. He is deeply versed in several Oriental languages, Hebrew, Syriac, Arabic, Coptic, and until recently was lecturer in Assyriology at the University of Bonn. For several years he edited the "*Oriens Christianus*," one of the most learned of the special reviews devoted to Oriental languages and literature. Dr. Cöln is about forty years of age, and takes up his important work with unique and highly admirable preparation. The Catholic University has now three Orientalists of acknowledged reputation, the nucleus of an excellent school of Scripture studies.

In the School of Letters, Dr. Paul Gleis, a graduate of the University of Münster, has been appointed in German language and literature on the Anthony Walburg Chair. Dr. Gleis is a favorite disciple of Professor Jostes, professor of Germanics at Münster and a foremost authority on early German literature. Though a young man of only twenty-four Dr. Gleis has already won a reputation in the province of early medieval

German and allied studies. Apart from his extensive and accurate knowledge of modern German literature, he has made proficient studies in the oldest phases of the Arthurian sagas, and has already taken his place among the most successful investigators of the Parsifal and Merlin legends. His advent will be welcomed by all American Germanists.

In the School of Philosophy Dr. Thomas C. Carrigan, of Worcester, Mass., a graduate in Education of Clark University (1911), enters the Department of Education as Instructor in School Organization and Management. Dr. Carrigan is thirty-nine years of age, a graduate of Holy Cross College, Worcester, and of the Boston Law School, and for fourteen years practiced law with success in his native city. For several years he has devoted himself with ardor to educational studies and is the author of a unique and important work on educational legislation: "The Law and the American Child." This dissertation received the highest praise from Dr. G. Stanley Hall, President of Clark University, as a very brilliant, thorough and unique study of the child legislation of all the states in the union. Dr. Carrigan will also conduct courses in the School of Law, to be determined later according to the needs of the students.

In the School of Law Mr. Ammi Brown, A. M. (Harvard, 1902), has been appointed Instructor in Common Law and will act as secretary of the Law Faculty. Mr. Vincent Leroy Toomey, LL. B. (Catholic University, 1909), has also been appointed Instructor in Common Law. Dr. Thomas C. Carrigan will conduct two courses, one on the Law of Wills and the other on Law and the American Child. The teaching staff in the Law Faculty now consists of five professors and instructors who devote their entire time to the conduct of the School. A large number of students have entered the first year of the Law School.

In the School of Science Mr. Charles Lawler Kelly, A. B. (Clarke College, Worcester, 1909) has been appointed Instructor in Chemistry. Mr. John James Cantwell, B. S. (The Catholic University, 1911) has been appointed Instructor in Drawing. Mr. John Joseph Haley, C. E. (Tufts College,

1911), has been appointed Instructor in Civil Engineering. Mr. James Francis Connor, A. B. (Amherst College, 1900), and for several years instructor in Mathematics at the Boys' Latin School, Baltimore, has been appointed Instructor in Mathematics.

The teaching staff of the University now numbers fifty-eight, including instructors, student-assistants and fellows. Of these twenty-four are ecclesiastics, the other thirty-four are laymen.

The Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, Curantibus I. B. CHABOT, I. GUIDI, H. HYVERNAT.

The above is the title of an Oriental Patrology published by the Poussielgue firm of Paris under the joint direction of Drs. Chabot, Guidi, and Hyvernats, three scholars of international reputation in their respective fields. This vast publication, destined to complete the Greek and Latin Patrologies of Abbé Migne, will add a very large number of precious documents to our ecclesiastical literature and will be an important contribution to the history of the origin and growth of Christianity in Egypt, Syria, Persia and Mesopotamia.

The purpose of the editors of the Corpus is, for the present, to publish all Christian works extant in Syriac, Arabic, Ethiopic and Coptic; Armenian documents will be edited later. In order to make this literature accessible to students who are not familiar with Oriental languages all texts are translated into Latin; the original and the version are printed separately, each constituting one volume. According to the method and arrangement of this Patrology, each Oriental literature is divided into several series or groups. Syriac is distributed into four series: I. Apocrypha, Liturgy and Canons; II. Exegesis, Theology and Philosophy; III. History and Hagiography; IV. Documents of foreign origin, especially translations from the Greek. Ethiopic forms two groups: I. Apocrypha and Theology; II. History and Hagiography; and Coptic three: I. Apocrypha and Liturgy; II. Theology; III. History. The pro-

gramme of the Arabic section is not as yet definitely settled. Each series will be accompanied by a volume of indices and tables of contents.

Since 1903 the editors, assisted by collaborators in Europe and America, have published over thirty numbers from the four sections mentioned above. A complete list of them is given at the end of this notice. It is gratifying to remark that the work already done has won admiration and praise from many quarters; the volumes published have been reviewed very favorably and, last year, the French Academy of Inscriptions and Belles-Lettres bestowed upon Dr. Chabot, the editor-in-chief of the Corpus, its highest award, the Jean Reynaud prize, of the value of ten thousand francs, for his Oriental Patrology and his excellent contributions to Semitic epigraphy and literature.

The *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium* is a tremendous undertaking and its importance cannot be overestimated. The editing and translating of this multitude of texts is of great value for Oriental philology. Many of these documents, now being brought to light for the first time, contain new words and new forms which will greatly enrich our Oriental vocabularies. All scholars know that Oriental dictionaries are far from being complete. We cannot speak of a Syriac or Coptic or Ethiopic lexicon in the sense we speak of a Latin or English Dictionary, for all Oriental dictionaries are based on the documents already published, and these are only a small fraction of those preserved in the libraries of Rome, Paris, London and Berlin, still waiting for some enterprising editor to give them to the public. Hence the lexicographer and the grammarian will reap an abundant harvest in the *Corpus*. Not only Oriental, but Greek philology as well, will be a gainer thereby. It is known for example that some Oriental works are translations of Greek originals now lost to us. Thus the *Theophany* of Eusebius of Cæsarea, of which only a few fragments remain in the Greek, has been preserved entire in a Syriac translation of the fourth or fifth century; the *Pistis Sophia*, a celebrated Gnostic work of the third century, exists only in Coptic, whilst the Arabic has

handed down to us the *Canones Hippolyti* (II Cent.) which are the most complete and explicit description of the institutions of the early Church. Again other Oriental works are translations from the Greek which appear to have been made during the lifetime of the Greek authors themselves. Such is the case with the *Discourses* of Titus of Bosra against the Manicheans and the writings of St. Cyril, St. Basil, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Paul of Samosata, Theodore of Mopsuestia and many others. Hence Syriac versions of this kind are of great value for the correct interpretation of the original and should be taken into account in a critical edition of the Greek text.

In the different departments of ecclesiastical science, the *Corpus* will prove a veritable mine of useful information. Biblical studies will receive much assistance therefrom. It is not indeed the intention of the editors to publish the Oriental versions of the Bible; this does not fall within the scope of a Patrology. But, although we have editions of the Scriptures in most of the Oriental languages, we have no complete critical edition of any one of them, in the sense that we have editions of the Massoretic text or the Septuagint. Thus there is no critical edition of the Syriac *Peshitta* as a whole. For this a great deal of preliminary work is necessary, of which much remains to be done; examination of ancient Syriac Biblical MSS., collection of variant readings, and comparison of the Syriac text with the Hebrew and Greek originals. This preliminary study will be furthered in part by the publication of the writings of the Syriac Fathers. Their theological works abound in Scriptural quotations, and although they often quoted from memory, they must surely have had copies of the Biblical text as it existed in their day. The copying of the Bible was an important part of the curriculum of studies in the great Syrian schools, and we read in the Acts of the Council of Seleucia (410) that candidates to subdeaconship were required to know the entire Psalter by heart. Hence the numerous Scriptural quotations scattered here and there in the writings of the Syrians, by giving us an idea of the text current in

their time, will be of some help towards a critical edition of the whole *Peshitta* which still remains a desideratum. Again the Biblical student will find most interesting information in the Scripture commentaries so numerous in Syriac literature. There is hardly a Syrian scholar of note that has not left some explanation of one or more books of the Bible, and it is in this province of sacred science that the Syrians have done some of their most original work. Their interpretation of Holy Writ is logical, sober and literal, and reflects the best traditions of the school of Antioch.

The student of the history of Philosophy cannot afford to ignore Oriental literature. True he must not expect to find among Oriental scholars complete treatises after the manner of the Scholastics, but he will not fail to notice that the West is, to a large extent, indebted to the East, especially to the Syrians, for its knowledge of the works of Aristotle. The influence of Aristotelian philosophy in Syria dates from the beginning of the fifth century when the spread of Nestorian doctrines had made a knowledge of Greek absolutely necessary. The *Isagoge* and the *Analytics*, in fact most of the treatises known under the name of *Organum*, were translated at an early period. After the destruction of the Persian school of Edessa by order of the Emperor Zeno in 489, the study of the philosophy of Aristotle was cultivated by both the Jacobites and Nestorians. Among the Jacobites we may mention Sergius of Reschaina (536), Severus Sebokt (VII Cent.), James of Edessa (708), and George, bishop of the Arabs (724): among the Nestorians Henanisho I (701), Mar Aba II (751), and the numerous scholars and physicians who lived at the court of the Abbassides in Bagdad during the ninth and tenth centuries. The Nestorians initiated the Arabs to the philosophy of Aristotle and translated it for them from the Syriac into Arabic. The Arabs proved very apt pupils; in fact they soon surpassed their masters themselves, and, after having made Aristotelian philosophy their own, introduced it to the scholars of the Middle Ages. Familiarity with the philosophy of Aristotle as understood by the Orientals will help us to form a just and correct estimate

of their theology. We know that after the Council of Chalcedon only a few of them remained attached to the Church of Rome; the great majority of them became Monophysites or Nestorians. Both factions have left us a considerable number of dogmatic texts: symbols, professions of faith, treatises on the Incarnation and on the union of the divinity with the humanity. But they modified considerably the opinions of the Greek heretics. Thus the Oriental Monophysites differ much from the Eutychians. Although they teach one nature, one hypostasis and one person in Christ, they insist very strongly on the reality of the humanity and its consubstantiality with ours, and hold that the divinity and the humanity are united into one composite nature somewhat after the union of the body and the soul in man. Strange as it may seem they anathematize alike Eutyches, Nestorius, and the followers of the Council of Chalcedon: Eutyches for teaching the commingling of the two natures or the absorption of the humanity into the divinity; Nestorius for dividing Christ and speaking of two natures and two hypostases, and the adherents of Chalcedon for what they call their inconsistency in not admitting two hypostases as well as two natures after the union. The Nestorians, on the contrary, teach two natures, two hypostases, and one person or *parsopa* in Christ. They have written numerous treatises on the meaning they attach to these terms, and their theology on the Incarnation will help us to understand better the teachings of Nestorius which, since the publication of Loofs' Nestoriana and Bedjan's Bazaar of Heraclides, have aroused fresh controversy.

If we now pass to the domain of History and Hagiography, much can be learned from Oriental literature. The humble chroniclers of the East, though less pretentious than their Greek predecessors and models, deserve their share of praise for the diligence with which they have preserved to us many precious documents. Among the Syrians we may mention the anonymous author of the Chronicle of Edessa compiled from the archives of the city and other records which are now lost; Josue the Stylite who has left us the best account of the great war between the Persian and Byzantine empires (505-

506); Denis of Tell-Mahre who has given us a translation of the second part of the *Chronicon* of Eusebius of Cæsarea, and Bar Hebreus whose Universal History contains much valuable information on the Patriarchs of Antioch, and, after the time of Severus, on the Patriarchs of the Monophysite branch of the Church of Antioch down to the year 1285. Armenian literature also is very rich in historical material. It boasts more than fifty chroniclers and compilers. Among the native historians we may notice Goriun (IV cent.) author of a life of Mesrob, the founder of Armenian literature; Moses of Khorene (IV cent.) who wrote a history of Armenia in four books, three of which have come down to us covering the period from the origins of his nation to the death of Isaac the Great; Lazarus of Pharbe (VI cent.) who has left a history of Armenia from the time of its partition between the Persians and the Romans to the year 485, and the Catholicos John VI (925) who continued the work of his predecessors to the beginning of the tenth century. All these writers give us much information concerning the various fortunes of Armenia which was the battle ground of the Roman and Persian armies in the fifth century and later on of the Arabs and the Mongols.

Next to history proper Hagiography will profit greatly by the *Corpus Scriptorum*. Syriac, Ethiopic, and Coptic literatures are exceedingly rich in works containing lives of the saints or passions of martyrs. The numerous passions that we have in Syriac, for example, throw much light on the conditions of the Persian Church under the reign of Sapor II who for forty years (439-479) persecuted the Christians in many districts of his vast empire. They supply us with important data concerning the wars between the Romans and the Persians, and with notices which enable us, in numbers of cases, to verify, correct, and complete, the episcopal lists of eastern dioceses, and to fix definitely the site of some ancient cities. Thus we are able in part to supplement the history of Sozomen, who, alone of all the Greek historians, relates the persecution of Sapor, during which about 15,000 martyrs, of every rank and condition of life, gave up their blood in defence of the faith.

Liturgical studies will glean interesting information from the *Corpus*. No country is richer than the Orient in this respect. Thus the Jacobites who adopted the liturgy of St. James possess more than fifty varieties of it, differing in this from the Nestorians who generally use that of SS. Adaeus and Maris. The Copts follow the ancient Alexandrine liturgy, while the Armenians have that of St. Basil. The publication of these liturgical texts will place in a clearer light the constant belief of the Egyptian and Eastern Churches in the dogma of the Transubstantiation and of the Real Presence, and the many rites and ceremonies connected with the reception of the Holy Eucharist.

The preceding considerations are enough to show the importance of this Oriental Patrology. To judge from the volumes already published the editors are deserving of great praise for the colossal task they have undertaken. But a work of such a magnitude cannot thrive merely on moral support; some financial assistance is necessary. Although the editors and collaborators are giving their services gratuitously, the expenses of publication are very considerable, including not only the cost of printing, but also the photographing or copying of a large number of manuscripts. Hence all scholars interested in Semitic languages or in ecclesiastical literature should help at least by subscribing for the whole or a part of the Patrology. The subscription price is very reasonable, being at the rate of 20 cents for 16 pages of oriental text and 14 cents for 16 pages of Latin translation. With such support the editors would be able to carry on this publication more rapidly. And why should not some Catholic Mæcenæ arise and further by his generosity a work so auspiciously begun? Protestants give large sums of money for exploration purposes in Bible lands and Catholics contribute freely to schools, hospitals, and missions. Is not a publication of this kind of as great importance and interest as excavations in Babylonia and Assyria? Are not the Christian texts that tell us of the piety of the solitaries of the desert, of the sufferings of the martyrs in times of persecution, and of the civilizing mission of the Church in eastern lands, more precious to us than the papyri of Egypt or the cuneiform

inscriptions of Nippur and Niniveh? Catholics should remember that this Oriental Christian literature is especially their own; it is a part of their literary heritage no less than the writings of the Greek and Latin Fathers. They should cherish it and rescue it from oblivion, for no document that throws any light on the origin and spread of Christianity can be a matter of indifference to them. May the editors of the *Corpus* therefore receive all the help and encouragement to which they are entitled! They are doing a noble work for science and the Catholic Church.

The following is a complete list of the works published in the *Corpus* from 1903 to 1910. Each *tome* consists of two volumes, one of text, the other of Latin translation. One may subscribe for the whole Patrology or any one section of it, or may buy one volume separately.

Syriac.

- Series II, t. xciii. Denis bar Salihi (xii cent.): Explanation of the Liturgy; text and translation by J. Labourt.
- Series II, t. xcvi. Denis bar Salihi: Commentary on the Gospels; text and translation by I. Sedlacek.
- Series II, t. ci. Denis bar Salihi: Commentary on the Apocalypse, the Acts of the Apostles and the Catholic Epistles; text and translation by I. Sedlacek.
- Series II, t. lxiv. The Letters of the Catholicos Ishoyabh III (vii cent.); text and translation by Rubens Duval.
- Series II, t. xxvii. Philoxenus of Mabogh (v and vi cent.): Treatises on the Trinity and the Incarnation; text and translation by A. Vaschalde.
- Series II, t. xxxvii. Documents bearing on the origin of the Monophysites; text by J. B. Chabot; translation in the press.
- Series II, t. lxxv. Theodorus bar Koni (vii cent.): The Book of Scholia; text by Addai Scher; translation in the press.
- Series III, t. iv. The Lesser Chronicles; three fascicles; text and translation by I. Guidi, J. B. Chabot, and E. W. Brooks.
- Series III, t. vii and viii. Elias of Nisihis (xi cent.): Opus Chronologicum; text and translation by J. B. Chabot and E. W. Brooks.
- Series III, t. xxi. Fascicle I: Lives of illustrious Monophysites; text and translation by E. W. Brooks.

Ethiopic.

- Series I, t. viii. Fascicle I: Apocrypha concerning the Blessed Virgin Mary; text and translation by M. Chaine.

- Series I, t. xxxi. Abyssinian Philosophers; text and translation by E. Littmann.
- Series II, t. iii. History of King Sarsa Dengel; text and translation by K. Conti Rossini.
- Series II, t. v. Fascicle i: The Annals of King John I; fascicle ii; The Annals of Kings Iyasu I and Bakaffa; text and translation by I. Guidi.
- Series II, t. vi. The Annals of Iyasu II and Ioyas; text and translation by I. Guidi.
- Series II, t. viii. Documents bearing on Ethiopic History, fascicle i; text and translation by K. Conti Rossini.
- Series II, t. xvii. Fascicle i: The Acta of SS. Yared and Pantalewon; text and translation by K. Conti Rossini.
- Series II, t. xx. Fascicle i: The Acta of SS. Basalota Mikael and Anorwos; text and translation by K. Conti Rossini. Fascicle ii; The Acta of SS. Aaron and Philip; text and translation by B. Turaiev.
- Series II, t. xxi. Fascicle i: The Acta of S. Eustathius; text and translation by B. Turaiev.
- Series II, t. xxii. Fascicle i: The Acta of S. Mercurius; text and translation by K. Conti Rossini.
- Series II, t. xxiii. Fascicle i: The Acta of SS. Fere-Mikael and Zarahabraham; text and translation by B. Turaiev.
- Series II, t. xxiv. Fascicle i: The Acta of SS. Abakerazun and Hawarayyat; text and translation by K. Conti Rossini.
- Series II, t. xxviii. Acta Martyrum; text and translation by E. Pereira.

Coptic.

- Series II, t. ii. Fascicle i: The Life and Works of Sinuthius; text by John Leipoldt and W. Crum.
- Series II, t. iv. The Life and Works of Sinuthius; fascicle iii; text by Leipoldt and W. Crum.
- Series III, t. ii. Acta Martyrum; text and translation by J. Balestri and H. Hyvernât.

Arabic.

- Series III, t. i. Peter Ibn Rahib: Oriental Chronicle; text and translation by L. Cheikhô.
- Series III, t. vi. Annals of Eutychius, patriarch of Alexandria; part i, text by L. Cheikhô.
- Series III, t. vii. Annals of Eutychius, patriarch of Alexandria; part ii, text by L. Cheikhô, Carra de Vaux, and Zayyat.
- Series III, t. ix. Severus ben el Moqaffa: fascicles i and ii; text by C. Seybold.
- Series III, t. xviii. Synaxarium Alexandrinum; fascicles i, ii, and iii; text by J. Forget.

A. A. VASCHALDE.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Dictionnaire Apologetique de la Foi Catholique, sous la Direction de A. D'Alès. Fascicule VI, Evangiles-Fin du Monde. Paris, Beauchesne, 1911.

The successive numbers of the new *Apologetic Dictionary of the Catholic Faith* are appearing with great promptness. Part VI is a worthy continuation of the excellent portions that have previously been published. By far the most prominent article is the treatise by Abbé Lepin on the *Canonical Gospels*. It comprises the last pages of the preceding fascicle and about one-half of the present number. At first sight one is inclined to object to its great length, for if printed in large type it would make a fair-sized volume. But this objection is soon forgotten when one examines the contents and sees the great amount of scholarly information presented to the reader and made easily accessible by orderly arrangement and by a conspicuous division into sections and numbers. Conservative to a marked degree, the treatise gives evidence of a vast amount of careful reading, and offers a comprehensive view of the great questions of the authenticity and genuineness of the Gospels, particularly of that of St. John, the integrity of the texts, the relations to one another of the Synoptics, and the historical value of all four. As the author proceeds from point to point, he notes the different views and theories of the rationalists, and makes abundant reference to modern writings bearing on each subject. It is a valuable guide for the study of the credibility of the Gospels.

Other important and lengthy articles in this fascicle are that on *Bishops* by Canon Michiels, who gives therein a clear summary of his book, *l'Origine de l'Episcopat*; that on the *Evolutionary Theory of Morals* by Abbé Bruneteau, in which the weaknesses and untoward consequences of the theory are mercilessly exposed; the erudite article of Father Durand, S. J., on *Exegesis*; that on *Religious Experience*, in which the author, Father Pinard, S. J., makes a careful estimate of the value of this element of religious life, at the same time criticizing the theories of W. James, H.

Bergson, and others; the article of M. Taudière on the *Family*, in which this important subject is treated first from the philosophic and social, and then from the historic point of view. In the latter portion, chief stress is laid on French legislation.

There are, besides, a number of interesting short articles, such as Abbé Griet's criticism of Bergson's *Creative Evolution*; the Abbé Besson's articles on *Exemption of Regulars*, and on *Therapeutic Feticide*; the all too short article on *Extreme Unction*, by Father de Guibert, S. J., and the fine account of *Fetishism* by Bishop Le Roy.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Introduction de la Messe Romaine en France sous les Carolingiens. Par L'Abbé H. Netzer. Paris, Alphonse Picard et Fils. 1910. 8°, pp. vi + 366.

No more timely and necessary study in the history of the Mediæval Liturgy could be undertaken than that of recounting the conditions and reasons which led to the supersession of the Gallican by the Roman Liturgy in the Carolingian Empire. The subject has many elements of attractiveness outside of the general interest attaching to liturgical changes and rivalries which led to the comparative unity in liturgical observances of the present time. The author has been at pains to detail as far as possible the extent to which the Gallican Liturgy was observed and the causes which led to its removal as well as in describing what this primitive liturgy was. A chapter is devoted to the great liturgiologists of the ninth century, Alcuin, Amalarius, Agobard, Florus of Lyons, Walafrid Strabo and others, who under the reforming impulse given by Charlemagne contributed so much to unity of observance in liturgical matters, and to the elucidation and illustration of liturgical customs. The work of the present author is especially valuable because of the wealth of old texts which it contains, and which are made available here in a manner not found elsewhere. The Abbé Netzer has made a valuable contribution to an interesting and difficult subject.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Enchiridion Fontium Historiae Ecclesiasticae Antiquae, quod in usum Scholarum collegit Conradus Kirch, S. J. Freiburg, Herder, 1910. 8°, pp. xxix + 636.

It would be impossible to make any collection of texts or sources which could meet with the approval and satisfy the needs of students in general. Much discretion and good judgment have been shown in the selection of the texts which make up this volume. It is primarily intended for students of Church history who have no adequate library at their disposal, and who wish to become acquainted at first hand with the evidence in regard to the early Church. The excerpts from ancient authors are arranged chronologically and deal with the principal topics of Church history, with early Christian missions, the hierarchy, Christian doctrine, persecutions, heresies and schisms, sacraments, liturgy, etc., and the relations of Church and State. In addition to the extracts from the writings of the ancient authors, there are quoted a number of official documents, acts of councils, rescripts and decrees of Emperors, together with specimens of inscriptions, *Acta Martyrum*, and passages from the papyrus remains. The extracts cover the first seven centuries. Even for students who have access to large libraries the work will be a useful desk-volume, containing, as it does many documents which are scattered through innumerable volumes as *v. g.*, the extracts from the pagan authors, the Muratorian fragment, etc. A system of cross references by means of marginal numbers makes it easy to find texts bearing on the same subject.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

The Dawn of Modern England, being a History of the Reformation in England (1509-1525). By Carlos B. Lumsden, Barrister-at-Law. Longmans, Green and Co. New York, 1910. 8°, pp. 303.

The main thesis of this work is not new: but its elaboration at the hands of the present author, and its application in concrete to the England of Henry VIII, are both suggestive and valuable. Instead of viewing the Reformation in the traditional manner

as being primarily a religious revolt, Mr. Lumsden assumes that the religious upheaval was but one phase of a wider and a more significant movement. His purpose was "to see if there was not some thing common in the practically simultaneous revolutions in religion, in learning, in law and in social economy that convulsed Europe in the later fifteenth and early years of the sixteenth centuries." The common cause, and common source of all these movements he finds to have been an economic one. Following the lead of Mr. Belford Box he concludes that: "the true inwardness of the change of which the Protestant Reformation represented the ideological side, meant the transformation of society from a basis mainly corporative and co-operative to one individualistic in its essential character." Even for those who are not prepared to follow the author in his attempt to apply the principles of the economic interpretation of history to the Reformation, there is much in this book that is of more than passing interest. One point of the most vital importance which is clearly brought out is the comparison between mediæval and modern civilization, showing the difference between the consciousness of social responsibility which marked the Middle Ages and the unrestrained individualism of the present. This idea enables the author to establish the connection between the social problems of the present and the changes inaugurated by the Reformation. "The battle that was fought in England and in Europe, and which we call the Reformation, was no dead and dull battle over mere theology, or over mere items of passing interest, but was a battle which with altered characters and with slightly different watch-words, is being re-fought in our own times and in our own land." In concrete the author reduces the struggle in the Middle Ages to a conflict for the possession of capital. He scouts the idea that the Reformation was merely an uprising of the people against the godless tyranny of Rome." One fact of supreme importance which stands out clearly in the early pages of the work is the wide cleavage between the mediæval and the modern concepts of property. To this difference rooted in the extreme individualism of the present can be traced most modern social complications. A weakness in the book is that the author when dealing expressly with English conditions fails frequently to connect what he describes with his general assumption that these conditions arose from economic causes. An excellent bibliography is appended to the work. In a

book showing such wide reading and erudition one would hardly expect split infinitives (p. 26), nor careless proof-reading. *Fon-tarina* for *Fornarina* (p. 22).

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Les Caisses d'Épargne, par M. F. Lepelletier, Professeur d'Economie Politique à la Faculté libre droit de Paris. Librairie, Victor Lecoffre. J. Gabalda et Cie, rue Bonaparte 90. Paris, 1911. 243 pp.

At the present moment, while the U. S. Postal Savings Bank is being put to the test in the field of public service, American readers will, no doubt welcome the little volume which appears under the title: "Les Caisses d'Épargne."

Without burdening the reader with tiresome details, the work presents a fairly complete history of legislation in the matter of savings banks, both public and private, in all the principal saving nations, together with a critical analysis of the various systems and a general comparison of their methods and achievements. Addressing himself primarily to French readers, and in their own language, the author naturally devotes the major part of his attention to a consideration of the French systems. However, his patriotism does not prevent him from pointing out the weaknesses of the French policy, as he sees them, nor from giving due credit to the excellence of foreign systems.

Besides those of France, the savings bank systems of England, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Holland, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, United States and Italy are examined in the order named, being grouped according to the greater or less freedom they enjoy in their operations, particularly in the employment of their funds.

The author quotes freely from official statistics, and pursues a uniformity of method in the prosecution of his analyses and in the presentation of his data, which renders it easy to compare the various national policies. In this consists, perhaps, the greatest value of the work.

Throughout the volume prominence is given to the fact that savings banks properly so called, are destined primarily for the service of those who have but small sums to invest. Hence the author although realizing that it costs something to receive and

handle these small sums especially in sparsely settled districts, advocates giving to the banks all the latitude that is consistent with safety, in order that the man of small means may receive an adequate return from his investment. Fault is found with some legislative bodies, among them the French, which hamper the operations of their savings banks in an over-zealous effort to render them safe.

The volume is full of useful information, although it is to be regretted that more attention is not given to American conditions. The author is silent concerning the U. S. Postal Savings Bank; still those who wish to come to an intelligent understanding of its aims and possibilities will do well to read his work.

M. Lepelletier is a professor in the Catholic Institute of Paris and Secretary-General of the Société d'Économie Sociale.

M. F. McEvoy.

The Basis of Ascendancy. By Edgar Gardner Murphy. Longmans, Green and Co. New York, 1909. 250 pp.

"Starting with the fact that the negro is a negro and that his capacities upon the average are not the capacities of the white man, what shall be the policy of the state toward the capacities he has." This, as he tells us himself, is the perplexing question which the author sets himself to answer.

Whether he has succeeded or not, his contribution is evidently the offering of one who has been in intimate contact with the problem. In refreshing contrast to the heated utterances of some who approach the question, he manifests a temperate well-balanced sympathy with the negro, together with a certain depth of insight into the psychology of both races, black and white, which bespeaks a knowledge gained by both study and experience.

The work is one of a series being a general discussion of problems to be treated more specifically in a volume to follow or which have received some attention in a previous volume, "The New South."

The theme is undoubtedly interesting and the author's treatment of it worthy of consideration, but his manner of presentation leaves something to be desired. In his efforts to escape the

commonplace in expression he is often betrayed into an obscurity of style which is most distracting to the reader.

However, the work is a sober, earnest attempt to solve a vexing problem and offers information and suggestions well calculated to stimulate fruitful thought.

M. F. McEvoy.

Lessons in Logic, by William Turner, S. T. D., Professor of Philosophy in the Catholic University of America; Washington, D. C. Catholic Educational Press; London, R. and T. Washbourne; 1911; pp. 302. Price, \$1.25.

There has been in Catholic educational institutions a long felt need of philosophical text-books which could be used without having to warn the student against false or questionable suppositions and implications. All branches of philosophy are intimately connected, and their dependence on one another is such that, however fair and objective an author may endeavor to be, his treatment of a special question is unavoidably colored by his views concerning other problems. It frequently happens even that insinuations are more dangerous than explicit statements because, being only accessory, less attention is paid to them. They are accepted as true at first sight because the statements, facts, rules, etc., along with which they are presented and to which they seem indissolubly bound are certainly true. This applies especially to logic which is so closely related to the fundamental problems of the nature and value of knowledge that the solution given to these problems cannot fail to make its influence felt throughout. There is an undercurrent which at times manifests itself at the surface.

Hence Doctor Turner's *Lessons in Logic*—the first volume of the Catholic University Series of Text-books in Philosophy—will be welcomed, and the other volumes of the same series will be eagerly awaited. One cannot expect to find much that is new in a text-book on logic. Dr. Turner's *Lessons*, while strictly adhering to traditional philosophy, are an ample proof that, in this instance, scholastic principles adapt themselves most harmoniously to the results of modern research in logic and methodology, and that, in their essentials, they fit in perfectly with more recent progress.

Clearness, which is one of the most important qualities required in a text-book, is a prominent feature of this. Avoiding the extremes of a diffuse exposition and of an algebraic conciseness, Dr. Turner states the rules clearly, with precision, and illustrates them by examples that are taken chiefly from concrete, even from every day life, and that, in consequence, will appeal to the student's mind. It may safely be said that if a student fails to become interested in logic as presented in these lessons, or if he finds himself unable to understand and master it, little if any profit will be derived from the substitution of another text-book.

C. A. DUBRAY.

The Story of Our Lord's Life told for Children, by a Carmelite Nun. New York, Cathedral Library Association, 1910. Pp. xii + 173.

"The Story of Our Lord's Life, told for Children," by a Carmelite nun, makes an interesting addition to the list of good books for the little ones. It is simply and beautifully told and the scriptural phraseology is preserved wherever it is possible. The scriptural passages form the ground work and the story is merely the explanation or commentary to suit the child's mind. The book is especially attractive because of its many well-chosen pictures which are selected from the great masterpieces dealing with Our Lord's Life. It should prove very helpful to Sunday-school teachers if used as supplementary work, because the book would appeal strongly to children. It fully succeeds in the aim expressed in the introduction to satisfy the child's natural love of the marvellous, the beautiful, and the true, by a personal knowledge of the life of Our Lord and His Blessed Mother.

NECROLOGY.

JUDGE WILLIAM C. ROBINSON.

Judge William C. Robinson, Dean of the Law School of the Catholic University of America died at his home in Washington on Monday, November 6, 1911.

Born in Norwich, Conn., on July 26, 1834, he received his early education in the private schools there and at Wesleyan Academy. He graduated from Dartmouth College in 1854 with the degree of A. B. He received the degree of doctor of law from Dartmouth in 1879, and his master of arts degree from Yale in 1881.

Eleven years after he was graduated from Dartmouth College Professor Robinson practiced law in New Haven, at the same time lecturing in the university. He was judge of the city court of New Haven from 1869 to 1871, afterward being appointed judge of the court of common pleas of Connecticut. He served in this capacity until he came to Washington.

Professor Robinson was a lecturer of law in Yale University from 1869 to 1872, and a professor of common law in the same institution from 1872 until 1896. A tablet was unveiled to his memory at the commencement exercises in June, 1909, at which President Taft was present.

Professor Robinson's "Elementary Law" is considered the standard book of its kind in publication today, and is used in all the law schools of the country, having been sanctioned by the Association of American Law Schools and Universities.

His other celebrated works are "Life of Ebenezzer Beriah Kelly," "Notes of Elementary Law," "Elementary Law," "Clavis Rerum," "Law of Patents," in three volumes; "Forensic Oratory," and "Elements of American Jurisprudence." He was a contributor to the leading legal periodicals from 1867 to 1910, and was editor of the *Mirror of Justice* in 1903.

He wrote many legal essays, and was considered an authority on patent law, sending one of his pupils into the Orient to revise the patent law of Japan. For this he was signally honored by the Japanese government.

At ten o'clock on Wednesday, November 8, a solemn High Mass of Requiem was celebrated in St. Joseph's Church, Washington, D. C. at which the celebrant was the Right Reverend Thomas J. Shahan, Rector of the University, and the preacher, the Reverend Dr. John T. Creagh, Professor of Canon Law. After the ceremony the remains, accompanied by the Law students of the University, were conveyed to the Union Station. The interment took place at Norwich, Conn.

The following is the text of the tribute paid to Judge Robinson by Reverend Dr. Creagh at the funeral services:

It is not easy, on such short notice, and in these solemn and moving circumstances, to pay fittingly a brief, final tribute of respect, in the name of a great school, to one who labored long and lovingly and with distinction in its service; and the difficulty becomes still greater when this tribute is to voice not only the common knowledge of a noble character in the presence of which all men must feel humbled, but also a sincere friendship which developed with increasing intimacy into admiration. The record left by Judge Robinson is an unusual one and worthy of a more adequate appreciation than that which, in honor of his memory and for our own good, after only a few hours' preparation, I now attempt.

Men are great not by virtue of their place, their material possessions or their intellectual gifts, but because of noble qualities of mind and heart, and of services rendered to worthy causes. Only the good servant of his fellow-man, of society, of the Church; only he who speaks by life and word a message of progress or of solace, and contributes to the betterment of humanity in some of its many fields of endeavor; only he of whom it can be said that the world is better for his having lived; only such are worthy to be rescued from the oblivion in which death enshrouds the great majority of our race and recalled to the memory of the living for purposes of encouragement and inspiration.

In the light of this standard, we assist today at the obsequies

of a great-souled man, whose achievements are worthy of commemoration. God blessed our departed friend with length of days, with strength of body, a brilliant intellect, and particularly with that steadfast purpose and stalwart energy that have enabled the sturdy New England stock from which he sprang to contribute so forcefully to the political and religious institutions of our country. All that he was and all that he had, all through his long life which stretched over more than the scriptural span, from 1834 to two days ago, he gave freely and generously to things high and holy. He was always active in good causes. He ever held himself ready to respond to the call of broader, more serviceable effort, and—the true test of a great soul—he recked not of personal cost or sacrifice. And throughout all his days, he bore “the white rose of a blameless life;” of him it can be truly said, “he kept the paths of justice and guarded the ways of the saints.”

Opportunities came to put his nobility of soul to the test. We, who witnessed his daily coming and going, know how like a true man he bore himself in the stress of daily strife, so that to know him was to learn again the highest possibilities of Christian character and the wonderful power of lay example, and to see inborn honor and candor and uprightness wrought to perfection under the fruitful influence of divine grace. Perhaps it is by these ordinary tests that character is best revealed.

But more notable opportunities for test and for service were his. And one of these, to which, arduous as it was, he fully measured up, which gives us our best insight into his character as a Christian and into his title to remembrance in his chosen field of work, came when the authorities of the Catholic University of America in 1895 determined to organize a school for the teaching of legal science and chose him to be its founder.

At that time Dr. Robinson had been a professor of common law for twenty-six years at Yale University. His success as a teacher, which was of the highest; his standing in the community, which had honored him with appointments to various judgeships and to the State Legislature; his popularity with the students, whose affection for him was traditional; his attachment to a school which he had watched and helped grow from insignificance to national importance; everything of reality in his past and present, and everything of hope in his future bound him to his surroundings, and especially forbade such a breaking of social and familiar ties

and such an annihilation of sure material prospects as were implied in this new venture, which as yet existed only in the minds of its originators.

His choice, however, was not long in the making. With the same resolution and the same spirit of sacrifice that had enabled him years before to abandon the Episcopal ministry and enter the Catholic Church as a layman, he now buoyantly and gladly cut himself off from his past and all its promise and undertook, for the good of humanity and of the Church, a work which might very properly be styled a creation.

No event so helps us to a clear understanding of the principal motives of his life as does this courageous undertaking. His comprehensive mind fully grasped the possibilities of the situation—untold possibilities of social beneficence and political security—and to the realization of these possibilities, after an heroic act of faith in God, he feared not to devote, even at the risk of loss, his reputation, his ability, his future. A small soul can not appreciate either the meaning or the merit of his sacrifice; a poor soul can not grasp the lofty purpose that sustained him to the day of his death and that he executed so well that those who come after him have only to continue to build on the sure, well-planned foundation which he laid.

In the University Law School we have his view of law, which was grand and high, worthy of a Papinian or a Paulus. He knew that law is the life of the State, that in it are infallibly reflected the elevation or debasement of popular judgment, and that fluctuations of the moral temperature of the body-politic are sooner or later registered in the code; that in a country like ours lawyers and judges are able to play a most important part in creating jurisprudence, and our lawmakers themselves are frequently men of legal formation. He knew also that a strong, just juristic sense, carefully trained and developed, can build up a body of legal principles that can prevail over popular passion, conquer conquering armies, and survive the social organizations which they were originally intended to govern.

In his mind, then, legal education must not be the mere assembling of large groups of students to learn how to win cases and gain a livelihood. That there will always be one class of students who have no higher view of their calling, Dr. Robinson was well aware, and he understood that in his school, as in every law-school,

provision must be made for them. But in his concept law was to be more than an art; it was to be what it had ever been in the minds of the great masters of Roman and Common Law, a science; not a mere scaffolding of precedents, but a noble, immortal structure of principles from which men should go out with their vision of justice clarified; knowing cases and statutes, but cognizant also of the great, controlling sources from which all just legislation flows; skilled in the mysteries of the soul as well as of the body of jurisprudence; ready, therefore, when need arose—as arise it surely will—to render service to ethics and religion and government as well as to law.

He was equipped as perhaps no other man in our country to execute this far-reaching design. He had a long and varied experience in teaching and in practice; he had assisted in the formation of generations of students; he was familiar with the general characteristics of legal education in the United States and in other countries. But,—more important for the successful carrying out of the work to which he had set his hand—he not only could analyze existing systems and point out their defects, he was a builder with plans and materials ready for a new and more imposing construction. He saw clearly the majesty of the Roman Law reaching out over nations and continents in unwearying dominion and sensed in its ever-applicable axioms a great, efficient, formative instrument; he realized moreover that to it men will continually turn more and more as to a common source of municipal and international law; he knew that the Canon Law had given system and form to the undigested customs which were the forerunners of the common law of England and the United States, and still spoke through many a detail of current statute and practice: he loved to proclaim the dependence of all human enactments on the law of God: and with him it was as an article of faith that all sciences, including law and sociology and politics and economics, were intimately related to ethics and religion and could not rightly be divorced from them. For him law was a sacred thing, *ars boni et aequi*, deriving its essence as well as its name from *iustitia*.

Thus enlightened, he clearly comprehended what could be accomplished for lawyers and the law, and through them for our social morality and civic security, by the utilization of every good agency, especially in a new school, untrammelled by traditions and devoted to all that was highest and best in every field of science.

In his law school, to the development of which he brought the rich requirements of many years and devoted his days and nights until the final call came, we behold not only the expression of his character and ability, but also his real monument. *Defunctus adhuc loquitur*. His masterly mind will still speak through its noble lines to those who come after him, proclaiming that God blessed the sacrifice in which the first stones were laid, that the work was well begun and well done, and all that remains is to maintain it as his wise counsels planned it.

In his own department as a professor of Common Law, Dr. Robinson was unrivalled. His eloquence, his special gift of clear and logical expression, his ability to invest with interest the most uninviting subjects, his experience as teacher, lawyer and judge, his wide knowledge of the legal literature of all departments and all lands, his readiness to serve and help, his well-known uprightness, contributed to win him a popularity which will cause the news of his death to bring sadness wherever men do the work of the law from Maine to California. Even his books, which of course lack the charm of his personality, bear evidence to his command of an unusual excellence of style, and a lucidity of statement which might well serve as a model.

His work, however, in behalf of the University was not limited to establishing and developing the School of Law, of which he was Dean. No one loved the University more, no one sacrificed more of time and labor for its general interests. He may justly be styled one of its founders. From the time he came to Washington to the very day before his death he did yeoman's service in senate and faculty and committee. It is by a code drawn up by his able and painstaking hand that the University is now governed. No pressure of his own class-work, or of the text-books that have made his name famous throughout the length and breadth of the land, ever caused him to turn a deaf ear when the call of the Trustees or of the Rector came to contribute to the common good of the institution for which he felt he could not do too much.

Of his greatest title to our regard I have not yet spoken. We who knew him shall remember best, and God, we trust, will reward most his constant, faithful devotion to the teachings and practices of our holy religion. A great lawyer, his first allegiance was to eternal justice. He was a scholar who saw God not only in science, but in daily life, and ever walked hand in hand with

Him. Here in this parish he was a common source of edification to priests and people. We of the University can bear witness to his attendance at daily Mass, his frequent Communions, his regular noon-day visits to his Lord in the Blessed Sacrament. Recalling his deep faith, his unaffected piety, his simplicity and honor and honesty, his unfailing charity, his evenness of temper, his serious reverence for sacred persons and holy things, his religious disregard for the vanities and trifles of life, we feel that here was one of those noble jurisconsults who mirror forth in their lives that justice which is the subject of their study, and whom Ulpian declared worthy to be called priests.

Surely, if death ever lay aside some of its gloom and terror, it is on such an occasion as the present. The grim visitor enters here not less as a friend than as a destroyer. It comes at the close of a long, honorable and well-spent life, and finds the body worn by age and not unwilling to lay down the burden of which it has become weary, though the mind be still vigorous and alert. It stills the eloquent tongue and halts the dexterous hand, but it cannot blot from public record the story of great hopes realized and great achievements done which will perpetuate the name and honor of him who sinks into the grave. It brings a great University to the bier of the departed to proclaim his high reputation as a scholar, his unquestioned integrity as a man, his unfaltering courage as a combatant in every contest for goodness and truth. It consoles his friends and acquaintances with the memory of an unblemished career. And if death must here break the sacred, tender bonds that bind parent to child, it at least speaks to the bereaved the sweet word of comfort—that he who has gone has left to his children the most precious of inheritances, a good name.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

The Sisters' College. With the permission of the Board of Trustees of the Catholic University an institute for the collegiate training of our teaching Sisters, to be known as The Sisters' College has been opened in connection with the University. In this institute the Sisters will follow courses leading to the degrees of the University. The instruction will be under the direction of the University but will be given apart from its regular courses and outside of the University grounds, for the present in the Convent of the Benedictine Nuns at Brookland. Several University professors have agreed to give their services as teachers in the new institute, which is modeled more or less closely on the St. Ann's Institute at Münster, in Prussia, carried on under the direction of the Prussian Episcopate, and so far quite successful.*

The college is open to all teaching Sisters sent by their superiors, and on the successful completion of its courses the University will grant the degrees lawfully earned by the students of the College. Credit for work of a collegiate character done elsewhere will be allowed, and examinations may be taken for advanced standing. The College will be conducted on the usual lines of the academic work of the University, of which it becomes an integral part, so that the graduates of the College are truly members of the University. The need of such an institute has long been keenly felt by our teaching Sisters, and they have freely importuned the University authorities to open to them, in some becoming way, the doors of this great central Catholic School. The Trustees of the University have finally agreed to permit the beginning of the good work in a modest way and with all due safeguards for the religious life of the Sisters. Twenty Sisters have already entered the College, 6 Sisters of Charity of the Blessed Virgin, Dubuque,

* *The Catholic University Bulletin*, May, 1908, p. 421.

Iowa, 3 Benedictine Sisters, Brookland, D. C., 2 Sisters of Jesus Mary, one from Quebec, Canada, and one from London, England, 2 Sisters of the Incarnate Word, San Antonio, Texas, 3 Sisters of Providence, St. Mary's of the Woods, Indiana, 2 Sisters of the Immaculate Heart, Scranton, Pa., 2 Sisters of St. Dominic, Sinsinawa, Wis., 3 Sisters of Divine Providence, Newport, Ky., 1 Sister of the Holy Humility of Mary, Cleveland, Ohio, 2 Sisters of Mercy, Chicago, Ill. The Sisters' College was regularly opened on October third with the Mass of the Holy Spirit and a pertinent discourse by the Right Reverend Rector of the University.

Formal Opening of the Sisters' College. The Sisters' College which opened on October 3 was solemnly inaugurated on Saturday, October 7, by His Excellency, the Most Rev. Diomede Falconio, Apostolic Delegate. The exercises took place in St. Benedict's Convent, Brookland, where the students of the College were assembled. His Excellency offered the Mass of the Holy Ghost, assisted by Very Rev. Dr. Thomas E. Shields, and Rev. Dr. William Turner as deacons. The Rt. Rev. Rector addressed the students and faculty on the significance of the occasion, and beautifully depicted the future usefulness of the new college in the cause of religion and Catholic education in this country. The choir of the Immaculate Conception College rendered the music, and many of the Dominican Fathers were present. The following members of the faculty of the Catholic University who are now conducting courses at the Sisters' College attended the ceremony: Very Rev. Dr. Edward A. Pace, Very Rev. Dr. Thomas E. Shields, Dr. George M. Bolling, Very Rev. Dr. John D. Maguire, Rev. Dr. William Turner, Dr. Aubrey E. Landry, Rev. Dr. Patrick J. McCormick, and Dr. Thomas C. Carrigan.

Meeting of the Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees of the University held their semi-annual meeting in Divinity College on Monday, October 12. Four new members were elected, Most Reverend Edmond F. Prendergast, Archbishop

of Philadelphia, Most Reverend James J. Keane, Archbishop of Dubuque, Right Reverend J. F. Regis Canevin, Bishop of Pittsburg, and the Honorable Thomas Kearns. Reverend Dr. Franz Cöln was appointed Instructor in Sacred Scripture; Reverend John Fenlon, S. S. and Reverend Anthony Vieban, S. S., were appointed to the management of Divinity College and were given charge of the courses in pastoral and ascetical theology. The Board authorized the completion of the central portion of Gibbons Hall.

Farewell Dinner to Cardinal Falconio. On Thursday evening, November 9, His Eminence Diomede Cardinal Falconio was the guest of honor at a dinner given by the University in Divinity College, and bade farewell to the assembled professors, students and representatives of the affiliated Colleges.

His Eminence is accompanied to Rome by the Right Reverend Rector, whom he has invited to assist at the consistory in which His Eminence and Cardinals Farley and O'Connell are to be elevated to the dignity of the Cardinalate.

Gift of Fifty Thousand Dollars. The magnificent gift of Fifty Thousand Dollars was presented recently by Sir James J. Ryan of Philadelphia, Knight of the Order of St. Gregory. The gift was made during a visit paid to His Eminence the Chancellor of the University. The generous donor was accompanied by Monsignor Maurice Hassett of Harrisburg, alumnus and former Instructor at the University.

Formal opening of the Year 1911-1912. The formal opening of the present academic year at the Catholic University took place on Sunday, October 8. Solemn Mass of the Holy Ghost was celebrated by the Rt. Rev. Rector in the Assembly Room, McMahon Hall, at 10.30 o'clock. He was assisted by the Rev. T. A. Ryder, C. S. P., deacon, Rev. H. A. Swift, C. S. P. sub-deacon, and Mr. J. C. Allard, master of ceremonies.

The entire faculty, dressed in academic robes, and the student body, now the largest in the history of the University,

attended the ceremony. The Rt. Rev. Rector made many important announcements of changes in the faculty for the new year, and afterward delivered an inspiring address on the "Academic Virtues."

Public Lectures. The following is the list of Public Lectures for the Fall Course, 1911:

- October 19—"Addison and the English Essay."
PATRICK J. LENNOX, B. A.
- October 26—"Calderón and Spanish Drama."
REV. DR. CHARLES WARREN CURRIER.
- November 3—"Beowulf, The Anglo-Saxon Epic."
FRANCIS J. HEMELT, A. B.
- November 9—"Marcus Tullius Cicero."
REV. DR. JOHN DAMEN MAGUIRE.
- November 16—"Aristophanes and Greek Political Comedy."
DR. GEORGE MELVILLE BOLLING.
- November 23—"Eusebius of Cesarea, Father of Church History."
V. REV. DR. PATRICK J. HEALY.
- December 7—"St. Augustine of Hippo."
REV. DR. WILLIAM TURNER.
- December 14—"Pascal as Christian Apologist."
REV. DR. GEORGE M. SAUVAGE, C. S. C.

The retirement of Mgr. Grannan from the active teaching staff of the University terminates a long career in Catholic educational work in the United States. Monsignor Grannan will devote himself hereafter to the management of the Henry McCadden Junior Fund for the education of young men to the priesthood in poorer dioceses of the United States and elsewhere. He has, however, also been entrusted with certain work in the interests of the Pontifical College, Pio Latino Americano.

Monsignor Grannan entered the Propaganda College in Rome in 1871. He was ordained in 1878, having taken the Doctor's degree in Philosophy and Theology at the Propaganda. He was Professor in the Theological Faculty of Mt. St. Mary's College, Emmitsburg, Md., for eight years. After that term of service he went to Europe where he studied for two years in Berlin and Paris, preparing for his work as Professor of

Scripture in the Catholic University of America. He taught in the University continuously for twenty years, from 1891 to the present year. He was Vice-Rector of the Catholic University for one year. During his term in Mt. St. Mary's College he was acting President for one year. He was one of the original twelve members of the Pontifical Biblical Commission. His appointment as Domestic Prelate to His Holiness last April terminates thus with fitting recognition an unusually long career in the work of Catholic education.

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